ML19351C793
| ML19351C793 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 07/02/1980 |
| From: | Donna Anderson, Breaux D, Hale C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19351C790 | List: |
| References | |
| REF-QA-99900509 IEB-79-04, IEB-79-14, IEB-79-4, NUDOCS 8010080081 | |
| Download: ML19351C793 (10) | |
Text
--
g) y_
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY POMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT REGION IV Report No. 99900509/80-02
. Program No. 51200 Company:
Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation P. O. Box 2325 Boston, Massachusetts Inspection at:
Boston, Massachusetts Inspection Conducted:
June 16-19, 1980 7///8b Inspectors:
d
-e D. G. Anderson, Principal Inspector
' Fate Program Evaluation Section Vendor Inspection Branch f
hh.
7///80
- 3. G. Breaux, Intern Inspector /
' Date Program Evaluation Section Vendor Inspection Branch Approved by-d/
7'2 0
C. J:Jian, Chief Date Program Evaluation Section Vendor Inspection Branch Summary Inspection on June 16-19, 1980 (99900509/80-02)
Areas Inspected:
Implementation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B criteria in the area of followup on regional requests. The inspection involved fifty-six (56), hours on site by two (2) USNRC inspectors.
Results:
In the area inspected, no deviations were identified.
One (1) unresolved item was identified.
Unresolved Item:
It appears that IE Bulletin 79-04/79-14 activities on the North Anna Unit 1 and 2 projects may not have been conducted according to written and approved procedures.
8 010080o 41
2 DETAILS SECTION (Prepared by D. G. Anderson and D. G. Breaux)
A.
Persons Contacted R. A. Bain, Engineering Mechanics Lead Engineer K. M. Bendiksen, Assistant Project Engineer
- W. H. Bohlke, Project Engineer R. G. Burns, Chief Quality Systems Engineer S. L. Chapin, Lead Electrical Engineer
- W. R. Curtis, Lead Engineering Assurance Engineer R. F. Deering, Electrical Engineer W. S. Diehl, Chief Engineer R. M. Dunne, Electrical Design Engineer F. H. Kucharski, Assistant Project Engineer S. Morss, Engineering Assurance Engineer P. Raysircar, Assistant Project Engineer G. M. Schierberg, Manager, Procurement Quality Assurance
- R. C. Tappan, Project Engineer J. A. Voelxen, Principal Nuclear Engineer
- Indicates attendance at the exit meeting.
B.
Followup on Regional Requests In this area of the inspection, four (4) regional requests related to items identified as 10 CFR 50.55(e) or as 10 CFR 21 reportable events and applicable to Stone and Webster were reviewed and evaluated by the inspector. Other items identified by Stone and Webster in problem reports and which could result in 10 CFR 21 reportable events were also reviewed and evaluated by the inspector for reportability.
In review-ing these items, the inspector assured that the following objectives were accomplished:
1.
Objectives r.
Determination of how the item was identified.
b.
That followup actions were conducted under the requirements and procedures of the Stone and Webster Quality Assurance Program.
Determination of the status of corrective action and preventive c.
action to assure that the item is satisfactorily resolved.
d.
Determination of the generic effects on other plants and notification of the affected utilities.
a i
i 3
Determination of the accuracy, applicability, and timeliness of e.
j reporting to the NRC.
2.
Method of Accomplishment, 3
The inspector reviewed the following Stone and Webster procedures which establish the requirements that implement the activities related to the identification, evaluation, notification and reporting i
of items which are tracked in the Problem Report system:
l QS-16.1, Stone and Webster Problem Report System, October 24, 1979.
QS-16.2, Notifying Clients of Potentially Reportable Deficiencies
]
Under 10 CFR 50.55(e), October 31, 1979.
l
'QS-16.3, Identifying and' Reporting Defects and Failures to Comply I
Under 10 CFR 21, October 31, 1979.
i EAP-16.1, Problem Report System, August 16, 1979.
EAP-16.2, Notifying Clients of Potentially Reportable Deficiencies Under 10 CFR 50.55(e), October 31, 1979.
EAP-16.3, Identifying and Reporting Defects and Failures to Comply j
Under 10 CFR 21, October 31, 1979.
The inspector verified the implementation of these procedures to 4
l assure that the following deficiencies meet the above noted objectives:
i a.
Main Steam Safety Relief Valve Seismic Reanalysis i
i This item was reported as an LER on March 25, 1980, by Duquesne l
Light Company for Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 1.
In the original analysis of the main steam piping, occasional loads had been inadvertently omitted frca the analysis.
While conducting a reanalysis of the seismic pipe stress on main steam piping, Stone and Webster determined that for certain Operational Basis a
Earthquake (OBE) conditions, long-term criteria allowable stress levels may be exceeded in the headers that support the main steam safety valves because of this omission.
l The inspector reviegt? ett following documentation relating to this item to assure that the inspection objectives have been met:
(1) Problem Report IPR 50589, Main Steam Piping Overstress Due To Safety Relief Valve Discharge Forces, 3/26/80.
(2) Final Safety Analysis Report, Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 1, Amendment 1, Response to Question 5.8.4 and 3.23, 4/23/73.
4 (3) Calculations: Job Book 5-4.
11700-RP-1B-6, Main Steam Safety Valve Stress Analysis Duiing Actuation, 8/11/72.
11700-NP(B)-048-FIB, Main Steam Safety Valve Blowdown, 4/24/80.
11700.34-NP(B)-3063, Main Steam Outside Containment / Stress Summary, 6/9/80.
12690.89-PH-1, Discharge Lines on Main Steam Relief Valves, 3/12/80.
(4) Drawings :
12690.89-S-121, 122, and 123, Structural Embedment-Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 1, 6/17/80.
12690.89-SK-P1-2, Main Steam Safety Valve Modification / Main Steam Valve House, 6/9/80.
(5) Computer Code Runs:
NUPIPE/R2069034/722/(1/22/80)
NUPIPE/R2069045/17/(6/5/80)
STRUDL/R2069035/2761/(6/12/80)
(6) Memoranda:
DLS-15865, Main Steam System Piping Analysis / Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 1, 3/25/80.
Part 21, 10 CFR21 Second Review for Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 1, Main Steam Piping System Outside Containment, 6/16/80.
Positive 10 CFR 21 Determination, 6/13/80.
10 CFR 21 Determination (negative), 6/18/80.
Results:
This problem was not applicable to other Stone and Webster projects.
The discharge vents from the Main Steam Safety Relief valves are fabricated from thin walled piping and because occasional load were not considered, could not meet the additional loads imposed by jet impingement, and seismic.
Corrective action has been taken and relates to redesign of the main steam safety relief valve discharge vents with a reanalysis to assure that the redesign meets the combined loads.
The new vents and anchors and supports for the vents will be installed during the present outage at Beaver Valley, Unit 1.
b.
Cable Tray Vertical Separation Discrepancy This item was identified by an NRC inspector during IE Inspection l
5 Nos. 50-412/79-09 and 50-322/79-07, and relates to a failure to maintain the required (SAR commitment) vertical separation between safety related cable trays.
The inspector reviewed the following documantation relating to this item to assure that the inspection objectives have been met:
(1) Problem Report:
IPR 50562, Cable Tray Barrier Requirements for Final Drawings, 3/5/80.
(2) Project Procedure:
2BVM-41, Criteria for Design and Identi-fication of Electrical Cable and Raceway Systems, 6/11/80.
(3) Drawings:
12241-RE-34G-5G, 12241-RE-34D-4C, and 12241-RE-34F-2C, Cable Tray Arrangement-Cable Tunnel Auxiliary Building, 1/15/80.
12241-RE-34AH-5A, and 12241-RE-34AG-80, Cable Tray Arrange-ment, Rod Concrol Building 1/15/80 and 4/25/80.
12241-RE-34B-5E, Cable Tray Arrangement Instrumentation and Communications Room Control Building, 1/15/80.
(4) Final Safety Analysis Report, Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, Section 3.12.3.5.2.
(5) Preliminary Safety Analysis Report, Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 2, Volume 4, Amendment 9, Section 8.S.I.a. and Volume 12, Questions 8.14(5) and 8.18, Amendment 4.
(6) Engineering and Design Change Notices:
F-18181, Cable Separation Deficiencies, 2/6/79.
F-17862, Cable Separation Deficiencies, 1/23/79.
F-13631, Cable Separation Deficiencies, S/31/78.
F-21086, Cable Separation Deficiencies, S/23/79.
F-12752, Cable Separation Deficiencies, 4/17/78.
F-13072, Cable Separation Deficiencies, 5/1/78.
F-17355, Cable Separation Deficiencies, 12/16/78.
F-17471, Cable Separation Deficiencies, 1/6/79.
F-17571, Cable Separation Deficiencies, 1/11/79.
F-17833, Cable Separation Deficiencies, 1/19/79.
F-17834, Cable Separation Deficiencies, 1/22/79.
F-17861, Cable Separation Deficiencies, 1/23/79.
F-17968, Cable Separation Deficiencies, 2/1/79.
F-18178, Cable Separation Deficiencies, 1/31/79.
F-18179, Cable Separation Deficiencies, 1/31/79.
F-18180, Cable Separation Deficiencies, 2/1/79.
F-18182, Cable Separation Deficiencies, 2/6/79.
F-18263, Cable Separation Deficiencies, 2/8/79.
r 6
F-18416, Cable Separation Deficiencies, 2/13/79.
F-19726, Cable Separation Deficiencies, 3/29/79.
F-20359, Cable Separation Deficiencies, 4/28/79 F-17091, Cable Sept. ration Deficiencies, 12/12/78.
Results: This item was identified by an NRC inspector at Shoreham (IE Inspection Report 50-322/79-07) and at Beaver Valley 2 (IE Inspection Report 50-412/79-09) and is presently being evaluated for generic applicability to other projects by the S&W. The SAR for both Shoreham and Beaver Valley allow the use of missile barriers for separation of cable trays where the minimum separa-tion criteria is deviated from.
Corrective action for the cable separation deficiencies will include the installation of missile barriers in lieu of meeting the cable separation criteria as well as updating all drawings where changes have been made. All drawing changes were completed on January 15, 1980.
Beaver Valley Project Procedure 2BVM-41 was revised on June ll, 1980, to require a final review of all safety related cable tray drawings for conformance to missile barrier requirements.
This final review will be documented and include a list of safety related systems requiring final review.
c.
Biologicsl Shteld Wall Welding Defects This item was identified during surveillance activities by Stone and Webster QC inspectors and reported to the NRC as a potential reportable deficiency by Niagra Mohawk Power Corporation for Nine Mile Point, Unit 2, under the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55(e) on April 15, 1980. Numerous defects in the welds of the Diological Shield Wall were identified. The inspector reviewed the following documentation relating to this item to assure that the inspection objectives have been met:
(1)
Specification:
NMP 2-5204G, Specification for Biological Shield Wall, July 14, 1977, and Addendum 1, January 15, 1979.
(2)
NRC Notification Report, Nine Mile Point Unit, May 30, 1979.
Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation /NRC Notification Report Followup on Biological Shield Wall Welding Defects. April i
15, 1980.
(3) Memoranda:
9M 2-8289, Biological Shield Wall /Nine Mile Point, Unit 2, March 18, 1980.
Results:
Stone and Webster takes credit for the fact that this 1
7 item was identified by their own QC inspectors and that subsequent NDE/UT examination by Stone and Webster resulted in the identifi-cation of other defects in the welds of the biological shield wall.
Stone and Webster feels that the massive (1 inch plate) pie shaped sections fabricated by Cives and welded under stress con-dicions at the site resulted in subsequent crack formations in welds attaching the horizontal concentric stiffeners to the inner shield walls.
The pie shaped sections had to be jacked into place in order for weld closure to be achieved.
Stone and Webster indi-cated that the NRC has informed them that this item may be generic to other BWR's.
Stone and Webster directed the CB&I repair of the biological shield wall and monitored and reviewed all NDE/UT records.
Stone and Webster has made presentations to the NRC concerning this item and has submitted an interim report, a second interim report, and will followup on these with their final report on August 1, 1980. Since this item is for a project under contract to the Stone and Webster Cherry Hill Office, further review of this item by NRC/VIB will be conducted during Cherry Hill office inspections in the future.
d.
Weld Build-Up on Class 1, 2, and 3 Nuclear Piping Sub-assemblies This item concerns a manufacturing practice examined during a Region IV, VIB inspection (Report No. 99900701/80-01). During the inspection in the area of Manufacturing Process Control of Power Piping Company of Pittsburgh, PA., who have a Stone and Webster contract to supply nuclear class 1, 2, and 3 piping sub-assemblies for Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No. 2; examina-tion of pipe stool fabrication disclosed that the majority of pipe weld preparations were built-up with weld metal.
The 0
build-up is adjacent to the weld preparation and extends 360 around the outside diameter (OD) and is several inches wide.
In the 99900701/80-01 inspection report the NRC inspector's concern of this manufacturing practice was as follows:
(1)
It would appear that the shoulder of the weld may interfere with the volumetric in-service ultrasonic inspection, if the contact method was utilized.
(2) That there would be the possibility of a wide band of sensitization on the ID of the pipe on AISI type 304 and 316 stainless pipe of wall thickness less than one (1) inch as a result of the heat input from the weld build-tp on the OD.
I
,e 8
(3) That unless specific instructions are issued to check mater-ial thickness at the end of the counterbore, the minimum wall requirement could be exceeded, since controlled drawings, SK-101 and SK-103 do not specify a maximum depth for the counter bore operation.
The inspector reviewed the following documentation related to this item.
(1) Memo DLC-SQCL No. 0619, Job 1*241 (Beaver Valley Power i
Station Unit No. 2) dated March 18, 1980, NRC Investigc-tion 80-02 at Power Piping-Donora, PA.
(2) Telephone Memo between Stone and Webster and Duquesne Light Company dated May 22, 1980.
1 (3) Report of a Problem Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No. 2, dated May 30, 1980, Recire Spray System, Pipe Spool.
(4) Letter dated April 16, 1980, No. DL8004230052 from Duquesne Light Company to United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I, Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No. 2 Docket NO. 50-412, USNRC IE Inspection Report No. 50-412/80-02.
Results (1) The licensee's response to the Region Inspection included the following:
(a) With respect to unresolved item titled Counterbore Tolerances (Longitudinal), Duquesne Light responded concerning the maximum counterbore depth that they had obtained information from Power Piping who had revised drawings SR-101 and SR-103 to give a maximum depth of counterbore along the longitudinal axis so the counterbore will not extend beyond the OD weld buildup in the future.
Duquesne Light had also been advised that instructions were given to all assigned personnel who had performed inspections that minimum i
wall verifications receive particular attention during and after grinding of the weld surface.
(b)
In the area of corrective action initiation in response to the USNRC Region I inspection 50-412/80-02 of Power Piping Company, Duquesne Light advised the NRC that they had convened a meeting at the Beaver Valley Unit No. 2
9 site with their engineers and Power Piping in order to review the problems in detail and lay out a course of action to be taken by Power Piping as an initial cor-rective action phase.
(2) The Project Engineer and engineers of Stone and Webster who were closely involved in addressing the concerns responded with the following information for clarification.
(a) The response to possible interference to ultrasonic inspection by the transition from weld overlay to pipe 0.D. surface was in documented Duquesne Light's response to Region I, IE inspection No. 50-412/80-02.
Regarding fabrications that had been completed in the past, Duquesne Light Company have been advised by Power Piping Company that the area of concern is subject to some form of grinding to assure a smooth transition.
(b)
In response to the same concern, Stone and Webster engineers concurred that there was post weld grinding and surfacing of the weld overlay.
Surface from shoulder of weld overlay to the pipe Butt-weld is sufficiently surfaced for adequate contact for ultra-sonic testing.
(c)
In response to the concern of sensitization of the ID of the pipe as a result of the heat input from the weld build-up on the OD, Stone and Webster engineers stated that no mett.llurgical study had been initiated as a result of the concern.
Sensitization was being minimized by in-shop weld processes.
These processes minimize localized heat build-up in weld zone.
(3) Stone and Webster's processing of this item is consistent with their approved procedures.
3.
Findings In this area of the inspection, no deviatione from commitment were identified.
The following unresolved item was identified:
The VIB inspectors were ompanied oc this inspection by inspectors from Region ?
.o reviewed site activities conducted 4
by Stone and Webster on t_m 7'PCo projects, particularly North Anna, Units 1 and 2.
The Re, ion II inspectors were following up on IE Bulletins 79-04 and 79-14, and identified, in the area of incorrect
10 valve weight review, a possible deviation relating to Stone and Webster's conducting these activities without proper procedural control. We will follow-up on this item during the next scheduled inspection by conducting a generic inspection in the area of Follow-up on IE Bulletin Review by Stone and Webster.
C.
Exit Meeting An exit meeting was conducted with management representatives of Stone and Webster at the conclusion of the inspection on June 19, 1980.
Those individuals indicated by an asterisk in Section A of the Details Section of this report were in attendance.
In addition, the following were also present:
F. B. Baldwin, Assistant QA Manager N. B. Cleveland, Vice President, Quality Assurance W. B. Dodson, Project Engineer J. W. Kelly, QA Program Administrator R. B. Kelly, Manager, Quality Assurance L. D. Nace, Chief Engineer, Engineering Assurance Division A. L. Van Sickel, Chief Engineer, Engineering Mechanics Division The inspector discussed the scope and findings identified during 3
this inspection.
Management representatives present acknowledged the comments of the inspector related to the results of the inspection.
i
,