ML19350E826

Forwards Draft Operations Procedure - Administrative (21.000.12), Verification of Correct Performance of Operating Activities, as Requested by E Pederson

ML19350E826
Person / Time
Site:	Fermi
Issue date:	06/19/1981
From:	Colbert W DETROIT EDISON CO.
To:	Kintner L Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
EF2-53-804, NUDOCS 8106230557
Download: ML19350E826 (6)

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Mr. L. L. Kintner Division of Project Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation United States Nuclear Regulatory Cam 11ssion Washington, D. C.

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Reference:

Enrico Fermi Atanic Power Plant Unit 2 NRC Docket No. 50-341

Subject:

Procedure for Verification of Correct Performance of Operating Activities Enclosed herewith is one (1) draft copy of Operations Procedure -

Administrative (No. 21.000.12), Verification of Correct Perform-ance of Operating Activities as requested by Mr, Erick Pederson.

Sincerely, f/d/ -

William F. Colbert Technical Director Fermi 2 Project Enclosure

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21.000.12 y

ENRICO FERMI ATOMIC POWER PLANT UNIT NO. 2 Type: OPERATIONS PROCEDURE - ADMINISTRATIVE i

Title:

VERIFICATION OF CORRECT PERF0rJ4ANCE OF OPERATING ACTIVITIES RECORD OF APPROVAL AND CHANCES Prepared by Jerry Humphreys 6/19/81 Date Submitted by Section Head Date Recommended by OSRO Chairman Date Recommended by Q/A Engineer Date Approved by Plant Superintendent Date Revision OSRO QA Plant Supt.

No.

Recosumended Date Recoaumended Date Approved Date 1

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21.000.12 Rev. O TABLE OF CONTENTS D

1.0 Purpose...................

1 2.0 References.

1 3.0 Procedure.

2 3.1 Requirements for Independent Verification During Removal from Service for Maintenance 2

of Testing. '

3.2 Requirements for Independent' Verification During Temporary Modifications.

3 3.3 Requirements for Independent Verification When Returning Systems to Service After Maintenance or Testing (other than Surveillat.ee Tosting)..

3 3.4 Requirreents for Independent Verification Wher. Returning Equipsient to Service Following Survedilance Testing.

3 3.5 Applicability of Independant Verification Requirements.

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21.000.12 Rev. 0 Page 1 1.0 Purpose 1.1 The purpose of this procedure is to define the requirements for independent verification of correct performarce of operating activities. This procedure is applicable to systems important to nuclear safety when such systems are removed from service for maintenance-or testing, when temporary modifications are made to such systems, or when such systema are returned to service.

4 Activities such as removing equipment from service, surveillance testing, and making temporary modifications are conducted in accordance with written procedures which are intended to assure that the activities are performed correctly and that necessary systems and equipment important to nuclear safety are available to perform their safety function in accordance with Technical Specification requirements. - In order to provide additional assurance (over and above that provided by the procedural control discussed above) that systems are properly returned to service, an independent verification of these activities will be done when functional tests to prove operability cannot be performed.

Independent verification will generally not be performed when doing so would result in significant radiation exposure.

2.0 References 2.1 Administrative Procedure - General, 12.000.12, Tagging and Protective Barrier System 2.2 Administrative Procedure - General, 12.000.15, Maintenance 2.3 Administrative Procedure - General, 12.000.18, Survelliance Program 2.4 Administrative Procedure - General, 12.000.25, Temporary Modifications Procedure 2.5 Administrative Procedure - General, 12.000.41, Work Packages i

2.6 Operations Procedure - Administraitve, 21.000.01, Shift l

Operations and Control Room 2.7 Operations Procedure - System, 23.628.01, Engineered Safety Features Status Display System 2.8 Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant Unit 2, FSAR, Appendix H, Section H.I.C.6, Verify Correct Performance of Operating Activities

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21.000.12 Rev. 0 Page 2 3.0 Procedure 3.1 Requirements for Indepeudent Verification During Removal from Service for Maintenance or Testing 3.1.1 When systems important to nuclear safety are removed from service for maintenance or testing, independent verification shall be performed to the extent necessary to assure that the proper system has been removed from q

service, and not some other system or train which is still required to be in service.

3.1.2 Independent verification is normally performed by independently checking the tagging, if applicable, although indirect means such as observation of indicators and status lights may be used.

3.1.3 Independent verification will be done prior to starting work by a qualified operator. This operator need not be licensed.

3.1.4 Documentation of this verification will be accomplished by the Nuclear Supervising Operator (NS0) entering the name of the person performing the verification on the originating document requiring the system to be removed from service. The individual performing the verifica-tion is responsible for informing the NSO as to when the verification is complete.

3.1.5 Any part or all of the independent verification of the.

removal of a system from service may be waived by the Nuclear Shif t Supervisor. (NSS) if the verification requires an entry into a High Radiation Area that would not otherwise be made. The waiving of the independent verification will be documented by the NSS so indicating on the document requiring the system to be removed from service.

i 3.1.6 Independent verification shall be performed prior to starting a maintenance or testing activity on a nuclear safety system that is removed from service. This verification should be performed as soon as possible after removing the system from service and shall be performed no later than 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> after the removal is complete.

3.1.7 The above procedure for independent verification of activities during removal from service of systems important to nuclest safety is in addition to the e

procedural requirements of References 2.1 through 2.7.

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' Page 3 3.2 Requirements for Independent. Verification During Temporary Modifications 3.2.1 Temporary modifications are performed and independently verified:in accordance with Administrative Procedure -

General, 12.000.25, Temporary Modifications Procedure.

This procedure (12.000.25) provides the details of the independent verification for installation and removal

-of temporary modifications.

3.3 Requirements for Independent Verification When Returning Systems to Service After Maintenance or Testing (other than Surveillance Testing) 3.3.1 When a system important to nuclear safety is returned to service from maintenance, a surveillance test is first performed if a Technical Specification operabili-ty requirement is involved. Therefore, the requirement for independent verification when returning a nuclear safety system to service af ter maintenance or testing 4

is satisfied by the independent verification requiremants in Section 3.4 of this procedure (Independent Verification When Returning Equipment to Service Following Survellance Testing).

3.4 Requirements for Independent Verification When Returning Equipment to Service Following Surveillance Testing 3.4.1 When a system important to nuclear safety is returned to service following Surveillance Testing, the appli-cable Surveillance Test Procedure will provide the final alignment requirements which must be independent-ly verified. Only those valves, dampers, breakers or switches affected by the test need.to be verified.

In addition, the removal of jumpers installed in accord-ance with the Surveillance Test Procedure will be verified.

3.4.2 Independent verification need not be performed if all the valves, dampers, breakers, or switches, involved in the activity can be proven to be in their correct alignment by functional testing without adversely affe-*.ing the safety of the plant or if the independent verification would require entry into a High Radiation Area. This also applies to the verification of the removal of jumpers. The waiving of the independent verification will be the responsibility of the Nuclear Shif t Supervisor. He will document his waiving of the indpendent verification by so indicating on the i

alignment verification sheet included in the applicable Surveillance Test Procedure.

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.l 21.000.12 Rev. O Page 4 3.4.3 Independent verifications will be performed by a quali-fied individual. This individual may be a qualified non-licensed operator, a licensed operator or-a certt-fied individual from the group responsible for perform-ing the Surveillance Test Procedure.

3.4.4 Independent verification will be documented by the signature of the qualified individual on the alignment verification sheet included in the applicable Surveil-lance Test Procedure.

3.4.5 Independent verification should be performed as soon as possible and shall be performed no later than 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> after the testing is complete.

3.5 Applicability of Independent Verification Requirements 4

3.5.1 The independent verification requirements discussed above apply only when the plant is in (or about to enter) an operating mode when the affected nuclear safety system is required to be operable. For exemple, during an outage, it would not be required to indepen-dently verify valving changes on a system which was not required to be operable, provided that the final system alignment was independently verified before the plant was returned to service.

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