ML19350D712
| ML19350D712 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 09/12/1980 |
| From: | Ahearne J NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8105180438 | |
| Download: ML19350D712 (25) | |
Text
<
Progress in Nuclear Energy The international Resiew Journal cosering all aspects of Nuclear Energy Volume 7 Number 2 1981 Contents L M. MrsTzisc 73 The future of nuclear power in the United States J. AllEARNE 77 Nuclear power: A Greek traceds !
H. WG.LFORD 87 Strengthening the management of the nuclear regulatory commission M. K. UoALL 93 A legislator's slew of the nuclear option F. W. LEWIS 103 Nuclear regulation after Three Mile Island E. L ZrBROSKI 111 Scope and functions of the U.S. nuclear safe:; anal.ssis center E P Wp.gissOs 119 Inpo... the nuclear man-machine interface K. HOLLISTER 125 Financial support for nuclear power plants
\\\\ f I i
y*"'
}\\
$l,
~a a
.'r
\\
isp p-Sf,'d 'c.,
A l
y
.Q r l
<<lj,gt\\
ISBN 0 08 0271391 ISSN 0079-6530 Trp* set by Cotswold Treesettong Ltd. Gioucester and pronted in Great Britson at Aberdeen Unrversity Press 4}Q l
810518ojj3g
John F. Ahearne S:ptember 12, 1980 Nuclear Power:
A Greek Tragedy?
1.
INTRODUCTION In this paper I will try to outline the present state and expected future of nuclear power and its. regulation in the United States.
As I explained to the Editors of this edition, I have no special expert knowledge on which to base these views.
However, they asked me to provide my views from having been a member of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission during the past two years.
This has been an eventful time for the Comission, encompassing the Three Mile Island accident, its reviews, and its initial impacts. When appointed to the Commission, I was described as a swing vote, the so-called moderate on a Comission which at that time had been described as split two-to-two.
Since the departure of a fifth comissioner in June,1980, the Comission once again is described as stalemated and we again await the arrival of a fifth comissioner, who is described as a moderate.
Prior to coming J
to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission I did not have a background in the development of nuclear power or in the environmental movement, the tvo areas from which most strong proponents and opponents come.
My experience, and therefore the perspective from which I will attempt to view nuclear power present and future, is that of an analyst and a minor participant in establishing United States Federal Government policy.
(This policy had been for national security and, in the early stages of the current Administration, energy planning.)
(Submitted to: PROGRESS E NUCLEAR ENERGY)
Volume 7, Number 2, New Series,1981
2 The two major influences on the nuclear regulatory environment in the United States, outside of the Three Mile Island accident, are the legak profession and the Congress.
In the following I will examine 'the increasing influence of lawyers and the diverse and increasing interaction with the Congress. Over the next decade these will dominate the approach taken by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission and, to the extent that the NRC is a major factor in the fe'ure of nuclear power in the United States, be a significant influence upon where nuclear po'wer goes in the United States. Other writers in this edition will address additional factors influencing nuclear power.
I only present what I see to be the role of the NRC and the effect of. regulatory requirements.
Thus, I do not attenpt to forecast new technology, in particular, breakthroughs in breeder development, nor do I attempt to estimate the need for either nuclear power or electric generating capacity.
I will mention these briefly as influences upon the NRC, but will not attempt to analyze or predict their actual growth or decline.
I do not intend to minimize their perhaps dominant role in the future of nuclear power but leave that to appropriate writert > n 'his edition.
In addition, I do not intenc ? ir
,, that the NRC and regulatory requirements are the most important factors gotarning the future of nuclear power in the United States.
I write from the p;r pective of the
. Nuclear Regulatory Commission af and concentrate on the.r?le of regulation a/
However, the views are mine alone and do not represent the official
~
views of the Commission.
3 and the impact of regulation. The fundamental mission of the Regulatory Commission is to provide " adequate protection for the health and safety of the public" 1/ in the regulated use of nuclear power for the commercial generation of electricity. The NRC is neither an advocate for the development of nuclear power nor a devil's advocate against such develop-or, rather, its mission is not to be such.
There are rany who ment have argued over whether or not that is the case.
This argument has led to a recent statement in a Congressional Report 2/ stating "... [T]he Committee is not providing funds to the Commission so it can decide whether nuclear energy should or should not continue to be developed.
The Congress has already decided that nuclear energy can and should be d;veloped...
The Committee directs the Commission to carry out the Congressionally-approved policy that mandates the continued and ex-peditious development of nuclear energy." The Commission attempts to insure that the design, construction, and operation of commercial nuclear power plants provide that adequate protection called for by the law.
2.
THE LEGAL PROFESSION The first conclusion I reach from my two years on the Commission is that the primary factor affecting nuclear reactor regulation will be the growing influence of lawyers. The Regulatory Commission is basically a legal body.
It operates under regulations written to carry out the mandate of the previously quoted law.
The procedures of the Commission have a semi-judicial framework, including a licensing board, an appellate
4 review board, and the Commissioners sitting as a final board.
The continuing growth in the roles of lawyers and in the legal procedures used by the Commission will be the dominant influence in the next decade.
2.1 Previous Approach Nuclear reactors in the United States have been regulated using engineering judgment. The AEC gradually developed a regulatory philosophy.
A regulatory group was formed in the AEC to implement that philosophy.
When the Nuclear Regulatory Commission was formed, this regulatory group became the NRC and retained this fundamental philosophy.
The approach taken was that traditionally used to control a complex technology. A body of competent nuclear engineers and other technologists argued through what they perceived to be the major technical issues with designers, builders, architects, and constructors of nuclear power plants. This interchange of views amongst essentially tec,hnical equals is the way regulation had developed for other complex technologies, such as the aircraft industry and, to a lesser extent, the automobile industry.
Several characteristics of such a philosophy are difficult to translate into a formal legal framework. These are the use of subjective judgment based upon experience, or intuition gained through experience, and a willingness to carry on the negotiations and the discussions on a technical level which presumes a uniform base of technical knowledge and therefore does not, either in spoken word or written records, re-quire discussion of basic engineering knowledge.
- The reviews of the Three Mile Island accident conducted by the Presidential Commission, the NRC Special Inquiry Group, and the Congress 9
9
~
5 have faulted this approach and criticized it as being inexplicable and fundamentally flawed.
I do not wish to argue here the correctness of their conclusions, only to note that they have all concluded that the use of this engineering judgment approach to reactor regulation is unacceptable. This. approach was found wanting in three specific areas:
(1)
It placed little reliance on the plant personnel who operate ano maintain power reactors.
One effect was to permit control rooms which complicate an operator's problems in handling abnormal l
situations.
(2)
By concluding reactors were well designed, this approach eventually minimized instrumentation to follow severe accidents, because
" accidents couldn't happen." 3/
(3)
Having resolved issues based on mutual technical under-sta'nding, there was little explanation for a layperson as to what were the issues and how were they resolved.
Furthennore, there was no detailed record to verify compliance with NRC requirements.
2.2 Future Approach The Commission currently is considering requiring every licensee to review its plant, both those currently operating and those in the review process, to determine whether the plant conforms with every Comission regulation, Regulatory Guide, or Branch Technical position. All devi-ations are to be documented, explained, and justified by a safety analysis.
This trend will continue until the Commission regulations become a checklist and the process of licensing or reviewing a plant will con-stitute verifying that the checklist is satisfied.
This will provide 9
S l
6 tight legal proof the regulations are met.
Unfortunately, this may not be a sound approach to the regulation of a complex technology. a/
I believe that further development in the approach taken by the NRC will be to increase the number of explicit legal requirements to which a licensee is sub &.t and to increase the use of formal proceedings to test whether or not the licensee has met these requirements.
This trend can be seen in the approach currently being taken in which the Commission hcs set up a licensing board to review the Indian Point reactors currently operating outside of New York City, basically to determine whether or not they should be shut down, and 'in the Commission's recent decisions which will lead to consideration of a broad class of issues in essentially a relicensing hearing for the undamaged Three Mile Island Unit i reactor.
In both cases the issues are not to be resolved by engineering or scientific reviews, but by legal proceedings.
2.3 A trend in the U. S. Government This growth in the impact of the legal profession stems from three factors:
it is a trend in the Unit'ed States Government, it allows young people to be effective, and it increases the role of the courts.
Over the last few years there has been an increased interest in the United States Executive Branch in addressing issues from a legal perspective.
This can be found in the Energy Department, the Environmental Protection Agency, af Many observers have questioned the increasing legalism: "The nuclear power plant licensing procedure seems increasingly to be a drama.
... It is a lawyers' game.... Nuclear plant safety is much too important a matter to leave to lawyers." 4f
7 and other agencies whose role has grown in the last five years. United States' Administrations have encouraged a legal aoproach to problems rather than a technical approach. This country is governed by laws, but in the past
' the role of law has been to establish a general framework in which policies were developed and programs implemented.
Recently the trend has been to establish policies and specify programs within the legal framework. This could be seen when in 1977 the new Administration announced a National Energy plan j/ which was embodied primarily in a comprehensive National Energy Act j/, proposed at the time of the announcement of the Plan. The Administration chose to propose to implement much of i.ts energy policy by means of specific laws which were to be enacted by the Congress.
(As have several other bills introduced in the last few years, this was renamed by critics as the Lawyers Unem-ployment Act, be:ause of the difficulty of understanding some of its provisions.)
The Congress has assisted, in the increased requirements placed on the Executive Branch through annual Authorization and even Appropriation Bills. The Congress has not chosen to address what should be the general policy regarding nuclear power and has not chosen in recent years to attempt to address explicitly what role nuclear power should play in the national energy plan.
Instead, the Congress has fought battles on such items as should there be a six month moratorium on licensing or how should emergency planning requirements be placed within the regulations gove'rning issuance of an operating license. This growth of the influence 6
e
8 of 1'egal procedures on regulatory policy also coincides with the growth and influence of the Council on Environmental Quality, led by some very bright lawyers.
2.4 Law, a route for youth A second, not unrelated, factor is that by means of legal procedures young people can have significant impact upon the Federal Government or upon large industry.
Ralph Nader exemplifies an individual who can change the system. He typifies a bright young person who by diligent application of legal procedures can have significant impact on national policy. Many of the brightest people in college conclude they should follow law in order to have such an impact early in their life.
In order to have significant impact from the development of technical competence, one ordinarily must spend many years developing that tech-nical competence and then spend an additional large number of years developing a thorough understanding of some specific area in which 'that technical knowledge is applied. After perhaps ten or twenty years, such an individual can rise to a sufficiently high position in either industry or the Federal Government that he or she can begin to have major influence upon policies or programs. On the other hand, a bright young lawyer can begin using the legal system to significantly affect the same policies and programs two or three years out of law school.
In general, such an impact requires not much more than perhaps one year becoming superficially familiar with the technology involved and perhaps an additional year learning the nuances of the particular laws appropriate to that agency or that area. Thereupon an individual can have significant influence using legal skills.
It is not difficult to see why much of our national intellectual resource is going into the legal profession.
Having done
~
9
~
so, it is then easy to understand why the legal profession is of growing influence. 'This is seen in the small world of nuclear reactor regulation.
2.5 ' Role of the Courts Finally, increased use of law in nuclear reactor regulation mirrors the growing influence of the courts.
At one time, the court system was used to address procedural wrongs. This has begun to change. These changed attitudes of the courts are seen in an article 7/ by Judge David Bazelon of the U. S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (where many of the appeals made to NRC decisions are taken). He wrote:
" Courts, standing outside both scientific and political debates can help to make sure the decision-makers articulate the basis for their decisions.
This role does not require, as some have suggested, that the courts intrude excessively into the agencies processes."
In a later article 8/, he expanded on the role' he sees for courts:
"I believe that the judicial responsibility is to moniter and scrutinize the administrative process. Our task is to ensure that the agency's decision-making is thorough and within the bounds of reason.
The agency's decisional record must disclose the evidence heard, policies considered, and the agency's pre-cise reasons for resolving conflicts in the evidence. This includes the basis for selecting one scientific point of view rather than another."
i i
10 There are some judges who argue the other side of this activist trend af but they appear to be dwindling in number.
- In the area of nuclear regulation these three influences combine as bright young people use a growing number of laws to argue skillfully in the courts.
I do not know whether this will lead to improved reactor regulation or merely increased reactor regulation.
I do believe it is the trend of the future, and as Jonathan Swift wrote: 10/
... [L]aws are best explained, interpreted, and applied by those whose interest and abilities lie in perverting, confounding, and eluding them..."
3.
CONGRESS A second major effect is the changing role of the Congress.
The Congress did play a major role in the direction of the AEC and then of the NRC during the time of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (a Committee composed of members of both the House of Representatives and the United States Senate).
This joint Committee was definitely in favor of the development of nuclear power, unsympathetic to requests by inter-venors or environmental groups for a slow-down or a more careful review of issues, and a dominant influence on the policies of the AEC.
a/
Another D. C. Circuit Judge wrote:
"I believe the judges should retrench from their disposition to act as the final arbiters
~~
of the public good.
We should, I think, be more reluctant than we have been to fault the other agencies of government and, also, more hesitant in filling the void when, in our judgment, the elected branches of government should have acted and failed." 9/
~
11 3.1 Present NRC Oversight With the demise of the Joint Comittee, the NRC has found itself regulated by at least eight oversight committees.
Several are active comittees whose members and, in particular, staff devote substantial time to reviewing policies of the NRC and providing either strong advice or specific direction as to what we should or should not do.
The members and staff of other oversight comittees spend much less time reviewing our actions, except on the few occasions in which an area becomes of major interest to the committees. And finally, there are comittees whose attention turns to us only at a few specific times of the, year.
As is not unusual in current Congressional / Executive Branch relations, these committees do not all see issues the same way.
Some of our over-sight comittees are neutral to anti-nuclear. Their thrust is to increase regulatory requirements and to require the NRC to increase scrutiny of and penalties imposed upon licensees.
Other committees are neutral to pro-nuclear, as is evidenced by the previous quote from the Appropriations Committee. This leads to difficulties for both the staff and the Comission as we attempt to respond to the guidance and direction given by committees with conflicting views.
Understandably, we are not provided infinite resources. We are usually forced to attempt a compromise and meet both sets of guidance in a manner which often satisfies neither committee.
In addition to the committees which are increasingly aggressive in their overview of the NRC, the Congress has an organization, the General Accounting Office, whose role is to examine, investigate, analyze, and report back to the Congress on any activity of the Executive Branch or i
independent agencies which the Congress wishes investigated.
Because of
12 the size of the GA0 staff, they are also able to initiate investigations on their own. Currently, GA0 has about 25 personnel assigned to reviewing theNRC.a/ Over the five years of existence of the NRC, the GA0 has averaged a little less than one report a month on one facet or another of the NRC.
And, finally, as a result of the Three Mile Island tecid;;+,,
the President set up a Nuclear Safety Oversight Committee whose function is to oversee the workings of the NRC on behalf of the Executive Branch.
The Commissioners and NRC staff are invited to attend hearings of this committee which, although congenial, still has as its fundamental role criticizing the NRC and providing recommendations to us, to the President, and to the Congress as to how we should act.
3.2 Increased Interest in Detail Congress has also become more interested in the details of what agencies do. This has been true in the case of the NRC. When regula-9 tory agencies were originally established, there was some consideration on the part of Congress that these agencies were to follow regulatory details that Congress with the then limited staf t would not be able to.
Congress now has a substantial staff and staff and members have little difficulty getting quite specific in the details that are followed.
For example, the Chairman of one Congressional subcommittee, who has been active in seeking Congressional review of each regulation promulgated' by Federal agencies, recently explained his approach:
"The people of the United States, through their elected officials, ought to have the As of September 2,1980, the GA0 had 17 active audits addressing a/
various aspects of NRC operations, involving 46 GA0 staff members.
~
13 final say-so about regulations which have the form and effect of law." 11/
There also has been an increased interest in bypassing the senior manage-ment of the agency and getting information directly from lower staff l evel s.
(As an example, recently the Chairman of one of our oversight committees wrote to a GS-14, who is an Assistant Director in a Division of an Office of the Commission, bypassing four layers of management, with such questions as what are his views on actions taken by a licensee and what recommendations would he make to the subcommittee for the future direction of the progran. in which he works.)
3.3 Future Role Will this increased Congressional involvement begin to converge?
Will it lead to a Congressional consensus that nuclear power either should be relied on or discounted? Will the Congress set some specific standards with respect to other generation sources, for example, as a comparative risk with respect to coal? Will the various committees decide to eliminate jurisdictional conflicts so that we would have a reduced number of Congressional masters to serve?
I doubt it.
I see instead an increased interest on the part of members of the different committees to become involved in the work of the NRC and, in particular, to become involved in a way that is critical.
It is very difficult to spend much time reviewing and then to compliment an agency, whether or not that agency deserves being complimentec t is far more likely that a review will focus upon something about which one could be critical, if for'no other reason that criticism can lead to proposed changes and therefore can lead to the Congress believing that they have had a positive j
O O
w
p impact. Unfortunately, the effect at times may not be positive, but it definitely will be an impact.
4.
' FUTURE OF NUCLEAR POWER
',.1 Growth Estimates
~
Where is nuclear power going? At least, where do I see it going from a regulatory perspective? Three y ars ago, the Administration attempted to justify cancellation of the Clinch River Breeder Reactor on economic grounds.
In doing so, the Administration presented to the Con';ress a chart showing the drop in projected demand for nuclear pnwer in the year 2000 (Table 1).12f As can be seen, there was a dramatic fall-off, leading to a 1977 estimate of 380 megawatts in the year 2000.
This estimate also predicted apK=imately 125 megawatts in the year 1985.
These estimates were harshly criticized as being self-serving, and as attempting to mislead those neutral' on the Clinch River issue. The argument was made that this drop would not materialize.
Table 2, from the 1979 Energy Information Administration Annual Report to Congress,13/
shows that current estimates for the year 1995 are beginning to settle around 155 gigawatts and the 1985 estimates are dropping towards 100.
Table 3 is a collection of what the NRC has estimated to be the total number of gigawatts that would be developed.
This includes plants that are operating, are under construction, or for which applications for construction have been filed: Over a period of approximately two and one-half years this number has dropped from 189,000 megawatts to 159,000 megawatts.
As readers of this journal know, such a decline in forecasts of nuclear power un is not restricted to the United States.
These
15 drops have also occurred in Japan, in the Federal Republic of Gennany, and in other developed countries where nuclear power has been forecast to have substantial growth.
4.2 Causes and Effect I do not believe that the Nuclear Regulatory Comission, or its predecessor, the AEC regulatory group, has been even a principal, much less the primary, factor 'c this drop.
I believe it has been due to forecast demands for electricity which never occurred, increased costs due to inflation, and significantly improved forecatting techniques, including having the forecasts made by other than the developers.
The acc'ident at Thr. 2 Mile Island will certainly have effects.
It will increase the cost of nuclear power.
There will be some h'ardware changes required, additional instrumentation, probably design features which will not lead to significant cost increases in the design of new plants. There will be substantially increased requirements in the number, education, and training of operating personnel.
The relative increase in operating costs of reactors may be significant, but operating costs will still be a small portion of the total lifetime costs of a nuclear power plant.
The primary impact of the accident has been a heightened public concern about nuclear power: a heightened and a vastly increased receptivity to questions on whether nuclear power is needed
.ar.d whether the risks or hazards of nuclear power need be accepted.
4.3 Commission Role The changes in regulations that will occur over the next decade will come as a result of influences internal and external to the Comission.
The influences internal to the Commission will primarily be the Commissioners.
16 The staff of the Nucl. Regulatory Commission must continue to be extremely competent nuclear technologists.
They must understand in detail the technology they regu'. ate. The changes in policies will primarily be driven by the members who form a majority of the Comnission.
However, such internal influences will be secondary to the external influences, partially because who gets on the Commission will reflect these external influences. The major influences external to the Commission will continue to flow from the Congress.
The Congress to an extent'will represent their constituents, but Congressional influence will continue to reflect the views of those members who, through desire or chance, end up on our oversight conr;ittees.
Their attitudes towards c clear power will be a major determinant on the future direction of the Nuclear.
Regulatory Commission.
As they become increasingly involved at the NRC staff level, they will wear down.any staff resistance. Therefore, the extent to which the NRC opposes the desires of individual committees or powerful members will end up being determined by the willingness of the Commissioners to do so.
1.4 External Factors Other major external factors include the United States economy, waste problems, and coal pollution. The economic factor will be whether or not nuclear power is needed to produce electricity in the 1990's.
.The latest estimates of the Department of Energy 14] are that nuclear power will produce between 9.4 and 10.~2 percent of the total energy for the United States in 1995, and meet between 21.4 and 25 percent of the electrical demand.15/
If the United States economy demands electrical
=
17 generation capaciO at a growth rate past 1995 that cannot be met by other technologies, then nuclear power will have a strong external stimulus.
The second obvious major external factor would be another accident, in particular, one in which significant, external damage occurs, including substantial loss of life. The: impact of such an accident in the United States would be greatest were it to occur in a developed country, because the U. S. public would conclude it could happen here since the construc' tion and operating competence would be similar to that in the United States A third major factor will be whether or not there can be a resolution of how to handle nuclear waste. Currently the United States Congress is addressing at least four different bills, which have approaches ranging from retrievable non-licensed repositories to non-retrievable fully licensed repositories, with the initial stage ranging from a mandate of 1986 operation to 1990 construction approval.
Probably the most diffi-cult question is how local States in the United States will be allowed to express their disapproval of Energy Department plans or Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensing actions with respect to a high level waste repository in their State. This is an extremely difficult po-litical question, as readers in other countries realize from the diffi-cuities that have arisen in the Federal Republic of Germany.and the
. United Kingdom.
No State wishes to house the repository unless all.of its concerns can be adequately resolved.
There is a latent fear amongst those developing nuclear waste programs that it will be impossible to resolve all political issues regarding the location of a repository and, in such a case, the Federal Government would have to use Federal preemption l
18 in order to force a repository into a given State.
The procedures leading up to such a difficult action have not yet been developed or agreed to. There is substantial hope that perhaps the Congress will in this session pass legislation enacting such a procedure.
If_it does not, then legislation will probably not pass through the necessary Congressional comittees for another two years.
And finally, a major issue will be whether the problems with respect to burning of coal, either directly or as a synthetic fuel '
product, are studied sufficiently well and understood sufficiently clearly so that an adequate comparison can be made with respect to the hazards and risks associated with nuclear power.
There are, of course, other issues, such as whether alternate nuclear technologies can be developed, including gas reactors or breeder reactors. The problems that I foresee in the next decade with respect to nuclear power will not be significantly impacted by either of those technologies.
I believe it is doubtful, at least in the United States, that an alternative design will be developed and implemented.
We have too many reactors already under construction, too many vendors already committed, for an additional design to take hold in the United States.
5.
SUMMARY
In sumary, I see many problems with respect to the future of
, nuclear power in the United States.
I believe the Three Mile Island accident formally and finally broke the ties connecting the NRC to the development of nuclear power, which was part of its heritage from the AEC.
I will not argue the issue as to how much of a link existed in the
19 regulatory side of the AEC or whether it was a major influence in the early years of the NRC.
Certainly many accused the NRC of such a link.
The Three Mile Island accident has severed any such ties. The Three Mile island accident was a catharsis.
In Greek tragedy, such a catharsis must occur, for a purging. The Three Mile Island accident was the NRC's catharsis, and it now becomes a regulatory agency.
It remains to be seen whether these changes will be similar to those in aircraft licensing regulation, where the regulatory framework inspired increased growth, or whether it will be similar to rail passenger regulation in the United States, where there is hardly any rail passenger service left to regulate.
5.1 A Greek Tragedy The NRC has become a regulatory agency, not a supporter of nuclear power. This can lead to. aggressive control or to apathetic mediocrity.
Both models have examples in regulatory agencies in the United States.
~
To carry on with the analogy to Greek tragedy, I see a few other simi-larities.
We do have a chorus, in fact, we have several -- the Congress, the media, the public interest groups, the industry.
Examples of some of these are found in a recent hearing in the State of Pennsylvania by one of our oversight comittees, in which members were examining an official of a power company which currently has a reactor under con-struction.
Under questioning regarding evacuation planning, this senior
, official of the company stated " evacuation plans are just the window dressing... "
He indicated he also believes that a planning zone of 1.7 ' miles is more than adequate for the purpose of evacuation planning and went on to say " emergencies that will require evacuation will not
20 occur." As a counterpoint to this member of the Greek chorus, two of the Congressman on the oversight committee have requested the NRC " seriously conIider the [above quoted] attitudes... and determine whether or not the company's permit for the construction of a nuclear power _ plant...
is consistent with public health and safety."
Since the editors of this edition asked for my own personal views and my own personal perspective on the future of nuclear energy in the United States, I will conclude by continuing this analogy with Greek tragedy.
Nuclear power in the United States has a fatal flaw: it,cannot
~
get public acceptance. The system of evolving public policy in the United States leads to eventual support for programs which do get public acceptance and for final disavowal of those that cannot.
I do not foresee that fatal flaw being eliminated. The deep hatred and divisions within the Un'ited States public on the issues of nuclear power, the uncertainties of accidents, the confusion over what is radiation, the fear of abnormalities and serious cancers in future generations, I believe will lead to the demise of commercial nuclear power in the United States.
73gte i
COMPARISON OF PAST FORECASTS ENERGV-ELECTRICAL CAPACITY-NUCL. EAR CAPACITY VEAR 2000 YEAR TOTAL
$LECTRICAL NUCLEAR
?
FO' RECAST ENERGY CAPACITY CAPACITY
.p MADE (O.uads)
(G W ol (GWo) 1972 150-2000.
';200 1974 174 2030
'T090
.n 1975 174 1750 800
-o cia
'976 144 '
1400 510 c=a co
'977
'20 1200 380 o
~
WJ r-77-3202M 3-s
!!M:
.l}
)
gggg;
__,,_m_
TABLE 2 Table 4.35 Midterm Nuclear Power Capa lty in Commercial Operation:
Comparison of Fore casts,1985-1995 r
(che< m a4 Y r ad)
Sowros iS&5 iMo ites 15 79 Armal Ae po4........................................................
Sf-109 121-139 137-190 19 7 8 Arma l R epo4........................................................ iC2-tit 142-174 inf4 19 77 hvuo l A epo4...................................................... 400-122 157-1F2 DOE WMy Survey (se mary 1940)........................................
122 iss 177 D a ta A na.:ns cas. tric. (*h 19 7 9)...................................
1 04 iM 154 Pa c.e ( Oct ober 19 797....................................................
22 1:3 its Exxon (December 19 7 97.............................................
123 146 177. *
- teora! EW A.3.s ter Ccunce (.Ldy 1977)..................
134 126-1p2 CON AES (*w. amber 19 797...........................................
N w Reg uis tcry Commmm.ce8........................................
D6 iM 154 Westscoume Corporaten (unrum iD80).....u............
1C3 142 1 82 BabcocA L %cos. McDerrre: Cap..(unrum 166D)......................
106 133 137
- The Pac. Company Ccr=amams and Eng==.rs. ke, The Pec Ewry anc P :rcer m;cas Cunoot to zco, October 1979.
- f.xxon Company, U.SA. Er=<pr Ostkok 1N2000. Doo mt.or 1979.
- Hatioral Ar.aoemy cd $m. Correnmee on NurJo.ar and Memeters Er=rgy Symems (CO*RM Er ryy Jn Trarm*tiert 1M.5 MC. Decemte 1579. Tabass 11-17 thrwpMi-@d.
r
- e*wRO CaWood-marriing Pr&.~.e for Fecal Years 1942-1E&$," Huc)+ar Regulatcry W Ma rtm 1660.
Ncne: - in(, cates ret mentaten.
=
W
...g e
e-e..
- .W88.
d e
4 g
l
\\
1 1
TABLE 2
'o 9
Table 3 StatusofNuclearPowerPlantsUnderNRCPurviewO Total Number of Plants GWE Date of Estimate 195 189 January 1978 1 97 192 March 1978 193 187 August 1978 190 184 December 1978 186 181 April 1979 183 178 August 1979 179 173 December 1979 169 163 January 1980 166 159 April 1980 JJ Source NRC Brown Books P
l l
l I
\\
\\
TABLE 3
REFERENCES The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. Sec. 182a.
_1/.
-2/
Report on H.R. 7590, Energy and Water Development Appropriation Bill, 1981 (1980), Committee on Appropriations, U. S. House of Representatives, p.147, June 16,1980, Report No. 96-1093.
-3/
Ahearne, J.
F., Remarks before the National Energy Resources Organization (1979), June 24,1979, NRC S-6-79.
4/
Reinsdorf, Walter (1980) Nuclear Plant Licensing, Environment 22, No. 5, pp 3-4.
-5/
The National Energy Plan (1977), Executive Office of the President.
April 29, 1977.
6]
National Energy Act (1977), submitted to the Congress, May,1977.
Variouc versions produced.
See, e. g., H.R. 8444, introduced in the U. S. Senate September 7, 1977.
-7/
Bazelon, David L. (1979) Risk and Responsibility, American Bar Association Journal _ 61 p.1068.
8]
Bazelon, David L. (1980) Science, Technology, and the Court, Science 208, p. 661.
Judicial Review and the Equal Protection Wright, J. Skelly (1980) hts - Civil Liberties Law Review 15_, p. 4.
9/
Clause,, Harvard Civil Rig 10/ Swift, Jonathan (1727) Gulliver's Travels, p.148, New American Library, Inc. edition'(1960), New York.
Levitas, E.
H., (1980)he(quoted in) Legislative Veto Battle Escalates -
11]
Should Congress Have t Last Word, National Journal R, p. 1473.
12/ Schlesinger, J. R., (1977) Testimony before the Subcommittee on Fossil and Nuclear Energy, Research, Development and Demonstration, U. S. House of Representatives, June 7, 1977.
U. S. Department of Energy (1979) Volume Three, Table 4.35, ReportEnergy Inform 13/
Annual Report to Congress,1979,
~~-
DOE /EIA-0173 (79)/3.
ly Ibid., Table 4.1.
g/
Ibid., Table 4.14.
_