ML19350C554
| ML19350C554 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Pilgrim |
| Issue date: | 01/29/1981 |
| From: | Jerrica Johnson, Martin T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19350C553 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-293-80-28, NUDOCS 8104030782 | |
| Download: ML19350C554 (8) | |
See also: IR 05000293/1980028
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
Region I
Report No. 50-293/80- 28
Docket No. 50-293
Category _
C
License No. DPR-35
Priority
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Licensee:
Boston Edison Company
800 Boylston Street
Boston, Massachusetts 0 2199
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Facility Name:
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station
Inspction at:
Plymouth, Massachusetts
Inspection conducted:
December 15 - 23, 1980
Inspectors:
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J. Johnson, Senior ge'sident Inspector
date signed
date signed
date signed
Approved by:
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T. T. Martin, Chief, Reactor Projects
date signed
Section No. 3, RO&NS Branch
Inspection Summary:
Inspection on December 15-23, 1980 (Report No. 50-293/80-28)
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Areas Inspected:
Routine unannounc.ed safety inspection of plant operations
including followup on previous inspection findings, an operational safety
verification, licensee actions in response to IE Bull _etins, observations
of en Emergency Drill, and a review of access controi to vital areas. The
inspection involved 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> by the resident inspector.
Results: No items of noncompliance were identified in the five areas inspected.
Region I Form 12
81040 3 Olgy)
(Rev. Aaril 77
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DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
W. Armstrong, Deputy Nuclear Operations Manager
H. Balfour, Staff Assistant (Emergency Planning)
R. Cunningham, Staff Assistant (Emergency Planning)
E. Graham, Compliance Engineer
W. Hoey, Sr. Radiation Protection Engineer
J. Keyes, Licensing Engineer
E. MacCormick, Security Specialist
R. Machon, Nuclear Operations Manager (Pilgrim Station)
C. Mathis, Deputy Nuclear Operations Manager
J. McEachern, Security Supervisor
P. Smith, Chief, Technical Engineer
E. Ziemianski, Management Services Group Leader
The inspector also interviewed members of the Operations, Security and
Technical staffs.
2.
Followup on Previous Inspection Findings
(0 pen) Deviation (293/80-30-03), Shift Staffing /0vertime.
The licensee's
commitments -concerning limiting overtime for licensed control room operators
were discussed in a telephone conversation between NRC: Region I Management
and Boston Edison Company Management personnel on November 28, 1980 and
confirmed in a letter dated November 28, 1980 from the Director, NRC Region
I to Boston Edison Company.
This letter stated that the Nuclear Operations
Manager or his Deputy would authorize overtime beyond 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> up to 12
hours for control room operators.
Upon receipt of the November 28, 1980 letter on December 4, 1980, Boston
Edison Company contacted NRC Region I via telephone to clarify errors and
restating their commitments.
The Nuclear Operations Manager or his Deputy's
approval would be obtained in order for a licensed operator performing
safety related control room duties to exceed 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, however, under
normal circumstances, an operator would not be allowed to exceed 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br />
performing these duties.
The inspector verified that entries had been made in the Watch Engineer's
Instruction Log dated November 24, and 26, 1980 promulgating this policy.
Following discussions with the inspector the licensee agreed to send a
letter to the Director, NRC: Region I, stating the current commitment and
when a station procedure would be written to implement this policy.
This item remains open pending review of the licensee's letter clarifying
their commitments, correcting the Immediate Action Letter dated November
28, 1980, and also pending review of implementation of the proposed permanent
station procedure.
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(Closed) Unresolved Item (293/80-27-03): The inspector reviewed the licensee's
actions with respect to Certain TMI Action Plan Category 'A' items described
in a letter from the Director, NRC Region I to Boston Edison Company dated
November 18,1980 (IAL No. 80-49).
Procedure No. 7.4.17 was revised on November 28, 1980 to allow for
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sampling the primary containment atmosphere via radiation monitor- C-
19. The particulate paper and iodine cartridge will be used to perform
an isotopic analysis of the containment atmosphere if required.
Procedure TP 80-84 was approved on November 28, 1980 and provides a
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method for converting high range noble gas effluent monitor readings
(R/hr) to release rates (uct/sec) via the use of nomograms.
Plant Design Change Field Revision Notice No. 80-03-25 was issued to
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correct the operation of the containment vent and nitrogen makeup
control switches and Maintenance Request No.80-475 was completed on
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December 2, 1980 implementing this change.
The inspector also observed
Verification of a selected switch with the Watch Engineer on December
18, 1980 to verify that a key was not needed between the 'open' and
'close' position and only needed a key to get into the ' emergency
open' position.
This item is closed.
3.
Operational Safety Verification
a.
Scope
The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable
logs, conducted discussions with control room operators, and verified
proper lineup of selected portions of emergency systems. Tours of the
control room, reactor building, turbine building, security building,
RBCCW auxiliary bay, switch yard, and the station yard were conducted
to observe equipment condition, potential fire hazards, housekeeping,
. physical security, and radiation protection controls.
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These reviews were conducted to verify conformance with the Code of
Federal-Regulations, Technical Specifications, and the licensee's
procedures.
b.
Findings
The inspector reviewed control room annunciators that were either in
alarm or had their alarm module pulled, with the Watch Engineer on
duty. The inspector toured selected areas with the Watch Engineer to
inspect the condition /or verify the cause of several annunciators.
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The inspector also discussed the status of control room annunciators
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with the Nuclear Operations Manager and his two Deputies.
The licensee
has temporarily assigned a nuclear control technician to independently
review annunciators and assist the station management with identifying
actions which can be taken to eliminate as many as possible to provide
operators with as closa as possible to a " black board".
The inspector reviewed actions being taken to date and will continue
to review the area of annunciators during routine inspections.
No items of noncompliance were identified during this review and
operational safety verification.
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THIS PAGE, CONTAINING 10 CFR 2.790 INFORMATION, NOT FOR PUBLIC
DISCLOSURE, IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK.
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5.
Emergency Drill
a.
Scope and Acceptance Criteria
The inspector observed the licensee's activities concerning the con-
duct of an Emergency Drill on December 22, 1980. The drill consisted
of a simulated leak in the Reactor Water Cleanup System in the Reactor
Building concurrent with a failure of the Standby Gas Treatment System,
and a subsequent declaration of a simulated Site Emergency.
The inspector attended tne pre-drill briefing of the drill team members,
observed the conduct of the drill from the control room and the Emer-
gency Control Center (ECC), and attended the critique held at the-
station immediately following the drill.
The inspector's review was
performed to evaluate implementation of the licensee's emergency
procedures and to evaluate the overall conduct of the drill including
the licensee's efforts in monitoring the drill and identifying areas
needing improvements,
b.
Findings
(1) Pre-Drill Briefing / Preparation
The inspector verified that the appropriate off-site agencies had
been notiff td of the pending drill, and that the drill team members
had made acequate preparation.
(2) Conduct of Drill
The inspector observed the initiation of the drill from the
control room at 10:21 a.m. December 22, 1980.
Initial actions in
the control room were observed including simulated operations of
equipment and actual notifications to off-site agencies.
The
Shift Technical Advisor arrived in the control room within two
minutes and the NRC was notified via the ENS circuit within five
minutes.
The inspector left the control room following the annunciation
c' the site evacuation alarm and arrived at the ECC to observe
tivities of the Emergency Director and associated radiological
response teams.
The inspector spot checked five radiation monitoring / sampling
. instruments to verify that the calibration stickers were current.
Coordination between the ECC and the control room, Technical
Support Center (TSC) and offsite monitoring teams was observed.
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The drill was terminated at 11:51 a.m. and routine operations
resumed.
The inspector verified that the licensee notified the appropriate
offsite agencies that the drill was completed and observed security
measures while personnel were re-entering the protected area.
(3) Critique
The inspector attended the critique held at the training center
immediately following the drill.
Comments were made by each
drill team member and the licensee management personnel in charge
at the ECC, TSC, Operations Support Center, and the Control Room.
Discrepancies in equipment condition and personnel actions as
well as areas needing improvement were appropriately identified
by the licensee.
The licensee's followup actions will be reviewed
during future routine inspections.
The inspector also met at the critique with the representative
from the Massachusetts Department of Public Health who indicated
that he was notified of the simulated event at approximately
11:00 a.m. in Boston, Massachusetts, and arrived at the site
within approximately one hour.
No items of noncompliance were identified during the conduct of
this drill.
6.
Licensee Actions in Response to IE Bulletin 80-1_7
a.
Confirmatory Order Dated October 2, 1980 - The inspector reviewed the
licensee's December 5, 1980 response which stated that the Continuous
Mcnitoring System CMS had been installed which provided indication and
alarm in the control room of w'
level in the Scram Discharge Volume.
The inspector also reviewed
procedure No. 2.2.122 "S.O.V. Level
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Monitors" Revision 0 datec November 26,198G, which describes the-
system purpose, indications in the controi room, and actions to be
taken for various alarms. The C.M.S. measures water level on 2 pts on
each of the East and West SDV headers. A red light indicates in the
control room if the water level reaches 1.25 inches (6 inch header).
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b.
Supplement 4 - The inspector provided an advance copy of SuppTement 4
to IEB 80-17 dated December 18, 1980 to the licensee on December 18,
1980.
The purpose of the additional action stated in this Supplement
was to provide assurance that the CMS is operable as installed.
The inspector reviewed log entries once/ shift from December 19, 1980
to December 22, 1980 which indicated that an independent manual check
had been performed as required by the Bulletin.
The inspector also
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reviewed a Watch Engineer's Instruction Log entry dated December 19,
1980 which required the once/ shift UT checks to be recommenced and
required the actions of procedure TP 80-68 if any significant water in
the SDV was identified.
Juring a telephone. conversation between Boston Edison Company and NRC
Region I management personnel on December 23, 1980, the licensee was
given permission to re-energize the C.M.S. and secure from the once/
shift manual checks (item 3 of Supp. 4) of the SDV and also granted a
seven day extension to perform the operability test of the C.M.S.
required by item 2 of Supplement 4.
c.
Supplement 3, Item 2 - The inspector reviewed the licensee's December
5,1980 response which described the acceptance criteria that would be
used for the SDV instrument volume limit switches.
This reiteria was
compared with the data from the previous 12 scrams and found to be in
agreement. When the computer inputs are completed this criteria will
be added to station procedures.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
This BuiTetin remains open
pending the completion of further actions and review by the NRC.
7.
Exit Interview
At periodic intervals during the course of the inspection, meetings were
held with senior facility management to discuss the in:pection scope and
findings.
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