ML19350C368
| ML19350C368 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Westinghouse, Erwin, 07000754, 07001113, 07000734, 07000008, 07000036, 07001100, 07001201, 07000398, Framatome ANP Richland, 07000824, 07000135 |
| Issue date: | 10/21/1980 |
| From: | Huff D NRC |
| To: | Partlow J NRC |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19350C362 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8104010171 | |
| Download: ML19350C368 (4) | |
Text
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/ Docket files 70-1100, 70-36, 70-1201, Case files70-135, 70-824, 70-1257, 007 21 ?jjj MCL r/f 70-754, 70-1113,70-143, DHuff 70-1151,70-734, i J-8,70-398 RBrightsen JJoyner, Reg. I NOTE TO: Jim Partlow EMcAlpine, Reg. II JHind, Reg. III FROM:
Darrell Huff LNorderhaug, Reg. V THRU:
Ron Brightsen
SUBJECT:
TAMPER-SAFING OF LEU As you know, I recently recommended (in my memo dated July 7,1980) that cogni::ance replace the requirement of witnessing for tamper-safing low-enriched uranium (LEU).
Since making thi, reconnendation, I have taken an even deeper look into this issue and am now prepared to make the further reccenendation that we abandon altogether the two-man rule used in connection with the tamper-safing of LEU. Hence, the purpose of this memo is to delineate my reasons for this latter reconnendation.
To begin with, in order to initiate my analysis, I asked myself the following question: Why do we require two individuals for the tamper-safing of LEU? After giving this matter some thought, I decided that there was only one logical reason;
=J i.e., to prevent or deter a single insider from stealing a significant quantity of LEU and then using tamper-safing to delay detection of this act. However, my review of this matter has convinced me that sufficient evidence exists to support the following conclusions:
Mt*e 1.
Theft of significant quantities of LEU by a single insider is not a credible v threat; especially in the case of tamper-safed items.
2.
The need to protect against the theft of a significant quantity of LEU by O
a single insider has never been officially established.
Use of the two-man rule at LEU facilities as presently constituted does not Y 3.
provide credible protection from the acts of a single insider.
p' 4.
If we allow a one-man rule for tamper-safing LEU, any apparent degradation fY in detection capability which might result from a single insider's
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use of tamper-safing to delay detection of theft is offset by other admini-VJ,9.n
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strative controls which are required for tamper-safing.
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The evidence and logic used in arriving at the foregoing conclusions is as follows:
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1.
The inast critical element which needs to be analyzed, when examining the desireability of a two-man rule for tamper-safing LEU is whether a' f./
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single insider threat truly represents a realistic concern relative to the theft of a significant quantity of LEU.
As described in my July 7 /
memo, a significant quantity of LEU involves a relatively large amount d /
of material (i.e.,between 2.5 and 4.5 tons of UO2).
In my opinion, it '
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is highly improbable that any single insider could steal, conceal, and
$ b -tl transport this amount of material with any credible chance of success.
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Furthennore, because of the administrative controls required for f
9,.A tamper-safing (documentation, signatures, item control, etc.), I
.A consider it even more incredible that a single insider would even S
conte = plate stealing from tamper-safed items.
f The tremorandum entitled " STAFF RESPONSE TO THE INSIDER 2.
(attached herewith) makes the following statement:
"The staff is now y.
reviewing safe;uards requirements for nonpower reactors and will be J
developing a generic issue paper in early CY S1 on whether to include $ j-insicer protecticn at Category II/III f acilities." This statement, when combined witn the fact tnat tne recent Category II/III ?hysical Se:urity Upgrade Rule lacks any insider protection requirements, leads to the inevitable conclusion that no need has as yet been officially estaolished for protection against the acts of insiders at LEU f a:il ities.
A 3.
At the present time, a two-man rule is recuired for only two activities performed within an LEU facility:
tamper-safing and inventorying.
Therefore, in theory at least, each of the remaining activities within an
,j LEU plant (mostly processing related) could be performed using only a y/
single individual.
Phrases such as "what is good for the goose is good for the gander" or "a chain is only as strong as its weakest link" are just a couple of appropriate cliches which come to mind when pondering this situation. However, I believe that the application of simple logic in the examination of the aforementioned evidence leads one to the conclusion which I reached; i.e., that the two-man rule current *.y in effect at LEU facilities provides no more of a credible deterrent to the theft of material by a single insider than a one-man rule would.
y'v 4.
One of the inhereat characteristics of those facilities which possess I
significant quantities of LEU is a relatively short residency time
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l for most tamper-safed items. As a result of this, in the isolated case l
where an insider uses tamper-safing to delay detection of the theft of LEU, this delay would most probably represent only a smals increase in
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the average time to detection. However, in my opinion, t_ha reviousiv-mentioned adninistrative controls exercised for tamper-safee items would
'iiEre than compensate for this apparent degradation in detection capability.
Because of these controls, thefts of this type from tamper-safed items would be detected with much greater sensitivity to discovering who stole the material and/or how much of the material is missing. Therefore, if single i
individuals were allowed to perform tamper-safing at LEU facilities, the
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55 overall detection capability for theft from tamper-safed items would not be discernibly different than that which now exists for untamper-safed items l
within an LEU facility.
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As you can see, the supporting evidence for conclusions 1 and 2 by itself provides adequate justification for the reccamendation to discontinue using the two-man rule for tamper-safing LEU.
In spite of this, in the event that this doesn't totally convince you, the arguments which support conclusions 3 and 4 generate enough additional doubt concerning the two-man rule presently in effect at LEU facilities to warrant a change in policy.
In fact, close examination shows that basicall:' two diametrically opposed actions could be taken as a result of these arguments: en..er the material controls for untamper-safed LEU could be upgraded to the level of tamper-safed items or a one-man rule could be adopted for tamper-safing LEU. However, the evidence clearly supports the latter action as being the reasonable alternative.
In conclusion, in spite of the fact that evidence increasingly tends to support the lessening of MC&A requirements for LEU, very little has been done +4 implement such a policy. Obviously, industry is still interested in 'deregu-l ation. "
In fact, many of us within the NRC are still interested, but we continue to pass the proverbial " deregulation" buck in hopes that someone else will make a decision. Of course, what I am proposing by recc:nending that we allow a one-man rule for tar:per-safing LEU is not " deregulation."
Nevertheless, it is a justifiable decrease in a re:;uirement for LEU which is long overdue. A wise man once said, "I waited for tomorrew but tomorrow never came." The time is now to act on correcting our past mistakes. There-fore, I reco::nend that we approve this change in policy for tamper-safing
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LEU by sending the attached letter to all LEU licensees.
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CA Darrell Huff Connercial Fuel Facilities Section l
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Attachment:
l As stated l
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j Gentlemen:
'This letter is written to inform you of a change in policy concerning the tamper-safing of icw-enriched uranium.
As you know, previous guidance regarding tamper-safing has contained no differentiation in the requirements for tamper-safing containers of LEU and SSNM. Basically, our policy has been to require two individuals to witness the measurement, sampling, and seal application procedures perfor ed in connection with tamper-safing without regard for the inherent differences between these materials.
However, our reevaluation of this policy now shows that requiring the second ~ individual for tamper-safing LEU serves no useful purpose relative to effective safeguards. Therefore, this policy is hereby being revised to allow single individuals to perfonn the witnessing and
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certification of the aforementioned procedures for LEU.
At this time, we wish to stress that this policy revision is not intended to allow a decrease in the quality of tamper-safing done at your facility. '
The same care and attention to detail should continue to be exercised for tamper-safing.
In addition, we believe that special emphasis should be placed on developing procedures for implementing this policy which will clearly define the responsibilities of the individuals involved in the I
certification of tamper-safing.
In order to incorporate this revised policy into the tamper-safing program at your facility, you will need to submit changes to your Fundamental Nuclear Material Control Plan. For your information, changes made in response to this letter shall be treated as changes made pursuant to fal
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10 CFR 70.32(c) which do not decrease the effectiveness of your ma*
control and accounting program and shall therefore require no fee.
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reading this letter, should you require any further information regaulng l
this matter, please contact Darrell A. Huff of my staff at (301) 427-4043.
Sincerely, i
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James G. Partlow, Chief l
Material Control and Accountability l
Licensing Branch i
Division of Safecuards l
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