ML19347F433
| ML19347F433 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fermi  |
| Issue date: | 05/12/1981 |
| From: | Tauber H DETROIT EDISON CO. |
| To: | Eisenhut D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| REF-GTECI-A-36, REF-GTECI-SF, RTR-NUREG-0612, RTR-NUREG-612, TASK-A-36, TASK-OR EF2-53-015, EF2-53-15, NUDOCS 8105190268 | |
| Download: ML19347F433 (4) | |
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,.. Y Y l (313) 237-8000 May 12, 1981 EF2 - 53,015 Mr. Darrell G. Eisenhut, Director Division of Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.
S. Nuclerir Regulatory Commission Washington, D.
C.
20555
Dear Mr. Eisenhut:
References:
1.
Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2
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NRC Docket No. 50-341
'77.'<h 2.
Re
' tor Building Crane - T31
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3.
NRC Letters from Darrell G. Eisenhut,
'.7 December 22, 1980 and February 3, 1981 U8ir u~
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4.
NUREG 0612, " Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants - Resolution of Tap A-36"
Subject:
Control of Heavy Loads over or in Proximity to Irradiated Fuel The NRC letter of December 22, 1980 requests that the control of handling heavy loads in close proximity to irradiated fu'l. or shutdown safety systems, be reviewed to determine the extent to which NUREG 0612 guidelines are being satisfied and to identify any necessary changes to achieve satisfactory compliance with these guidelines.
NRC Reauested Action Ic is requested that licensees and license applicants implement interim action that addresses the following NUREG 0612 guidelines:
1.
Definition of safe load paths per Section 5.1.1(1).
2.
Development and implementation of procedures per Section 5.1.1(2).
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Mr. Darrell G. Eisenhut i
May 12, 1981 EF2'- 53,015 Page 2 3.
Qualification, training and conduct of crane opera-tors per Section 5.1.1 (3).
4.
Inspection, testing and maintenance of cranes per.
Section 5.1.1(6).
5.
In addition, this interim action should address a.
The explicit thoroughness of procedures covering rigging of lifting devices and movement of loads.
b.
Visual inspections of load bearing components.
to identify deficiencies.
c.
Appropriate repair of defective components.
I d.
Verification of adequate operating training and familiarity with specific procedures for handling of loads.
Edison Response-All of the Safety Systems needed for a safe shutdown at Fermi 2 are located below the Reactor Building fif th floor which provides adequate protection to prevent ~any heavy loads from ccming into contact with any of these system l
components due to any inadvertent misoperation of the Reactor Building crane.
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The Reactor Building crane's main hoist does provide a dual load support path that meets single failure criteria.
Handling of the spent fuel cask with this hoist meets single j
failure criteria.
Action is being initiated to verify ade-i quate fifth floor protection or to achieve single failure l
criteria for handling of other heavy loads with the main hoist.
Certain main hoist heavy loads, upon a failure of I
a sling attachment to the load, will still be retained by l
the remaining sling attachments.
However, there can be i
sufficient movement to cause contact with the Reactor l
Building fifth floor.
A study has been initiated to verify l
that the fifth floor can withstand such impact to prevent any damage to safety system components located below the fifth floor.
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1 Mr. Darrell G. Eisenhut May 12, 1981 EF2 - 53,105 Page-3 The Reactor Building crane auxiliary hook which is rated.at 5 tons does not meet single failure criteria. - Strict admin-istrative procedures are to be established to prevent the operation of the auxiliary hook over the open reactor vessel and fuel storage pool' except when its operation thro Jh a load limit is restricted to a maximum lift of 1,500 pounds.
Reactor Building fifth floor structural studies will also address the potential five ton load drop from the auxiliary hook.
For those loads where single failure criteria.is not fully established, rigid safe flow paths will be established to prevent these loads from being carried over exposed spent fuel in the reactor and fuel storage pools.
However, for these loads, and even where single failure criteria is being met, safe load path determinations will take into consideration wherever it is practical, the locations of safety system components.below the Raactor Building fifth floor to conform with the " Defense-in-Depth" philosophy of NUREG 0612.
There are hoists below the Reactor-Building fifth floor 4
located within certain equipment areas that are intended to be used during the maintenance of this-equipment.* Normally, these hoists will be used when these' systems are removed from service and already are not available for any safe shutdown' operation.
The capacity and travel of these below -floor hoists are very limited.
It is expected that further inves-tigation will find that they cannot~ impact other systems.
There will be a complete review of all below fifth floor hoists and their operation, that addresses the concerns of NUREG 0612.
If any potential impact upon safety systems should be identified, action that addresses the guidelines of NUREG 0612 will be initiated to eliminate or assure that such impact will not jeopardize the shutdown safety integrity of these systems.
Final detailed procedures for handling heavy loads at Fermi 2 have not yet been completed.
However, such procedures will be completed prior to the issuance of an operating license.
These procedures when completed will address the above NUREG 0612 general items.
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Mr. Darrell G. Eisenhut May 12, 1981 EF2 - 53,105 Page 4 Fermi 2 documents which address the handling of heavy loads have been reviewed to determine the extent to which they address these same NUREG 0612 items.
These documents which define the requirements for the inspection, testing, operator qualification and operation of the Reactor Building crane, rnd movement of the spent fuel cask within the Reactor Building will provide the basis for developing the specific maintenance procedure on this equipment.
These same documents will also provide guidance, along with NUREG 0612, for including specific procedures for handling all other Reactor Building crane heavy loads.
A review of these documents finds that guidelines provided in.
NUREG 0612 Section 5.1.1 (1), " Safe Load Path" - (for the spent fuel cask) have been adequately addressed.
Also, there is sufficient information to enable specific handling procedures for the spent fuel cask and other heavy loads to be written in accordance with the Section 5.1.1 (2), " Procedure" guide-lines.
The guidelines in Section 5.1.1 (3) pertaining to Reactor Build-ing crane operator training and qualification can be satisfied and will be incorporated in the requirements and procedures for crane operators.
Existing FSAR and Functional System Description Documentation does address the inspection and testing of the Reactor Build-ing crane.
Many of the requirements specified in these docu-ments fall within the guidelines of NUREG 0612 Section'5.1.1(6),
particularly those pertaining to' frequency of inspections.
Specific instructions based upon these documents and MUREG 0612 can satisfy this Section's guidelines and will be included within the specific maintenance procedure for the Reactor Building crane.
Special attention to interim Action Item 5 above will be directed to personnel responsible for writing, reviewing and approving the Reactor Building heavy load handling procedures, and to the maintenance personnel responsible for the perfor-mance of this plant function.
Sincerely,
/
T cc:
D. Howell L.
L. Kintner B.
Little
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