ML19347F227
| ML19347F227 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 03/05/1981 |
| From: | Fox D, Hale C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19347F225 | List: |
| References | |
| REF-QA-99900503 NUDOCS 8105150496 | |
| Download: ML19347F227 (4) | |
Text
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p U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0KiISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT REGION IV Report No. 99900503/81-01 Program No.
51200 Company:
Burns and Roe, Inc.
496 Kinderkamack Road Gradell, New Jersey 07649 Inspection at: WNP-2 Site on Hanford Reservation, Washington; and Richland, Washington Inspection Conducted:
February 10-13, 1981 Inspector:
-T A
3h/4/
D. F. Fox, Pri 21 pal Inspector Date Program Evaluation Section Vendor Inspection Branch 3-$df 6
Approved by:
A e
C. J..
valuation Section
, Chief
~~
Date Progr Vendor Inspection Branch Summary:
Inspection conducted on February 10-13,1981,(99900503/81-01) in concert with the Region V inspection of the Washington Public Power Supply System Hanford No. 2 Nuclear Power Plant.
Areas Inspected:
Action on previous inspection findings.
The inspection involved eight inspector-hours on-site by one USNRC inspector.
Results:
Withir, the scope of this inspection, we found no instance where you failed to meet your commitments to NRC.
810s150 %
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DETAILS SECTION A.
Persons Contacted J. M. Blas, QA Manager, Home Office S. H. Rifaey, Field Group Supervisor S. Satpute, Field Group Supervisor 6.
Scope of the Inspection Tliis inspection was conducted in concert with the NRC Region V inspection of the Washington Public Power Supply System Hanford No. 2 Nuclear Power Plant.
The scope of the Vendor Inspection Branch inspection, and thus of this report, was limited to action on previous inspection findings.
The results of this inspection were presented at the Region V exit interview with Washington Public Power Supply System personnel.
Refer to Region V I&E Inspection Report No. 50-397/81-03 for details of the Region V inspection.
C.
Follow Up on Previous Inspection Findings 1.
(Closed) Follow up Item (Report No. 80-01,Section I.D.3.c).
The start up logic (auto start versus manual start) for the emergency diesel generators when a LOCA occurs will be reviewed during a fu'.ure inspection.
The inspector reviewed Burns and Roe Drawings No. E-502 (Main One Line Diagram) and E-517 (4160V Switchgear Elementory Diagram) and Stewart and Stevenson Drawing No. 53-00-0019, and determined that:
(1) the diesel generators receive an automatic start signal in the event of a LOCA (via a LOCA signal repeater relay) or, in the event of undervoltage (69% of nominal) on the 4160v buss; (2) the 4160v buss is automatically switched to the diesel generators' 4160v output within seven seconds after undervoltage on the 4160v buss is detected by the automatic detection and control circuitry.
2.
(Closed) Follow up Item (Report No. 80-01,Section I.D.3.c).
The basis for establishing the ISI (Inservice Inspection) design and access criteria for the Auxiliary Feedwater Piping System will be evaluated during a future inspection.
The inspector reviewed Burns and Roe Technical Memorandum No. 1043 and Specification No. 2808-215 (Mechanical Equipment In:tallation and Piping) dated September 17, 1975, including nir.e change orders thereto dated through July 14, 1980.
Section 3.11 of the original
3 issue, through Revision 3 of the specification, stated that "... all ASME III piping, and certain ANSI B.31.1 piping, as indicated on piping data sheets, will have inservice inspection.
In order that inservice inspection may be performed, contractor shall satisfy the requirements of Table 3...." Revision 4 of the specification clarified the meaning of "certain ANSI B.31.1 piping" to be restricted to that feedwater piping downstream of the feedwater pump to the containment isolation valve.
Burns and Roe management stated that the plant design and layout precluded meeting some of the access, weld preparation, removable insulation and surface finish requirements for inservice inspection for much of the feedwater piping.
Since inservice inspection of the feedwater piping is not required by Section XI of the ASME B&PV Code, the requirement for inservice inspection was deleted from Specification No. 2808-215 by Revision No. 9 dated July 14, 1980.
Review of PED-215-M-3218 (RCIC spray header break flange addition) dated April 24, 1980, rwealed that the inservice inspection access requirement for welds associated with the addition of header break flanges / spool pieces in the RCIC spray line downstream of the isola-tion valve had been waived.
Burns and Roe management stated that the Washington Public Power Supply System (who reportedly has the responsibility for inservice inspection of the Hanford No. 2 Nuclear Power Plant) verbally agreed that waiving of the access requirements for these (and approximately twelve other welds in various ASME Section III piping systems within the containment) was acceptable since other methods could be employed to satisfy the requirement for their preservice and inservice inspec-tion.
Burns and Roe management stated that they would identify all ASME Section III welds for which the access requirements were waived by Burns and Roe to the Washingtan Public Power Supply System via a Corrective Action Request or a Nonconformance Report, during the first quarter of 1981.
3.
(Closed) Deviation B (Report No. 80-02):
Qualification records j
of source surveillance personnel were not maintained as required.
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The inspector reviewed the corrective action and generic considera-l tion with Burns and Roe management and verified the preventive measures described in Burns and Roe letter of response dated l
December 19, 1980.
Specifically, a total of ten former vendor I
surveillance personnel whose qualification records were no longer l
available were identified by Burns and Roe.
Resumes and employ-l ment applications of these individuals are reportedly reestablished
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in the QA files along with an annotation as to why the required certification records are missing.
4 Quality Assurance Instructions QAI-07-110 (records maintenance) was amended by a Quality Assurance Notice issued during Inspection No. 80-02 to delete the paragraph that allowed personnel qualification records to be discarded three years after an employee leaves the company.
The quality assurance instruction will be formally revised to delete the paragraph by March 30, 1981.
The corrective action will be verified during a future inspection of the Burns and Roe facilities at Oradell, New Jersey.
4.
(Closed) Deviation C (Report No. 80-02):
Technical audits were not conducted as scheduled nor closed out as required.
The inspector reviewed the corrective action and generic considerations with Burns and Roe management and verified the preventive measures described in Burns and Roe letter of response dated Decereber 19, 1980.
Specifically, all scheduled technical audits and reaudits (except that the technical audit of Civil Engineering; No. 78-13; was rescheduled for reportedly substantive reasons) were conducted and closed out as required and procedure WNP-2-043 (Technical Audits of Project Engineering) was revised on February 4, 1981, to reduce the number of sequential actions that must be performed to perform and close out technical audits.
The corrective actions will be verified during a future inspection of the Burns and Roe facilities at Oradell, New Jersey.
5.
(Closed) Follow up Item (Report No. 80-02,Section I.B.2):
Neither the Burns and Roe nor the Washington Public Power Supply System Quality Assurance Program appears to specifically identify who has the responsibility for independently verifying the design adequacy of the safety-related structures, systems and components of the Hanford No. 2 Nuclear Power Plant.
This item was identified as an unresolved item to t.he Washington Public Power Supply System during this inspection and will be followed by Region V during a future inspection.
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