ML19347D327
| ML19347D327 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Allens Creek File:Houston Lighting and Power Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 03/13/1981 |
| From: | Black R NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE LEGAL DIRECTOR (OELD) |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19347D328 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8103170102 | |
| Download: ML19347D327 (16) | |
Text
,
- )
03/13/81 UtlITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o
}
'\\,'
OQ'?[/ Vj BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD
/ y'
/E1 In the Matter of
)
% ly, HOUSTON LIGHTING AND POWER C0'4PANY
)
Dociet No. 50-
- Ojt, A
v @
)
4 (Allens Creek Nuclear Generating
)
Qyb - -
Station, Unit 1)
)
e NRC STAFF'S RESPONSE TO TEXPIRG'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATIO';
0F VARIOUS RULINGS DURING EVIDENTIARY HEARINGS, AND FOR CERTIFICATION OF VARIOUS ISSUES TO THE APPEAL BOARD 1.
INTRODUCTION On January 29, 1981, Intervenor TEXPIRG filed, under one cover, a series of notions with both the Licensing Board and the Appeal Board seeking the following relief:
(1) reconsideration of various Licensing Board rulings with respect to procedural :. otters; (2) referral of an interlocutory appeal pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 52.730(f); certification of various issues pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 52.718(i); and (3) the renoval of the Licensing Board.
On February 3,1981, the Appeal Board denied TEXPIRG's motion with respect to the issues directed to the Appeal Board and noted its disapproval of "the practice of simultaneously seeking Licensing Board reconsideration of interlocutory rulings and appellate review of the sane rulings." Houston Lighting & Power Co. (Allens Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-630,13 NRC (February 3,1981).
g ----
t+~9 "rr-*dgec- -L94--t ti =~d ----
Z
.. _. 2
. :Juded J uied.that TEXRIRG_S mqtiqr, to $liscualify_the Bond was denied because - ;; ; _
l l
810 3170 /Od' G
it was procedurally defective. Tr. 4808. With respect to the reconsideration,
motion, the Board ruled that TEXPIRG would be required to resubnit its motion with specific record citations to the Board's actioris and rulings which TEXPIRG asserts are in error.
Tr. 4812.
TEXPIRG resubmitted its original January 29, 1981 pleading on February 17, 1981, with record citations written in by hand at various places.
Since the resubmission also requested the same interlocutory review by the Appeal Board, the Appeal Board again was forced to respond. On February 23 the Appeal Board issued a " Memorandum and Order" again dismissing the endeavor to obtain appellate relief as premature because tne Licensing Board had not yet acted upon the reconsideration request.-1/
For the reasons set forth below, the NRC Staff subnits that (1) the motion for reconsideration of various procedural rulings should be denied, and (2) the motion for referral or certification must be denied.
II.
BACKGROUND The thrust of TEXPIRG's motion is to challenge various Board rulings and actions which have attempted (1) to set forth the duty and responsibility of all parties to attend hearing sessions, and (2) to take appropriate
_1/ In both decisions, the Appeal Board has noted that the request for appellate review must be a new and different pleading than that filed with the Licensing Board seeking reconsideration. A new Jat.inmst taka-tric-accow:t the.L.icens.ir.c.Icardis__&ticr cr f_ C. c
- ! ;. C. - f '-- - '- - "
~ - ------ -- - -
re wi.,Tu u, _. J.-
-- ;.. ;. w
... _ _ _.. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _.. _ _ _ _ _ _. _. '.. _ _ _ _ _1),ALAB-3ld, 3'
4L 00
=3~6).
Besse NUC.eir PnNer_4*3+,1ca. P "!
measures to prevent argumentative, repetitive, cumulative, or irrelevant cross-examination. The majority of TEXPIRG's allegations of error fall into two categories:
(1) the Board erroneously prohibited the right of cross-examination by certain parties (See, e.g., Motion paras. 1, 2 and 5),
or (2) the Board erroneously restricted the right of cross-examination (See, e.g., Motion paras. 3, 4 and 6).
As our subsequent discussion and a perusal of the record will show, these evidentiary hearings have been lengthy and controversial. Although the Staff would concede that a good deal of the lenath can be attributed to the number of issues in controversy, it is also our perception that much of the time has been spent in argumentative, repetitive, cumulative or irrelevant cross-examination. A good indication of this type of cross-examinaticn can be gleaned in the general sense by comparing the time needed to respond to and rule on objections to certain questic, or lines of cross-examination as opposed to the hearing time engaged in " meaningful" cross-examination.3 Without trying to impugn the conduct of any party during these difficult and time-consuming proceedings, it is also Staff's view that counsel for TEXPIRG has repeatedly engaged in procedural and cross-examination tactics that have resulted in numerous objections by other parties to the proceeding.
See e.g.
Applicant's k
1 m-7 -_
because much cbjectioneble cross-examir- :01 was allowed to continue 4 a'hestateen of-mo#4ng-the;4eac4ng-alore.
l
_4_
characterization of this conduct set forth in " Applicant's Response to TEXPIRG's Motion For Recor. sideration of Various Rulinas During Evidentiary Hearings, and for Certification of Various Issues to the Appeal Board," dated March 4,1981, p. 4, which Staff is in general agreement with.
TEXPIRG's cross-examination and procedural tactics have directly resulted in numerous reprimands by the Board (E.g., Tr. 6184-6189, 6233-6240) and ultimately have caused the Board to impose procedural limitations on all parties' right to cross-examine witnesses.
Tr. 5974, 6171, 6181-6189, 6233-6240, 6304, 6657-6659. Although the Board's procedural limitations may have limited certain intervenors' oppor-tunities for cross-examination,-3/ it will be shown below that these limitations were necessary and reasonable measures to impose to preserve order, to move the hearing along in a timely manner, to aid in the development of a sound and complete record, and to assure the protection of the public interest.
In addition, these limitations were within the discretionary authority of the Licensing Board to "[r]egulate the course of the hearing and the conduct of the participants."
10 C. F.R. 52. 718(e).
TEXPIRG has not shown how the Board has abused its discretion and, accordingly, this motion for recon-sideration must be denied for the reasons set forth below.
III.
DISCUSSION A.
Legal and Regulatory Authority to Impose Procedural Restrictions The au_thority of a li,censinn bnard *-
_ _ _w _ _._
_ jion to
~ __
___.____._____,_m._
avoic celay and to maintair: arder cannot be questione..
See 10 C.F.R.
--3/
See e.g. Tr. 6658 where Mr. Schuessler was denied cross-examination Eased on his absence from the proceeding.
52.718. A presiding officer has all powers necessary to acconolish these ends, including the power to "[r]egulate the course of the hearing and the conduct of the participants." 10 C.F.R. 92.718(e). These powers are further delineated in 10 C.F.R. 62.757.iierein it states that the presiding officer may:
(b) Strike argunentative, repetitious, cumulative, or irrelevant evidence; (c) Take necessary and proper measures to prevent argumentative, repetitious, or cumulative cross-examination; and (d)
Impose such time limitations on arguments as he determines appropriate, having reaard for the volume of the evidence and the importance and complexity of the issues involved.
The above regulations reflect the Corrnission's intent to conduct proceedings expeditiously and to assure that procedures maintain sufficient flexibility to accommodate that objective. This intent is " founded upon the recognition that fairness to all the parties in such cases and the obligation of administrative agencies to conduct their functions with efficiency and econony, require that Commission adjudications be conducted without unnecessary delays." 10 C.F.R. Part 2, App. A.
The discretion of a licensing board to impose procedural limitations on parties to avoid unnecessary delays is also well founded in NRC case law.
It is recognized that such matters as the scooe of cross-examination and the parties that may e~ ace in it are committed to the discretion of the
.
.=-x
-.-. - - - = _
=
case.
Public Service Comoany of Indiana (Marble Hill, Units 1 and 2),
. ALAB-461, 7 NRC 313, 316 (1978).
In its discretion, the Board may " halt immediately cross-exanination which manifestly is making no contribution to the ventilation of the issues in contest but, rather, is productive simply of delay and an unduly encumbered record." Northern States Power Compan,E (Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-244, 8 AEC 857, 868 (1974).
The Board is also empowered to require an advance indication respecting what the intervenor will attempt to demonstrate or ascertain through cross-examination and to preclude or limit such cross-examination it determines will be of no value to the development of a full record on the issue involved.
Id. at 869; Northern States Power Company (Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-288, 2 NRC 390, 393 (1975).
In summation, there is ample authority which indicates that a licensing board is empowered to take appropriate action to avoid delay, to regulate the course of the hearing and the conduct of the participants. These actions can include the restriction of cross-examination as well as the outright denial of cross-examination rights under certain circumstances. We now turn to the question of whether this Board abused its discretion by imposing such restrictions and prohibitions in this proceeding.
B.
Restrictions on Cross-examination TEXPIRG has asserted error with respect to the Board's restriction of
==~ ~
T-- ~- 3= ?i +;t=y =ya 1 =KPM=~- ~g= M5-5======= - -- ~= - ' -
-n =: =
. -. = :
.. = _.
1.
TEXPIRG argues that the Board has improperly limited the scope of intervenor cross-examination by restricting examination to "the literal direct testinony, instead of the scope of the contention." Motion, para. 3.
It also complains that the scope of the contention (presumably addressed in the direct testimony) is restricted to the literal basis set forth in the I_d.
contention.
d Staff must necessarily respond to this assertion of error in two parts.
First, it is clear that under the Federal Rules of Evidence (Fed. R. Evid. 611(b)) and the Commission's rules of practice (Prairie Island, supra, ALAB-244, 8 AEC at 867, petition for reconsideration denied, 8 AEC 1175, aff'd,1 NRC 1 (1975)), cross-examination is to be strictly confined to the direct examination of that witness. Thus, TEXPIRG has no legal basis to assert error in this regard.
Second, the thrust of TEXPIRG's other argument is that the literal interpretation of the scope of the contention has been too restricted and, accordingly, it has been precluded from examining areas that it has felt relevant to the contention. See e_.g. Tr. 2781-89; 2933-37. However, after a review of the record, it is apparent that TEXPIRG has a misunderstanding of the proper scope of cross-examination in these proceedings. TEXPIRG's counsel has admitted that he seeks to examine witnesses on any matter relevant to the "overall decision as to whether or not this project meets
- - -- -- apsvgy - pm-A._--amo. g,
.wwwf 3--+#.
r 1 o-a-m
,w %mm mm.
--rign to eron-ensit.e un eWt.r-ime thet -this -333r?M-;He i dc.,%t-
- ~ - ~ -'
just those that the intervenors may have specifically listed as bases for Contentions." Tr. 2937.
It is clear that TEXPIRG has tried to expand the pernissible scope of cross-examination allowed by the Commission's Rules of Practice.
Although the Board has generally given all intervenors wide latitude in the scope of cross-examination, it certainly has not abused its discretion in the instances cited by TEXPIRG by restricting examination to the scope of the direct testimony or the contention being addressed.
Accordingly, this allegation has no merit.
2.
TEXPIRG claims error in that the Board prevented effective cross-examination by demanding that a " cross-examiner tell the witness what his goal was."
Motion, para. 4(a). TEXPIRG's own citations to the record demonstrate, however, that the Board attempted to elicit fron Mr. Scott the purpose of his line of questions not to alert the witness (as TEXPIRG claims), but to prevent repetitious, cumulative or irrelevant cross-exanination. See Tr. 4102-06, 4944-54.
The Appeal Board has held that a licensing board is empowered to require an advance indication respecting what the intervenor will attempt to demonstrate or ascertain through cross-examination and to preclude or limit such cross-exanination it deter-mines will be of no value to the development of a full record on the issue involved.
ALAB-244, suora, 8 AEC 857 at 869. Accordingly, tne action complained of by TEXPIRG has been sanctioned by the Appeal Board and, thus,
, - m -,r
.. -,.- m g.+,. g,-. g
-o
_ __.. __ __ _eXeJLh EiO f -i_L5_m e1% _ _ - _ _
_]
In addition, we would note that TEXPIRG has not cited any instance 4
whereby it was pret.4 Sd from pursuing a legitimate line of inquiry.
Therefore, it has shom no prejudice as a result of the Board's actions in this regard.
3.
TEXPIRG finally asserts error because the Board unduly restricted cross-examination by either refusing cross-examination to continue or by placing time limitations on the completion of examination. Motion, paras. 4(c) and 4(d). Again, TEXPIRG's citations to the record on these assertions demon-strate that these restrictions on cross-examination were reasonable under the circunstances to prevent argumentative, repetitious, cumulative or irrelevant cross-examination.
See Tr. 3075-81, 4958-59, 5042-51, 5083-5088.
Since TEXPIRG has not asserted nor shown any prejudice as a result of these restrictions, it has not met its burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion.
Accordingly, the Board's actions were within the scope of its discretion.
In summation, TEXPIRG has complained of numerous instances where the Board has restricted its cross-examination. TEXPIRG has not asserted nor shown that it has been prejudiced by these actions. Since the Board can take necessary and proper measures to prevent argumentative, repetitious or cumulative cross-examination and can impose such time limitations on arguments as it deems appropriate, these actions were clearly within its scope of authority. Absent any prejudice shown, there clearly is no abuse of discretion by the Board in imposing these reasonable and proper restrictions on cross-examination.
C.
Prohibitions on Cross-examination 1.
TEXPIRG asserts error in that the " Board has required that all
_ ------- q,. y.,.
-s. y - -y& -,~,.m q 21-+y_, -.-
...u y -
lU_.__ 290m.;em.L::Thb f MEIPinff9T;lt.farea11_ginrect--the Sacrd has imposed no such requirement. What the Board has required, in an attempt I
_ 10 _
to regulate the course of the hearing and the conduct of the participants, is that all parties who wish to cross-examine a particular witness, must be present throughout the duration of that examinaticn until it is that parties' turn to cross-examine.
If any party is absent during cross-examination, the Board has determined the party waives its right to any further cross-examination of that particular witness. Tr. 5973-77, 6171, 6181-89, 6233-40, 6304, 6657-59.
It further ruled that intervenors would proceed with cross-examination in alphabetical sequence; however, if another sequence of examination was agreed to by the parties prior to the beginning of cross-examination, that would be permissible and accommodated by the Board.
Tr. 6233-34.
The Staff submits that these procedural devices to regulate the course of the proceeding and the conduct of the participants are reasonable when viewed in the context of this proceeding.
To have no such limitations would result in (a) repetitious and cumulative cross-examination, and (b) the inability to establish schedules which would facilitate witness travel and participants' preparation on given issues.
3.
TEXPIRG claims that the Board improperly applied the Appeal Board's decision in Prairie Island (ALAB-244), suora, to prevent intervenor Rentfro from cross-examining on contentions other than his one admitted contention regarding the health effects of high voltage transmission lines.
However, TEXPIRG has misconstrued both the Licensing Board's ruling in
- WM.~~,75G;Q:=K:W:D ;- 9.;W&a-- J:4.K====.="~==-
- ~Z
{TG3MT46T,-the-B6ErdlidJot -h6TdTthaTPiFaiMe TsTahd prevents-an-----
_ 11 intervenor from cross-examining on another party's contentions, but rather the Board applied a portion of the Prairie Island rule which prevents such cross-examination unless an intervenor has a "discernibu intarest' in the contention on which he wishes to cross-examine.
(8 AEC at 868 and
- n. 15). S Since the statement of interest in Mr. Rentfro's petition to intervene only discusses the proxinity of high voltage transmission lines to his residence, the Board properly refused to permit hin to cross-examine Applicant's witness on the effects of heavy metals in the Allens Creek cooling lake.
The Board explained on the record that this holding was directed only to Mr. Rentfro and that it was based on the narrowness of his petition to intervene.
(Tr. 3846). TEXPIRG's argument is legally and factually flawed and should be rejected by the Board.
D.
Other Allegations of Board Error TEXPIRG's Motion also contains assertions of Board error with regard to actions or rulings other than those limiting cross-examination. These allegations of error are set forth in the Applicant's Response, pp.14-16.
These allegations of error pertain to Board actions or rulings which are factually documented on the record and concern generally (1) the dismissal of witnesses in the absence of TEXPIRG, (2) the holding of extra hearing sessions, and (3) the admission of Staff and Applicant environmental documents.
Since Staff is in substantial agreement with Applicant's response to these assertions of error, we will not attempt to duplicate Applicant's efforts in this response.
As a general statement, the Staff submits that these allegations of error do
- ~not aenvrim.
do u s.
w.. i. on oerm C n
- c. r. c.
.. :.m s
~~
~
'- ~ ~ ~takeh~by tW BoafraF~e cTearly~witfilh its power and aiithoMty 'as set ~torth ~
~ ~ ~ ~ ~
in 10 C.F.R. 62.718.
_5_/
This " discernible interest" standard was affirmed by the Commission in Northern States Power Company (Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-75-1,1 NRC 1 (1975).
E.
Conclusion Regarding Reconsideration of Board's Procedural Restrictions As is evidenced by the foregoing discussion and a review of the record, TEXPIRG has asserted error with regard to the Board's actions or ruling:
which have imposed procedural restrictions on the intervenors. Most of the procedural restrictions alleged to be in error have been enacted in order for the Board to properly regulate the course of the proceeding and the conduct of the parties.
Specifically, the Board has imposed certain procedural rules to ensure that parties who wish to cross-examine on a given issue are in attendance throughout the duration of that witness' examination in order to prevent reDetitious and cumulative questions.
As has been shown, this attendance rule is certainly within the Board's discretionary power to impose and TEXPIRG has neither asserted nor shown prejudice as a result of this requirement. 5 Accordingly, any allegation of error with respect to this attendance requirement must be denied because no abuse of discretion has been shown.
In addition, to prevent argumentative, repetitious, cumulative or irrelevant cross-examination, the Board has restricted cross-examination in some instances by prohibiting any further questions in a given area or by setting time limitations.
As the record indicates, these restrictions
_6/ Since this ruling was imposed, it appears intervenors, including IEXPlRG JN adanteMuite..xell_tn._this r9rptire.::ent..by giyiag_.cpLt ___ __,,
-- e7=fMtmn gram
.s cW rtnnTvenm r-N tky -bvmy-e c.
~ = ~ =..
_.. _ be in_ attendance, _ See e,a m Tr. 7965, 7998_-8011.
have been justified in light of the character and relevancy of the cross-examination when the restriction was imposed. Again, TEXPIRG has neither asserted nor shown how it has suffered prejudice as a result of these restrictions.
Since these restrictions are clearly within the Board's exercise of powers, and no prejudice has been shown, there is no abuse of discretion. Accordingly, any allegations of error with respect to these restrictions on cross-exanination must be denied.
Finally, since the TEXPIRG Motion does not demonstrate an abuse of dis-cretion, TEXPIRG's request for certain remedial actions to permit intervenors further cross-examination privileges (Motion, Part II) must also be denied.
Therefore, the Staff submits the motion for reconsideration must be dismissed.
F.
Referral and Certification Under Sections 2.730(f) and 2.71 8(i )
The Commission's regulations set forth in 10 C.F.R. 52.730(f) proscribe interlocutory appeals to the Appeal Board except in cases where the Licensing Board in its discretion determines that a prompt review of its ruling "is necessary to prevent detrinent to the public interest or unusual delay or ex p e n s e.... "- 7_ / If the Board makes such a determination, it may refer its ruling to the Appeal Board for decision. 8_,/
No specific criteria for
,7/
If the Board has issued a ruling on a particular issue, referral under 62.730(f) is the proper procedure rather than certification under 52.718(i).
Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2),
c
_ 7 t m -WF"W N
m
_ rf_
-_j__._- _ _
__ _ __ zg_The Appeqi_ Luerd iporrefjagto _dcceutJcT-reftetr.al--frpin.1 _L icti;s i r - ___ _n _ _ _
tt Board where there has been no strong showing that 92.730(f) criteria have been met.
See, e.g., C_onsumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-438, 6 NRC 638 (1977); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-293, 2 NRC 660 (1975).
14 -
certification are set forth in the provisions of 52.718(i), but the standards P
under this section are no less than those for referral.
Public Service Co.
of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAS-271, 1 NRC 478, 483 (1975).
The general policy of the Commission, however, does not favor certification of an issue during the pendency of a proceeding, Id. at 483, and certification is the exception and not the rule, Toledo Edison Company, et al. (Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station), ALAB-300, 2 NRC 752, 759 (1975).
Moreover, the Appeal Board has made it clear that it will undertake discretionary interlocutory review only sparingly, and only if the Licensing Board's ruling (a) threatens the party adversely affected with immediate and serious irreparable harm which could not be remedied by a late appeal or (b) affects the basic structure of the proceeding in a pervasive or unusual manner.
Pennsylvania Power & Light Co. (Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-593,11 NRC 761, 762 (1980); Accor d, Public Service Co. of Indiana (Marble Hill, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-405, 5 NRC 1190,1192 (1977).
See, Houston Lightina & Power Company (South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2),
ALAB-608,12 NRC 168,169 (1980).
TEXPIRG has failed to demonstrate that referral or certification of its seven questions is warranted under the criteria of 552.730(f) or 2.718(i).
On page 6 of its motion, TEXPIRG lists seven o"eitions which it seeks to
~~~
~~
nave tene
_ _, t w Ar. t
-c<.e e ocaresses tne
~ ~ ir~ikekaio efeNil or cer ific5 io Uk s seven qu tions to Oielppeal~
- :5 -
^
Board. The only justification provided by TEXPIRG to support its request for interlocutory review is TEXPIRG's belief that the Licensing Board has committed " reversible error." TEXPIRG states that the Licensing Board should correct its errors "or refer its ruling to the Appeal Board so they can promptly set the standards to be used in this proceeding."
(Motion,
- p. 4).
This conclusory statement hardly provides an adequate basis to justify an exception to the rule prohibiting interlocutory appeals.
The Appeal Board has made it clear that its role is not to ronitor a Licensing Board's ruling on what evidence is admissible and in what
" procedural franework it may be adduced." Toledo Edison Comoany (Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-314, 3 NRC 98, 99 (1976).
In that case, the Appeal Board specifically noted that during the course of a proceeding a licensing board almost inevitably will be called upon to make numerous determinations respecting what evidence is permissible and in what procedural framework it may be adduced. Were we to allow ourselves to be cast in the role of a day-to-day monitor of those determinations, we would have little time for anything else.
All of the questions sought to be certified by TEXPIRG fall within the categories of " permissible evidence" or " procedural framework." E/
_9/ These questions can be briefly summarized as follows:
a-____em o 2 m u. _ g um,,
m m,u _. t. :2 n x n a _5 ' _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __,
-t _ _
m.
.- - 2~.~~Did ~the Board ~ improperly 3torTEXFIRG= frow &ois-examination t 3.
Did the Board improperly prohibit Mr. Rentfro from cross-examination on issues that he had no discernible interest?
FOOTNOTE CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE
16 -
As we have discussed at length above, the Licensing Board was totally justified in exercising its discretion to regulate the course of the hearing and the conduct of the.carties by imposing reasonable restrictions on the cross-examination of either docur.entary evidence or written testimony. Nothing in TEXPIRG's motion demonstrates that the Board abused its discretion with respect to TEXPIRG's right of cross-exanination, nor does it show how it suffered any prejudice as a result of the Board's restrictions. Accordingly, Appeal Board review is not warranted on any of these questiens.
IV.
CONCLUSI0'i Based on the foregoing, TEXPIRG's motions seeking (1) reconsideration of various Licensing Board rulings with respect to procedural matters; (2) referral of an interlocutory appeal; and (3) certification of various issues should be denied.
Respectfully submitted,
/3, dfE'J U s v.b I
i Richard L.' Black Counsel for NRC Staff Dated at Bethesda, Maryland this 13th day of March,1981
_9' FOOTNOTE CONTINUED FROM PRECEDING PAGE 4.
Did the Board improperly dismiss witnesses in the absence of TEXPIRG?
Z--
-Li;., -- -- =
2s=.,_---
EFT ;4" -W ET-- - ---
FES and the Applicant's ER Supplement to be placed into evidence?
6.MhoUldTnedoaTo ~breppo7nted~orTne~KppeiTBoard provTde some
" firm direction" to the existing Board?
7.
Should the present hearings be delayed until the above questions are answered by the Appeal Board?