ML19347C210
| ML19347C210 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 09/15/1980 |
| From: | Mills L TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19347C205 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8010170031 | |
| Download: ML19347C210 (3) | |
Text
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORIT d
CHATTANOOGA.; TENNESSEE 37401 400 Chestnut Stireet Tower II g
September 15, 1980 J'
19 n9: IS Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II - Suite 3100 101 Marietta Street Atlanta, Georgia 30303
Dear Mr. O'Reilly:
SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 - NRC-0IE LETTER RII:WIC 50-327/80 INSPECTION REPORT - RESPONSE TO ITEMS OF NONCOMPLIANCE The subject letter dated August 21, 1980, cited TVA with one infrac. tion and one deficiency in accordance with 10 CFR 2.201.
Enclosed is our response to these items of noncompliance.
If you have any questions, please get in touch with D. L. Lambert at FTS 857-2581.
Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY n.M
. M. Mills,, nager Nuclear Regulation and Safety Enclosure cc:
Mr. Victor Stello, Director (Enclosure)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 4
5 8 O 1Q 17$h3k$
An Equal Opportunity Employer
.m e
ENCLOSURE SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 RESPONSE TO INFRACTION 327/80-25-01 AND DEFICIENCY 327/80-25-02 Infraction 327/80-25-01 As required by 10 CFR 73 55(d)(7), "The licensee shall positively control all points of personnel access into vital areas..."
In addition Section 5.2.1 of the Sequoyah Physical Security Plan (PSP) states that "All vital areas barriers will be resistant to penetration. The penetration resistance of. the barriers will not be diminished' by doors, windows and 1
other openings in the barriers."
i Contrary to the above:
1.
On June 23, 1980, a vital area door was removed for maintenance without i
adequate compensatory measures being provided to control access into the vital area.
2.
On June 20, 1980,, a protective grating was removed from a vital area barrier opening to provide access to the area for maintenanca personnel without adequate. compensatory measures being provided to control access into the vital area.
1 Corrective Action Taken and Results Achieved The discrepancies described above have been corrected.
Outage and maintenance employees have been informed of the importance of vital area barriers and of the requirement to positively control employee access into these areas. These employees have also been informed to coordinate all future work of this nature more closely with Public Safety 1
l Services.
l 4
Public Safety Services has revised their administrative procedures to provide more explicit instructions for establishing and maintaining compensatory measures to control access into vital areas. Public Safety Services Memorandum Instruction Number 2, Revision 2, dated June 20, 1980, contains these instructions..
Corrective Steps Which Will Be Taken to Avoid Further Noncompliance No fbrther corrective action is planned at this time.
Date When Full Compliance Will Be Achieved We are now in fall compliance.
O 4
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Deficiency 327/80-25-02 e.
' As required by Technical Specification 6.8.1, written procedures shall be established, implemented and maintained covering activities listed in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1 33. Revision 2, February 1978. Methods for temporary change are implemented by AI-9 Control of Temporary Alterations and the use of Temporary Alteration Orders. Section 7.1 of AI-9 states that "All temporary alterations of Critical Systems, Structures and Components which are designated as operable shall be performed...using instructions as specified on a Temporary Alteration Control Form which has been reviewed by PORC and approved by the plant superintendent." In addition, "the Temporary Alteration Order is always required when using this method" to properly identify to the control room operator the temporary condition.
Contrary to the above, on June 25, 1980, the ice condenser inlet doirs were blocked shut with temporary mechanical stops. The use of mechanical stops constituted a temporary alteration of a critical system, designated as operable, and was done without the use of a Temporary Alteration Control Form or Temporary Alteration Order.
l Corrective Action Taken and Results Achieved l
The discrepancy described above has been corrected. At this time, there has been no further deficiencies in the use of Temporary Alteration Control i
Form.
The plant staff and operations employees have been reminded of the proper methods for implementing and controlling temporary alterations. The General Employee Training and Operator Retraining Programs contain training classes covering the control of temporary alterations and the use of temporary alteration orders.
Corrective Steps Which Will Be Taken to Avoid Further Noncompliance No further corrective actions are planned at this time.
Date When Full Compliance Will Be Achieved We are now in compliance.
O
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