ML19345H647
| ML19345H647 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 05/11/1981 |
| From: | Dircks W NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO) |
| To: | Chilk S NRC OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SECY) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19345H645 | List: |
| References | |
| REF-10CFR9.7 SECY-81-267, NUDOCS 8105210535 | |
| Download: ML19345H647 (72) | |
Text
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k UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 MAY 111981
+,...
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Samuel J. Chilk, Secretary of the Comission FROM:
William J. Dircks, Executive Director for Operations TRANSMITTAL OF DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY COMMENTS ON MARCH 5, 1981
SUBJECT:
DRAFT OF 10 CFR PART 60 TECHNICAL CRITERIA AND RESOLUTION OF 00E COMMENTS Enclosed is a copy of the April 24, 1981 letter to John B. Martin from Sheldon Meyers, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Waste Management, Department of Energy (D0E), comenting on a draft of the 10 CFR Part 60 technical criteria that was distributed at the NRC-sponsored symposturr. on 10-13, 1981 high-level wast'e disposal held in Gatlinburg, Tennessee, March (Attachment 1).
These coments were discussed in a meeting with DOE staff on May 6, 1981, where it was agreed that a number of the comments were not applicable to the proposed rule forwarded to the Comission with SECY 267 and clarification of the NRC staff's intent on a number of other items was requested. contains proposed revisions to Enclosure A of SECY-81-267 in response to these DOE coments in comparative text. provides a discussion of the resolution of the coments. identifies a number of additional clarifying changes to proposed Subpart E.
The working draft of the Environmental Protection Agency High Level Waste Standard requested by Chairman Hendrie is being sent separately to the Comissioners.
l
[
b~
u William J7 M Executive Director for Operations
Contact:
M. J. Bell (WMHL) 42-74173 M
8105210
[7590-01]
i Q
ENCLOSURE A Supplementary Information and draft Technical Criteria
[7590-01]
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 10 CFR Part 60 Subparts E, F, G, H DISPOSAL OF HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTES IN GEOLOGIC REPOSITORIES:
TECHNICAL CRITERIA AGENCY:
Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION:
Proposed Rule.
SUMMARY
The NRC is publishing proposed amendments which specify technical' criteria for disposal of high-level radioactive wastes (HLW) in geologic repositories.
The proposed criteria address siting, design, and performance of a geologic repository, and the design and performance of the package which contains the waste within the geologic repository.
Also included are criteria for monitoring and testing programs, performance confirmation, quality assurance, and personnel training and certification.
DATE:
Comments received after [90 days after publication] will be considered
.if it is practical to do so, but assurance of consideration cannot be given except for comments received on or before this date.
f l
ADDRESS:
Written comments or suggestions on the proposed amendments should be sent to the Secretary of the Nuclear Regulatory Ccmmission, Washington, D.C.
20555, Attention:
Docketing and Service Branch.
Copies of comments may be l
examined in the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Public Document Room, 1717 H Street NW., Washington, D.C.
1 Enclosure A
[7590-01]
4 4
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Frank J. Arsenault, Director of the Division of Health, Siting and Waste Management, Office of Nuclear Regu-latory Research, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C.
20555, Telephone (301) 427-4350.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
On December 6, 1979 the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Commission or NRC) published for comment proposed procedures for licensing geologic disposal of high-level radicactive wastes.
The licensing procedures were published in final form on February 25, 1981 (46 FR 13971).
On May 13, 1980 (45 FR 31393) the Commission published for comment an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking concerning -technical criteria for regulating dis-posal of high-level radioactive wastes (HLW) in geologic repositories.
Included with the advance notice was a draft of the technical criteria under development by the staff. The public was asked to provide comment on several issues discussed in the advance notice and to reflect on the draft technical criteria in light of that discussion.
The comments received l
were numerous and covered the full range of issues related to the technical l
criteria.
The technical criteria being proposed here reflect some changes from the ANPR made in consideration of those comments.
The Commission l
has prepared an analysis of the comments which explains the changes made from the ANPR, and intends to publish soon the comments and the analysis as a NUREG document.
A draft of this NUREG has been placed in the Commission's Public Document Room for review.
In addition, the staff has begun a program to develoo guidance as to the methods that it regards as satisfactory for demonstrating comoliance with the reouirements of the oracosed rule.
2 Enclosure A
[7590-01])
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The technical criteria being set forth here as proposed rulemaking are a result of the Commission's further effort in regulating geologic disposal of HLW by the Department of Energy (DOE).
The rationale for the performance objectives and Environmental Impact Assessment supporting this rulemaking are also available in the Commission's Public Document Room.
In developing these criteria we have not reexamined DOE's program-matic choice of disposal technology resulting from its Generic Environmental Impact Statement, inasmuch as the Commission has expressly reserved until a later time possible consideration of matters within the scope of that generic statement (44 FR 70408).
Accordingly, the technical criteria apply only to disposal in geologic repositories and do not address other possible or potential disposal methods.
Similarly', in that DOE's current plans call for disposal at sufficient depth to be in the area termed the saturated zone, these criteria were developed for disposal in saturated media.
Additional or alternative criteria may need to be developed for regulating disposal in the nonsaturated or "vadose zone".
Authority Sections 202(3) and (4) of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, provide the Commission with licensing and regulatory authority I
regarding DOE facilities used primarily for the receipt and storage of high-level radioactive wastes resulting from activities licensed under the Atomic Energy Act and certain other long-term HLW storage facilities of the 00E.
Pursuant to that authority, the Commission is developing criteria appropriate to regulating geologic disposal of HLW by the 00E.
The requirements and criteria contained in this proposed rule are a result l
of that effort.
3 Enclosure A
[7590-01]
Relation to Generally Applicable Sta'ndards for Radiation in the Environment Established by the Environmental Protection Agency The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has the authority and respon-sibility for setting generally applicable standards for radiation in the environinent.
It is the responsibility of the NRC to implement those standards in its licensing actions and assure that the public health and safety are protected.
Although no EPA standard for disposal of HLW yet exists, these proposed technical criteria for regulating geologic disposal of HLW have been developed to be compatible with a generally applicable environmental standard.
Specifically, the performance objectives and criteria speak to the functional elements of geologic disposal of HLW and the analyses required to give confidence that these functional elements will perform as intended.
Disruptive Processes and Events The NRC's implementing regulations assume that licensing decisions will be based, in part, on the results of analysis of the consequences of processes and events which potentially could disrupt a repository.
Thus, throughout the criteria are requirements that the design basis take into account processes and events with the potential to disrupt a geologic repository.
If the process or event is anticipated, i.e., likely, then the design basis requires barriers which would not fail in any way that would result in the repository's not meeting its performance objectives.
If the process or event is Jnlikely, then the overall system must still limit the release of radionuclides.
l Multiple Barriers The proposed technical criteria were developed not only with the understanding that EPA's generally applicable environmental standard 4
Enclosure A
[7590-01]
4 would need to be implemented, at least in part, by performing calcula-tions to predict performance, but also with the knowledge that some of those calculations would be complex and uncertain.
Natural systems are difficult to characterize and any understanding of the site will have significant limitations and uncertainties.
Those properties which pertain to isolation of HLW are difficult to measure and the measurements which are made will be subject to several sources of error and uncertainty.
The physical and chemical processes which isolate the wastes are themselves varied and complex.
Further, those processes are especially difficult to understand in the area close to the emplaced wastes because that area is physically and chemically disturbed by the heat generated by those wastes.
However, a geologic repository consists of engineered features as well as the natural geologic environment.
Any evaluation of repository
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performance, therefore, will consider the waste form and other engineering which is elemental to the repository as a system.
By partitioning of
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the engineered system into two major barriers, the waste package and the underground facility, and establishing performance objectives for each, the Commission has sought to exploit the ability to design the engineered features to meet specific performance objectives as a means of reducing some of the uncertainties in the calculations of overall repository performance.
In addition, the requirements for containment, controlled release rate, and 1000 year groundwater tran;it time are three criteria which act independ-ently of the overall repository performance to provide confidence that the wastes will be isolated at least for as long as they are most hazardous.
Enclosure A 5
[7590-01]
Containment and Isolation During the first several hundred years following emplacement of the wastes, both the radioactivity of and the heat generated by the wastes are attributeble mainly to the decay of the short-lived nuclides, primarily fission products.
At about one thousand years after emplacement both the radioactivity and heat generated have dimin'shed by about three orders of magnitude.
As the decay of the long-lived isotopes, primarily actinides, begins to dominate, both the raficactivity and thermal output of the wastes continue to fall until almost ole hundred thousand to one million years after emplacement.
By that time both have diminished by about 5 orders of magni.tude and both heat and radioactivity become roughly constant due to the ingrowth of daughter isotopes, primarily Ra 225, Ra 226 and their daughters.
The technical criteria would require the engineered system to be designed so that the wastes are contained within the waste package for the first thousand years following emplacement.
Following this period, containment is no longer assumed and the function of the waste package and underground facility is to control the release of radionuclides from the underground facility.
By requiring containment during the period when the thermal conditions around the waste packages are most severe, evaluation of repository performance is greatly simplified to considerations of the degree of conservatism in the containment design relative to events and processes that might affect the performance during the containment period.
Although both the radioactivity of and heat generated by the decay of the wastes have diminished about 3 orders of magnitude during the containment period, the area surrounding the emplaced wastes will not 6
Enclosure A
[7590-01]
o return to temperatures near those before the wastes were emplaced until after about 104 years.
As mentioned earlier, the thermal disturbance of the area near the emplaced wastes adds significantly. to the uncertain-ties in the calculation of the transport of the radioisotopes through the geologic environment.
The technical criteria are intended to compen-sate for uncertainties by imposing further design requirements on the waste package and underground facility, thereby limiting the source term by controlling the release rate.
Role of the Site The Commission neither intends nor expects either containment to be lost completely at 1,000 years following emplacement or the engineered I
system's contribution to the control of the release of wastes to cease abruptly at some later time.
However,.the Commission recognizes that at some point the design capabilities of the engineered system will be lost and that the geologic setting--the site--must provide the isolation of the wastes from the environment, and has translated this requirement into The Commission also a performance objective for the geologic setting.
recognizes that isolation is, in fact, a controlled relesse to Y..e environment which could span hundreds of thousands of years, and that the release of radioisotopes, and the potential exposures to individuals which could result, should be addressed in the evaluation of a repository.
A complement to the evaluation of the effects of design basis processes and events which might disrupt the repository is a projection of how the repository, unperturbed by discrete external events, will evolve through the centuries as a result of the geologic processes operating at the site.
Hence, an amendment is being proposed to that portion of Subpart 8 of 10 CFR Part 60 which describes the contents of the Safety Analysis Report of DOE's Enclosure A 7
[7590-01]
application for geologic disposal of HLW which would require DOE to (1) project the expected performance of the proposed geologic repository noting the rates and quantities of expected releases of radioisotopes to the accessible environments as a function of time, and (2) estimate likely maximum individual doses to humans which could result from those releases.
Retrievability The licensing procedures of 10 CFR Part 60 were written assuming that there would be a program of testing and measurement of the thermal, mechanical, and chemical properties of the major engineered barriers to confirm their expected performance.
The Commission would like to tie the requirement for retrievability of the wastes to the expected time needed to execute the performance confirmation program.
However, at present it appears to the Commission that neither the specific nature nor the ceriod needed for execution of the performance confirmation program will be certain until construction of the repository is substantially complete; that is, until the actual licensing to receive wastes at a geologic repository.
Hence it is difficult at this time to use the performance confirmation program as a basis for establishing a period of retrievability.
Nonetheless, the DOE is now making critical decisions regarding the design of geologic repositories which will have a direct effect upon how long the option to retrieve wastes can be maintained, and upon the difficulty which will be encountered in exercising that option, should that be necessary for protection of the public health and safety.
Therefore, as a practical matter, the proposed rule sets l
forth a requirement that the engineered system be designed so that the option i
to retrieve the waste can be preserved for up to fifty years following comple-tion of emplacement.
Thus, the wast.e package and the underground facility 8
Enclosure A
[7500-01]
j j
e would be designed so that their natural degradation would not be the deter-minant of when the Commission would decide whether to permit closure of the repository.
Rather, t'a Commission would be assured of the option to let the conduct cf the performance confirmation program indicate when it is appropriate to make such a decision.
In particular, the Commission is concerned that the thermo-mechanical design of the underground facility be such that the openings can be maintained until the Commission either decides to permanently close the repository or to take corrective action, which may include retrieval.
The Commission does not want to apnrove construction of a design which will foreclose options for future decisionmakers.
The retrievability requirement does not specify the form in which the wastes are to be retrievable or that wastes by "readily retrievable."
The requirement is simply that all the wastes be retrievable during a
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period equal to the period of construction and emplacement.
The DOE's plans for retrieval are specifically requested as part of its license application and the practicability of its proposal will be considered by the staff.
H,uman Intrusion Some concern has been raised on the issue of human intrusion into a geologic repository.
Human intrusion could conceivably occur either inadvertent 1v or deliberately.
Inadvertent intrusion is the accidental breaching of the repository in the course of some activity unrelated to the existence of the repository, e.g., exploration for or development of resources.
For inadvertent intrusion to or. cur, the institutional controls, site markers, public records, and societal memory of the repository's existence must have been ineffective or have ceased to exist.
Deliberate 9
Enclosure A
[7590-01]
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or intentional intrusion, on the other hand, assumes a conscious decision to breach the repository; for example, in order to recover the high-level waste itself, or exploit a mineral associated with the site.
Historical evidence indicates that there is substantial continuity of information transfer over time.
There are numerous examples of knowledge, including complex information, being preserved for thousands of years.
This has occurred even in the absence of printing and modern information transfer and storage systems.' Furthermore, this information transfer has survived disruptive events, such as wars, natural disasters, and dramatic changes in the social and political fabric of societies.
The combination of the historical record of information transfer, provisions for a well-marked and extensively documented site location, and the scale and technologj of the operation needed to drill deeply enough to penetrate a geologic repository argue strongly that inadvertent intrusion as described above is highly improbable, at least for the first several hundred years during which the wastes are most. hazardous.
Selecting a site for a repository which is unattractive with respect to both resource value and scientific interest further adds to the improbability of inadvertent human intrusion.
It is also logical to assume that any future generation possessing the technical capability to locate and explore for resources at the depth of a repository would also possess the capability to assess the nature of the material discovered, to mitigate consequences of the breach and to reestablish administrative control over the area if needed.
i Finally i: is inconsistent to assume the scientific and technical capability to identify and explore an anomalous heat source several hundred meters beneath the earth's surface and not assume thct those exploring 10 Enclosure A
[7590-01]
\\
would have some idea of either what might be the causa of the anomaly of J
what steps to take to mitigate any untoward consequence of that exploration.
The above arguments do not apply to the case of deliberate intrusion.
The repository itself could be attractive and invite intrusion simply because of the resource potential of t!.e wastes themselves.
Intrusion to recover the wastes demands (1) knowledge of the existence and nature of the repository, and (2) effort of the same magnitude as that undertaken to emplace the wastes.
Hence intrusion'of this sort can only be the result of a conscious, collective societal decision to recover the-wastes.
In light of the above, the proposed technical criteria are written to direct site selection towards selection of sites of little resourca value.
Further, the proposed criteria would require reliable documenta-tion of the existence and location of the repository and the nature of the wastes emplaced therein.
Intrusion for the purpose of sabotage or terrorism has also been mentioned as a possibility.
However, due to the nature of geologic disposal, there seems to be very little possibility that terrorists or l
saboteurs could breach a repository.
Breach of the repository would i
require extensive use of machinery for drilling and excavating over a considerable period of time.
It is highly improbable that a terrorist group could accomplish this covertly.
Major Features of the Procosed Rule 1.
Overall Description The proposed technical criteria have been written to address the following:
performance objectives and requirements for siting, h sign and coristruction of the repository, the waste package, confirmation of 11 Enclosure A
[7590-01]
o repository performance, quality assurance, and the training and certification of personnel.
As appropriate, these topics are divided in turn to address separately requirements which apply during construction, waste emplacement, and after closure of.the repository-the latter termed decommissioning.
Although the licensing procedures indicate that there would be separate subparts for siting and design requirements, viz.
Subparts E and F, respectively (cf. 660.31(a)(2)), the NRC now believes that the site and design are so interdependent that such a-distinction l
is artificial and misleading.
For example, although the requirement to
)
place the underground facility at a minimum depth of 300 meters is clearly a design requirement, it is manifested as a siting requirement since unless the site 6 a host rock of sufficient thickness at sufficient depth, the above design requir'ement cannot be met.
Hence the propcsed subpart E to 10 CFR Part 60 contains both site and design requirements.
To enable the Commission to reach a finding as to whether the generally applicable environmental standard for disposal of HLW is met and that the public health and safety will be protected, a careful and exhaustive analyses of all the features of the repository will be needed.
That analysis n~eces-sarily must be both qualitative and quantitative.
The analyses performed can and will be largely quantitative during the period that greatest reliance can be placed upon the engineered system, up to about 10,000 years after closure.
Thereafter, although the issues of concern, and'certainly the physics cf a repository itself, do not change, the numerical uncertainties begin to become so large that calculations become more indicative of expected repository behavior rather thaa definitive of actual performance.
Hence, such calculations will be supplemented more heavily by qualitative 12 Enclosure A
[7590-01].
descriptions, arguments, and analogs to achieve confidence in the success of a repository.
In sum, the technical criteria perform two tasks.
First they serve to guide DOE in siting, designing, constructing, and operating a reposi-tory in such a manner that there can be reasonable confidence that the public health and safety will be protected.
Second, they serve t:,,dide DOE in those same areas in such a manner that there can be reasonable confidence that the analyses needed to determine whether the public health 1
and safety is protected can be performed.
l 2..
Performance objectives The design and operation of the repository are prescribed to be such that during the period that wastes are being emplaced and performance assessed, exposure to workers and releases of radioactivity to the environ-ment must be within limits set by the Commission and the EPA.
- Further, j
the repository is to be designed so that the option can be preserved to retrieve the emplaced wastes beginning at anytime up to 50 years follow-ing completion of emplacement.
Following permanent closure, the reposi-
[
tory must perform so that releases are within the limits prescribed by l
the generally applicable environmental standard which will be set by the l
l EPA.
Further, the design of the repository must include a waste package and an underground facility, as well as the site, as barriers to radio-nuclide migration.
l The performance of the engineered system (waste package and underground facility) following permanent closure is specified to require containment of the wastes within t>.> waste package for at least 1,000 years following closure, when temperatures in the repository are substantially elevated, and control of the release of nuclides to the geologic environment thereafter.
13 Enclosure A
[7590-01]
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Transuranic waste (TRU) may be disposed of in a geologic repository.
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Since transuranic waste does not generate significant amounts of heat, there is no advantage to containment for any specified period.
- Hence, the requirement for TRU waste is simply a controlled release equivalent to that for HLW, provided they are physically separated from the HLW so that they wil not experience a significant increase in temperature.
l 3.
Siting Requirements Although no specific site suitability or exclusion requirements are given in the criteria, stability and minimum groundwater travel times are specified as required site characteristics.
In addition, the tech-nical criteria identify site characteristics considered favorable for a repository as well as characteristics which, if present at the site, would-lead to a presumption that the site is not suitable for hosting a repository.
The Commission has judged that these should not be made absolute requirements because the impact of these characteristics on overall performance would be site specific.
The Commission's approach requires that the ccmbination of conditions at the selected site provide reasonable assurance that the performance objectives will be achieved.
Further, if adverse conditions are identified as being present, they must be thoroughly characterized and analyzed and it must be demonstrated that the conditions are compensated for by repository design or by favorable conditions in the geologic setting.
4.
Design and Construction In addition to the requirements on designing for natural phenomena, criticality control, radiation protection, and effluent control, the proposed technical criteria require the design of the repository to accom-modate potential interaction of the waste, the underground facility, and 14 Enclosure A
[7590-01]
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the site.
Requirements are also placed upon the design of the equipment to be used for handling the wastes, the performance and purpose of the backfill material, and design and performance of borehole and shaft seels.
Further, there are requirements related to the methods of construction.
The Commission believes such requirements are necessary to assure that the ability of the repository to contain and isolate the wastes will not be compromis;d by the construction of the repository.
The proposed technical criteria would require that the subsurface facility be designed so that it could be constructed and operated in accordance with relevant Federal mining regulations, which specify design requirements for certain items of electrical and mechanical equipment and govern tue use of explosives.
These criteria are a blend of general and detailed prescriptive requirements.
They have been developed from Commission experience and practice in the licensing of other nuclear facilities such as power plants and fuel cycle facilities.
While there are differences in the systems and components addressed by these criteria from those of power plants or fuel cycle facilities, and the criteria have been written appropriate to a geologic repository, the proposed criteria represent a commoa practice cased on experience which has shown that the above items need to be regu-lated.
The level of detail of these criteria reflects the Commission's current thinking on how to regulate effectively geologic disposal of HLW.
Hc, wever, the Commission continues to examine other possibilities for pro-mulgating the more detailed of these requirements.
5.
Waste Package The proposed req,irements for the design of the waste package emphasize its role as a key component of the overall engineeied system.
j 15 Enclosure A
[7590-01]
Besides being required to contribute to the engineered system's meeting containment and controlled release performance objectives, both compati-bility with the underground facility and the site and a method of unique identification are required of the waste package.
Included in the sec-tion of the proposed technical criteria which deals with the waste pack-age are requirements that the waste form itself contained within the package be consolidated and non pyrophoric.
6.
Performance Confirmation The proposed technical criteria include requirements for a program of testing and measurement.
The main purpose of this program is to con-firm the assumptions, data, and analyses which led to the findings that permitted construction of the repository and subsequent emplacement of the wastes.
Further, the performance confirmation program includes requirements for monitoring of key geologic and hydrologic parameters throughout site characterization, construction, and emplacement to detect any significant changas in the conditions which supported the above find-ings during, or due to operations at the site.
Also included in the program would be tests of the effectiveness of borehole and shaft seals and of backfill placement procedures.
REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY CERTIFICATION:
In accordance with the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, 5 U.S.C. 605(b), the Commission hereby certifies that this rule will not, if promulgated, have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.
This proposed rule affects only the Department of Energy, and does not fall within the curview of the Act.
16 Enclosure A i
[7590-01]
Pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, as amended, and sections 552 and 553 of title 5 of the United States Code, notice is hereby given that adoption of the following amendments to Title 10, Chapter I, Code of Federal Regulations is contemplated.
1.
The authority citation for Part 60 reads as follows:
Authority:
Secs. 51, 53, 62, 63, 65, 81, 161b.,
f.,
i.,
o.,
p., 182, 183, Pub. L.83-703, as amended, 68 Stat. 929, 930, 932, 933, 935, 948, 1
953, 954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2071, 2073, 2092, 2093, 2095, 2111, 2201, 2232, 2233); Secs. 202, 206, Pub. L.93-438, 88 Stat.1244,1246 (42 U.S.C.
5842, 5846); Sec. 14, Pub. L.95-601 (42 U.S.C. 2021a); Sec. 102(2)(c),
Pub. L.91-190, 83 Stat. 853 (42 U.S.C. 4332).
2.
Section 60.2 is amended to read as fcllows:*
$60.2 Definitions For the purposes of this Part--
" Accessible Environment" means those portions of the environment directly in contact with or readily available for use by human beings.
[it includes-the-earth's-atmesphere--the-land-surface--surface-waters--and-the l
oceans:--it-aiso-includes presently-used potabie-aquifers and-these which h a v e-b e e n-d e s i g n ate d-a s - u n d e rg r o u n d-s o u rc e s-o f-dri n ki n g-wa te r-by-th e Environmentai-Protection-Agency ]
l AComparative text in which deletions are struck through and additions are underscored has been used for the proposed amendmer.ts to Section 60.2, 60.10, 60.21, and 60.51.
This is done for the Commission's convenience and comparative text will not be used in the Federal Register Notice.
I l
17
, Enclosure A
.