ML19345G987

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Amend 19 to License NPF-2,authorizing One Time Only Tech Spec Change Until 810515 to Allow Time for Mods to Dual Plant Svc Water Sys
ML19345G987
Person / Time
Site: Farley Southern Nuclear icon.png
Issue date: 04/03/1981
From: Varga S
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML19345G988 List:
References
NUDOCS 8104220992
Download: ML19345G987 (4)


Text

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  1. p** **Q3, UNITED STATES

[ *, d/-f( j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION e-C W ASHmGTON. D. C. 20555

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...T ALABAMA POWER COMPANY DOCKET NO. 50-348 JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT NO. 1 AMENCMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 19 License No. NPF-2 1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Comission (the Comission) has found that:

A.

The application for amendment by Alabama Power Company (the licensee) dated March 24, 1981, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Comission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Comission; C.

There is reasonable assurance (1) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations:

D.

The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security cr to the health and safety of tne public; and E,

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Comission's regulations and all applicable requf rements have been satisfied.

. 2.

Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-2 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Soecifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 19 are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3.

This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

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Attachment:

Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: April 3,1981

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT AMENDMENT NO. 19 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-2 DOCXET N0. 50-348 Revise Appendix A as follows:

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PLANT 3YSTEMS 3/4.7.4 SERVICE WATER SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION i

3.7.4 At least two independent service water loops shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MCDES 1, 2, 3 and 4 ACTION:

With only one service water loop OPERABLE, restore at least two loops to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> *ar be in at least HOT STANCBY within the l

next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTCOWN within the following 30 hou's.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.4 At least two service water loops shall be demonstrated OP RASLE:

a.

At least once per 31 days by verifying that each accessible valve (manual, power operated or automatic), in the flow path, servicing safety related equipment that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.

b.

At least once per 18 months during shutdown, by:

1.

Verifying that each automatic valve servicing safety related equipment actuates to its correct position on a safety injection test signal.

2.

Verifying that the buried piping is still leak tight by visual inspection of the ground area.

The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> action provision may be extended to be 10 days (for each system) for the recirculation portion of the Service water system. Modifications, affecting operability, will be made on only one of the two service water loops at the same time. One loop must remain fully operational until the other loop has been modified and is fully operational. All other portions of the service water system are not covered by this one time change. All modifications to both loops are scheduled for completion by about May 15, 1981.

'The orovisions of S_cecification 3.0.4 are not acolicable.

FARLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 7-16 Amendment No. 19

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UNITED STATES y ; c(f( j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

, g #/ p j WASHINGTON, D. C. 20556 f'b SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO. 19 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-2 ALABAMA POWER COMPANY JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT NO. 1 DOCKET NO. 50-348 Introduction By letter dated March 24, 1981, Alabama Power Company (APCO) proposed a change to Technical Specification 3.7.4 Service Water System ACTION Statement. The change is needed to allow tire for modifications to the dual plant (Units No.1 and No. 2) service water recirculation lines.

The current limiting condition for opevation allows 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> time should one service water loop become inoperable. APC0 estimates the recirculation line modifications would require ten days for each loop.

Only one train (loop) will be modified at a tima.

We have evaluated APCO's proposed Technical Specification changes and have made minor changes. These changes have been discussed with the APC0 staff who concur with our changes. Our discussion and evaluation are included herein.

Discussion The service water system for Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2 is shcwn on tne attached Figure 1.

The comnined river and service water systems are designec to seismic eategory I safaty class 3 and sing'le f ailure proof.

T.e river water intake system consists of :wo trains with five cumps decicated te eacn train.

Each train will ncrmally have fcur o:eratine

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Orin; ner.al :::eratiens valves i and 2 are nor ally ~ closed ~

wnile river water is ;um::ed :c :ne ::end via valves 3 anc 4 Enile in the pend, sil: settles cut and water ficws tc the service water wet

i wnicn acts as a cc=cn intake structure for :ne Uni: 1 and 2 service water systems.

Each uni: is su:: lied with redundant service water trains.

Eacn train nas five cecicatec service water pum:s; only four will normally be opera:inc.

During normal :::eration service water is supplied c the clant and cis.harged to the river tnrougn valves 7 and 9 for Uni: I and valve S and 10 for Uni: 2.

The pend recirculation valves 5 and 11 for Uni: 1 and valves 5 and 12 for Unit 2 are normally closed.

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If level indicators in the service water wet pit sense icw water levels, valves 3 and 4 are automatically clcsed and valves 1 and 2 c:en so that river water can directly enter tne wet pit.

If control rocm alarms continue to indicate low level in :ne pond, the operators can close valves 7 and 9 for Unit 1 and 8 and 10 for Unit 2 (direct service water cischarge to tne river) and open valves 5 and 11 for Unit i and valves 6 and 12 for Unit 2 (recirculaticn of service water back to the pond).

On Maren 24, 1981 the licensee re:orted a design deficiency in the service water syste : tnat was discovered durir,g cre-operational ficw tests for Unit 2.

Farley FS*R Secti:n 9.2.1.3 states that under a costulated accident c:ndition involvirs a service water dam break, loss of offsite p:wer (diesei generators would sucaly power to the river water and service water pum:s), anc tne single most limiting active failure (e.g., loss of one train of river water), the coerator would nave 30 minutes before action would te required.

During this 30 minute span a ficw mismatch would exist in the wet pit as four river water pumcs are postultted to serve eignt service water pumos.

If the operator does not take. action to terminate service water ficw to non-essential syste s, tne w'et pit

. vater level uculd decrease until the service water ;w:s woulc develop

';pSH prc:le s.

The eight service water pumps serving both units require approximately 53,000 gpm. Pre-operational flow tests by the licensee showed that the combined flow capacity of four river water pumps was over-estimated.

Tests showed a combined capacity of approximately 43,000 gpm which would necessitate operator action in 20 minutes before service water pump problems would initiate.

On March 24, 1981, the licensee proposed modifying the service water sytems by adding valves 13,14,15 and 16 and the new 36" line shown'on the attached figure. When water levels in the service water wet pit reaches a pre-detemined low level, instrumentation will now automatically open valves 5, 6,11; 12,15 and 16 and will automatically close valves 7, 8, 9 and 10. This action terminates service water flow dirtctly to the river and diverts flow to the service water wet pit. Valves 13 and 14 will automatically close to a throttle positior, so that service water discharged from the two units will go to both the wet l

pit snd the pond. The additional flow to the wet pit provides more than 30 minutes before operator action is required to balance the service l

water and river water fl,ows.

The existing Technical Specification 3.7.4 requires two operable service water trains.

If one train becomes inoperable, repair is required in the effected 1 cop within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or the reactor must be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTOOWN within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />. The licen-see's letter of March 24, 1981 requested that the ACTION statement of this Technical Soecification be extended to 10 days on a one time basis to allow for the described modifications. The licensee stated that the modifications are scheduled to be completed by May 15, 1981.

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.. EVALUATION The licensee has made very conservative assum:tions to create the neec for this Tec'.nical Soecification change. The pcstulated scenario includes less of the ;cr.d's d6 which has been designed to withstand both the design basis seismic event (seismic Catecory 1) and the pretable raximum ficoc coupied with waves, loss of offsite power and the ucrs: case single active failure wnica v.culd be the loss of cne river cater train. The previous FSATs analysis stated that uncer nis scenario :ne c;erater wculd have 30 minutes to correct the river w&ter/ service water ficw r.ismatch in the

, we: pit. Ct.e to over-estimated river ws:er flow with four :um:s running,

ne licensee :re:icts that crij 20 minutes woule :e available before actica is neeced. The prc:ased mcdificatter.s au:cmatically diverts service water back to the wet pit and tne c:erator once again has over
30. minutes to take action.

The licensee has advised us that the additional valves, piping, electrical components, wiring, etc., included in the modifications will be purchased and designed to the identical codes and standards used for the existing Unit 1 and Unit 2 service water system.

While the modifications are being cerformed, only one train returning to the pond will be inoperable at a time.

It is important to note that the return line nat will be tem:crarily inocerable is normally closed. Both units will continue to be served by both trains of se-vice water. Prior to modifications both trains of river water will be verified to be coerable and the licer.see will not initiate any ecdifications if :nere is a forecast cf unusual river water flows wqicn could c:stibiy iraair rieor water cperability.

We consider that the possibility of a combined dam failure, loss of offsite power and failure of a river water train is remote.

The possibility of this occurring within :ne ten day extensien to the Tecnnical S;ecification action state-ment is even mere remete.

Even if all of the a::ve cces cccur, :ne c; era:ce will " ave 20 instead cf 30 minutes tc correct :na flew mismatch in :ne wet ci: by isolating ncn-essential service water systems. The plant 0:ers:ces nave received s;ecial traininc :: crepare tne=selves fer

nis :cssi:ility.

We have reviewed the proposed Technical Specification' change and find it to be acceptable with mincr changes agreeable to the licensee. We have examined the proposed modifications to the service water system and conclude that they will be adequate to perform the system function. We agree that the modification schedule of completion about May 15, 1981 is satisfactory.

. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION We have determined that the amendment does not authorize a change in effluent types or total amcunts nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environmental impact. Having made this determination, we have further concluded that the amendment involves an action which is insignificant from the standpoint of

  • nvironmental impact and, pursuant to 10 CFR 651.5(d)(4), that an environmental imcact statement or negative declaration and enviren-mental impact appraisal need net be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amencment.

CONCLUSION We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, thati (1) because the amendment does not involve 4 significant increase in the prooability or consequences of accidents previously considered and does not involve a significant decrease in a safety margin, the amencment does not involve a significant hazards consideration, (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the preposed manner, and (3) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Date:

April 3,1981

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