ML19345C497

Forwards Questions Re 801017 Shutdown Following Discovery of Major Leak in Secondary Cooling Sys.Subsequent Events Indicate Incident May Be More Serious than Believed & Independent Inquiry Initiated.Responses Requested by 801231

ML19345C497
Person / Time
Site:	Indian Point
Issue date:	11/25/1980
From:	Fink S, Koppell O NEW YORK, STATE OF
To:	Ahearne J NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
References
NUDOCS 8012050388
Download: ML19345C497 (3)

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STANL:h.5NK s.J November 25, 1980 p Dr. Jchn Ahearne, Chairman Nuclear Regulatory Ccmmission 1717 H Street, NW Washington, D.C. 20555 00 g !{,;,nU7,,,

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Dear Dr. Ahearne:

On October 17, the Indian Point 2 nuclear power reacter was forced to shut down after a major leak was found in the secondary cooling system. Subsequent events have shown that this incident may have been more serious than initially believed. The plant is now estimated to be out of service for over eight months in order to conduct the necessarv tests and repairs.

Needless to say, serious cuestions of safety have been raised as well as the costs of replacement power and repairs.

This has become a major concern for Coned's management and ratepayers as well as elected and appointed officials. As a result, the Assembly Special Committee on Nuclear Power Safety in conjunction with the Committee on Corocrations, Authorities and Commissions is conducting its own inquiry into this incident.

The Committee's objective is not to duplicate the efforts of other federal, State, or local investigations, but rather to analyze this incident for its implications on existing State laws and oolicies. We are writing to you in order to establish a record which wii.1 become the basis for legislative policy rec-ommendations of a remedial and prescriptive nature.

Your prompt and complete reply to this letter and enclosed auestions would be greatly appreciated. To facilitate our review cf your response, please attempt to reply by December 31, 1980.

Thank you for your cooperation.

Sincerely, A >

M_v tanley Fink, S,eaker Chairman, Nug ar

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Oliver Koppe 1, Chairman I Corocrations, Authorities, Commissions j

SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON NUCLEAR PONER SAFETY NEW YORK STATE ASSEMBLY INQUIRY INTO THE ACCIDENT AT INDIAN. POINT #2 NOVEMBER 26, 1980 Notification

1. Were the events of October 14-23 at the Indian Point 2 nuclear reactor reportable, licensee events under the NRC notification regulations (Part 21 -- Reporting of Defects and Noncompliance)? If not, why not?

2.. To date, has the NRC found. Coned in violation of any federal statute or regulation with regard to notification of (a) the resident: inspector (b) the NRC regional office (c) local official or (d) any other public official?

3. Did the leakage of water into the containment at any time pose a public health hazard of either a radiologic or other type?

4. If the reactor had been brought to full power with the river water engulfing the lower portion of the reactor containment vessel, could the vessel have cracked or ruptured? If yes, could this have constituted a radiologic oublic hazard of any kind?

5. Did the initial' unavailability of the resident inspector on October 17-19 constitute a breakdown of the NRC emergency notifi-cation system or in any other way jeopardize the commencing of appropriate NRC oversight of this event?

6. Does the NRC have any olans to revise these notification Legulations in' light of the events of October 17-20?

7. What are NRC's responsibilities and procedures for notification of State and local officials in the event of an accident?

Worker Excosure

- 1. How many workers were exposed to radiation during the detection and clean-up of the spilled water? Were any of these workers either contaminated or " burned out", i.e. received up to or above their maximum allowed e::posure limits for the cuarter year?

2. Were all workers'doing the clean-up assigned on a voluntary or mandatory basis? Were these full-time / permanent workers, jumpers, or other temporary workers?

3. Did all the workers entering a radiologic area have on full

-protective gear-and does NRC prescribe training in radiation hazards before. workers can enter a radiation area? Please describe.

Remedial Actions

1. . Does theLNRC plan to examine the x-rays of all the welds in the cooling system.to~ ensure that faulty welds'have not been the cause of the chronic leaks in this portion of the cooling system during ?.he_last?7 years? Can the'NRC verify that all the weld x-rays'have been reviewed and certified as proper?-

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design of the fan cooler system (as Coned now alleges),If

.NRCl plan to issue orders mandating' design modificationsdoes in allthe nuclear. power plants eauipped with such systems? What design

! modifications-to plant cooling system, such as cooling towers are under consideration?

3.

Does the NRC plan to increase, alter or amend its operator alleged in this event do not re-occur. training procedures and requir Prior Historv 1.

t Please (LER's) provide us with a list of licensee event recorts which indicate the' number of times the fan cooling of times the system has had to be repaired or patched? system 2.

the fan cooling system at Indian PointDoes #3.

the NRC have a record of i

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