ML19345B702

Final Deficiency Rept Re Failure of Instruments on Main Control Board During Hot Functional Testing,Initially Reported on 801023.Caused by Excessive Heat Inside Control Board.Installation of Ventilation Sys Is Underway

ML19345B702
Person / Time
Site:	Summer
Issue date:	11/20/1980
From:	Nichols T SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS CO.
To:	James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
References
10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, NUDOCS 8012020369
Download: ML19345B702 (3)

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SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC a gas COMPANY most CFriCC SCu 764 CotuMaiA, SourH CAnouNA 292is T. C. Nw woLs. Ja.

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November 20, 1980 ,t hungna C eanc.s j t

i Mr. James P. O'Reilly  ;

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission [,

Region II '. 3 101 Marietta Street, N. W.

• 3 Suite 3100 '

1 Atlanta, GA 30303

Subject:

Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit i Docket No. 50/395 Reportable Significant Deficiency Overheating of Instruments on Main Control Board On October 23, 1980, Mr. John Rausch of NRC Region II was informed by means of a telephone call of a potential significant deficiency.

During Hot Functional Testing (HFT) was the first time that the majority of the instruments and controls of the main control board were energized concurrently. While HFT was in progress, several non-safety related instruments located on the main control board failed. Upon investigation, the temperature inside the ecntrol board was found to be approximately 120 F. The failures were thus attributed to this heat.

The problem war documented c: a start-up field report and temporary ventilation was provided to remove the heat.

If such temperatures were present for an extended period, failure of safety related instruments could occur. Such a failure could result in the inability of the plant to operate or shutdown safely. Under the South Carolina Electric & Gas Company (SCE&G) program, we are reporting this as a significant deficiency as defined by 10CFR 50.55(e).

Detailed information is presented in Attachment 1.

Solution of the problem requires the addition of a mechanism for heat removal to the main control board. SCE&G and Gilbert Associates are currently working on this design.

This is the final report on this matter. If you ha ve any questions, please contact us.

Very truly yours, Q\ q T. C. Nichols, Jr. (p l g l NEC:rm Enclosure

' " 0120 2 0 3(e9 5

. Mr. James P. O'Reilly Page 2 November 20, 1980 CC: Messrs. V. C. Su=mer G. H. Fischer E. H. Crews, Jr.

D. A. Nauman O. S. Bradham O. W. Dixon, Jr.

R. B. Clary W. A. Williams, Jr.

J. B. Knotts, Jr.

J. S. Skolds B. Bursey NPCF/Whitaker File U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 9/

Division of Inspection and Enforcement Washington, DC 20555 U. 5. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Management Branch Washington, DC 20555

O ATTACHMENT 1 10CFR 50.55(e) - SIGNIFICANT DEFICIENCY

1. Identification of Nonconformance During the functional testing, while the. majority of instruments and controls were energized, several non-safety instruments on the

- main control board failed. These' failures were attributed to the temperature within the board (approximately 120 F) .

2. . Number an'. *,ccation of Nonconformance Ventilation 17 the main control board

3. Significant Deficiency Created and Evaluation If these temperatures were present for a long period of time, failure of safety-related instruments could occur. Failures of this type could result in'the inability of the-plant to operate or shutdown safely.

4. Corrective Act 2' To prevent failure of instruments and controls because of' heat within the main control board,' South Carolina Electric & Gas Company is adding a ventilation system to the board.

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