ML19344E159

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Submits Addl Info in Response to IE Bulletin 80-14.During Manual Scram on Unit 2,two Hi Level Scram Discharge Vol Switches Failed to Signal High Water Level in Scram Discharge Vol.Caused by Crushed Switches
ML19344E159
Person / Time
Site: Hatch  Southern Nuclear icon.png
Issue date: 08/13/1980
From: Widner W
GEORGIA POWER CO.
To: James O'Reilly
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
References
IEB-80-14, NUDOCS 8008270370
Download: ML19344E159 (2)


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,7 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Of fice of Inspection and Enforcement

REFERENCE:

Region II - Suite 3100 R1I lPO 101 Marietta Street, NW 6 321/50-3 D Atlanta, Georgia 30303 16E Bulletin 80-14 ATTENTION:

Mr. James P. O'Rei11y

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Gentlemen:

On July 25, 1980, a Georgia rower Company (GPC) response to I6E Bulletin 80-14 was issued. This response stated tha t surveillance procedure HNP-1-3004 and HNP-2-3004 w re required to be performed quarterly and monthly on Units 1 and 2, respectively.

Our letter further stated that these procedures would ensure detection of any SDV level switch degradation. Subsequent discoveries on Unit 2 proved this not to be the case. While performing a manual scram on Unit 2 per I&E Bulletin 80-17, two (2) of the hi level scram discharge volume switches, 2Cll-N013A and 2C11-N013D, failed to signal high water level in the SDV.

Further investigation revealed that the floats in these switches were crushed, and that they had not functioned correctly previous to the last surveillance per HNP-2-3004 done on July 4, 1980. Thus, the procedure had not detected the inoperability of the 2 switches, 2Cll-N013A and 2Cll-N013D.

An investigation to identify the most probable cause of float failure is presently being conducted by GE and Plant Hatch to determine the most probable cause for the switch float failure aad to recommend corrective action if needed.

The functional test, which includes float chamber water level actuation of the switch, is included in HNP l-3004 and HNP-2-3004, but was required to be performed only every operating cycle. All six (6)

Magnetrol level switches on Unit 2 were satisfactorily tested on April 9, 1980.

Due to the event mentioned above, a revision to UNP-1-3004and UNP-2-3004 has been implemented.

This revision, dated July 31, 1980, requires float chamber water level be used to actuate all the high level switches, C11-N013A through D, and is performed following every scram per HNP Tech Specs 4.1.l(7) on Unit 1 and HNP Tech Spec 4.3.1-1(D) on Unit 2.

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~s Georgia Power b U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection and Enforcement Region II - Suite 3100 August 13, 1980 Page Two If you have any further questions, please contact this office.

Very truly yours, JOTW ff W. A. Widner DLT/mb xc: Director of the Office of Inspection and Enforcement Director of the Division of Operating Reactors, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation W

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