ML19344D668

Final Deficiency Rept Re Welding of safety-related Instrument Hanger/Supports.Caused by Failure to Perform & Comply W/Procedures.Controlled Reinsp Program Instituted

ML19344D668
Person / Time
Site:	Summer
Issue date:	04/18/1980
From:	Mary Johnson SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS CO.
To:
References
50-395-80-10-03, 50-395-80-10-3, NUDOCS 8004250429
Download: ML19344D668 (3)

Text

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. . 1 SOUTH CAROLINA EttcTaic a GAS COMPANY

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April 18, 1980 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Mr. James P. O'Reilly "

Director Region II

• 101 Marietta Street, NW -

Atlanta, Georgia 30303 7

Subject:

V. C. Summer Nuclear Station Unit #1 Reportable Item in Accordance with ICCFR50.55(e)

Gentlemen:

On March 19, 1980, the Region II Principal Inspector (T. Burdette),

was notified of a potential reportable item relative to deficient welding of instrument hangers / supports. These weld deficiencies were detected af ter e tpports had been accepted by the Contractor's ASME Code QC organization. This item has been assigned NRC number 50-395/80-10-03.

Nature of Condition Some safety related instrument hanger / supports are found to generically contain veld deficiencies such as undersize fillets, undercut, porosity, slag, non-fusion, etc. These conditions were identified by the Contractor's ASME QC organization after the welds had previously been accepted by that organization, making all such welds suspect.

Cause The cause of the condition is the failure to perform and comply with procedures on the part of the Code craf t and QC organizations concluded to be a further manifestation of our previously established and reported breakdown in the ASME inspection program. The Code QC l

program breakdown results from any of a combination of factors including some specific procedural inadequacies and some less

, specific interpretation, training, competency, attitude, and super-vision inadequacies.

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'tbr. Jamna P. O'Rollly .

Pagn 2 April 18, 1980 Safety Implications To determine exact safety implications, Engineering would need to evaluate each specific deficient weld condition and the combina-tion of conditions by hanger as they relate to their affect on a specific hanger and subsequently on a system. The extent of this ef fort is indeterminate since the extent and specifics of the deficiencies are unknown prior to reinspection. Since it is apparant that deficient '

conditions exist due to.the QC breakdown, it is not possible to rule out the potential of some specific defect having safety implications. -

For this reason, the conditions are conservatively being classified as a potential significant deficiency which will be corrected to remove any doubt as to product acceptability.

Actions to Correct Conditions A controlled reinspection program has been instituted to identify all deficient safety related instrument hanger / support welds and have all deficient conditions repaired or evaluated by the Engineer. The reinspection will be performed by the Constructor's Code QC personnel.

The SCESG/QC organization will monitor the reinspection performed by

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the Constructor's Code QC utilizing a Supervisory Performance Assess-ment Team. The SPA Team consists of p.ersonnel reporting to the SCE&G/

QC Manager, whose assignment is to directly conitor by physical presence the Constructor's Code QC first line supervisors. .The SPA Team will also do a random hardware verification (inspection) of the Code QC effort in lieu of the 100% overview inspection being employed relative to other probl' ens assiciated with .the Code QC breakdown. The SPA Team conitoring function will provide the SCE&G/QC Manager visibility '

into the reinspection effort and hardware acceptability now felt com=ensurate with the confidence levels established in the Code QC organization. In addition, SCE&G/QA will perform surveillance on

. the instrument hanger / support reinspection effort.

Corrective Action to Prevent Recurrence Coc=ensurate with the corrective actions in the Code QC area in general, specific actions were taken relativa to instrument hanger /

support welding. SCESG and the constructor implemented a program of in-depth review of procedures in this area to provide adequate work instructions to welders and inspectors. Training of craf t and inspection personnel has taken place with SCE&G verification of adequacy. In addition, SCESG/QC and QA will continue to monitor the Constructor's Code QC organizations effort. The long term objective of this corrective action is to continue to re-establish confidence in the Code QC organization. ..

Mr. Jrnea P. O'Railly

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• Paga 2 ,"

April 18, 1980 SCESG believes the actions outlined above will adequately resolve deficiencies with ASME instrument hanger / support walds. Since all ,

necessary actions have been identified and are in the process of being imple:::ented, we consider this a final report on this subject. All actions taken regarding this item will be available at the construction site for NRC review. Should further information be required, please contact us.

Very truly yours, .

V AW DRM/ DAN /MCJ/jls cc: C. J. Fritz G. C. Meet:e .

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