ML19344D599

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Responds to IE Bulletin 79-27, Loss of Non-Class IE Instrumentation & Control Power Sys Bus During Operation. Util Has Reviewed Applicable Buses.No Buses Identified Which Could Affect Ability to Achieve Cold Shutdown
ML19344D599
Person / Time
Site: Arkansas Nuclear 
Issue date: 02/28/1980
From: Trimble D
ARKANSAS POWER & LIGHT CO.
To: Seyfrit K
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
References
IEB-79-27, NUDOCS 8004250103
Download: ML19344D599 (2)


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-ftC NSIC ARKANSAS POWER & LIGHT COMPANY STATE POST CFRCE box 551 UTTLE POCK. AAKANSAS 72203 (501) 371-4000 i

February 28, 1980 2-020-15 Mr. K. V. Seyfrit, Director Office of Inspection & Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Region IV 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 Arlington, Texas 76011

Subject:

Arkansas Nuclear One - Unit 2 Docket No. 50-368 License No. NPF-6 IE Bulletin 79-27 Loss of I&C Power (File:

2-1510.1)

Gentlemen:

In response to the required actions of the subject bulletin, the follow-ing is provided.

1.

We have reviewed the Class 1-E and non-class 1-E besses supplying power to safety and non-safety related instrumenta ; ion and control and found no such busses which could affect the ability to achieve a cold shutdown condition.

In mh case, indication of a monitored parameter required to achieve a cold shutdown was urovided with re-dundant indication powered from a separate source.

This review has confirmed our design conformance to IEEE-279 as discussed in the ANO-2 FSAR Section 7.4.2.1.

One portion of this iaction reads as follows:

".... Single failures considered include electrical faults (e.g. open, shorted or grounded circuits) and physical events (e.g.

fires, missiles) resulting in mechanical damage.

Compliance with i

single failure criterion is accomplished by providing redundancy of power supplies, actuation circuits, and by separating the redundant elements electrically and physically to achieve f.he required inde-pendence."

2.

We have reviewed our existing emergency proceduras and feel that they are presently adequate to achieve a cold shutdown condition upon loss of power to any Class 1-E or non-class 1-E bus supplying power to safety or non-safety related instrument and control system.

We have, therefore, not prepared emergency procedures as you re-j quested.

We do not agree, based upon our response in 1 above, that this situation would require actions on the implementation level of an emergency procedure.

Other procedures are presently available for restoring power to a bus, but they are not what we consider

" emergency procedures".

8004250ID'3,

o 2-020-15 February 28, 1980 3.

No design modifications or administrative controls are proposed as a result of our review of operating experience and our re-review of IE l

Circular No. 79-02 as requasted.

Very truly yours, OM f. Y David C. Trimble Manager, Licensing DCT: ERG:skm cc: Mr. Victor Stello, Jr., Director Office of Inspection & Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.

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