ML19344D393
| ML19344D393 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 03/03/1980 |
| From: | Carroll D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | Wright G ILLINOIS, STATE OF |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8003120260 | |
| Download: ML19344D393 (2) | |
Text
- p'M E %Q'o#
UNITED STATES 8 " 3,,
~'1 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION g
.E REGION 111 b[
o, 799 ROOSEVELT ROAD o
GLEN ELLYN. ILLINOIS 60137 IfAR 3 1g99 1, tate of Illinois l
Depatoment of Public Health ATTN:
Mr. Gary N. Wright, Chief Division of Nuclear Safety 535 West Jefferson Street Springfield, IL 62761 Gentlemen:
The enclosed IE Information Notice No. 80-07 titled " Pump Shaft Fatigue Cracking" was sent to the following licensees on February 29, 1980.
American Electric Power Service Corporation Indiana and Michigan Power Company D. C. Cook 1, 2 (50-315, 50-316)
Cincinnati Gas & Electric Company Zimmer (50-358)
Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company Perry 1, 2 (50-440, 50-441)
Commonwealth Edison Company Braidwood 1, 2 (50-456, 50-457)
Byron 1, 2 (50-454, 50-455)
Dresden 1, 2, 3 (50-10, 50-237, 50-249)
La Salle 1, 2 (50-373, 50-374)
Quad Cities 1, 2 (50-254, 50-265)
Zion 1, 2 (50-295, 50-304)
Consumers Power Company Big Rock Point (50-155)
Midland 1, 2 (50-329, 50-330)
Palisades (50-255)
Dairyland Power Company LACBWR (50-409)
Detroit Edison Company Fermi 2 (50-341)
Illinois Power Company Clinton 1, 2 (50-461, 50-462)
() 3 / 20 'e i g.o_ven +u
ea v
State of Illinois p3 y40 Iowa. Electric Light & Power Company Duane Arnold (50-331)
Northern Indiana Public Service Company Bailly (50-367)
Northern States Power Company Monticello (50-263)
Prairie Island 1, 2 (50-282, 50-306)
Public Service of Indiana Marble Hill 1, 2 (50-546, 50-547)
Toledo Edison Company Davis-Besse 1 (50-346)
Union Electric Company Callaway 1, 2 (50-483, 50-486)
Wisconsin Electric Power Company Point Beach 1, 2 (50-266, 50-301)
Wisconsin Public Service Corporation 4
Kcwaunee (50-305)
Sincerely, d4l.
ro h rroll, Actin ief Administrative Branch
Enclosure:
IE Inforw tion Notice No. 80-07 cc w/ enc 1:
Mr. D. W. Kane, Sargent
.and Lundy Central Files Reproduction Unit NRC 20b
-TIC r
I L.
February 29, 1980 MEMORANDUM FOR:
B. H. Grier, Director, Region I i
J. P. O'Reilly, Director, Region II J. G. Keppler, Director, Region III o
K.' V. Seyfrit, Director, Region IV R. H. Engelken, Director, Region V FROM:
Norman C. Moseley, Director, Division of Reactor Operations Inspection, Office of Inspection and Enforcement
SUBJECT:
IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 80 PUMP SHAFT FATIGUE CRACKING The subject Information Notice is transmitted for issuance on February 29, 1980.
The Information Notice should be issued to all Light Water Reactor Facilities holding power reactor Operating Licenses or Construction Permits.
Also enclosed is a draft copy of the transmittal letter for this purpose.
Norman C. Moseley, Director Division of Reactor Operations Inspection Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Enclosures:
1.
Draft Transmittal Letter 2.
IE Information Notice No. 80-07 CONTACT:
R. A. Hermann, IE 49-28487 SEE PREVIOUS YELLOW FOR CONCURRENCE WPU:SM:DM ROI ROI RCI ROI 2/22/80.
RAHermann ELJordan HDThornburg NCMoseley JOB S(2) 2/ /80 2/ /80 2/ /80 2/ /80 l
SSINS No.:
687t Accession No.:
(
UNITED STATES 7912190675 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASH:NGTON, D.C.
20555 February 29, 1980 IE Information Notice No. 80-07 PUMP SHAFT FATIGUE CRACKING On October 9,1979, the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) reported to NRC that low-stress high-cycle fatigue cracks had been found in two non-safety-related feedwater pumps at their Browns Ferry BWR facility.
One pump had been operated for approximately 20,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> and the other for approximately 28,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br />.
TVA indicated that excessive vibration had been experienced prior to detection of the cracks by ultrasonic and visual inspection.
TVA also reported that catastrophic failure had been experienced with a boiler feed pump at their Paradise fossil unit. The TVA failed pump shafts were of type 414 stainless steel.
TVA plans to replace the shafts with a type 17-4ph stainless steel.
A number of centrifugal charging / safety injection pump shaft failures have been reported since 1977.
The pumps of interest are the dual purpose centrifugal pumps which are utilized for a normal charging function and in the safeguard mode are aligned for high pressure borated coolant injection.
These pumps were procured by Westinghouse from the Pacific Pump Division of Dresser Industries.
The pump shaft material was supplied to Pacific Pump by the Carpenter Technology Corporation.
Westinghouse and Pacific Pump have been conducting an on going investigative program since 1977 to resolve the shaft failure problem.
Results from the program suggested that the causes of the shaft failures could be related to shaft material deficiencies, design and/or abnormal operation of the centrifugal pumps.
Farty centrifugal charging / safety injection pump shafts fabricated from four heats of A276 type 414 stainless steel bar were air cooled and tempered at 1000 F.
The above stated heat treating practice resulted in shafts with low toughness (Charpy "V" notch energies - Longitudinal 6-10 ft-lbs, transverse 2-3 ft-lbs)
Corrective actions taken to reduce the incidence of charging pump / safety injection pump shaft failure have included:
1.
Replacement of the type 414 low toughness stainless steel material.
Replacement material for the charging pump shafts is type 414 stainless steel, oil quenched and tempered at 1150-1200 F.
Some of the air cooled shafts have been re-tempered at 1150 F.
2.
Design modifications to the shaft to reduce stress raisers. The modifica-tions included ' increasing the fillet radius in the split ring groove, l
increasing the thread root in the locknut section of the shaft and the use of formed cutting tools during fabrication.
IE Information Notice No. 80-07 February 29, 1980 i
Page 2 of 2 3.
A review of the operating history of the dual purpose centrifugal pumps indicate s'anormal operation to be a potentially significant contributor to the early failure of the pump shafts.
Abnormal operation includes any condition that results in partial or complete loss of fluid in the pump or continued operation under high vibration conditions caused by misalign-ment or other installation problems. Westinghouse Nuclear Service Division's Technical Bulletins 77-9, 78-1 Rev. 1 and 79-6 provide guidance for monitoring of and limits for pump vibration as well as guidance for pump operation and maintenance.
Ten additional Safety Injection Pumps manufactured by Pacific Pump were identified os having shafts with the same material and heat treatment as the failed charging / safety injection pump shafts.
These ten additional pumps are of a different design and provide for stedium pressure boron injection in the safeguard mode but do not function in normal operation.
Licensees are encouraged to review the materials utilized for and the design of shafts in safety-related pumps and non-safety-related pumps which could affect safety-related system performance.
Particular attention should be paid to abnormal operating conditions which could induce high stress in the pump shafts, susceptibility of materials to crack initiation and growth, and the presence of stress raisers.
Thit Information Notice is provided as an early notification of a possibly significant matter that is still under review by the NRC staff.
It is expected that recipients will review the information for possible applicabi-lity to their facility.
No specific action or response is requested at this time.
If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact the Direct.or of the appropriate NRC Regional Office.
1
a4 IE Information Notice No. 80-07 Enclosure February 29, 195.
RECENTLY ISSUE 0 IE INFORMATION NOTICES Information Subject Date Issued To Notice No.
Issued 80-06 Notification of Significant 2/27/80 All holders of Reactor Events OLs and to near term OL applicants 80-05 Chloride Contamination 2/8/80 All licensees of nuclear of Safety Related Piping power reactor facilities and applicants and holders of nucldar power reactor cps 80-04
%R Fuel Exposure in 2/4/80 All BWR's holding a Excess of Limits power reactor OL or CP 80-03 Main Turbine Electro-1/31/80 All holders of power Hydraulic Control System reactor OLs and cps 80-02 8X8R Water Rod Lower 1/25/80 All BWR Facilities End Plug Wear holder power reactor OLs or cps 80-01 Fuel Handling Events 1/4/80 All holders of power reactor OLs and cps 79-37 Cracking in Low Pressure 12/28/79 All power reactor OLs Turbine Discs and cps 79-36 Computer Code Defect in 12/31/79 All power reactor OLs Stress Analysis of Piping and cps Elbow 79-35 Control of Maintenance 12/31/79 All power reactor facilities and Essential Equipment with an OL or CP 79-34 Inadequate Design of 12/27/79 All holders of power reactor Safety-Related Heat OLs and cps Exchangers 79-33 Improper Closure of 12/21/79 All power reactor facilities Primary Containment holding OLs and cps Access Hatches 79-32 Separation of Electrical 12/21/79 All power reactor facilities Cables for HPCI and ADS holding OLs and cps