ML19344A893
| ML19344A893 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 05/30/1980 |
| From: | Pappas H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | Wright G ILLINOIS, STATE OF |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8008220486 | |
| Download: ML19344A893 (2) | |
Text
--.
tur
[pn ratg o
UNITED STATES 8"
I,,n NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
,E REGION 111 799 ROOSEVELT ROAD 0,
g O
GLEN ELLYN,ILLINOls 60137 o
tWAY 3 0 880i State of Illinois Department of Public Health ATTN:
Mr. Gary N. Wright, Chief Division of Nuclear Safety 535 West Jefferson Street Springfield, IL 62761 Gentlemen:
The attached IE Information Notice No. 80-22 titled " Breakdown in Contamin-ation Control Programs" was sent to the licensees listed below on May 28, 1980:
American Electric Power Service Corporation Indiana and Michigan Power Company D. C. Cook 1, 2 (50-315, 50-316)
Cincinnati Gas & Electric Company Zimmer (50-358)
Commonwealth Edison Company Dresden 1, 2, 3 (50-10, 50-237, 50-249)
LaSalle 1, 2 (50-373, 50-374)
Quad-Cities 1, 2 (50-254, 50-265)
Zion 1, 2 (50-295, 50-304)
Consumers Power Company Big Rock Point (50-155)
Palisades (50-255)
Dairyland Power Cooperative LACBWR (50-409)
Iowa Electric Light & Power Company Duane Arnold (50-331)
Northern States Power Company Monticello (50-263)
{
Prairie Island 1, 2 (50-282, 50-306)
Toledo Edison Company 4
Davis-Besse 1 (50-346) 8 0082 2 0 g
?
State of Illinois 2-lMAy 3 0 S60 Wisconsin Electric Power Company Point Beach 1, 2 (50-266, 50-301)
Wisconsin Public Service Corporation Kewaunee (50-305)
Sincerely,
'b f
Helen Pappas, Chief Administrative Branch
Enclosure:
IE Information Notice No. 80-22 cc w/ encl:
Mr. D. W. Kane, Sargent & Lundy Central Files Reproduction Unit NRC 20b Local PDR NSIC TIC
)
N i
s 1
i l
l 1
SSINS: 6870 Accessions No:
UNITED STATES 8005050059 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, DC 20555 May 28, 1980 IE Information Notice No. 80-22 BREAKDOWNS IN CONTAMINATION CONTROL PROGRAMS Description of Circumstances Recent inspectiins at power reactors have revealed breakdowns in contamination control progrars resulting in releases of radioactive materials to the unrestricted area and off-site environment by several different pathways.
The first pathway was via disposal of supposedly clean trash in the nearby county sanitary landfill.
High background radiation levels due to an onsite buildup of radioactive waste precluded adequate radiation surveys of clean trash prior to removal from the restricted area.
In addition, the surveys were being conducted by improperly trained personnel.
The result was the undetected disposal of radioactive material in the local sanitary landfill.
An NRC inspector observed the practice and confirmed his suspicions when he detected levels of radiation 10 to 20 times normal background levels at the landfill.
Subsequent surveys by the licensee, the State, and the NRC revealed several other areas in the landfill with higher than normal dose rates.
Excavation by the licensee revealed items with contamination levels up to 100 mrem /hr contact reading.
These items had been delivered with the clean trash from the plant and buried at the landfill.
A second pathway was identified to be through the sale by the licensee of scrap materials to salvage dealers in the surrounding area.
Several items with contamination levels in excess of the licensee's unrestricted area release limits were discovered to have been sold to these vendors.
Maximum dose rates on these items tiid not exceed 1.0 mrem /hr.
This condition evidently also resulted from the elevated background radiation levels within the plant and the practice of permitting unqualified personnel to conduct radiation surveys.
A third pathway was found during a recent NRC inspection. An NRC inspector's radiation survey revealed soil contamination on site extending beyond the protected area fence.
Radiation levels as high as 1.5 mrem /hr were measured on contact with the soil.
The contamination is believed to be atmospheric
. fallout of particulate radioactivity which was exhausted from the plant stack diaring containment purge following explosive plugging of st_eam generator tisbes. The steam generator manways were not covered and the purge system was not equipped with HEPA filters.
The licensee's survey program did not include routine, periodic site and perimeter surveys.
--^
IE Information Notice No. 80-22 May 28, 1980 Page 2 of 2 This IE Information Notice is provided as an early notification of a significant matter that is still under review by the NRC staff.
It is expec+Gd that recipi-ents will review the information for possible applicability to their facilities.
No specific action or response is requested at this time.
If NRC evaluations so indicate, further licensee actions may be required.
No written response to this IE Information Notice is required.
If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office.
i N
D 4
m
- .w-e.
g c,
IE Information Notice No. 80-22 Enclosure May 28, 1980 RECENTLY ISSUED IE INFORH\\ TION NOTICES Information Subject Date Issued To Notice No.
Issued 80-21 Anchorage and Support of 5/16/80 All power reactor 7
Safety-Related Electrical facilities with an Equipn.St OL or CP 80-20 Loss (
Gecay Heat Removal 5/8/80 All light water reactor Capabil at Davis-Besse facilities holding Unit 1 K. lie in a Refueling power reactor OLs or cps Mode 80-19 NIOSH Recall of Recircu-5/6/80 All holders of a power lating-Mode (Closed-Circuit) reactor OL, Research Self-Contained Breathing Reactor License, Fuel Apparatus (Rebreathers)
Cycle Facility License and Priority I Material License 80-16 Possible Weapons Smuggling 5/5/80 All power reactor Pouch facilities with an OL, fuel fabrication and processing facilities and Materials Priority I licensees (processors and distributors) 80-17 Potential Hazards Associated 5/5/80 All radiography With Interchangable Parts Licenses On Radiographic Equipment 80-16 Shaft Seal Packing 4/29/80 All power reactor Causes Binding In Main facilities in your Steam Swing Check And Region with an OL or CP Isolation Valves 80-15 Axial (Longitudinal) 4/21/80 All Light Water Reactor Oriented Cracking In Facilities holding power Piping reactor OLs or cps 80-14 Safety Suggestions From 4/2/80 All power reactor Employees facilities with an OL or CP
.-