ML19344A887
| ML19344A887 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 03/17/1980 |
| From: | Pappas H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | Wright G ILLINOIS, STATE OF |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8008220477 | |
| Download: ML19344A887 (2) | |
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9 UNITED STATES Tic
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,4 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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.i REGION lli L'
f 799 ROOSEVELT ROAD D
8 GLEN ELLYN,ILLINOls 60137 g g gg State of Illinois Department of Public Health ATTN:
Mr. Gary N. Wright, Chief Division of Nuclear Safety 535 West Jefferson Street Springfield, IL 62761 Gentler en:
The enclosed IE Information Notice No. 80-11 titled " Generic Problems with
@SCO Valves in Nuclear Applications Including Fire Protection Systems" was sent to the following licensees on March 14, 1980:
Allied Chemical Corporation (40-3392, 70-08)
American Electric Power Service Corporation Indiana and Michigan Power Company D. C. Cook 1, 2 (50-315, 50-316)
Cincinnati Gas & Electric Company Zimmer (50-358)
Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company Perry 1, 2 (50-440, 50-441)
Combustion Engineering, Inc.
(70-36)
Commonwealth Edison Company Braidwood 1, 2 (50-456, 5.0-457)
Byron 1, 2 (50-454, 50-455)
Dresden 1, 2, 3 (50-10, 50-237, 50-249)
La Salle 1, 2 (50-373, 50-374)
Quad-Cities 1, 2 (50-254, 50-265)
Zion 1, 2 (50-295, 50-304)
Consumers Power Company Big Rock Point (50-155)
Midland 1, 2 (50-329, 50-330)
Palisades (50-255)
Dairyland Power Cooperative LACBWR (50-409) scossse 177
e IWWt 171980 State of Illinois 2-Detroit Edison Company Fermi 2 (50-341)
Illinois Power Company Clinton 1, 2 (50-461, 50-462)
Iowa Electric Light & Power Company Duane Arnold (50-331)
Northern Indiana Public Service Company Bailly (50-367)
Northern States Power Company Monticello (50-263)
Prairie Island 1, 2 (50-282, 50-306)
Public Service of Indiana Marble Hill 1, 2 (50-546, 50-547)
Toledo Edison Company Davis-Besse 1 (50-346)
Union Electric Company Callaway 1, 2 (50-483, 50-486)
Wisconsin Electric Power Company Point Beach 1, 2 (50-266, 50-301)
Wisconsin Public Service Corporation Kewaunee (50-305)
Sincerely, l
1 o y E.
a ol, Acting Chief Administrati Branch i
Enclosure:
IE Information Notice No. 80-11 cc w/ enc 1:
Mr. D. W. Kane, Sargent & Lundy Central Files Reproduction Unit NRC 20b Local PDR NSIC TIC 1
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SSINS No. 6870 Accession No.:
UNITED STATES 7912190684 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D.C.
20555
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March 14, 1980 IE Information Notice No. 80-11 GENERIC PROBLEMS WITH ASCO VALVES IN NUCLEAR APPLICATIONS INCLUDING FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS Description of Circumstances: is a Recall Notice from The Viking Corporation, dated July 16, 1979 that identifies ASCO valves used in certain Viking fire protection equipment that could fail.
Licensees should review their fire protection system components to determine if the equipment identified in the Viking Recall Notice is in their facility.
If the identified equipment is installed in the fire protection system, then the modifications specified in the Recall Notice should be made and tested for proper operation.
The requirements of the technical specifications or an/
other licensee commitment should be complied with when a fire protection system is disabled.
South Carolina Electric and Gas Company (Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station) reported to the NRC on October 24, 1979, a potential significant deficiency regarding the effects of oil on elastomeric materials used in ASCO NP-1 solenoid valves.
Specifically, these valves utilize an ethylene propylene elastomer which expands or swells when brought into contact with oils, possibly causing valve failure.
For this reason, ASCO specifies these NP-1 solenoid valves for.use in " oil free instrument air" systems.
Although instrument air systems are " oil free" by design, installation instructions may specify the use of thread lubricants utilizing an oil base.
Thus, the potential exists for traces of this lubricant from threaded connec-tions in the air system, in addition to traces of oil from the air compressors themselves, to come into contact with the elastomers in the solenoid valves.
Degraded elastomers can cause the solenoid valve to fail by sticking, swelling closed flow paths, or rupturing causing leakage across the seat or to atmosphere.
Failure of the solenoid to function properly on an active valve could prevent a system from performing its required safety function.
Some ASCO NP-1 solenoid valves are equipped with tags which state:
"Important -
this valve is equipped with ethylene propylene elastomers which can be attacked by oils and greases.
To be used for oil-free instrument quality air.
Clean pipa threads of cutting oils." Care should be taken to use approved thread lubricants which do not contain oil for the installation of these valves.
IE Information Notice No. 80-11 March 14, 1980 Page 2 of 2 ASCO offers viton elastomers as an option for their NP-1 soleno.id valves.
The viton elastomers are not affected by oil or grease.
Replacement kits of viton elastomers are available for the NP-1 solenoid valves from ASCO.
It is recom-mended that ethylene propylene elasto.ners found in Class IE qualified ASCO NP-1 solenoid valves be replaced with the viton kits.
In addition, enclosed is a letter from EG)G (Enclosure 2) dated December 26, 1979 that provides the results of an LER review of failure of solenoid valves.
This Information Notice provided information about a potential shfety concern.
No written response is required.
If you desire additional information regarding this matter, contact the Director of the appropriate Regional Office.
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Enclosure:
1.
Viking Corporation Recall Notice 2.
EG&G Letter, Dearien to Tiller dated December 26, 1979 wm.__
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- e IE Inforraation Notice No. 80-11 Enclosure March 14, 1980 RECENTLY ISSUED IE INFORMATION NOTICES Information Subject Date Issued To Notice No.
Issued 80-10 Partial Loss of Non-Nuclear 3/7/80 All power reactor Instrument System Power facilities holding Supply During Operation OLs and cps 80-09 Possible Occupational 3/7/80 All holders of Health Hazard Associated power reactor OLs with Closed Cooling Systems and near term cps 80-08 The States Company Sliding 3/7/80 All power reactor Link Electrical Terminal facilities with an OL Block or a CP 80-07 Pump Shaft Fatigue Cracking 2/29/80 All Light Water Reactor Facilities holder power reactor OLs and cps 80-06 Notification of Significant 2/27/80 All holders of Reactor Events OLs and to near term OL applicants 80-05 Chloride Contamination 2/8/80 All licensees of nuclear of Safety Related Piping power reactor facilities and applicants and holders of nuclear power reactor cps 80-04 BWR Fuel Exposure in 2/4/80 All BWR's holding a Excess of Limits power reactor OL or CP 80-03 Main Turbine Electro-1/31/80 All holdets of power Hydraulic Control System reactor OLs and cps 80-02 8X8R Water Rod Lower 1/25/80 All BWR Facilities End Plug Wear holder power reactor OLs or cps 80-01 Fuel Handling Events 1/4/80 All holders of power reactor OLs and cps 79-37 Cracking in Low Pressure 12/28/79 All power reactor OLs Turbine Discs and cps
=79-36 Computer Code Defect in 12/31/79 All power reactor OLs Stress Analysis of Piping and cps Elbow
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IIA 5 tlNM MIO lxA A orin 111111 K NT (falt)'}l,.rr,ol July 16, 1979 RECALL NOTICE Viking Ho_ del B-2 Magnetic Bypass and Firecy*cle Trim Box We have been informed by the manufacturer that the following listed solenoid valves may contain a black teflon coated core which could cause improper valve operation under certain water and heat conditions.
Such failure could result in the sprink-ler system not operating or, once having operated, not being capable of being. reset.
Solenoid valves in question are as follows:
ASC0" Automatic Swi tch Co., with the following specifications:
C a t a l ori No.
Voltage Serial No.
THT8210B34 120/60 19913E
^
120/60 70440E THT8210834 THT8210B34 120/60 59284E THT8210634E 120/60 79329E THT8210B34 120/60 97504E TFTx8210B34E 120/60 28508H TNT 8210834E 120/60 42536H 8211834 24/60 28510H THTS210B34E 12/cc 79328E THT8210534 24/DC 13912E tnt 8210B34 24/DC 50445E THT8210S34 24/DC 56556E THT8210834 24/DC 59285E THT8210634E 24/DC 79327E THTS210834E 24/DC 82928E
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THT8210834E 24/DC 91819E
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THT8210B34E 24/DC 16871H THT8210834E 24/DC 18391H 8211B34 24/DC 28511H THT8210B34E 125/DC 79330E 1
inese valves may have beco used on the following items of Viking equipment:
The Model E-2" Magnetic Bypass and the Fi recycle Valve Trim Box shipped f rom Viking f rom January 1977 through May 1979, including those rnodified as a result of the Viking January 20, 1978 Recall Notice.
(OVER)
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ENCLOSURE 2
[ EGsG ideho,inc.
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December 26, 1979 2
v Mr. R. E. Tiller. Director Reactor Operations and Programs Division Idaho Operations Office - DOE Idaho Falls, ID 83401 SOLEN 0ID VALVE FAILURES REPORTED IN LICEilSEE EVENTS REPORTS -
JAD 2ba.79 Ref:
D. G. Eisenhut Ltr to All Pressurized Water Reactors dated Septonber 21, 1979
Dear Hr. Tiller:
EGSG is in the process of sumarizing and evaluating Licensee Event Reports (LERs) under contract to the Pmbabfifstic Analysis Staff of tRC. Having received a copy of the above referenced letter.
EG&G felt that some of the information gleaned from the LERs may be of value to NRC in investigating the nature and frequency of solenoid valve failures.
In evaluating Licensee Event Reports (LERs) on valves and valve operators we have encountered many failures of solenoid valves which control the air supply to air operated valves. Fifty fail-ures of solenoid valves in air supply systems appear in 41 LERs.
Twenty-three of the 50 failures occurred in ten sets of two or three failures. Each set of multiple failures was discovered in one plant on a single data. We considered these sets to be pos-sible connon cause failures because each set exhibited a comon failure anchanism.
Fifteen of the 50 failures were reported by one plant. Zion 1.
All of Zion's failures resulted from the same failure mechanism -
foreign material contanination. Twelve of Zion's 15 failures were multiple failurest that is, they appeared in sets of failures as discussed above. The remaining 35 failures were reported by 20 different plants; one reported five fa lures and the rest reported 5'
i three or less.
In evaluating these solenoid valves, it appears that generic prob.
1 ens emy exist in the use of solenoid valves for contmiling air l
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in 1977 the manufacturer received some teflon coated cores that may not have been processed properiy.
It has now become apparent that under certain. water and heat conditions the teflon coating may blister and flake off and this may cause the valve to stick in either the open or closed position, in May, 197S the manu-f acturer e. hanged to a non-coated corc which he believes will correct the problem.
Viking became aware of the pr'oblem at the result of reports from the field indi-cating failures of devices during routine testing.
A check with the manuf acturer Indicated that the above described changes had taken place.
Viking feels very strongly that the presence of potentially defective solenoid i
valves in the field constitutes en extremely dangerous situation and recommends to all owners of the above listed equipment that they immediately inspect the eculpment to determine if the suspect solenoids are employed, ALL VIKING INSTALLERS ARE REQUESTED TO INFORM ANY OWNERS WITH WHOM THEY MAY BE i
ACOUAINTED OF THIS POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS SITUATION AND TO OFFER THEIR SERVICES TO SUC4 OWNERS.
ff suspect solenoid valves are found, the system should immediately be tested in accordance with the owner's instructions and a Modification Kit should be ordered directly f rom ASCO at the following address:
Automatic Switch Company 56-A Hanover Rd.
Florham Park, New Jersey 07932 Attn:
Mike Colaneri Asst. Mgr., Service Dept.
Telephone (201) 966-2314 ORDER ASCO KIT NO.
214-997_(For AC or DC Service)
Order one kit for each Magnetic Bypass to be mo.dified and two kits for each Fire-cycle System.
The Modl.fication Kit will consist of:
Core and sufficient parts with specific in-structions for repair of Magnetic Bypats and Firecycle Trim Box.
in order to effect the modificiation, it will be necessary to take the, system out**
of service, shut of f the powe r, disconnect the solenoid leads and disassemble the coil.
There is no disassembly of piping, it is estimated that modifications to the solenoid valve itself can be accomplished in approximately 20 minutes.
The Modification Kit will be furnished without charge by ASCO.
The modifications should be made as soon as possible and the replaced parts returned to ASCO by January I, 1980 Any quest ions, should be referred to ASCO.,
Owners should be reminded of the extreme importance of conducting maintenance and tests in accprdance with Viking's Instructions. All of the above noted failures were determined by such activities. Proper testing and maintenance are particularly im-portant when electro-mechanical components are involved.
Such camponents should be exercised frequently. An emergency system is no better than the care it receives.
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e, J R. E. Tiller Decetaber 26, 1979 JAD-2Sd-79 Page 2
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T supply systems. The rajor pdles appears to be the incompatibility of the solenoid valves with foreign material, specifically oil, which can be present in the air supply system. Forty percent of the sole-nofd valve failures were reported as being caused by all or other foreign suterial in the air supply systen. Another problan appears to be the environnent in which the solenoid resides.
Eighteen per-cent of the failures were reported as being caused by high tempera-ture and humidity resulting in electrical failure of the solenoid.
We hope that this infonnation will be useful.
If you should have any questions, please contact C. F. Ililler at (FTS) 583-9673 or N. D. Cox at(FTS)503-9605.
Very truly yours, W # sed by J. A. Dearten Manager Code Assessment and Applications Program NDC:tn cc:
W. E. Vesely, NRC-PAS D. G. Eisenhut. MRC-DOR R. W. Kiehn EG&G Idaho o
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