ML19344A704
| ML19344A704 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 06/13/1980 |
| From: | Dircks W NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19344A705 | List: |
| References | |
| TASK-IR, TASK-SE SECY-80-284, NUDOCS 8008210561 | |
| Download: ML19344A704 (3) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES T
NUCLEAR RE'GULATORY COMMISSION June 13, 1980 WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 SECY-80-284 INFORMATION REPORT For:
The Comissioners From:
William J. Dircks, Director Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Sa guards h {-
Thru:
Executive Director for Operations
Subject:
POTENTIAL THREAT TO LICENSED NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES FROM INSIDERS (INSIDER STUDY)
Puroose:
To provide to the Commission the staff's completed investi-gation of the pctential insider threat to NRC licensed acti vities.
Discussion:
On January 30, 1979, the Commission directed the staff to study the insider threat to licensed"n'uclear activities as a follow-on effort to SECY-78-456, " Generic Adversary Characteristics Study." The enclosed report presents the results of the staff's investigation into the potential insider threat.
As directed, the report:
- 1) is basically generic in nature; 2) examines insider adversary character-istics and methods for detecting and deterring the insider; and 3) is intended to assist NRC policymakers and staff in evaluating the internal threat to nuclear programs and the measures designed to thwart that threat.
6-The study provides data supportive of earlier Comission assessments of the potential threat to licensed nuclear activities from insiders.
It affirms the reasonableness of t
current requirements in 10 CFR Fart 73 for safeguards against insider thieves and saboteurs and adds more substance to the
- regulatory foundation undergirding these requirements.
Data and findings from the Insider Study may also prove useful as background in current and future rulemaking and licensing activities.
For example, the study affirms the value of background investigations, which the Comission is already considering, as a measure to protect against malevo-lent insiders.
1
Contact:
SECY NOTE:
This paper is currently scheduled for a
. __S._ Mull e m_ SG P D Comission meeting on Thursday, June 19, 1980.
J. Davidson, SGPD l
42-74191 f
80 08210561
~
The Commissianers 2
The study's data are quite rich, but they are derived from a limited population of incidents.
Given the dynamic nature of the " threat" and the size of the data base, to suggest that any single finding or group of findings is a complete and static representation of the nature of the insider adversary would be simplistic and misleading.
Because the staff feels that the study has exhausted potential sources of infonnation on the insider issue at present, addi v
tional research is not recommended at this time.
However, as part of its regular threat assessment mission, the Division of Safeguards staff will continue to review threat-related information from a variety of sources, updating the Insider Study if significant new data becomes available.
Results of the study are highlighted in the executive summary of the report.
Generally, it indicates that characteristics of malevolent insiders apparently depend on the adversary's objective (i.e., theft or sabotage) and the relative strength or weakness of the safeguards environment in which they operate.
Various methods used by government and industry to prevent or detect insider crime are examined in the report.
I In its initial request the Commission noted that the experi-ence of analogous industries should be examined, but that "in collecting and analyzing such data from... non-NRC activi-ties the staff should ensure that the relevancy and limitations of such data to NRC regulated activities are addressed."
The study group relied primarily on data derived from analogous industries because the small number of cases of insider malevolence in the nuclear industry prohibited useful analysis.
Nevertheless, the Commission's concern about the comparability of analogs was carefully considered.
From an initial data base of over 200 apparently analogous cases of insider crime, the study group, using the general components of a nuclear safe-9uards system as a baseline, evaluated each case and assigned it an analog value based on the relative completeness and l
rigor with which the analogous safeguards system was designed.
After the case-by-case evaluation, the data base was reduced to 115 cases involving insider theft or sabotage in safeguards environments considered roughly comparable to the licensed i
nuclear industry.
Of the 115 cases, 44 are considered to have occurred in a " strong" safeguards envirornnent with the balance occurring in a " weak" safeguards environment.
An interesting element of the study deals with the number of individuals involved in the insider theft cases. The results show that of the 112 insider theft cases considered, 33 involved conspiracies, with the number of conspirators ranging from two (11 of the cases) to a maximum of 20 (one case).
The fact that conspiracies were identified and that they varied in number of perpetrators supports the Connission position that protection against irsider theft should address
l l
i The Commissioners 3
conspiracies, but should not be tailored to safeguard against a specific number of insider conspirators.
Rather, as the Commission noted in its statement of considerations for the Upgrade Rule, " physical protection systems, when designed to the level specified in the general performance sections of the rule and in accordance with the reference system specified in the rule and other design guidance to be provided, will be responsive to a general range of threats characterized by that stated in the amer.dments.
With respect to specific numbers of adversaries, the numbers are not as significant as are the capabilities and resources of the adversary."
The study group's goal was not to rate analogous safeguards systems worse than, equal to or better than nuclear safeguards.
Such a precise rating would have required measure by measure, item by item comparisons that were unattainable within the scope of the study.
Of necessity, the study group has relied on the best analogs available for comparison.
In view of Commission and staff interest in the DOE-sponsored study entitled "The Role of Security Clearances and Personnel Reliability Programs in Protecting against Insider Threats,"
we invited DOE's Office of Safeguards and Security (OSS) to brief the Commission on the results of this research concur-rently with staff's briefing of the Insider Study.
Mr. George Weisz, Director of OSS, has agreed to participate in the briefing.
Coordination:
The Executive Legal Director has no legal objection.
i liam J. Dircks, Director Office of Nuclear Material Safety s
and Safeguards
Enclosure:
Potential Threat to Licensed l
Nucl' ear Activities from Insiders (Insider Study)
DISTRIBUTION Commissioners Commission Staff Offices Exec Dir for Operations ACRS Secretariat
_.