ML19343D460
| ML19343D460 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 09/24/1980 |
| From: | Ross M METROPOLITAN EDISON CO. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8105040538 | |
| Download: ML19343D460 (82) | |
Text
JWB 1
1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
________________x 3
In the Matter of:
METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY 5
[Three Mile Island Unit 2) 3 6i g
x
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7 Room D-4,
~
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Howard Johnson Motel, J
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, d
9 Wednesday, 24 September 1980.
3 10 The INTERVIEW OF MICHAEL J. ROSS was convened at i
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2:08 p.m.
g, 12 p
y_13 APPEARANCES:
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.)
NORMAN MOSELEY, 5
14 :
Office of Inspector 6 Enforcement
)
l Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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j 15 '
washington, D. C.
)
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j 16 TERRY HARPSTER,
)
j office of Inspection & Enforcement
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Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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Washington, D. C.
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)
On behalf i
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JOHN CRAIG
)
19 l Office of Inspection & Enforcement
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of the 5
i Nuclear Regulatory Commission
)
20 l Washington, D. C.
)
Nuclear l
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)
2I DAVID GAMBLE
)
Regulatory o
Office of Inspector & Auditor
)
O 22,
Nuc1 ear Regu1aeory commissie,
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commissiec l
Washington, D. C.
)
23,'
)
RICHARD HOEFLING, Esq.
)
O 24; Office of the Executive Lega1 Director
)
i Nuclear Regulatory Commission
)
25 Washington, D. C.
)
I.
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$l050@Wy ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
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1 APPEARANCES (continued) :
O 2
ERNEST BLAKE, Esq.
Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trow'oridge 3
Washington, D.C.,
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Appearing for Metropolitan Edison Company 5
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ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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(2:08 p.m.)
3 MR. GAMBLE:
On the record.
4 This interview is being conducted as a portion of e
5 the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's investigation into the A
8 6
exchange of information between Metropolitan Edison Company e
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7 and the NRC on March 28th, 1979.
A j
8 Will you please raise your right hand, Mr. Ross.
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9 Whereupon, 3.
E 10 MICHAEL J.
ROSS
_El 11 was called as a witness in the above-entitled matter and,
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12 having been first duly sworn, was examined and testified as O
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fo11 owe:
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E 14 MR. GAMBLE:
Please state your full name for the N
15 record.
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y 16 THE WITNESS:
My full name is Michael J.
- Ross, A
d 17,
spelled R-o-s-s.
N 5
18 MR. GAMBLE:
And will counsel present please identify 5
E 19 himself.
A 20 MR. BLAKE:
My name is Earnest Blake.
I'm with 21 the law firm of Shaw, Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge,
(])
22 Washington, D. C.
I am here representing Metropolitan 1
23 '
Edison Company.
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24 MR. GAMBLE:
Mr. Ross, Mr. Blake is representing 25 the Metropolitan Edison Company.
Do you have any objection to ll l
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I hin presence during the interview?
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2 THE WITNESS:
I do not.
3 MR. GAMBLE:
Thank you.
(_)
4 EXAMINATION e
5 BY MR. MOSELEY:
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G Mr. Ross, during your questions I will make E
6 7
reference to prior interviews and statements that you have M
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made.
I have those available for reference, and if at any d"
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time you would like to view the statement, just say so and I
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h10 will be happy to show it to you; but I had not planned to
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II show you each of them as we go along.
But if at any time you 2
f I2 want to see them, just say so and I will be' happy to 'let you s
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13 see them.
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Okay.
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In testimony to the Special Inquiry Group in m
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I7 period prior to 11:00 a.m., you responded -- and this is a f
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18 quote:
"I think we discussed the fact that high pressure 19 i 8
1 injection hsd been off for some time, or throttled back.
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20 don't think we ever related it to fully uncovering the core 21 that early."
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f Now in the first sentence of this quote, who do
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you specifically mean when you use the pronoun "we"?
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A As I recall, "we" would be the people in the back 25 "
of the room in the think tank.
That would be our group.
That n
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I would be Miller, Rogers, people like that participated in that O
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It would be specifically the think tank people?
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. A.
It would be the think tank people.
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0 Now let me ask you some specific names, because h
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7 period in time.
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Did it include Kunder?
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A.
I can't definitely say he was there, but he was 3
10 in there, in the room and part of that most of the time.
I Il can't say he was there for that particular conversation.
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Okay, but let's relate it back to the sentence that
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.I think we discmssee the fece that high pressure
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5 15 Now let me ask you:
Do you think Kunder partici-
-j 16 l pated in that discussion?
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My recollection is "yes," but that's just what it
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18 is, "my recollection."
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G Okay.
Fine.
Do you recall Zewe participating in n
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this?
21 A
Yes.
22 f G
Chwastyk?
23 '
(Pause.)
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O Let me interrupt you there.
I was making reference ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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1 to your prior testimony.
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2 A
Right.
I wouldn't know the timetable 18 months 3
later, but...
Chwastyk wasn't there right away.
As the day q
4 went on, he participated in our crea, as did everybody i
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involved.
I can't say for sure he was part of that.
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Okay.
What was the reaction of any of those people G
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with whom this was discussed, or who participated in this 3j 8
discussion?
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Basically the reaction was that we shouldn't take ic h
10 high pressure injection off; but we ought to get back to 11 inject in the core and come up with a way of coc;
- it, and a
j 12 that's the way we proceeded in order to keep high pressure
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13 injection on.
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Did this discussion include consideration that in w
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g 15 fact this was the principal contributor to the reactor being E
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I don't know if we specifically said that's why 5x 18 it was in that condition.
I don't think that was ever speci-Fe 19 fically said at that time.
Just saying:
We've got to come up 5
20 with a way of cooling it and get forced circulation back.
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21 That's where we were headed.
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22 G
In the second sentence of this quote -- and I will 23 reread this to you -- the second sentence says:
"I don't think
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24 we ever related it to f ally uncovering the core that early."
25j In that sentence, did the pronoun "we" include the li a
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1 same people?
I presume it did.
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A I assume it did; yes, sir.
3 G
Again in that same sentence that we just quoted, 4
the words " fully covered" were used.
Did you mean that g
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In other n
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Was that discussed?
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7 A
I don't think we ever talked about partial uncovery Aj 83 as per se.
I don't think we ever discussed degrees of core J
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uncovery.
We discussed more forced circulation, more "get it i
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Ej 11 G
Likewise, the words "that early" were in that 3
12 sentence.
What did this mean?
9
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I don't know.
Probably that I realized at some s_
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or we had access to the fact that it was uncovered, later on.
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16 That's probably what that meant.
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Do you recall specifically bringing the core 5
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18 uncovery, or partial uncovery, or whatever that stage then E
19 it might have been, do you recall when this conclusion may i
n 20 have oeen reached and discussed?
21 l A
I don't think we in the think tank ever said:
- Hey,
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22
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the core is one-half uncovered.
I don't think we ever got to l
b 23 that conclusion that day.
That would have had to be sometime
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24 later.
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Well, but I'm asking yoa, all degrees -- from just i
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1 barely uncovered to all the way uncovered.
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2 A
I don't think we ever accepted the fact that day 3
that the partial core uncovery was in fact accomplished.
That 7C 4
day.
Later I think we probably would have -- days later, when e
5 we looked at that.
9 j
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Then is it your statement today that the words R
7 "that early" on the end of that sentence refer to that it 3
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wasn't discussed at all on March 28th?
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No, I wouldn't say it wasn't discussed at all.
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I just don't think we u
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12 ever accepted that fact.
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(_)
13 (Pause.)
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Was information related to the securing or
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to the best of your knowledge?
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A It's really difficult to say, being very honest.
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18 The NRC was there, present, and did we specifically say:
- Hey, P
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i we throttled back; or we did this; no.
But they were free in 5
20 our discussions, and I think Gary many times asked them:
Do 21 you have any input?
Throughout the day.
But they were in
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22 l this think tank with us.
They participated in our discussions.
23 '
When I say " participated," it was open.
It wasn't like we
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24 l went back into a room in hold or anything.
We went into the 25 office, we closed the door, and we talked openly.
We had a i
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1 real problem and we knew it.
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Was information related to a concern about possible 3
core uncovery passed on to the NRC on 3/28, to the best of
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4l your knowledge?
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Possible core uncovery was discussed on 3/28, and A
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6 I think I have said that in previous testimony.
It was e
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discussed, and we were wondering if maybe we shouldn't let E
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the core flood tanks come in -- right or wrong on our dd 9
reasoning, it would give us an indication of core coverage.
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That was part of our reasoning that day, be it
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Was this information about this possibility that I
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18 Do you recall the NRC people being present during those 5
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conversations?
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20 A
It's hard for me to say they were present for. that 21 specific conversation.
Again I'll say, they were in the room 1
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22y all day.
They had free access.
When I say "in the room,"
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23 they were in there with us, right next to us, from me to
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24 l you (indicating), when we sat down and discussed it.
25 I'm sure that they knew about us bringing the core 1
ti ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
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floods in.
I'm sure they knew that information.
O 2
G In your opinion -- this is based on March 28th.
3 Place yourself back on March 28th -- should either the k) 4' throttling of the IPSI or the concern that the core might be y
uncovered, should that specifically have been reported to the 3
6 NRC?
R
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Under the guidelines we have today, very definitely.
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Would I do it today?
Yes.
do 9
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You've answered my second question.
What.about on oH 10 3
March 28th?- Was it your impression that this should have been?
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A on March 28th, quite cicarly the guidelines and d
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the way we did business was a lot different.
Today we have I')
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We have E
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established phone circuits.
Quite clearly today we would have x
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done that.
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It's not quite so clear on March 28th we would have G
17 reported that information, even though the NRC did have an wx 18 open phone line within our office.
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g To your knowledge, was this in' formation withheld 20 from the NRC on March 28th?
A Definitely not.
They were free to participate in
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i any of our discussions we had that day.
23 '
G But there was no decision to not report this ON 24 i information?
25 A
Definitely not.
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4 In your interview with the IE investigators back O
2 in May, you stated in part, and again I quote:
"Some people w/
3 stated the pump didn't run, and we were pretty well convinced 4
that it pumped steam, I think."
And "the pump" here refers e
5 to the primary coolant pump.
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6 Again, to whom specifically does the "we" apply?
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A Again I think the "we" applies to the people that
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4 Both the think tank and the control room?
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Oh, yes.
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Does this statement mean that you believe that 3
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I think at least I could say that they had indica-m 2
15 tion that it wasn't pumping water.
Whether or not it was g
16 pumping steam, eve,rybody could draw their own conclusions.
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Someone has testified -- and I don't recall who 18 right off the top of my head -- that isometric drawings were
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19 checked in relation to this.
Were you involved -- were you R
20 personally involved -- in the checks of isometric drawings?
21 A
I recall something about that, okay; but I don't
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22 think I was personally involved.
It's been a long time.
I've 23 never been asked that particular question before.
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24 MR. HARPSTER:
Gary Miller told us that after you 25 !
ran the pump and saw the steam down around the valute ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
JWB 5-10 12 I
that it would either be yourself or Seelinger that he would 2
rely on to check those drawings to try and relate that to the 3
level of water.
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4 THE WITNESS :
I did not do that specifically myself.
5 3
I do remember some discussion within the tank about levels, 9
0 possible levels, what the problem was.
I don't think we R
8 7
ever related it yet to a core level, or I think our actions n
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would have been slightly different at the time; slightly 0
different.
10 BY MR. HhRPSTER:
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Let me ask you -- excuse me -- why would you get out d
12 z
the isometrics if you weren't trying to relate it to the inlet
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nozzle levels and the core level?
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A Why we did a lot of things that day, quite honestly, m
9 15 Q
is something that's hard for us to defend right now.
It's s
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easy for me to sit in this room and say I'd do things 6
17 different37 now --
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G No, I think it's a very reasonable thing to do, 19 8
don't misunderstand me.
I would have gotten out the drawings i
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20 in a hurry, too.
A I don' t specifically remember relating it to the
()
core level; but I do remember a discussion about isometric 23{
drawings.
lO (reus e. )
25 !
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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BY-MR. MOSELEY:
2 O
Was the information passed on to the NRC, to the 3
best of your knowledge, about the pumps pumping steam?
O 4
A' That's hard to say.
What I remember is possibly a 5
y little earlier when perhaps the NRC was there.
I don't know n
6 what time for sure they showed up; it was early in the morning, R
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but I don't know what time.
It's possible that that was done a
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before they got there.
You'd have to look at the times.
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O To your knowledge -- I'm asking you about your oH 10 j
knowledge -- to your knowledge was it?
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Well, I'm sure in the discussions that it was 3
obvious that we couldn't get the pumps to pump.
That was 13 brought up in the think tank.
They were part of that arrange-3 14 ment, so surely they knew the pumps wouldn't pump water.-- or x
9 15 g
we would have been running them.
m We were headed all day towards two things that day:
6 17 forced circulation for the cooling mode; and reactor coolant a
5m 18 pumps for decay heat.
That's what we were trying to do all
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day.
20 0
But the pumps may have been not in operation because of some other conclusion.
For instance, that you
()
were outside the operating limits of the operating curves and 23 '
that caused the assumption you had other considerations not
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quite as dramatic as the fact that they were pumping steam?
25 A
It's possible someone could have drawn a conclusion ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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like that, I guess.
I don't think our discussions, after the O
2 initial time, talked about pump curves.
I think we pretty 3
much got away without talking about pump curves.af ter that.
4 4
Again I ask you -- again prior to March 28th, in 5
g your opinion should this information have been passed on to the a
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NRC?
a R
7 A.
Again I think my answer would be the same.
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8 It is quite clear to me today, but on March 28th it's not quite d:i 9
so clear under the guidelines, and the training, and the 10 emergency plans that we had at the time that that would have E
11 said:
Hey, relay it.
Nor is it quite obvious that we had a is l
12 method of relaying prior to March 28th.
Today, no problem.
O l is We cou1d.heve hed it re1 eyed on the red phone riehe eway.
l 14 4
To your knowledge was this information withheld
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y 16 A.
Not to my knowledge.
1 h
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Let me gorback to your statements earlier on x
$i 18 concern for core covery, or potential for core uncovery.
Who 19 of the group believed that the core might be uncovered, or 20 had concern about core coverage?
21 A.
I think if you look back at my testimony I think O
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22 23 of were we absolutely positive it was covered.
That's probably 24 how we approached it:
Are we positive the core is covered?
25 I think that concern was raised in the think tank.
I raised l
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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it at least once.
O 2
O Okay.
But if we go down the list of people who 3
were participants -- maybe you didn't take a look, but do O
4 you have a perception of who believed that, yes, it just may 5
not be covered?
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6 A
I don't think anybody would allow themselves to R
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believe it was uncovered.
I think that was our problem.
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But yet that was one of tne reasons for the d
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depressurization.
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10 A
The jurimary reason is we wanted to get forced
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core floods would tell us something about the condition of
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the core to reassure us that it was covered; that's the way E
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I think we talked about it.
BY.MR. CRAIG:
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G So then the core flood tanks were very minor 6
17 considering the real goal was to get forced circulation with x=
18 decay heat, and just because the core floods would discharge l
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a little bit of water, you could draw the conclusions that
'O you would from that; but it was secondary in your objectives?
^
Is that correct?
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A Secondary -- It's hard to pinpoint primary and 23 l secondary, but I think the primary goal all day was the forced
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cooling mode, and I think that's correct.
l 25 '
G One more question.
The discussions about the ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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possibility of the core being uncovered, can you describe O
2 those discussions, with the exception of "if we depressurize 3
and the core flood tanks inject, we'll have reassurance that O
4 the core is flooded," what other discussions were there 5
y concerning core uncovery?
n 6
(Pause.)
R b
7 A
It's hard for me to think -- to remember.
The s
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only ones I remember vivid.y was those particular ones there d
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in the think tank.
I don't remember anything else on core 5
h 10 uncovery.or large discussions based on-that.
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And those particular ones included the discussion a
g 12 of the core flood tanks?
Is that correct?
3 (L-)N g 13 A
Yes, sir.
14 BY MR. MOSELEY:
x 15 Let's direct our attention now to the EMOV or the 0
j 16 PORV.
Regarding this, you stated to the Special Inquiry Group e
h I7 in September, and I quote:
"The thing I recall is that someone z
18 said, yes, the valve was open.
They said, we missed it; it
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g was open.
The valve is now shut.
It is a kind of" and I 20 hereafter supply a word; I think you must have said " revelation,"
21 "when we increased the pressure in the plant."
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2 Again, to whom specifically did the pronoun "we" 23 l.
apply?
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A I think that that quote was taken right af ter we 25 !
l arrived in the control room -
"we" being me and a couple of
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ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
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the oncoming people at that time in the morning.
I think right 2
after I got there, about the time I got there the PORJ was 3
shut, and that is information I kind of picked up from there.
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4 G
Let's see if we can identify people related to l
this particular thing.
Is the time now about 6:00, 6:30 a.m.?
8 6
What time are we talking about?
e n
8 7
A Yes, to the best of my recollection it is some-n b
where around 6:30 in the morning.
O d
9 g
G And this would include yourself, Kunder, Zewe, og 10 who else?
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A Oh, there were a lot of people there by that time, d
12 2
a lot of staff engineers.
Logan was there.
Maylor.
In fact,
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I think he's the guy who shut it, or had it shut.
Ken Bryant.
E 14 g
There were a lot of people there, an awful lot of people there 9
15 g
at that time in the morning.
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16 4
Rogers?
d 17 A
That, I don't remember.
I don't remember him ee 18
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distinctly at 6 30 in the morning, but I do remember him 19 l
around right after 7:00 or so, in that area.
I don't remember 20 I
him distinctly at 6 :30.
G Do you recall discussing this -- that is, the fact O
22 that it was recognized that the valve had been open for some 23 period of time and that this had contributed to the problem
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that you were then in -- was this discussed with Miller when he arrived?
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1 ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
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A.
I didn't take part in what he got turned over from O
2 Zewe when he arrived.
I don't know what Zewe told him about it.
3 In the think tank, it was brushed across that the PORV was a O
4 part of the problem and it's now shut; but at that time they e
5 were looking at so many other problems that had kind of b
6 mushroomed secondarily and they had a lot of confusing informa-g 7
tion by then.
A!
O G
But didn't that information indeed contribute to a dd 9
belief that this was the cause of the problem?
This is why h
10 you were where you were?
The pressurized level was high, your
=
Il pressure in the system is low?
m f
I2 A.
Well, I don't think anybody ever jumped up and 13 said:
We got here because the PORV is open.
I don't think I4 anybody ever pounded on the table and said that.
I'm sure it j
15 was discussed.
m j
16 G
Didn't this statement that I just read in effect us h
I7 say:
This is why we are where we are?
Would you like to x
18 refer to it?
E I9 g
A.
Would you reread it?
n 20 (Handing document to the witness.)
2I O
It starts about line 12 on page 9, and I am O
22
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23 (Pause.)
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24 A.
I think that particular statement refers to the 25 information we heard as we came into the control room I think ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
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is what that particular statement refers to.
O 2
0 Is the interpretation that I just gave you the one 3
that is correct?
Is my interpretation correct, that this says 4
that this is now we got here?
e 5
A.
I don't think that says that.
I think it's a j
6 statement of the fact of what happened at the time.
The g
6 7
conclusion we draw from that is sometimes hard to defend l
l 8
later on.
d m;
9 4
I'll refer you to another quote from testimony of z
h 10 yours to IE in May, and this quote says:
"Right after it was t
j 11 closed, Zewe came around and said, gaez, that was it.
The is g
12 reactor building pressure was going down, so we figured he'd O l i3 found oue whee wes going on ee the time.-
l 14 Isn't that saying that there was a realization by 15 Zewe, and he's making this statement to others, that:
- Hey, j
16 this is why we got here.
v5 17 A.
I think you'd have to ask Bill that, but that's what E
}
18 that would mean to me, yes.
E 19 4
And was this discussed with Miller when he arrived, 20 or at sometime later?
I believe I asked you whether it was 21 discussed.
O 22 a.
Again, 1 didn't take vert in what he was hriefed 23 ;
on when he came in.
In the think tank, I'm sure it was known
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24 kncwledge that the PORV was open and had been shut.
25 0
And that it was open for some period of time, not ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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just for a couple of minutes?
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A.
Yes, it was open for some period of time; but I don't 3
know what the conclusion we at the time drew from that.
I id #5 4
think that information was known.
The conclusion was not.
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0 When you agreed with me, with my assessment that 2
this is what was said, is that an agreement today or an agreement 3
that that's what was being said on March 28th?
/
4 A
It's an agreement, that's my testimony, to the best a*
e 5
of my recollection, it's correct at the time.
I don't have a 6
distinct knowledge of that right now, that particular scene at R
7 this time.
I do remember the PORV scene.
8 8
0 Let me make sure that I understand what you said.
Od 9
Have you said that the fact that the PORV was open 10 for a period of time much in excess of what you would expect it 3l 11 to have been open, and that this was discussed by members of a
j 12 the Think Tank and members of the supervision on watch or in the
()
13 control room in the early morning of March 28th?
Is that what l
14 you have said?
2 15 A
I am saying to my recollection we did have knowledge 5
y 16 l that it was open for a period -- a long period of time.
I can't M
d 17 testify what conclusion we drew from that at this time.
U 18 Q
And can you tell me, was this specifically discussed, I
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19 do you recall this specific discussion of this which included n
20 Mr. Miller?
21 A
Specific discussion?
No.
It was discussed in the
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22 Think Tank, in passing, definitely.
I can't say to you'I 23 remember distinctly.
We passed this on to Miller.
We talked 24 for more than a minute about this particular valve.
()
25 i Q
Was it discussed with Mr. Herbein on March 28th, to b
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPAN'/, INC.
22 ar6-2 I
the best of your knowledge?
O 2
A I do not know.
I did not talk to Mr. Herbein on March 3
28th.
O 4
BY MR. HARPSTER:
5 y
Q Mike, let me ask you a question.
I've poured over e
5 0
this transcript several times and tried to put myself in your g
7 place that morning, when the valve was shut for about an hour 8
before that, or a little longer.
You're sitting at saturation d
I with theelevel?high..and the pressures down.
At that time you o
h 10 are pretty stable.
You are sitting there, it's anomalous.
You
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12 tion.
Nothing seems to get you out of it.
13 o
When Mahler shuts the valve 6:20, the pressure l
14 streams right back up.
Now there's still a considerable
$j 15 amount of time before you get any radiation alarms.
Not a lot I0 is going on, but you're recovering pressure.
People have to know hI you did something to get out of it.
You don't have the radiation 3:
l 18 problems yet if people don't recognize that shutting the valve i
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19 g
got you out of it -- and I think we've got the general impression 20 that people realized that the valve was shut -- what were people concerned about?
What could they attribute this condition to, which all the efforts were to try and get the pressure back 23 i
up, and yet there was really nothing else going on in the plant O
24
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was just down and you couldn't recover it.
You had no radiation ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC,
23 cr6-3 I
alarms at that time.
I don't see what shifting the fncus of O
2 attention off trying to understand what you had up to then -- I 3
can understand later in the day when there's a lot going on O
4 and you're trying to move on, but up at that point you don't 5
have the radiation problem.
You've solved your major problem 6
now, your pressure is coming up.
R b
7 A
Yeah.
I don't think anybody ever stopped and looked n[
8 back at what we had prior to 6:30.
I think it's that simple.
d I
BY MR. MOSELEY:
.2 10 0
Becauce we're talking about the time period after
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is f
12 A
6:30, the valve was shut, the pressure was increased.
13 I guess everybody at that time was thinking we're going to start a
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l 14 reactor coolant pump and go on.
That's what they'were thinking,
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15 and the events before and what happened before were not considered.
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I6 That's it, I believe.
That's it.
- rs h
I7 Q
And specifically it was not considered by yourself x
f 18 or anyone else, to the best of your knowledge, that this was t
evidence of LOCA?
0l A
I don't think I ever jumped up and said that was a 21 LOCA, but I also didn't have any knowledge of how the pressure had been prior to 6:30.
I do today.
23 l 0
Even when you saw evidence that it returned rather I
24 dramatically after the valve was closed, you didn't ask yourself 25l
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ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
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previously?
O 2
A You've got to understand the picture.
You step into 3
the control room at 6:30 in the morning, there is a lot of O
4 confusion, a lot going on.
You get caught up in this and you e
5 never go back.
It's like being on a freight train with blinders.
h j
6 You're going straight down the road.
You're just trying to take g
6 7
care of business, what's in front of you.
That's what happens s
j 8
to you.
Today it wouldn't happen.
dd 9
Q Was the information passed on to the NRC on March 5l 10 28th, to the best of your knowledge, that this valve had been
=
II open for a period of time much in excess of what people expected?
is I_
II A
To my knowledge, I don't have any knowledge of it 13 being passed on or not being passed on.
I can't answer.
b I4 Q
Okay.
Again the related questions, prior to March
$j 15 28th, would you believe -- did you believe this to be something
=
ij 16 that would be reportable to the NRC?
- d h
II A
Reportable to the NRC?
Once we got into the emergency z
!B 18 plan, quite clearly it's reportable, even prior to March 28th.
A g" I9 Q
You were in the emergency plan at this point in time, 20 were you not?
21 A
We didn't get into the emergency -- emergency wasn't O
22 c1,, ont11,ome time in t3, morning, some degrees of it.
- yeah, 23 l it'd be reportable based on the emergency plan.
Prior to March 1
24 28th, there was no clearcut definition, as there is today, i
25l within one hour you establi.sh a hot line communication with j
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
25 cr6-5 1
the NRC home office.
There was no guidelines like that prior O
2 to March 28th.
3 0
To your knowledge, was this information withheld 4
from the NRC on March 28th?
=
5 A
To my knowledge, it was not.
b 6
BY MR. HARPSTER:
g 6
7 Q
Let me go back to the subject once more, Mike.
George Al 8
Kunder testified -- and you will have to beg my indulgence d
9 9
with my memory -- but a quote that sticks in my mind, we asked 10 George about the time when they shut the valve, "We knew then s
11 we really blew it, we had indeed lost a lot of coolant."
is y
12 Did people -- how did you attribute the fact that Ol13 you had a void in the system, which you knew then, and when you I4 shut the valve, I think by that point you knew you blew the E
15 rupture disc in the drain tank.
You knew you had water moving.
l
- j 16 At that point, were those pieces not put together?
Where did W
I7 the void come from?
How did people attribute the void in the z
M 18 system, the fact -- where did that water go?
I?
19 A
I think it's very hard to say.
I don't think we 20 ever really nailed it down and said, "By god, you had a loss-of-21 coolant, you're low on coolant level, do something."
I don't O
22 thinx th,t w,s ever na11ed down.
,oday we wou1d do it 23,
differently, any place today.
A tough price to pay.
Q 24 BY MR. MOSELEY:
25 i
Q Mr. Ross, others have testified that the hotleg h
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
26
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cr6-6 I
temperatures which were measured by the digital voltmeter set 2
up by Mr. Porter were known by Think Tank members and discussed 3
in the meetings.
4 were you aware that this instruments indicated temperatures of 700 to 800 degrees Fahrenheit?
0 A
I was aware they indicated temperature.s around 700 n
R 7
degrees.
b Q
What was your assessment of these temperatures?
dh' What did they mean to you?
A They meant to me that I didn't have a cooling method
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for the core, is what it meant at the time.
Today it means N
something different to me, as it does to any operator.
But O:
i3 g
at the time it meant to me that I didn't have an adequate E
14 g
cooling method in the core.
2 15 g
Q And you related it to method rather than coolant 16 g
available?
ti 17 A
I don't think I ever said, oh, I've got a low level.
wx
!E 18 I think I said, hey, I'm not removing the heat.
E 19 l
Q Did you at any time on March 28th discuss the 20 implications that you drew of these temperatures with Mr. Miller?
A I think we did discuss them in the Think Tank.
One O
22 of the things we discussed was to establish the cooling method.
23 l As you gentlemen know, no place in any procedure in any B&W plant was there an alternate cooling method thought of, like the I
25 3
PORV.
That's why we started pushing water th::cugh the PORV.
The ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
27 ar6-7 I
thought was to cool the core, we're out of coolant.
O 2
Get the temperatures down.
That was our thinking at the time.
3 Today that's an approved procedure for an out-of-core cooling.
4 Q
So the fact that the temperatures that were being 5
{
measured was too high was discussed by the Think Tank?
6 A
The fact that they were high was discussed.
I don't n
R 7
7 believe I ever or anybody in the Tank ever drew a conclusion, n
8 8
geez, you're superheated or you're this or you're that.
I don't a
4 9
'y-think that conclusion was ever -- jumped up and said this is it.
N 10 E
Q Let me ask you about whether or not you are aware of
=
some discussions with other people who may or may not have fI been part of the Think Tank.
What about Flint?
S
{- l A
I did not have any discussions with Flint that.I'm E
14 aware of, that morning, myself.
w 2
15 a
Q Mahler, Chwastyk?
x 16 g
A Mahler was in the control room that morning.
Chwastyk b~
17 was'in the control room in the afternoon.
ax M
18
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Q But are you aware, did you participate in or over-19
]
hear discussions of the implications of the T-hot as measured 20 by the DVM?
Were you aware, did you overhear any discussions 21 with them?
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A With them specifically?
23 O
Yes.
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A No, I was aware of the temperatures, but I don't 25 recall any discussions with them specifically.
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
28 ar6-8 I
Q Okay.
You have told us what your assessment of these O
2
' temperatures were, in the range of 700 to 800.
Was the 3
assessment of any of the members of the Think Tank different O
4 from your own?
5 A
That I can't really say.
I can say in our discus-6 sions, no one jumped up and down and said the core is uncovered.
g b
7 A couple of times the question was raised, are we sure it's K
k 0
covered.
But no one related the temperature at that time to dd 9
E.
either superheat or anything, any of the things we would do g
10 today.
3 5
II Q
Zewe stated to us a couple of weeks ago that after is the DVM was set up, that -- I'm quoting him now -
"We were 13 aware that we were in excess of saturation temperature for 14 the existing pressure."
j 15 He also goes on to say that he believes that super-z l
il 16 heated steam conditions were discussed by the Think Tank.
us h
I7 Did you participate in or overhear any discussions x
E 18 about superheating conditions on the morning of 3/287
=s" 19 8
A I don't recall that we got superheated steam ever n
0 being passed.
We did discuss and we did look, or have B&W look at some steam tables, and what their analysis was, I don't know.
O(m/
22 Our analysis was we were too darn hot for where we were for 23 existing pressure.
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24 c
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25 i i
used, but the implications that the temperature is beyond what i
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
29 arti-9 I
it could be unless you are above saturation temperature.
That's O
2 the concept I'm using, this shorthand term.
Superheat.
Was 3
that concept discussed?
O 4
A It always was discussed.
The conclusion drawn from 5'
j it was as firm as it should have been today.
Yes, it was c*
6 discussed.
g b
7 Q
You indicated that B&W had been asked to look at Ml 8
this.
Who specifically in B&W?
do 9
A When I say asked to look at, they were involved in o
h 10 some discussion.
I believe that's probably how Al Flint got
=hII in.
I'm not knowledgeable in that particular area.
Q Mr. Flint testified that he had conversations or O
a i3 g
discussions with several people where he describes that the E
14 bubble cannot be collapsed because of the superheat condition, w
b that you would overpressurize your system before you can get x
6 to saturation pressure for that temperature.
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17 Did you either hear from Mr. Flint or hear Mr.
am b
Flint's conclusions stated on March 28th?
5 19 8
A I.did not.
n 20 Q
Your reference to -- in the Senate testimony you made a reference to a belief that B&W had looked at steam tables and concluded superheat.
And you made reference to it 23 i
earlier today.
How did you become aware that B&W may have learned something in this area?
25 i
A It's just you hear something in the background, you ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
30 ar6-10 1
see something more than I was involved, and we directed them O
2 to look at it.
It wasn't like that at all.
They were looking 3
at sometlaing at someone's direction.
Just like you hear things O
4 behind you.
You have a picture of that day to understand e
5 what I'm talking about.
h j
6 Q
I understand that.
Even though someone was not g
7 directed to do it, how did you become aware and what was your A[
8 state of knowledge as to what they had done on March 28th?
d 9
A I remember someone walking around with steam tabins, Eg 10 vaguely.
I thought it was either Rogers or one of those Il people.
That's the conclusion I drew, and that's what that is j
12 was based on.
5 O
13 Q
Miller stated to us that someone could have been I4 plotting or trending the TH information from the DVMs.
To your h
15 knowledge, was this being dote?
z j
16 A
To my knowledge, it was not being done.
It was being us f
17 reported regularly.
I had knowledge of TH readings.
But aa x
18 far as a plot, I don't recall.
E 19 Q
Do you believe if a plot had been kept that you 20 would be aware of it?
21 A
I believe so.
O 22 o
on narch 28th, were you aware that temperatures in 23 excess of 705 degrees F are above the critical temperature of O
24
- steam, I
25 A
I am aware of the critical temperature of steam.
l ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
I l
31 ar6-ll I
That morning I drew no correlation between the two.
O 2
Q Okay.
But on March 28th you were aware that if you 3
were above 705 degrees, that you were above the critical O
4 temperature?
You had that knowledge?
5 g
rim sure that in our training we had that.- Cohclosion h
0 drawn that morning?
None, basically.
g
- S 7
Q Were the hotleg temperatures or the implications A
k 0
thereof reported to the NRC in the morning of March 28th, to the d
o; 9
best of your knowledge?
z 10 A
That I can't say.
They were reported into the
=
5 II Think Tank, and the information was being called across the in 12 E
control room.
It was freely open.
Whether or not they got it, O:
i3 g
I can't say.
E 14 g
Q Again, in your opinion, on or prior to March 28, z
hI should this have been reported?
m I0 A
My answer is pretty much the same.
Once you get h
I7 into the emergency plan, it clearly should be reported, anything a:
!3 18 in the emergency plan.
=
C 19 g
Q Okay.
To your knowledge, was this information 0
withheld from the NRC?
2I A
No, sir.
22 Q
Just summarizing what you told us today and what 23 '
you have said in previous testimony:
O 24 cm,
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25 for a longer period of time; was your perception that the ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
32 ar6-1:
I reactor coolant pumps'were pumping steam; you were aware that O
2 the EMOV had been open for an extended period, and that the 3
hotleg temperatures were considerably higher than expected.
O 4
On March 28th, did you infer from these various 5
y plant conditions, which you have said you were knowledgeable of, 4
6 that they were indications that a serious inventory problem R
b 7
existed in the reactor coolant?
=
8 A
It's hard to say without -- you know, it's hard to d
9 sit here today, because it's so easy to pick up and say, " Boy, e
h 10 that's a problem."
That day we never deduced it as a problem.
=
II We were aware of all the indications, we were aware of the a
g 12 problem, but did we say, " Hey, you have a real inventory
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y 13 problem?"
I don't think.
m l
14 Q
To the best of your knowledge, what efforts were 15 made to determine or estimate the coolant inventory deficiency a
E I0 in the primary system on the morning of March 28th?
w h
I7 A
Oh, I think once we got established, we ensured
=
18 that high pressure injection was maintained at all times.
That
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was one thing we did.
Our reasoning and logic may have been n
20 somewhat distorted at that time, but we were trying to keep 21 high pressure injection going.
My previous statement that I
/~S 22
(_)
knew it was secure and throttled back for some period of time 4
23 doesn't mean we condoned it.
(')
One of the things we did is we put it back on that 24 25 '
morning in the Think Tank.
We put it back on knowing that we ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
i 33 ar6-13 I
were going'to raise the level or anything like that, I can't V
2 say we drew that conclusion that morning.
3 O
So your statement is, just to make sure I understand O
4 it, your statement is that to the best of your knowledge, no g
5 one attempted to estimate or in some way quantify the inventory 0
6 deficiency on the morning of March 28th?
R*S 7
A Not directly.
We were looking at temperatures.
We 3l 8
hoped a temperature decrease would tell us we were cooling.
d q
9 Following that logic, I don't think anybody ever said, "Go out z
10 and determine core level," no, sir, other than the method we
=
II talked about.
E f
I2 Q
What temperature specifically were you using as a
( ~
0 V) 13 criterion?
5m l
14 A
We were using any instruments we had, that would be g
15 on the hotleg temperatures and the coldleg temperatures, which x
j 16 weren't telling us a lot, and the temperatures in the RPS cabinet,
m N
I7 the T-hots.
{
18 Q
Miller' told ds that'in.the.first week of September e
I9 g
daat -you..c6ntrolled operations on March 28th, and he said, n
20 and I'm quoting him:
2I "I feel that if something significant would
()
22 have happened in that control room, Mike Ross would 23 have informed me of it."
()
24 And I end the quote there.
25 You testified today and in previous testimony that ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
34 ar6-14 I
you were aware that the HPCI was secured for a long period, O
2 that the pumps were pumping steam, that the EMOV had been open 3
for an extended period, that the hotleg temperatures were highsc O
4 than expected.
5 What evaluations did you make of the significance of 6
this?
g b
7 A
Our evaluations weren't very thorough that day, a
8 8
admittedly, but the evaluation we made is we didn't have a known d
o; 9
method to cool the core, and we were trying to cool the core z
10 with high pressure injection.
II Q
And you made no recommendations based on this 3
g 12 information?
13 o
A Well, the recommendation was establish circulation, x
14 and that's what we were trying to do.
h:
g 15 0
And again<all this information didn't tell you that x
iE I0 there was a severe shortage of coolant?
v5 h
I7 A
It does today.
It would to anybody.
Then it didn't
=
!B 18 clam up and hit me in the face, no.
E I9 8
BY MR. HARPSTER:
n 20 Q
Let me go back and ask you a question, Mike.
I'm l
21 j
trying to understand what was going on through the morning.
O 22 1 s,,,, pic,,,,,,
s,, you, ce,ce,,,
x, z,,,,,,,,,,
23 it, you understood that the loop was voided.
Now you're l O 24 pom,1,, 1, 1,s s,z,,,
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trying to assure yourself that the core is being cooled, and ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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35 ar6-15 I
that's pretty much what it looks like tc me.
I went back and O
2 pulled all the computer data to see what they were punching out.
3 A
That's what we were trying to do.
4 Q
You're watching the surge line pressurizer temperatures, 5
g looking for some indication yosr temperature is coming down?
4 3
6 A
We were watching a lot of temperatures, trying to g
7 see something decrease, basically, some indication that, yeah, K
j 8
we were establishing a coolant level.
O d
9 Q
But you know you're voided in the hotleg, your RTDs z.c 10 are up in a steam condition, and you don't have any flow.
Your e
II flow, if I understand what you're doing, is at the top of the is
(
12 pressurizer.
13 A
That's correct.
14 Q
What is your indicator of core cooling?
[
15 A
The indicator of core cooling would be the only
=
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16 thing we had at the time.
At the time the only thing we used as h
I7 was hotleg temperatures.
Today we draw the conclusions they z
{
18 were probably in the steam space.
That day whether we ever c
l b
19 finally reached that conclusion, I don't know.
20 Q
Were you able to use your pressurizer temperatures l
21 as an indication?
Because that's where your flow path is now.
O 22 A
We sho 1d h,,,
heen,h1, to.
I don.t reca11 us l
l 23 l ever doing that.
O 24 Q
,he re,se,1,sxed, the operators we,, punchin, it 25 ;
out while the rest of your data was delayed on your alarm printer ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
ar6-1 36 1
and your utility typer.
If they punch it out, it comes out in O
2 real time,.and somebody was looking at it.
3 A
Yeah, we were looking at it, but we didn't know what O
4 we were trying to use it for.
It's now obvious, other than 5
g see a decrease and an indication that we wera establishing 9!
0 some coolant.
7 0
Were you aware during the morning -- did the Think Al 8
Tank discuss -- George Kunder at 9:30 in the morning, when he d
ci 9
talked with Don Haverkamp, expressed concerns that the core is h
10 being cooled by steam, he's worried about building up a boron
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11 slurry down there.
3 g
12 A
I was not.
13 Q
So those concerns really never got discussed in the a
14 Think Tank about the core being steam cooled?
Is that your b
15 recollection?
x l
j 16 A
My recollection is that.
1 h
I7 BY MR. MOSELEY:
x IO Q
Let's turn our attention to count rate behavior, E
g concerning the early morning increase of source range nuclear 20 instrumentation, you told the IE investigators in April the 21 source range indication really bothered me.
This is a quote.
O 22 1,,,,11,s,,se,,,m,
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23 l You also told the Special Inquiry Group in September, and I quote:
25 "I saw an increase in the source range indication ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
ar6-1 37 1
that I didn't like right after I walked in."
That's the end 2
of the quote.
3 You also said that you asked Bill Zewe if he was O
4 injecting, and was he emergency borating.
At the time you were g
watching the nuclear instrumentation, did you believe that 5
4 c'
]
6 the reactor was actually returning to criticality?
6, 7
A I don't know what conclusions I drew.
My gut feeling Aj 8
was something was wrong, was the conclusion-I drew.
I just d
- i 9
walked in, and the only conclusion I could draw, she is going ig 10 to go critical on us for some reason.
I remember that's one 1I of the things we looked at.
Whether I just walked in or in I
12 whether it was an -- times were real tough after something O5g 13 like this.
But it did bother me very much, and the conclusion CEl l
14 the draw, the only thing I could draw, she is starting to go g
15 critical, reason or not.
z y
16 Q
In Flint's testimony to the Kemeny Commission, he us f
17 i says that he drew the conclusion that the nuclear instrument 1
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18 indications were not a recriticality, but were a change in i:"
19 g
leakage flux on the core.
He says that he discussed this with 20 Rogers, and Rogers told him that he would discuss with Met Ed 21 management.
22 Did Rogers inform you of Flint's conclusion?
23 A
No, sir.
j O
24 a
oid you gareic1 gate in any discussion on Merch 28th 25 in which Mr. Flint's conclusion or anyone else's similar i
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
ar6-18 38 1
conclusions were discussed?
O 2
A Not that I remember, no, sir.
3 0
Was the count rate behavior and the potential for O
4 recriticality passed on to the NRC on March 28th, to the best of e
5 your knowledge?
3a 6
A To my knowledge, I don't have any knowledge of it R
7 being passed on.
I did not.
8 Q
And I'll ask you the same related question as before, d
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about what your opinion was of the reportability of this on N
10 March 28th, and subsequently.
j 11 A
Pretty much the same.
Once we had instituted the 3
g 12 emergency plan, we reported everything we saw in the plant.
O5y 13 0
To your knowledge, was this information withheld x
l 14 from the NRC7 2
15 A
No information that day was withheld.
l 5
j 16 BY MR. CRAIG:
w l
d 17 Q
Mike, concerning the count rates increasing on the
{
18 neutron instrumentation, you stated that you were concerned E
19 about it.
What happened to that concern?
20 A
It just happened, as did many things that day, some-l 21 thing else came up that was bigger and we went on to the next
()
22 item.
We checked that we were borating, we checked that we 23 were injecting at that point, and you've got to remember that l
([)
24 we were always kind of showing up, trying to figure out what was 25 going on.
We checked those two concerns.
There wasn't much ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
ar6-19 39 I
else we could do at that point, other than borate and inject, so O
2 we went on to the next item.
3 Remember, you're on a freight train going down the 4
road at 80 miles an hour.
5 g
0 Did you check it later at some point to see where 9
3 6
the counts were?
R E
7 A
I don't recall ever going back and looking at that Ml 8
again.
d c
9 0
You casumed that the emergency boration was taking
,z 10 care of the --
E II A
We know we didn't achieve criticality or anything y
12 like that.
At least, it never went off any higher.
We went 5
Oa 13 on to the next item.
5 m
l 14 BY MR. MOSELEY:
M]
15 Q
Concerning the core exit thermocouple instrumenta-x g
16 tion, to the best of your knowledge, for what were the core M
h I7 exit thermocouples used during normal operation?
z 18 A
In TMI Unit 1, they're not even hooked up.
They're P"
I9 g
not used for anything.
In TMI Unit 2, they were hooked up and 20 used for very little, nothing that the operators would normally 21 use.
()
22 Q
Who would use these?
23 A
Probably B&W.
(b6 24 25 ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
JWB #7 40 I
.G Are you guessing?
Or do you know?
2 A
I don't know; I'm guessing.
Probably B&W would be 3
my guess.
4 G
To the best of your knowledge,- then, no operators 5
y or operator-type people -- that includes operations supervi-0 sion -- used the core exit thermocouples?
R 7
A I wouldn't know, but Jim Floyd would have used it.
K]
8 for us as Unit 2 supervisor; and Unit 1, I didn't use it d
f.
9 obviously because it wasn't hooked up.
oF 10 g
4 What training had you had in the core exit
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II thermocouples?
m c
12 z
A The training I had in the core exit thermocouples
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O 13
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l was that we knew they were installed, and we knew they weren't E
14 hooked up, and we knew they weren't used.
w b
G In your prior -- you were in the Navy before you z
d 0
went to work for Met Ed?
e A
Yes, sir.
x 18 G
Did you use core exit thermocouples?
=
19
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A We used core thermocouples, yes.
The Navy program 20 did use them specifically for a loss-of-power mcde.
G Which is a situation somewhat akin to the situation on March the 28th at Three Mile Island --
23 A
Somewhat.
G
-- in that you don't have forced circulation flow.
25 Is that correct?
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
41 7-2 JWB l
A Somewhat, yes, sir.
_O 2
0-Did you have reason to recall this prior experience 3
and the use of these on March 28th?
()
4 A
No, I did not.
5 g
g Do you know why these thermocouples or alarms are 9
3 6
in the computer?
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R 7
A No, I do not.
A k
Q To the best of your knowledge, is there*any d
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procedure -- Met Ed procedure -- for these thermocouples?
g o
hI A
Prior to March 28th, on Unit 1, there definitely
=
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d 12 z
g Were you aware of anyone monitoring the computer
/~T A
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printout of in-core thermocouples during the day of March 28th?
E 14 g
A No, sir.
e 9
15 E
G You were not aware that Flint, for instance, was z
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16 g
doing this?
6 17 A
(Nodding in the negative.)
wz 18
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U 19 A
"No."
20 g
You stated to the Special Inquiry Group that you were in the vicinity when Porter reported to Miller the core O
22 exit thermocouple readings which had been taken down below 23 the terminal.
Later in the same interview, you say:
"They f>i 24 were discussed a couple of times" -- and I'm quoting you.
25 "They were discussed a couple of times, and I can't remember ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
42 7-3 JWB i
1 whether it was just the two times that I remember, or four O
2 times, but they were discussed.
And each time in the discus-3 sion, they were discounted."
4 Did the existence of the high temperatures at least e
5 imply to you that the core was or had been uncovered?
h 6
A At the time, they did not.
g R
7 4
Did you discuss or overhear discussions with other Ml 8
think tank members the possibility that these readings could d
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indicate that the core was uncovered?
Yg 10 A
As I stated before, I was aware of the readings, E
11 sir.
The span of the readings.
I don't remember anybody Y
12 drawing any analogy to the core coverage based on the (2) 5 5
13 thermocouples.
m l
14 4
Do you recall the reasons discussed on March 28th g
15 for discounting these daermocouple readings?
z d
10 A
Yes.
The span was very wide.
There were some M
h 17 anywhere from 200 degraes up.
It was just a fan.
Basically z
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There were some P"
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that were 0, 200*, 40',
it was -- what I got out of what I 20 heard was it was just a real wide area, and no conclusion 2I could be drawn from it.
()
22 4
Do you recall a discussion that new junctions may 23l have been formed?
Do you recall that statement on March 28th?
()
24 A
No, sir.
No new junctions.
I've neard since 25 March 28th, but not that day; I don't recall.
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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l 7-4 JWB 43 1
0 You stated to the Special Inquiry Group that you O
2 think, or you recall hearing additional thermocouple rear *'.ngs 3
which I, in reading your statement, take that to mean reference O
4 to additional readings taken down below at the terminals.
And
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the same.
R 7
A.
Yes.
I don't remember that today, but I remember Ml 8
something vaguely with another set of readings coming in, and U
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they discounted them the same way, and we just went on.
l3 10 0
Can you give me some -- Can you relate that in any i
II way, those additional discussions, to something else that is f
12 was going on at the time?
Or can you enlarge on.the state-Oj13 ment that you have already made?
l 14 A.
No, sir; you've got to remember the time span we're 15 involved in here.
I cannot.
- [
10 BY MR. GAMBLE:
as 17 g
Do you recall if it was a large quantity of x
18 readings?
E 19 A.
I recall it was not a large quantity of readir;s --
20 and this is a feel for how the thing flowed.
I recall a 21 small sampling of readings, is how I put it.
O 22
,Y Ma. MosessY, 23 G
Do you believe the other discussions were somehow I
24 referring to the same set of readings?
Or did you have the 25 impression they were additional readings?
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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A.
My impression was they were additional readings, s
2 but I can't say.
I know now some things I didn't know then 3
and that's the problem, as you guys know. -My impression at 4
the time is that they were additional readings; but where they e
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6 knowledge now.
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instrument was left hooked up down below such that it could be d
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read at various times during the day?
io g
10 A.
No, sir, not down below.
We had an instrument i5j 11 hooked up upstairs, but not on the thermocouple.
k y
12 G
And you don't have any knowledge of who may have 25 O
g i3 discussed these readines, or any reco11eceion whatsoever es 14 to who was discussing it and in what context they were m
2 15 discussing it?
j 16 A.
The first discussion, Ivan made the discussion and d
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17 I heard a part of that.
Subsequent discussions are kind of 18 like a flowing blur, and I am sure Ivan was part of it.
i:"
19 BY MR. GAMBLE:
R 20 Q.
In the context of a think tank meeting?
21 A.
All I remember about the first oney-it was out O
22 in the contro1 room.
Thet.s m, best reco11ece1on, but you.ve 23 got to remember that it's 18 months old.
Q 24 G
Right.
The first one you believe might have been 25 out in the control room?
i ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
7-6 JWB 45 1
out in the control room?
2 A.
That's my first belief.
I don't know why I say that 3
I just say that from something I remember and I don't know what O
4 it is.
It seems to me it was right out in the control room.
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Do you have any feel b
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for that?
g 8,
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I think they were mentioned just in passing, perhaps, 3]
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BY MR. MOSELEY:
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You indicated that you have knowledge now, improved
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12 couple readings, the ones that were taken down below.
What Oe5 13 is that?
Do you have knowledge that additional readings were m
l 14 taken?
15 A.
I hear rumors that a lot of things went on down-16 stairs.-
I've heard people say that -- I've heard a lot of h
17 information that thermocouples were applied, and I've heard a 18 lot of things.
I had heard that a complete set was taken, but i:"
19 g
that's all hearsay information.
20 4
Have you seen the record that was made of a ccmplete 2I set on March 28th, which was subsequently I believe placed on 22 the console and its whereabouts was unknown for some period 23 ;
of time?
Ay 24 A.
I did not.
25 0
You are now aware of this?
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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JWB 7-7 46 1
A I haven't seen them to date.
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You have not?
3 A
No.
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0 And on March 28th, did you ever reconsider your 1
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7 vessel, the 700- to 800* temperature, the explanation of a
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an apparent return to criticality?
Did any of those things d
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cause you on March 28 to go back to the thermocouple readings 5
h 10 and maybe say "we should have looked at those more closely"?
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Not on March 28th.
Today, yes.
E f
II G
Did you participate in any discussions on the
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I believe you told us you c
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overheard Porter talking with Miller, and you overheard some z
g 15 other conversations.
Did you yourself participate in discus-x E
I0 sions?
w h
I7 A
I probably exchanged some words with Ivan and Miller
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18 when that came, but no other discussions.
A" 19 g
G Not to include anyone other than Porter and Miller?-
20 A
Not to my knowledge, no, sir.
2I G
Was the core exit thermocouple reading information passed on to the NRC on March 28th, to the best of your s
3 knowledge?
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24 A
I have no knowledge whether it was or it wasn't.
25 4
And on the basis of your statements earlier -- I ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
7-8 JWB 47 I
don't mean you necessarily have some specific questions that O
2 we've asked about your belief on reportability -- but I would 3
like to ask you:
To your knowledge, was this information
()
4 withheld from the NRC?
5 y
A Again, no information that day was withheld from a
3 6
anybody.
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R 7
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You stated to the IE Investigators in May that N
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you were aware of the containment pressure spike.
You looked a
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You also said you associated II the event with an instrument problem.
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You.wererallicensed"SRO at.the time, Mr. Ross.
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Didn't you know of the redundancy which would have to be set E
14 aside for the building spray pumps to come on?
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A Very definitely.
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And you then knew that an instrument or power h'
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malfunction couldn't have caused the spray pumps to come on?
m 18 A
You say " knew."
We still associated it with some
=
19 l
kind of a failure and proceeded.
We didn't say:
Hey, that 20 couldn't have happened, but we want to write this off.
I'm saying that what we concluded was that it couldn't have =
1-happened, based on our previous training; therefore, it was 23 l
an instrument failure -- be that logically right or wrong, that's what we concluded.
25 I l
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
m 7-9 JWB 48 l
1 BY MR. CRAIG:
2 4
You ' concluded that what couldn't happen, specifi-3 cally?
O V
4 A
Any kind of a spike.
It couldn't have been there 5
g based on that rapid of a change.
We seen a change that was n
3 6
" bang, bang," and I said it had to be an ii.atrument failure,
~
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and went-on.
K 8
8 BY MR. MOSELEY:
dd 9
O And you didn't question that the downside, the 8g 10 return to normal, may have been caused by some failure of the Il containment vessel?
m j
12 A
Definitely not.
()
5 13 G
Chwastyk has told us that after the spike he had
=
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15 the spike was real, and beceuse the pressure had dropped so x
E I6 quickly that the containment could have failed.
He also said w
h 17 that he had temperatures and pressures checked as a result of x
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18 his belief that the spike was real.
E I9 g
Were you aware of these actions?
20 A
I was not.
I'm sure we had temperatures and 21 pressures checked because we were doing that.
We were looking
(
22 at things -- what's the temperature?
What's your pressure in 23 l the building?
We had pressure in the building; we had the
()
24 building bottled up and we were locking at it.
The inspection 25 I have no knowledge of; nor do I have any knowledge that it ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
7-10 JWB 49 i
was done.
O 2
G Do you have knowledge particularly that the 3
containment building temperature was checked as a result of 4
the spike?
e 5
A As a result of the spike?
6 3
6 0
Yes.
g 7
A No, I have no knowledge of that.
M l
8 G
What particular temperatures are you aware of that d
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were made specifically as a result of the spike?
2i h
10 A
I'm aware of nothing specific as a result of the 3
5 11 spike.
I am aware that we were looking at pressure, and we J
12 were looking at temperature in the building.
We wanted to z
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14 cooling was keeping the pressure down for any reason, so we 2
15 kept the pressure low in the building.
We wanted to keep what j
16 was in the building in the building.
as g
17 G
And Chwastyk didn't discuss any of these action; 18 or their results with you?
h 19 A
No, not at that time.
At subsequent times, days a
20 later, we inspected the reactor building and we took radiation 21 surveys on top of the dome with a meter and things like that, O
22 but at that time I have no knowledge of anything at the time 23,
of the spike.
We went on to something else.
O 24 G
sue, nr. noss, you were the man in charge of 25 !
operations on that date.
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
7-:11 JWB 50 1
A That's correct.
O 2
G Here's Mr. Chwastyk taking actions.
He has some 3
concern that this was a real pressure spike.
He has people O
4 take certain actions and he didn't tell you?
=
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or he didn't take them that day.
dj 6
G How was information flowing to you as the Director R
7 of Operations on that day?
7.l 8
A I was coming out to the control roomv-I wasn't dd 9
spending full time out there --
periodically; receiving iog 10 information; looking at certain parameters and coming back to 11 the think tank.
That's what we were doing that day.
3 y
12 G
With whom would you discuss this,'any status --
()
13 A
The shift supervisor, a
l 14 G
Do you feel that that information flow was working l
2 15 on March 28th?
j 16 A
As well as it could under the conditions that we w
6 17 had; yes, sir.
18 G
Even when people say they had various concerns i
5 l
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21 working?
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22 A
I still conclude the information flow was working.
23 I still question whether or not they say things now that we
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24 did then, or things we did days later.
I've had that problem l
l 25 myself.
1 ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
1 i
7-12 JWB 51 l
1 G
Your statement to the I&E Investigators in May O
2 about Miller's interaction with you at the time of the spike 3
says, and I quote:
"My thought at the' time -- and Miller was 4
out there with us, and he questioned, he said:
Geez, you know, a
5 I thought I heard something too.
We were moving down the road E
a 6
there 100 miles an hour, and we looked at it, and we said:
R d
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He did say he thought he heard something.
That's
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2 15 a ventilation fan shift, dampers go shut -- we just never g
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All our training said E
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Well, you're a little ahead of me.
I'm trying to --
21 before we get to relating it to hydrogen -- I'm trying to
()
22 understand knowledge that there was a pressure spike.
A We had knowledge that there was a spike indicated.
23 ;
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24 G
And you and Mr. Miller were standing there, and l
25l someone is saying the spray pumps come on, and people are ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
7-13 JWB 52 I
taking actions, and it's your belief that Mr. Miller is aware O
2 of these things the same as you were aware of these things?
3 Is that correct?
O 4
MR. BLAKE :
Could we go back and read the first
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MR. MOSELEY:
Sure.
Did you want the five-minute g
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No, just the question which you started d
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with.
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MR. MOSELEY:
Would you reread the question?
E II MR. BLAKE:
I thought you asked half of a question 3
f A2 and he answered the second half.
I'm not sure what the answer O
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l 14 THE REPORTER:
" O, Your statement to the I&E Inves-h 15 tigators in May about Miller's interaction with you at the x
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10 time of the spike says, and I quote:
"My thought at the time" --
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,N I7 MR. BLAKE:
Could we stop just for a second?
You're l
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quoting now Ross' statement from your statement?
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I9 MR. MOSELEY:
Yes.
g 20 THE REPORTER:
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2I us, and he questioned, he said:
Geez, you know, I thought I O
22 he,re something, too.
Me were moving down the road there 100 23 miles an hour.
We looked at it and we said:
Gee, the spike O
24 w,s so ; sort, it must have heen en inst,ument..
shat.s the l
25 end of the quote.
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associated it with anything other than an instrument failure.-
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We had never been trained to say that a hydrogen buildup would iog 10 happen in that short a period of time.
All our training said 3l 11 60 days,.not to worry.
B y
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Well, you're a little ahead of me.
I'm trying to --
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l 14 understand knowledge that there was a pressure spike.
2 15 "A
We had knowledge there was a pressure spike M
16 indicated.
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And you and Mr. Miller were standing there, and 5
5 18 someone is saying the spray pumps come on, and people are
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20 of these things the same as you were aware of these things?
21 Is that correct?"
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22 BY MR. MOSELEY:
j 23,
O Would you answer that question, then, the last
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24 one?
25 A
I'm convinced Miller was aware of the spike.
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
l 7-14 JWB 54 1
Whether or not he was aware of all the ES equipment functions,
[D 2
I can't say.
Zewe turned around and said, " Hey, the spray 3
pump's started."
That's how I knew it happened.
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And Miller is standing next to you, and one might e
5 conclude from that that he must have heard it.
Is that g
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correct?
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7 A
That would be my conclusion.
You've got to remember X]
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room at that time.
10 G
I understand.
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11 BY MR. CRAIG:
3
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12 What about the spike itself as indicated on the
()
13 recorder?
Did you see that?
m l
14 A
I looked it.
It was long enough.
It was from 2
15 here to there (indicating).
I did look at it and seen the j
16 spike go up, and I seen it clear right away.
They turned to e
b' 17 me and said:
Can we secure the spray pumps?
We looked at the 18 pressure and said:
Yes, secure them, no use spraying the
=
19 building.
gn 20 g
Is it your belief that Gary Miller also saw that 21 chart recording?
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22 A
I can't say.
Gary was in the area.
I stepped 23 away and talked to Bill, and we were all kind of in the same O
24 etee, sut I cen.t conclusively say he knew it and saw the 25 spike.
He was in the area.
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
7-15 JWB 55 1
MR. CRAIG:
Can we go off the record for a second?
O v
2 (Recess.)
3 MR. HARPSTER:
Back on the record.
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BY MR. HARPSTER:
e 5
g Mike, could you tell us what you did see in terms M4]
6 of other indications and things like the containment isolation R
7 valves and this, what did happen when you got the pressure s]
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dd 9
A Well, the primary indication you have of course is Y
10 the pressure recorder in the reactor building.
The thing you El 11 do get is a four-pound building isolation signal that causes 3
y 12 the valves to reclose anything you've had open, any building
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g 13 isolation valve.
At 30 pounds, it causes the building spray a
14 pumps to start.
If those actions take place, operators are g
15 talking saying the building spray pumps started; you hear
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those kind of things and that would be your indication.
W 6
17 Do you hate announciation on your vertical boards 5
18 of your SFAS logic?
E 19 A
Yes, " building spray start," a couple of different gn
~
20 announciators you would have.
I don' t know them all.
21 4
Things which might be more apparent to people that
(])
22 perhaps didn't have visual perspective, those little reactor 23 building recorders sitting there, " loss of intermediate
(])
24 cooling," things like that?
25 lI A
Things like that, but it would be a number of alarms l
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
i
.7-16 JWB 56 coming in and out at that time, whether someone in the back j
could pick it up and say:
Geez, that alarm was caused by this?
2 It's hard for me to say.
For the operators, yes, we could 3
O pick that up.
C/
4 l-e 5
G But the SFAS logic would put the big announciators g
8 6
up there?
e
^
t j
7-A.
Yes.
8 G
That's something that would get your attention.
That's not one of the alarms you would lose track of?
9 i
h 10 A.
It would get your attention; but whether you'd get z
E it in addition to all the other alarms flashing around the jj B
d 12 control room, I can't say for somebody else.
E BY MR. HOEFLING:
_.)
13 m
E 14 G
Why do you say, Mike, that you were convinced that
- s 2
15 Gary Miller was aware of the pressure spike?
A.
Because he asked me, "What was that?"
And we were 16 t
v3 6
17 in the area, and I guess I probably said something to the 5
5 18 effect that we had a spike.
And he says, well -- I don't 5
19 recall ever saying to him, " Hey, Gary, all the spray pumps eM 20 started, and all the building isolation isolated."
I don't 21 recall ever saying that.
I don't know what I said on the 22 record, testimony-wise, but I guess my basic reason for saying p) w 23 l that is he was in there when it happened; he heard what went 24 on in the control room, basically.
25 G
Do you recall saying to him:
We've had a pressure i
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
57 7,-17 JWB I
spike or an indication of a pressure spike?
/mU 2
A I don't recall ever using those distinct words.
3 BY MR. MOSELEY:
O'-
4 g
Mr. Chwastyk has told us that he now recalls that g
the NRC Inspector with whom he discus' sed the containment 5
9 3
6 pressure spike on the day of the accident was Don Neeley.
R 8
7 Did you overhear that conversation that Mr. Chwastyk had with Ml 8
Neeley --
d d
9 A
I did not.
Y 10 4
-- or whoever?
E h
11 A
I did not, sir.
m g
12 Can you confirm that the NRC Inspector who was
()
13 present at that time was Neeley?
m l
14 A
I cannot.
2 15 g
Both Miller and Kunder have stated that while they y
16 were at the Lieutenant Governor's office on March 28th, they w
d 17 telephoned back to the site.
Did you talk with either of them U
{
18 by phone while they were away?
P "g 19 (Pause.)
20 A
I'm not sure.
I believe I talked to Kunder once.
y 21 g
You are not sure whether you talked to Miller or
()
22 not?
23,
A I'm not sure; but I do believe I talked to Kunder i
Q 24 once.
25 I g
Do you recall what you discussed with Kunder?
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
~/
7-18 JWB 58 1
A Again, 18 months later, I have a vague recollection A
\\_i 2
of what we discussed.
My recollection is, we just went over 3
when would they be back, what was going on in the plant.
I nU 4
can't concretely say what I discussed with him at this time.
g g
Do you recall whether or not the discussion 5
6 included the fact that Arnold had called in about that time-R 7
frame and was concerned that the system should be repressurized?
A l
8 A
I do not recall that.
d o;
9 4
In the deposition to the Special Inquiry Group in 10 September, you stated that you called Seelinger to core to the 11 Unit 2 control room because you were not satisfied that you 3
l 12 had the type of control over what people were doing in the
()
13 control room as you had when Miller was there.
m l
14 Would you please describe to us those concerns g
15 which motivated this action?
x g
16 A
Would you read to me my testimony on that, please?
w 6
17 I'll let you read it.
U 18 A
Okay.
P 19 (Handing document to the witness.)
20 MR. MOSELEY:
Let's take a break.
21 MR. CRAIG:
We'll go off the record and take a O
22 break.
23,
(Recess.)
(])
24 MR. MOSELEY:
Let's go back on the record.
25 '
Do I need to repeat the question for you?
o ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
7-19 JWB 59 I
MR. BLAKE:
Why don't you go ahead and repeat the U
2 question.
3 BY MR. MOSELEY:
Il 4
G In a deposition to the Special Inquiry Group in 5
y September, you stated that you called Seelinger to come to the 6
Unit 2 control room because you were not satisfied that you R
- S 7
had the type of control over what people were doing in the s]
8 control room as you had had when Miller was there.
d 9
Please describe the concerns which you had to o
10 motivate this action?
E k
II A
I guess the best way I can answer that is that 3
N I2 Joe Logan was fairly new, and I had more confidence ia Jim'
(~J) 0 13 j
Seelinger and his ability.
Also, Joe Logan was not as force-N m
5 I4 ful a personality as Gary Miller.
g 15 G
Does this mean that you were concerned that things z
g 16 were not under control?
e h
I7 A
It means I was concerned with the possibility of
=
b IO people doing things we didn't know about, or just not quite P
I9 E
as controlled as it has been -- not out of control.
n 20 end JWB-7 21
-8 22 1s 23 l
T 24 l
\\J l
25 l
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
60
- 8 arl 1
Q Did you have evidence that people were taking actions
~
2 which were not directuu at action?
3 A
No, I had no evidence.
,,(-
4 BY MR. HOEFLING:
g 0
What kind of indications were they, Mike, that gave 5
9 6
rise to your concern about control of activities?
g 7
A I guess just a lack of a forceful person in the back X
8 keeping things in the'back working.
A forceful personality.
d y
9 Q
In the back is in the shift supervisor's office?
10 A
In the shift supervisor's office.
Miller is a more E=
11 forceful personality than Logan.
t y
12 BY MR. HARPSTER:
O5a 3
13 0
When Miller left, did the management meetings stop?
m l
14 Did things just sort of drift as they were for the afternoon?
15 A
I don't recall a lot of management meetings after he g
16 did leave.
e 6
17 BY MR.MOSELEY:
18 Q
When?
I'm sorry.
P 19 A
After he did leave, I don't recall a lot of meetings.
g 20 The time period was not that long.
21 Q
There was a period of a coaple of hours, two and a
()
22 half hours, maybe?
23 A
I don't know.
I don't remember it being that long.
t
()
24 Q
Did the meetings resume when Miller returned?
i
~<8 A
Very definitely.
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
l
61 ar8-2 I
Q Is that sort of what motivated you, the meetings 2
weren't being held and people weren't communicating?
3 A
I guess that was part of it.
I was just concerned O
4 act the lack of forcefulness and control is what I remember.
g I don't have anything I can say, "This was done wrong," I don't 5
9 6
have anything like that.
R 7
BY MR. EARPSTER:
Al 8
0 Because of Logan's newness to the unit, was he unable d
q 9
to make operational decisions?
zo 10 A
I can't answer that.
I didn't see that as a problem i
II at the time.
k N
I2 BY MR. CRAIG:
I')
5
/
13 Q
Mike, the last interview, yourcomment about l
14 personalities went right over my head.
You say that you l
g 15 called Selinger because Logan wasn't as larceful as Gary Miller.
m j
16 Gary Miller was the man in charge.
Why would you want somebody W
.h I7 to have a more forceful personality to deal with Gary Miller?
x M
18 A
Miller was absent from the site at the time. Joe r
H= I9 g
Logan was filling in.
n r
20 0
When you called over Selinger?
21 A
Yeah, Joe Logan was filling in.
He was in charge (h
i s) 22 of the unit.
23 l Q
Did you believe things weren't getting done?
Is that l
()
24 the problem?
25 A
I believe we did not have the force in the control 1
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
n=__
.. ~ - -
62 ar83 1
room we had when Gary was there.
Thst's all.
I didn't see
,7~
'O 2
anything that was totally out of control.
3 BY MR. HOEFLING:
4 Q
Did you see anything that was partially out of e
5 control?
Kn h
6 A
Nothing that I can remember now, sir.
g-8 7
Q What did Selinger add to the situation?
'n j
8 A
Byuthe time Selinger got there, Miller got back.
do 9
That's what I recall.
10 Q.
What activities were going on during the period of E
11 Mr. Logan's captaincy?
y m
i 12 A
Pretty much the same activity.
We were trying --
S
_J S
13 we were trying to go into KE is what we were trying to do.
We g
m l
14 were injecting the core.
We were pretty much trying to get 2
15 that condition.
There was not a lot going on at that time.
g 16 Q
What did you expect Mr. Selinger to contribute to d
I7 the situation?
"x 18 A
I guess I just had more confidence in Selinger.
=
19 Q
In doing what?
20 A
- n doing most anything with Unit 2 or with personnel 21 or anything.
22 Q
And specifically what?
i Specifically with personnel or knowledge of the unit.
l 23 A
()
24 Q
Was there a question that if you asked a person to 25 do something, the person wouldn't do it, or he would make 1
i i
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
1 63 i
ar8-4 I
efforts to turn the decision around?
What was the concern?
j 7
(
i 2
A I guess the concern was a little lack of my confidence 3
that everything was being controlled in every area besides mine.
O 4
That was the only concern.
m 5
BY MR. HARPSTER:
h 6
Q What other areas?
We have a real -- you've left us R
d-7 hanging because you're saying you don't have confidence in the
{
8 unit superintendent, and we're trying to find out what motivates 4
c 9
you.
What was your concerns that day, that you go get Selinger.
g 10 A
I didn't say I didn't have confidence in Mr. Logan.
E 11 I said I had more confidence in Mr. Selinger.
N I2 Q
Who was the Unit 1 superintendent?
5 a
13 A
That was correct.
5m I4' Q
Did you have any concerns that things weren't getting g
15 done outside your area?
z j
16 A
My only concern was he wasn't as forceful and I m
f 17 didn't he.ve the confidence.
It's hard for me to say I have z
y 18 these four concerns.
I didn't.
P" 19 BY MR. MOSELEY:
g 20 Q
Okay.
Moving on, Mr. Ross, in a tape recording 2I made by NRC Region I at about 10:15 in the morning on March
()
22 28, Kunder is talking with Don Haverkamp, and I'm quoting him.
23 He says:
(])
24
" Talking to Mike Ross.
He's looking at the 25 indications.
His assessment is that he's surely certain got ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
64 ar8-5 pn the core covered, and we are getting water, you know, water into
()
i 2
the core.
The only thing is that the TH are still high, and 3
that's what's bothering us."
.~s 4
And that's the end of the quote.
e 5
2 Contrasting this, you told the Special Inquiry 3
6 Group in September that at about 11:30, you were becoming more
_n R
7 and more concerned that maybe the core itself wasn't covered l
N 8
8 then.
d d
9 i
You also *.old the IE investigators in May, in di3 cussing l cH 10 E
the decision to depressurize, that you or we were concerned l
E 11 j
that the core wasn' t covered.
d 12 Can you explain this contradiction?
(
h 13 E
A I can't.
I don' t remember Kunder coming up to me E
14 y
and saying, " Hey, are you sure the core is covered? "
I never 2
15 g
had that conversation with George.
16 Q
You don't recall Kunder asking you at about 10:15 y
17 g
as to what your conclusion was on covering the core?
M 18 g
A No, sir.
I don't remember him speaking to me 19 l
separately.
We talked in the Think Tank and that may have been 20 where he got this from.
21 Q
Well, if we tried to envision what was going on,
()
22 Mr. Kunder was on the telephone with Don Haverkamp, who was 23 ;
back in the regional office.
My understanding is that the
()
24 telephone that was in use was the one that in the shif t 25 supervisor's of fice.
So if this conversation indeed took i
i ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
4 65 l
cr8-6 I
place, he would have been in the -- in that of fice.
But you n'
2 recall no such conversation?
3 A
Not with George.
We had conversations, as I stated 4
before.
We weren't positive the core was covered.
=
5 Q
You don't recall a shift in your belief of the core 2
Nl 6
uncovery from a timeframe about 10:00 to 11:30?
R 7
A No, I do not.
K 8
8 Q
Do you recall when the concern that the core might d
d 9
not be cr /ered -- which led to the repressurization strategy, iog 10 do you recall when this first became of concern and was being 3l 11 discussed?
3
(
12 A
Timewise, I do not, of course, because times are a
()
d 13 blur. as I'm sure you gentlemen understand.
I think it became m
l 14 a concern the more we talked about it, because we didn' t have 2
15 indications the plant was cooling down, you know, firm indications Y
j 16 I think we grew concerned that we weren' t reaching a stable M
g 17 condition.
5 5
18 BY MR. GAMBLE:
Q Can you take it timewise as a certain period of time
{
19 20 in advance of the decision to depressurize?
21 A
No, I can't.
Times are really hard.
()
22 BY MR. MOSELEY:
23 0
on March 28th, did you make or were you aware of any
(])
24 other employees of Met Ed or GPU who made calculations as to 25 i the extent of fuel failure based on the data from the containment I
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
I 66
,i cr8-7 I
dome monitor or other instruments?
,mO 2
A I was not, j
3 Q
On March 28th, did you hear or hear of an order not O
4 to energize equipment in containment?
=
5 A
on March 28th?
En h
6 Q
Yes.
g 8
7 A
No.
3[
8 Q
Did you hear such an order on some other day other d
ci 9
than March 28th?
2iog 10 A
Yeah, we spent quite a period of time trying to El 11 deenergize equipment, and what day that was -- I don't believe S
6 12 it was March 28th.
z O
3 L/
y 13 Q
Are you saying you don't believe, or you are sure m
E 14 it wasn' t March 28th?
$z 2
15 A
I am sure it wasn't March 28th.
16 BY MR.HOEFLING:
3 al g
17 Q
How about March 29th?
18 A
The 29th and the 30th all ran together, those two E
19 days.
H 20 0
It would have been on one of those two days, but you 21 can't pin it down?
22 A
Yes, to the seet of my reco11ection right now.
! O 23 BY MR. MOSELEY:
24 Q
tee me mexe eure thee we heve you correce.
You seid O
25 that you had spent a lot of time trying to deenergize equipment. '
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
67 ar 8-8 I
That's not quite the question.
The question is an order not 2
to energize equipment.
3 A
Basically it's pretty much the same thing.
We spent 4
time taking breakers out, tagging operators, pulling fuses, et 5
cetera.
Pretty much the same thing.
They went together.
It 0
is the same thing, in not energizing.
g
- E 7
Q And why was this order given, or why was this action M{
8 taken to. energize and not to energize?
d A
My recollection is we didn't want to take a chance oP 10 g
on an explosion in the building, based on the hydrogen build-up.
E E
II Q
So it was related to an explosive potential?
is g
12 A
Yeah.
13 0
Rather than being inundated with water or some other
=
l 14 reason?
h 15 A
It was probably both.
We just didn't want to take x
if 16 any chances in energizing in an atmosphere where we don't know v5 h
I7 what it is.
x h
II Q
And your recollection is that that occurred on a day E
U g
other than March 28th?
i 20 A
Yes, si::, that's my recollection.
2I Q
You stated to the Senate in October that through the O
22
,,,,,m,3,,ch,,ge,w,,
,e,,,o,1,1
,,,p,,,_,,,,the
,,,,e.
23 Who decided what information to pass on?
O 24 x
1h,t,,,1ee.
1,,,,, thi,x,,yhee, eec1eed this was I
25 an official chain, this was our chain of notifying the state.
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
68 2r8-9 1
It varied.
Normally I communicated with Jim Selinger much of
(-C the time, and he corrmunicated back through.
2 3
Q Then the information that was passed on was not
-O V
4 selected because of its potential interest to the state, or passed e
5 on specifically for further pass-on to the state; is that right?
3 N
h 6
A No, that's not right.
The information selected was g
2 7
significant information that was to be disseminated to all A]
8 personnel, including Unit 1 personnel, the state, anybody else d
ci 9
they had on the phone over there.
10 0
Let me ask you a few specific things, were they E
l 11 included in the pass-on.
is 12 Wa; core uncovery or the possibility of core uncovery O
j i3 geeeed on throush ehee chenne12 l
14 A
I don't remember if it was or not.
2 15 Q
Was plant stability or the perception of plant 5
g 16 stability passed on?
on g
17 A
Yes.
I can't say a hundred percent, but every time we 5
5 18 changed something, we passed on.
F2 19 Q
But this is a change in status rather than a projec-A tion of where the equipmeitt may be in the future; is t. hat correct?
20 21 A
Yeah.
Projections were kind of tough to make that O
22 day, yes, sir.
I would think that would be correct.
23 Q
Was the fact of inventory deficiency passed along?
O 24 A
To my knowledge, no.
v 25 I Q
Pressure spike?
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
69 ar8-10 1
A.
I can ' t s ay for s ure.
I kind of have the feeling it
()
2 was passed on, that we had a spike.
3 0
What gives you that feeling?
O 4
A I don't know.
It may have been something I read later, 5
and that's a problem.
h 6
Q Was the potential for the situation deterior.~ ing R
R 7
passed on?
Ml 8
A Yes and no.
The status was passed on.
The fact that d
Q 9
we were concerned we were running out of water was passed on.
10 The fact that we were concerned we didn't have forced cooling was 3=
11 passed on.
In diatMight, yes.
$mj 12 Q
What about the lack of effective heat removal through
()
13 ATWS circulation?
m m
i 14 A
I can't say for sure it was passed on.
g 15 Q
Was the ineffectiveness or -- let me rephrase it.
x g
16 Was the fear of bypassing of the core with HPCI flow, M
d 17 was that passed on through that channel?
18 A
I don't know.
It was discussed on our side.
5
{
19 Q
I'm sorry?
20 A
It was discussed on our side.
Whether it was 21 discussed on the Unit 1 side, I don't know.
()
22 Q
Or whether it was passed along the communications 23,
channel.
i
(])
24 Mr. Ross, since the TMI accident, have you been 25 influenced either directly or indirectly to change your a
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
70 cr8-11 1
recollection?
O k'
2 A
I have not.
3 Let me rephrase that.
I have not knowingly.
I don't (3
's /
4 know, if you read something, you can be influenced.
e 5
Q Would you describe Met Ed's policy with regard to Ea i
6 reporting inforaation to the NRC?
And let's now put ourselves e
7 back on, let's say, Marda 27, or your understanding of March 28th 3l 8
in response to this series of questions, d
d 9
A Metropolitan Company policy has always been the same.
i og 10 We pass on anything we think is reportable, either regulatory E
I 11 nature or regulatory cogcern, or may be.
It's better to pass too
<t d
12 much on than not enough.
That's our basic policy.
3 C')
=d 13 Q
Was this -- prior to March 28th, was this policy S
E 14 enunciated in any written form, to the best of your knowledge?
Ue 2
15 A
No written form that I'm aware of.
U g
16 Q
So your understanding of that policy is through e
r g
17 what?
s 5
18 A
Management discussions.
It's been our policy as long l
E" 19 as I can remember.
il 2M 20 Q
Who was responsible at the site for reporting informa-
[
~
21 tion on March ? 3th?
t
(])
22 A
Emergency director would have responsibility for all i
23 those functions, he would have the communicator working for him.
{
(])
24 Q
Prior to the declaration of the site emergency and I
25 therefore no emergency director, who would be responsible?
l l
1 ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
71 ar8-12 1
A Shif t supervisor.
O V
2 Q
Was there in the policy a definition of what information 3
was to be reported?
Was there any specificity in this?
U) 4 A
In,he policy or in the plan?
e 5
Q In the policy.
This verbal policy or your understanding M.
el 6
of it.
R R
7 A
This verbal policy was passed on whatever information 3[
8 was prudent or would be useful.
c.5 d
9 0
And therefore there wasn't any criteria you didn't 2ic 10 have, even in your mind sort of a list of criteria to use in h
11 making the report?
it j
12 A
No, no listed criteria as there is today in 50.72.
O l13 Q
At any time on sarch 28th, dia the reporting-m ag 14 responsibility -- was it on your shoulders?
2 15 A
No, sir.
g 16 Q
Did this company policy tsnd to stress events in their as ti 17 best light when they were reported, when information was 13 18 i eported?
5" 19 A
Definitely not.
The idea was make theitreport, tell k
20 them it was preliminary if that's what it was for all occasions,
21 including licensee event reports.
O 22 Q
Did the gotioy seres, e vo1uneeering oe informee1on 23,
when you reported?
i O
24 A
seress2 The ge11cy wes seeted to give more informeeiom 25
-- it's better to give too much than too little.
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
72
-1 cr8-13 1
Q Let's compare respond to any question the NRC asked O
V 2
you, to a statement volunteered to the NRC.
Whatever you believe 3
is of significance, which they may need to know.
Compare those O
D 4
two, and let's see where the policy lay.
e 5
A The policy is answer the question in completeness, 39 6
in total honesty, simply.
R 7
Q Then it didn't address volunteering, or stress, as I al 8
have phrased the question, it didn't stress volunteering d
d 9
information to the NRC, that you believe is of significance?
2io 10 A
The word " stress" is what I'm hung up on.
The
!!!l 11 policy said yes, volunteer.
Stress is a word that we all have 3
g 12 different meanings on.
That's what I'm hung up on.
Yes.
We O
!i3 were co1d to vo1unteer informetion.
m 14 Q
You have answered the question.
Did this policy --
2 15 and again let's try not to hang up on s tress --
g 16 A
I'm sorry, as d
17 Q
- the reporting of unverified information, although 5
3 5
18 it could be potentially significant?
5" 19 A
We did that on many occasions, unverif.i;ed.
We called l
I 20 in licensee event reports and said, "We do not have fir al data,"
l 21 and we have called back and said, "It's not a reportable item O
22 because.
23 So I think the policy has always been to do it.
I O
24 think we have demonstrated that.
25l Q
Did this policy in any way restrict what was to be ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
73 cr8-14 l
1 reported to the NRC?
()
A Not to my knowledge.
Q -
Did the policy include a feeling on your part that r(_y) when in doubt about the reportability of an item, report it?
4 A
When in doubt of reportability of an item, push it 5
e 2
}
through the reportability chain, e
{
Q Have you ever been told to withhold information from S
I A
the NRC?
8 4
A Definitely not.
c 9
Q On March 28 th, did you have a feeling that information 10 z=
should not be volunteered.tto the NRC?
g 11 A
Definitely not, p
12
((~}
h Q
Did you feel on March 28th any influences or pressures
_s g
13 that might affect decisions to report items to the NRC?
E 14 w
A No.
2 15 w*
Q I have a final series of questions that relate to 16 g
d information which for one reason or another was missing or not 6
17 w*
available at one time or another.
18 E
The NRC investigation which was contained in NUREG 0600, 19 8"
the orange document, identified some missing segments of data 20 as to where it was labeled.
The reasons for these missing segments of data has not been identified and specifically pointed i
O 22 1
1 ott there is alarm status printout for two different periods of time during the day, a utility typer output for several different times on March 28th, and an analog trend recorder No. 2 strip ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
74 ar 8-15 1
chart for the entire day..
I) 2 Can you explain or do you have any idea what happened 3
to this data?
O V
4 A
I do not.
=
5 Q
Have you been involved in or overheard conversations 6-concerning this data?
R R
7 A
I have not been involved.-
I have definitely overheard A]
8 conversations.
People talk.
O ci 9
0 And could you give us some idea of what these iog 10 rumors or overheard conversations, what was the substance of i5l 11 them?
y 12 A
All I can give you is rumors, rumors where they were O
lis thrown ewey sy nac gove, sue, you know, don t mexe me gue thee on m
E 14 the record.
- s 2
15 Q
That's all right, -if that's what's been said.
That's e
g 16 what we want to hear.
as(
17 A
Those are definitely rumors, is what they are.
You 18 know, you hear of things.
That's what I didn' t want to say. You
=
19 hear of things, you know.
3 20 Q
But is there a name?
I 21 A
No, sir.
O 22 Q
uow, in eddie1on, there wes some deee of grimery 23 system parameters that were printed out during the day that O
24 have not seen foune.
con you e xp1ein or do you heve eny idee 25 what this data is?
Let me add that this is data that was printed f
I i
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
75 cr8-16 1
out, and it was my understanding was taken into the Think Tank (m)
2 periodically during the day for updating of the Think Tank.
3 A
No, sir, I have no knowledge.
r%
4 Q
Have you been involved in or overheard conversations
~
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concerning this data?
S h
3 6
A Not particularly, no, sir.
R d
7 Q
What efforts have been made by Met Ed to locate or M[
8 ' explain this -- the f act that this was missing, to your knowledge?
d q
9 A
To my knowledge, I have been asked personally do I zog 10 have, or have any knowledge of it.
My answer has been no to Met 11 Ed, and I know Met Ed has searched.
Other than that, I've been 3
y 12 associated with Unit 1.
I don't know what their data search is.
(%)
(_
g 13 Q
Can you describe the Met Ed search of this?
What's
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mg 14 your knowledge of that Met Ed search and what its time period is?
{
15 A
Okay.
I'll answer the question the same way.
Since I z
j 16 came to Unit 1, I never looked.
I don't know what their method is A
6 17 or how hard they searched.
18 Q
Finally, there was a sheet on which core exit E
19 thermocouples were repor'ed on the morning of March 28th, and g
20 this information -- its whereabouts was not known from the date 21 of March 28th to May 7th.
Today you have told us you are not
()
22 aware that th ' aata had been taken.
However, would that same --
23 ;
well, let me put it this way:
(])
24 What was your knowledge as to what efforts have been 25 l made to locate this -- account for this?
i end 8 A
I don't have any knowledge at all.
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
- 9 JWB 76 1
BY MR. GAMBLE:
O 2
4 Mr. Ross, earlier we spoke about conversations that 3
Mr. Chwastyk said he had had with NRC Inspector Don Neeley G
l V
4 about the pressure spike, and you indicated you couldn't 5
g confirm Inspector Neeley's presence in the control room area e*
3 6
at that time.
g 7
Do you know Inspector Neeley?
A 8
8 A.
Yes, I know him to see him, dd 9
BY MR. MOSELEY:
10 G
Did you know him on March 28th -- by sight, that 11 is?
If you were to have seen him on March 28th, would you m
I I2 have known that that's Don Neeley?
13 A.
No, but I would know now.
I don't think I knew m
l 14 him then.
g 15 BY MR. CRAIG:
a:
j 16 G
Did you recognize that there was an NRC Inspector a5 N
17 present at that time?
5
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18 A.
There was an NRC Inspector present most of the day, i:"
19 g
I can't concretely say he was standing there when it happened.
c 20 I have a feeling he was there.
21 BY MR. GAMBLE:
O 22 4
In retrospect, was that 1nsgector Nee 1ey?
23 l A.
No, I don't think it was Neeley.
O 24 MR. MossLsY, rhat conc 1uees o r geestioning, 25 l Mr. Ross.
We appreciate your time, and once more going l
l ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
/
JWB 9-2 77 I
through the effort to recall the events of that day.
Thank
.O 2
you very much.
3 THE WITNESS:
Okay.
O 4
(Whereupon, at 4:05 p.m.,
the interview of Mr. Ross 5
g was concluded.)
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ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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O NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION This is to certify that the attached proceedings bef re the U
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION in the catter of:
Date of Proceeding: Metropolitan Edison Company
{Three Mlle Island Unit 21 Deposition Docket flucb er :
nonosieinn of MTrnAvr. a_ noss Place of Proceeding:
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania were held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript thereof for the file of the Coccission.,
ANN RILEY Official Reporter (Typed)
I) dm Aha v
Official Reporter (Si6 nature) 9
1 b
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the (G
)
U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION in the matter of:
Date of ?roceeding:
Wednesday, 24 September 1980 Docket !! umber: DEPOSITION OF MICHAEL J.
ROSS
[TMI Unit 2]
? lace of ?roceeding:
Harrisburo, Pa.
were held as 'rerein appears, and that this is the original transcript thereof for the file of the Commissi^
JANE W.
BEACH Official Reporter (Typed)
(mD 0,
J,fx !
b) btLtlf v
/
Oflicial Recerter (3ignature)
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.A SHAw, PITTMAN. PoTTs & TROWBRIDGE 8800 M STR E ET, N. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036 ST E PH EN B. H UTTLE R (202) 331 4aOO R AMSAY D. POTTS WINTHROP N. BROWN
$$TEUART L.PITTM AN (I'EORGE F. TRowBRIDGE JAM ES B. KAM LIN OTEPH EN O. POTTS ROBERT C. ZAHLER g^" E R ALD CHANNCFF RICHARD E. GALEN ILL8P D. BOSTWsCR ROBERT B. ROBBINS (202)296 0694 & 296 1760 l
ttMOTHY HANLON STEVEN M. LUCAS
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ORGE M. ROG ERS. JR.
M ATIAS F. TRAveESO DIAZ g
,i HN B. RHINELANDER VtCTORIA J. PERKINS
- 9ggg, g,CRUC E W. CHURCHILL JOH N H. O'N ElLL, JR.
LE4' LIE A. NICHOLSON, JR.
J AY A. EPSTIEN 89 2693 (SHAwLAw WSH)
M ARTIN O. MRALL RAND L. ALLEN L
"##b#
.e O'.lCH ARD J. R ENDALL TIMOTHY B. McBRIDE JAY E. SILBERG ELISAB ETH M. PENDLETON l
E ARs ARA M. ROS SOTT8 LUCY G. ELIASOF 4t EORG E V. ALLEN. JR.
PAUL A. K A PLAN EDWARD B. CROSLAND WM. BRADFORD REYNOLDS HARRY H. GLASSPIEGEL OUNSEL FKED A. LtTTLE THOM AS H. McCORMICM FRED DRASNER SUSAN D. FALMSON N ATH ANIEL P. BRE ED. JR.
WILLIAM P. BARR MAnn AuGENeuC=
JOH N t.CARR.JR.
October 27 1980 E RNE ST L. 8 LAKE. JR.
PHILIP J. HARVEY 8
CARLETON S. JONES ROBERT M. GORDON THOMAS A. BAXTER JEANNE A. CALCERON j
8 JAM ES M. BURGER BARBARA J. MORGEN SHELDON J. wF'SEL BONNIE S. GOTTLtEB JOHN A. McCU6 LOUGH ALFR ED M. POSTELL J. PATRICK HICKEY SETH H. HOOG ASIAN JAMES THOMA S LENHART SH Ef LA E. McCA F F E RTY STEVEN L. M ELTZ ER D ELIS SA A. Rf DGWAY DEAN O. AULICM KENNETH J. HAUTM AN JOHN ENGEL DAVID LAWRENCE MILLER
'NOT AcaseTTED IN D.C.
Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Di. rector Division of Reactor Operations Inspection Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.
C.
20555 s
.)
Dear Mr. Moseley:
v Enclosed,are signed correction sheets for the transcripts of September 24, 1980 interviews of Michael L. Benson and Michael J.
Ross.
Mr. Benson has provided some six correctionc; Mr. Ross has indicated no corrections.
Sincerely, vfW.$dk Ernest L.
Blake, Jr.
bas enclosures i
I (o
l
'2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0FDiISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Corrections to the September 24, 1980, Interview of Michael J. Ross:
Page Line Change To Read I
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-- h f f Michael J 61 toss
..