ML19343D457
| ML19343D457 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 09/02/1980 |
| From: | Flint J METROPOLITAN EDISON CO. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8105040528 | |
| Download: ML19343D457 (47) | |
Text
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1 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION O
V 2
x 3
In the Matter of:
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4 METROPOLITAN-EDISON (TMI II)
Docket No.
None s
5
.. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
$h6 Room D-4 4
Howard Johnson Motor Inn
-d 7I 473 Eisenhower Boulevard 5
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 5
8 u
Q Tuesday, September 2, 1980 c
9 Interview of John Flint began, pursuant to notice, at 11:30 h
10 2=
a.m.
7 11 {
e.
12 l-PRESENT:
3 9
TERRY HARPSTER, Office of Inspection and Enforcement
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Nuclear Regulatory Commission u
I4 "
JOHN W.
CRAIG, Office of Inspection and Enforcement M
Nuclear Regulatory Commission E
15 5
NORMAN C. MOSELEY, Office of Inspection and Enforcement I0 M
Nuclear Regulatory Commission x
6 17 O
DAVID H. GAMBLE, Office of Inspector and Auditor h
gg Nuclear Regulatory Commission s
E I
RICHARD K.
HOEFLING, office of the Executive Legal Director j9 j
Nuclear Regulatory Commission 20 JOHN G. MULLIN, The Babcock & Wilcox Company 21 KEVIN P. GALLEN, Esq., Morgan Lewis & Bockius 22 l
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ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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MR. GAMBLE:
This interview is being conducted as a lportionoftheNRC'sinvestigationintotheexchangeofinformation 3
.between the Metropolitan Edison Company and the NRC on March 28, 4
5-1979.
N h
6, Counsel for B&W are here.
Do you have any objection h
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7
'to their presence?
j 8
THE WITNESS:
No, I do not.
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9 MR. GAMBLE:
Now, I will ask you to raise your right 5
10
_ hand and take an oath.
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II Uhereupon, 4
B i
XXXX Y 12 JOHN FLINT
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13 - was called as the deponant and, having been first duly sworn, was
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14 examined and testified as follows:
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1 15 EXAMINATION 5
y 16 3 BY MR. IIARPSTER :
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O All right, John, I will begin the questioning.
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John, you have previously testified that on the morning i
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i-19 of March 28, 1979, you were not aware that the high pressure g
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20 ! injection flow had been throttled for some time prior to your i
farrival.
Were you aware that the let-down flow had been increased 2I 22 Ito a high volume in an attempt to establish normal pressurizer
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No, I was not.
It was approximately two days before I m-25 ;llearned that information.
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O Did you at any time on the morning of March 28, 1979,
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discuss the status of these systems as they existed prior to 2
3 lapproximately 8:30 a.m.,
diat is the let down increased, and the (A_)
4 high pressure injection secured?
5-Did you discuss it with either Gary Miller, Leland e
1 76 N
3 6, Rogers, George Kunder, Jack Erbein, Bill Zewe, Brian Mehler, or e
A N
R 7 l Joe Chwastyk?
A i
8 8 li only in general, not those specific systems, just when A
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-9 I first came into the control room asking what the status had Y
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'been, what the conditions were prior to my arrival.
It was just 2=
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11 generally overall on the system, and not high pressure injection
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12 or the let down per se.
3 C.
5 13 MR. GALLVEN:
Could we go off the record for a second?
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14 (Discussion was held off the record.)
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15 MR. MOSELY:
We are ready to go back on the record.
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16 BY MR. HARPSTER:
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17 Q
John, are you aware of anyone else who discussed the h
18
! status of these systems as they existed prior to about b:30 that E
y 19 morning with any of those people?
E 20 A
Not on that day, no.
21 Q
John, you previously testified that shortly af ter you 22 arrived in the control room on the morning of March 28, you learned 23 that the electro-magnetic relief valve had been open for several 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, that they had finally shut the block valve to isolate it.
25l You also testified that you did not find out for two ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
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4 1
days that the MOV had been open for over two hours.
You asumed q(d 2
tha t it s tuck open, and that the operators realized it,. and shut 3
the block valve.
4 What was your knowledge with regard to the length of time e
5-the MOV was open on March 28, 1979 ?
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I originally incorrectly stated-that I had knowledge on
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that day that it was open for over two hours.
In subsequent-K j
8 testimony I made a specific point correcting the fact that 'I did 40 9
not learn that information until two days later during the 3,
10
' evaluation of data, when I could not understand the data.
At that E
h 11 time I found out that it had been open for several hours.
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j 12 On the day in question, from the way that it was stated
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13 'by the operators, I had the impression that it was open for perhaps x
5 14 - 12 to 15 minutes, no extended period, nothing unusual associated E
E 15 :aith the remark.
I 5
i 16 Q
Did you at any time on March 28, 1979, discuss this j
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17. item with Gary Miller, Lee Roger, Kunder, Zewe, Mehler, or 5
!E 18 Chwastyk?
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Are you referring to it being open?
M 20 0
The fact that the MOV had been open for some time?
l 21 l
A No, I did not, not on the 28th.
As I say, I was under 22 the impression that it had only been open for a very short time, 23 jthat they had identified it and isolated it.
4 24 i
Q A review of your testimony indicates that on the morning 25 of March 28, 1979, you were aware of the magnitude of the hot-leg k
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I ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
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temperatures, approximately 770 to 800 degrees as indicated on the U,o 2
wide-range recorder.
3 You were also aware that these were confirmed by an 4
extended scale read out device hooked up by Ivan Porter in the e
5 control room.
You were aware that the hot-leg temperatures were An d
6 considerably in excess of the saturation pressure for the existing e
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7 condition, and in fact meant that the system had to contain super-Ej 8
heated steam.
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9 You also testified that you discussed these conditions 5
10 with Gary Miller, Lee Rogers, and others.
E 11 On March 28, 1979, what discussions were held and with E<a y
12 whom in regard to these conditions and their implications, to the 5
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Probably the first discussion I had was with Ed 5
2 15 Frederick, the control room operator.
He was under the impression, 5
16 and essentially wanted me to confirm the fact that it was super-j 7:
g 17 heated stcam in both hot-legs, which I did do.
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18 Also on that sane day, and shortly after dhat, I talked 5
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19 to Bill Zewe, I mentioned it to Lee Rogers, George Kunder, the n
od-e) 20 nuclear engineers from +hd-Ed, which would be Benson, Crawford, 21 and Scott Wilkerson.
I have the recollection that I also discussed 22
'it with Gary Miller.
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Could you just briefly tell us what those discussions 24 fwould have been about, what inferences were drawn from these?
?i 25 j A
Paraphrasing it, it would be basically that we did have n
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Q About what time of the morning would this be?
3 A
The discussion with Ed Frederick 'would be approximately 4
10:00 or 10:15.
With the others it would be during the next 5'
y probably one and a half to two hours.
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6 Q
On March 28, 1979, were these conditions'related to R
7 core coverage?
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I associated them with the fact thau the core had been r.3 o;
9 uncovered earlier in the day, in comparison also with additional z
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10 data that I had viewed on the console and had taken off of the N
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Are these the implications that were discussed with these E
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For the most part, yes.
I might have used slightly
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I7 lbpposed, let us say, to an operator.
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18 But, I did present that opinion, and it was in light of E
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t-he fact that they had mentioned they had thought they were going l
20 lbritical earlier in the day, that they had added boron.
They did 2I i
act understand why they had had a re-criticality, essentially.
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I advised them that I did not believe that it was a V
23 re-cri ticali ty.
There was a change in the leakage flux from the 24l ore,
,c and it was due to -- I am not sure of the precise words, but 25 pssentially voiding in the core, or uncovering of the core.
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ALDERSON REPORTING LOMPANY, INC.
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O Uhat was their reaction or reply when you told them 2
that you thought the core had been uncovered, do you recall?
3 A
Basically, I don't believe that the people believed me 4
at the time.
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O You have testified, and let me quote from you Met-Ed 6
interview of April 20th, 1979, " Talks with various personnel in GT
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the control room, Gary Miller, and the rest of the operation sj 8
personnel, informed me of the sequence of events that led them up c.3 ci 9
to this position. "
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10 What was the substance of the discussions with people N
II that brought you up to date on the conditions; could you tell us i
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I2 that?
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Basically, the fact that they had the reactor trip, and I
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they had lost secondary -site feedwater.
They had a lead, or at
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15 least they thought they had a leak in the B generator, had
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y 16 bottled the generator up.
They had high radiation readings.
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Some of the actions that
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the generators up.
n 20 They were going into discussing repressurization to 21 collapse steam bubbles, along those lines.
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BY MR. GAMBLE:
U 23 0
Mr. Flint, you indicated thatmost of the people did not 24 believe you when you talked of the core uncovery, and the conclu-C D
25 l sion there.
Did anyone seem to believe you, or be more i
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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sympathetic to that conclusion?
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on that day, I did not have that impression.
3 BY MR. HARPSTER:
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What was believed to have been the status of the core e
5 that morning when people brought you up to date?
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6 A
At that time, my impression was that they thought the R
7 core was covered, and that they had had a re-criticality, which a
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they did not understand.
They had initiated emergency boration.
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9 They had taken some boron samples, and the samples indicated very z,cg 10 low boron.
They thought that somehow they had diluted the boron z
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12 BY MR. MOSELEY:
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Did they tell you what they believed to be the source of L.
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h 14 the super-heat, those people who did not agree with you,.or the
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15 source of the temperatures?
I 16 A
There was a question of whether or not the indications e
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In other words, whether or not they were valid E
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18 readi ng s.
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19 BY MR. CRAIG:
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Let me interject a question to go back a little bit to 21 the super-heat.
22 You stated that Ed Fredericks wanted you to confirm 23 ;
that there was super-heat in the primary system.
Did he explain 24 why he wanted a confirmation, or why he felt that he needed a O
25 confirmation; didn't he have steam tables out to look at them; or ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
9 I
what led him to believe that there was super-heat?
O 2
A I don't know specifically what led him to believe that 3
there was super-heat there.
I did not see any steam tables in 4
evidence.
However, considering the fact that the system pressure
- 2 5-was approximately 1000 to 1200 pounds, and you are reading off-P.
6 scale high in excess of 620 degrees Fahrenheit, you did not need R
7 steam tables at that point to tell you.
There had been a previous M
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experience with some super-heat steam.
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9 I think that he just wanted confirmation that he had 3
10 this opinion, and he wanted somebody else to verify whether or not B
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Uasn' t that common knowledge in the control room?
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A Getting back to the previous question, I don't think
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I4 that the people thought that those indications were correct.
5 15 They were under the impression that the temperatures were lower 16 g
than th at.
Somehow they were getting erroneous readings for I
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18 '
O Was the extended scale read-out device hooked up by C
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e-Ivan Porter at this time?
fn 20 A
At the time that I came into the control room, it was 21 hooked up, yes.
l 22 O
Did they also disbelieve the indications that were O
23 displayed on those?
l 24 A
My impression would be thatthey questioned it.
j 25 f
Q Was a record kept of the data indicated by the extended r
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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scale read-out device connected to the hot-leg RTes?
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2 A
To the best of my knowledge, no.
3 Q
John, you have testified here today and in previous
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testimony that on the morning of March 28, 1979, you were aware 5-g that the reactor cooling pumps were steam-bound.
You were aware 9
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that the relief valves had been open for at least a short period R
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of time. and you believed that super-heated steam existed in the s
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hot-legs.
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On that morning, did you infer from these plant 9
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conditions an indication that an inventory problem existed in the
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NI A
I knew that' diere was a problem.
It was highly doubtful
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that we had a full inventory of water in there.
But I did not E
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know at that time, as I said, about the throttling the high
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pressure injection, or the fact that for over two hours the valve z
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had been stuck open, and that they had not shut the block valve.
p 17 I did not know about them increasing the let-down flow wz M
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I felt that there was a problem with the inventory, 1
i 20 but from the information that I had available to me, it did not 21 seem as though we should have had an inventory problem.
22
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Q You testified on June 30th before the Kemmeny 23 ;
i Commission that perhaps an hour or an hour and a half after you l arrived at the site on March 28th, you concluded that the core had 24
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25 Y I been uncovered for an extended period of time.
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
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You reported this to Lee Rogers, and that you. believed O
2 he went to discuss it with Gary Miller and George Kunder.
3 What was the reaction of Lee Rogers when you told him
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4 your conclusions?
5-g A
I don't know, thinking back on it, if Lee totally 9
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understood what I told him.
He was on his way to a meeting in the R
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shift supervisor's office when I spoke to him.
I started my Aj 8
remarks of f with the.words that the. problem with an apparent G
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re-criticality was not in fact a re-criticality.
Basically, words 9
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10 that they did not have to do an emergency bor-ate.
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I about voiding or changes from leakage flux out of the core.
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(_Tjg not certain that this registered on him because he did not stop.
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He said, "All right, thank you," and then he went on in into the z
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office.
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I would have thoucht, looking back on it, that he i
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probably would have asked me a lot more had he realized the z
5 18 magnitude of what I was telling him.
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BY MR. MOSELEY:
n 20 Q
You did not have any of that belief at the time, on 21 l March 2 8 th.
This is an after-thought.
22 A
Righ t, this is an af ter-thought.
At that time, I
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23 thought he understood what I was saying, and that he was going to i
24
(~T go in and tell them.
I thought that he had understood fully what 25gp I had told him.
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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BY MR. HARPSTER:
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2 Q
Did you have any knowledge of any conversations with 3
regard to these indications or inferences in the control room or 4
in the think-tank meetings?
5-A Only the conversations that I had with the individuals h
6 at that time.
Other than that, no, I don't have any other R*S 7
knowledge.
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Q So no one ever discussed with you your inferences that d
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the core had been uncovered?
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A They did not come back and talk to me about it.
As I
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the time.
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Did you at any time that day discuss primary system m
I4 inventory with Miller, Rogers, Kunder, Herbein, Zewe, Mehler or I
Chwastyk?
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A With Bill Zewe, to some small degree; indirectly with 6
17 Jack Herbein when I mentioned that we could not collapse the bubble gz 18 by repressurization.
Itwas not specifically addressed as an
=s invento ry.
It was an indirect statement.
20 Q
Could you help me out a little there.
You talked with 21 Jack Herbein, about what time of the day would that be?
22 f)
A Early afternoon.
I could not put it more specifically.
23,
h 'Y re-p e ri nde t
It is when we were goina to, attend the second, pressurization-of the 24
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system in order to collapse the bubbles.
I mentioned that we had N/
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tried tilat previously, that the temperatures indicates super-heated i
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
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steam conditions, and we could not possibly collapse them.
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2 O
This is a chart showing a plot of the parameters on 3
March 28, 1979, could you show us, John, approximately what time
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4 of the day it would be from these?
5-j A
It would be this repressurization.
It would be just 9
0 prior to this one, maybe 15 minutes to a half hour before this 3
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0 BY MR. CRAIG:
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This is the repressurization just prior to starting the E
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cooling pump in the afternoon.
Is that correct?
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A That would be the one.
The one in the morning they 6
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were 3ust repressurizing when I came in.
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BY MR. MOSELEY:
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Q The one at 17:30, is that what you are saying?
9 15 5
A It would be approximately 17:30, right in that range.
.j-16 BY MR. HARPSTER:
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Q Do you recall what his reaction was at the time?
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18
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A He still desired to attempt the repressurization to 19 collapse it in the event that the. indications were not correct on 20 the temperature.
Since I wasn't, as previously testified, present 21 l
over in the observation center, I don't know what went into their (g
22 A) factoring of why they wanted to do it, or their level of knowledge i
23 l
at that time.
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Q What efforts were made to determine or estimate the I
25 reactor core inventory?
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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BY MR. HOEFLING:
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Q Excuse me, John, but did you say that you also dis-3 cussed this inventory question with Zewe?
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A I mentioned to him the fact that when we were talking 5-about the voiding, and we had steam in the hot-legs.
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What time would that have been, do you recall?
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7 A
It would have been in the vicinity of 10:30.
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What was his reaction to that?
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9 A
I think that at that dme the people were still having Z-,
10 trouble believing the conditions, I guess.
I did not get a z
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positive response back from him, just a "Well, we have bad the k
f I2 block valve opened," or "we stopped high pressure injection," or
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g 13 "that is possible because of what was done previously." I did not m
14 receive anything like that.
It was sort of just left hanging
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there.
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j 16 BY MR. GAMBLE:
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Q Have you discussed it with any of the others that
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IO Mr. Harpster mentioned, Kunder, Miller,,Gwastyk,.Herbein and Mehler?
19 j
A I don't recall discussing it with Mehler or i
20 1!Chwastyk.
It would probably have been in an indirect manner with 21 the rest.of them, not directly, specifically that the inventory l
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appeared low, but more on the fact that the core appeared to have 23 been voided or uncovered, and the &ct that we had steam in the 24 hot-legs.
To me that immediately implies that you have to have 25 g4a reduced inventory if you have those conditions.
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BY MR. HARPSTER:
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Q John, what led you to discuss these conditions with 3
Jack Herbein in the afternoon?
Can you briefly tell us how you
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4 happened to talk with Jack Herbein.
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A I happened to walk into die-shift supervisor's office 6
when the conversation was going on, at the time Gary Miller was R
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explaining to them the fact that we had tried that morning for 4
j 8
several hours and that it had not worked, and that he did not G
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z, expect it to work this time.
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,h 10 At that point I mentioned to duam that with the super-
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The e
12 code safety would have lifted long before.
The piping was not x
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designed for that kind of pressure.
E 14 y
Q John, to the best of your knowledge what efforts were
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made to determine or estimate the reactor core inventory in the
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primary system on the morning of March 28th?
f 17 None that I specifically know of.
j A
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18 Q
What about in the afternoon?
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A I don't know of any specific attempts to identify the 20 actual inventory itself, unless you are referring to the fact that 21 they lowered pressure to ensure that the core was covered by
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bringing the core flood tanks in, or dua f act that they were 23 charging high pressure injection to break up bubbles.
But as far
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as an actual attempt to determine inventory, no.
25 ]
l Q
John, did you believe that when the lowered the l
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
16 1
pressure that the core flood tanks would give -- if they lowered V
2 it a little bit, it would ensure that the core was covered, or lead 3
you to believe that it was covered?
V 4
A I felt prior to that time that the core was indeed e
5-covered, or at least being adequately cooled.
If it was not, and 6
they had a bend path out, the core flood tanks when they G
7 initiated would tend to have a significant pressure change if tae s
S core was not covered.
In other words, the contents should empty d
c; 9
fairly rapidly, and they did not do so.
10 BY MR. MOSELEY:
11 0
Did you share the conclusion that other people had is N
I2 that this was evidence that the core was covered?
E 13 A
It was additional evidence that the core was covered l
14 at this time.
By this time, the in-core therma 2 couple temperatura
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15 was down on scale.
They had been charging water for ]uite a x
.j 16 period of time to increase the level in the generator to help cool e
h I7 down.
Then, of course, the source range and intermediate range h
18 M
were not indicating prior -seele, I thought that the core was C
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adequately covered at that time.
e 20 0
You indicated that you thought that the core was 2I either covered, or was being adequately cooled, would you go on a 22 p
little bit and describe how you drew this differentiation?
G 23 A
The in-core thermal._ couple readincf showed the 24 temperature:s were decreasing with time.
Therefore, that meant that V
l 25 we either had water in the core, and it was carrying the heat away, ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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17 y
or that we had a steam / water mixture going up through there of some (VD 2
type, or that perhaps steam flow.
But at least there was cooling 3
f the ccre, otherwise the temperatures should have remained O
4 e1eveted, or seevea ert-see1e-5.
O The computer read-outs of the thermal couples.
e E
h 6
A That is correct.
Eg 7
BY MR. HAPSTER:
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8 0
John, given those plant conditions, were you able to d
d 9
relate or associate these plant conditions with conditions which 5
E 10 had existed previously in the plant, when once before they had E
I 11 drawn a bubble in the hot-legs, or had stagnation in the hot-legs?
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12 A
Not directly.
Before, as I remember, we did not have 5
13 a core in there under the prcvious conditions.
We did not have h
14 temperatures as high.
We certainly did not have all these E
2 15 radiation readings.
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16 I could remember the other incident, and knew that that e
ti 17 was basically the same from the high temperatures.
In fact, they E
18 stayed up there elevated for quite a while.
But other than that, P"
19 no, I would not draw a correlation between the two.
R 20 Q
was there any discussion that you were aware of with 4
21 regard to those previous events, and using those as a guideline as 22 to the plant conditions you had that day?
23 A
Not that I can remember.
24 BY MR. M?SELEY:
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25l O
Before we leave that subject.
You mentioned earlier
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ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
18 1
that they had seen super-heated steam in the loops before.
When V
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3 A
It was during some hot functional testing, as I (V3 4
remember.
5.
Q You got super-heat without a core?
8 6
A I don't remember all the_ details, but they did have that.
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d BY MR. HAPSTER:
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Was there any discussion with regard to this, John?
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result of a voiding in the core.
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Did you have 23 any discussions on March 28, 1979, with Miller, Herbein, Kunder, 24
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A I remember speaking w'.th Bill Zewe, George Kunder.
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19 Again, this goes back to the previous answer, with Ed Fredericks 1
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with which individuals at this time.
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Did you have any subsequent discussions with Rogers on that day with regard to the inferences you were drawing?
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4 BY MR. HAPSTER:
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John, to die best of your knowledge what are the O
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core exit thermo-couples used for during normal operations?
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I have never read or heard anything about specifically 21 why they are alarmed at that point.
22 O
John, you previously testified that you were monitoring
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extremely hot.
Did you at any time that day discuss the in-core
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Miller or Chwastyk?
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23:00.
n 20 BY MR. MOSELEY:
21 Q
When did you first discuss these subjects with these 22
's folks?
23 A
It would be in the vicinity of 10:00 or 10:30.
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talked to them, or individually?
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18 BY.MR. HAPSTER:
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You have said that the temperature 21 were off-scale higher than 700 degrees; did people understand
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A Not everyone understood that.
The people who had 24 worked with the computer understood that, some others.did not.
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and not indicative of bad reading?
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But he was aware that they were in fact that hot?
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believed they were valid readings.
4 24
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Was there any discussions with Rogers about whether or
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Did Rogers believe that they were 4
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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valid readings?
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5-BY MR. CRAIG:
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You may be aware that other people have testified, k7 Ivan Porter did, he felt that the core exit thermo-couples were
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believe the instrumentation.
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But I was not aware of that.
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commonality that could cause them both to do that, other than an
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3 BY MR. MOSELEY:
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marks meant that they were actually high, and others did not.
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Could you identify who fits into each of those categories?
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m I4 People more on the administrative side of it, Gary 15 Miller, George Kunder, Joe Logan, I would say these people, or in
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I' BY MR. HAPSTER:
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John, you previously testified that you were 24 M~
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27 1
Kunder, Herbein, Zewe, Mehler, or Chwastyk?
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hI BY MR. MOSELEY:
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exit thermo-couples?
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I am sure you don't, but I want to be sure.
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BY MR. HAPSTER:
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22 f~'g A
I told Lee that I would be following the in-core 234 temperatures plus the other primary and secondary data.
If there 24
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If i
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ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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someone came up and asked me a question, I would tell them what 2
the latest data was indicating.
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I believe you testified in the past that you looked at
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l ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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John, you testified that some people believed you, and 22
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I interpreted that to mean that somebody believed 24
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You have also testified that if not all, many of the d
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If I may interrupt here for a second.
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What he believed Mr. Zewe believed.
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He stated earlier that he was going to report to Lee 16 Rogers or to somebody else, and the somebody else would be Bill i
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20 BY MR. CRAIG:
21 Q
You have stated that you have discussed them with
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23 MR. GALLEN:
I don't believe that he is competent to 24
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It would be highly speculative s
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on his part to say what he believed Zewe believed.
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ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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I have no objection to your answering the question, 2
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THE WITNESS:
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BY MR. MOSELEY:
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We have gotten Zewe, O
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I think that Ed Fredericks believed me because we had is N
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BY MR. HARPSTER:
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O John, let me ask you once more about the specific 3
conversation.
You talked with Gary Miller early in the morning, j
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in fact, he had decided -- at least you found out some time R
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I4 A
I think at that time people believed it, or had a 15 tendency to believe it, and it did not occur again, m far as I x
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2I MR. HARPSTER:
Any other questions?
BY MR. HARPSTER:
i 23 I Q
John, since the TMI accident, have you changed any 24 of your recollections, to your knowledge?
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In any timespan?
You say since the accident.
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY,INC.
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MR. GALLVEN:
!!e already testified ea.* lier that he
('_
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the PORV.
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4 THE WITNESS:
I found that out two days later, I found 5
g out about the high pressure injection being throttled about 9
6 two days later, the change in the letdown flow several days later.
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It was about six weeks before I found out about the high reported Z
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9 This, of course, changed my opinion of what core damage ze 10 was during that period of time.
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18 BY MR. HARPSTER:
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Q John, let me ask you a couple of questions about n
20 information which has been missing as a result of several of 2I these investigations.
The NRC investigation of the accident 22 r'
identified missing segments of data.
These were identified in N.)s 23 NUREG 0600.
The reason for these missing segments has not been 24 identified.
'J 25 These include the alarm status printout for various ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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times during the day, the utility typer output for various times 2
during the day, and the analog trend recorder No. 2 strip chart.
3 Can you explain or do you have any idea what happened
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5 A
Some of the data was thrown in the trash can inadvertent Ly j
6 The individual that threw it there didn't need it.
He had his R
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That was an NRC individual.
!!ost of the rest of the data M[
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What is j
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m 15 0
Have you been involved in or overheard any conversations i[
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d.
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Ivan Porter has mentioned a time or two about the NRC z
18 inspector throwing the material in the trash can, the fact that i:
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19 M
20 During one of my discussions with Jim Creswell of 21 Region III, we did discuss the fact that the data, at least at 22 p
that time, was still not evident, that T had taken off the O
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Jim said he was going to attempt to track it down.
U 25
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ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
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management phsse of it.
I don't know if it was ever found.
I 2
have never gone back to the files to see if it's all there.
3 DY MR. !!OSELEY:
kJ 4
Q Could you identify for us specifically what was thrown 5
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Do you know exactly.what it was?
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A Ivan Porter was trending some plant parameters and R
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apparently the NRC individual wanted some specific data.
IIe M
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obtained that data, and when he tore his information off, he dd 9
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12 BY MR. GAMDLE:
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About when was that?
Do you have any idea?
l 14 A
At this point in time --
$j 15 BY MR. !!OSELEY :
z E
I6 Q
Can you identify who the individual was?
e h
I7 A
No, I'm afraid I can't.
It's been too long, and z
5 18 there have been too many people in between for ne to specifically E
19 g
say who it was.
20 BY IIR. CRAIG:
21 Q
Can you identify who was taking the data into the 22 shift supervisor's office?
Was it one person?
23,
A I carried some of it in.
The NRC people carried some 24 in.
Ivan Porter took data in.
You know, whoever was calling G
25 off the data to us.
This was another transient, and during any ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
cr2-5 36 1
transient, all the data is saved.
You evaluate it, and only 2
after complete evaluation is done, is any data either then sent 3
to the files or discarded or kept with the transient package, b
4 So there were a good many people taking data.
I e
5 couldn't begin to identify everybody.
E h
6 BY MR. MOSELEY:
R 7
Q This trending was not in the form of a chart that was s[
8 posted on a wall or something of that nature?
d Ci 9
A No.
You can set up 15 or 16 datapoints on the computer b
d 10 and then call them up from one minute until hourly intervals, E
11 and it will automatically scan those points and print those is j
12 data points out.
And then you can periodically call up whatever 25 13 you have on your operator's groups.
There are three operator's l
14 groups that contain up to 32 points.
You can call each one of g
15 those out periodically, and obtain them on a scan.
a:
g' 16 BY MR. II ARPSTER:
us 6
17 Q
John, the sheet on which the core-exit thermocouple E
18 measurements were recorded on the morning of March 28th vanished k
19 until May 7th, 1979.
Can you explain, or do you have any idea 20 what happened to this data?
21 A
In all probability, somebody was looking at it, p) evaluating it, probably had it in a notebook or set it in a desk 22 V
23 drawer, came across it later, realized that the information was 24 supposed to be saved, and at that time turned it in.
qO 25 0
Have you been involved in or overheard any conversations ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
1
,02-6 1
37 1
related to this?
O 2
A People finding data?
No.
The fact that some data was 3
missing, and we assuned that's where it is, yes.
I was with 4
the data reduction management team for several months, and we r
e 5
were trying to locate this data in order to evaluate what had Xe j
6 occurred, and so we would come up missing it, and we would ask 7
around, trying to locate it.
K k
8 BY MR. MOSELEY:
d A[
9 Q
Was this speculation on your part, that someone may have zog 10 had it in a drawer or something, or do you have knowledge to that E
j 11 effect?
's l
12 A
I do not have knowledge of this specific instance, but 5
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13 it had occurred in the past, where somebody was working on a 14 specific piece of information, had put it in a notebook, and had 5
2 15 set it on the desk and gone on to another task or something, 5
16 g
and then realized and later turned it in.
So that would be e
d 17 speculation on my part for this specific information.
E 13 BY MR. IIARPSTER:
k 19 g
Q John, what efforts have been made by Met Ed to locate n
20 or explain any of the missing data related to the accident?
21 A
I have no specific knowledge of what individuals might r-22 have done.
I do know that Met Ed advised everyone, as did B&W, k-)3 23 that all data related to this accident was to be retained, it 24 was not to be discarded, and that it was to be turned in.
x.,
25 specifically what they have done, or who has been assigned to do ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
f 2-7 38 1
it, I have no personal knowledge, r3 kJ 2
0 John, are you aware of any efforts made by Met Ed 3
to account for the disappearance of the core-exit. thermocouple 4
data until May 7th?
e 5
A I do not know what they did in that area, no.
E h
6 Q
One last question.
To go back, John, on March 28th, R
7 1979, did you monitor containment building temperatures during a
j 8
or after the containment pressure spike?
d d
9 A
I specifically dd not.
Once in a while I might go over bg 10 and look at the printouts of the pressure, but I did not get 6l 11 involved in any detail until approximately two days later, when k
j 12 we were actually reducing data.
5
('T d
13 Q
Are you aware of anyone else who did?
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l 14 A
There were several individuals that did. Now I 2
15 couldn't tell you who they were, because I remember the 28-pound E
j 16 spike, and I remember somebody going over and making the w
6 17 statement, it was a 28-pound spike; after looking at the chart, 5
5 18 somebody else came over.
But now I couldn't tell you who either E
19 one of those individuals were by name.
R 20 BY MR. MOSELEY:
21 Q
Was that response related to the pressure indication 22 or the temperature indication?
gs O
23 A
That specific incident was related to the pressure 24 indication.
There were on occasion people going over and looking 7-O 25 at temperatures.
But as I say, there have been too many people ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
cr2-8 39 I
and too much time, and I just don't remember who specifically
/
)
2 was doing that task.
3 BY MR. !! ARPSTER:
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k-)
4 Q
John, you say people were monitoring some of these e
5 indications during this spike.
Do you specifically recall --
5 6
were people generally aware that the containment pressure spike R
R 7
had taken place at that time?
A[
8 A
My impression was that people were generally aware dd 9
it had taken place.
There was a double thump which sounded g
10 like the ventilation vent was changing cycle, and then very E
{
11 shortly a fter that, the building spray pumps came on, and we k
j 12 had cther actuations.
()
13 The individual I nentioned went over, looked at it, m
l 14 stated, announced in a normal voice that we had a 28-pound 2
15 pressure spike in the building.
y 16 Somebody else came over and looked at it, and then i
g 17 this statement was made, it could possibly be an instrumentation 5
M 18 problem, because we were having electrical problems.
They
=
l 19 were going to go out and check the centers to find out whether X
20 or not it was an electrical problem.
21 There was, let's see, the operators there, myself, one
(^)
22 NRC individual, I believe Ivan Porter was there.
It was, I i V 23 would say, general knowledge that at least something had 24 occurred.
Whether it was electrical or a detonation, that
,3kJ l
25 later proved to be -- people, I think, at that time didn't know.
i ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
L
40 32-9 I
O Do you recall whether Gary Miller or others from the
.f.~
4 Iv' 2
Met Ld management were present at that time?
3 A
fly best recollection was Gary was in the shift super-t v'
4 visor's office, and afterwards came out, but I couldn't swear to 5
j that'at this point in time.
?
6 BY MR. gat 1BLE :
G b
7 0
You say afterwards; you mean immediately af terwards?
K[
8 A
Shortly after the alarm came and the building spray, I d
ci 9
think he stepped out of the office at that point in time, but I b
10 didn' t ter:: all the way around because I was looking at what was 3=
II happened on the panel, and so I couldn' t swear that he did, in is j
12 fact.
And I don't remember any of these senior people, such as S
nU g
13 George Kunder or Joe Logan being out in the control room l
14 specifically at that time, or Gary, either.
g 15 BY MR. HARPSTER:
a:
j Q
Was Lee Rogers present in the control room at that 16 us N
I7 time?
Tal 18 A
To the best of my knowledge, Lee at that time was k
19 in the shift supervisor's office.
20 0
Was there any discussion that you were aware of subse-21 quent to this spike, with regard to what had caused it, whether rw 22 or not it was real?
b 23 A
Only the fact there was some indication, the thought 24 r^1 that it might have been an electrical problem.
They were going O
25 to go out and check whether or not it was an electrical problem.
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
cr2-10 41 1
The next I heard about it was approximately a day and
("T k/
2 a half or two days later, when in fact it was determined to have 3
been a hydrogen detonation.
m k_)
4 BY MR. MOSELEY:
e 5
0 You said it was general kn(wiedge there had been a E
6 pressure spike.
Was there general knowledge that the containment 7
sprays had also come on?
Do you think that was general knowledge?
X[
8 A
I felt it was general knowledge, because the dd 9
enunciators went off, the alarm bell went off, the typer goes, 10 and people mentioned the fact we have building spray, and there's 3
{
11 people taking action to shut the spray pumps off, and so forth, w
g*
12 BY MR. GAMBLE:
5 i(}
13 Q
When Gary Miller came out, did he ask what happened, l
14 or say anything?
2 15 A
I only got the impression that he came through the door, E
16 and that maybe that actually somebody went in and told him j
e 6
17 inside.
At this time I just plain don' t remember where -- where 1
U 18 it was or how he received the information.
b 19 MR. HARPSTER:
Let's go off the record for just a R
20 second.
21 (Discussion off the record.)
-w 22 MR. MOSELEY:
Could we go back on the record, please.
I 23 BY MR. MOSELEY:
I 24 0
Were you at Davis-Besse when they had their transient?
7sU 25 I know you had been at Davis-Besse in the past.
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
cr2-ll 42 1
A I had left Davis-Besse approximately a month or a
(
l 2
month and a half prior to that transient, and some of the control 3
room operators -- I can' t remember who they were at this time --
O
\\'
4 asked me about the transient, because I had been at Davis-Besse.
e 5
But I was not there when it occurred.
2 N
h 6
Q Did they ask you about it on March 28th?
7 A
No.
This was, oh, perhaps one, three months later; X[
8 something like that.
They had heard that there had been a dd 9
transient at Dacis-Besse, that the electromatic relief valve had io 10 been involved, but other than that, they didn't know anything.
5 At the time I was involved very heavily with the start-up of Unit l
11
's j
12 2.
I never saw a report come through.
None of the operators 5
(_)
13 ever talked to me.
I just assumed that whatever their problem l
14 was must have been very minor, because there was never any 2
15 follow-up action that I ever saw on it.
16 Q
So when you say some time later, you mean about three
]W d
17 months after the Davis-Besse event, not three months after 5
18 Three Mile Island?
5 19 A
No, it was after the Davis-Besse event occurred that R
20 I was asked about it, and then I actually didn't find out what 21 occurred until after we had our problem.
22 In fact, it was alno.ct a year before I really found
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s_-
23 out what had happened at Davis-Besse.
24 Q
Okay.
m 25 MR. MOSELEY:
I don't have any further questions.
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
.~ -
ar2-12 43 MR. IIARPSTER:
John, we would like to thank you for y
y ur time.
We would like to ask that you not discuss the 2
questions with other people that we will be questioning, so we 3
can try and get the best information possible from them.
i 4
Thank you very much.
5
=
E MR. CRAIG:
We will provide you with a copy.of the 8
6 i
a transcript.
7 i
(Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m.,
the deposition was 8
r.J ci 9
adj urned.)
N G
10 iG I
11 I
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ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
OJ NUCLEAR REGULATORY CO.* MISSION This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the 4 )
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION in th'e matter of:
- Date of Proceeding: September 2, 1980 Decket llumber:
None
? lace of Proceeding: Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.
were held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript thereof for the file of the Cor:. mission.
PATRICIA A.
MINSON Official Reporter (Typed) 0m 4S. /Ja#ln Official Reporter (Signature)
I O,
i wE lO d
t l
l i
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION This is to certify that the attached pecceedings bercre the NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION in the matter ef:
Date Cf ?roceeding:
September 2, 1980 Docket tiu=ber:
None Place of Proceeding: Harrisburg, Pennsylvania _
were held as herein appears, and tha: this is the original transcrip-thereof for the file of the Cocsission.
ANN RILEY Official Reperter (Typed)
O Aud W
Cfficial Reporter (Signature) e e
O N
/
O W
1 ERRATA SHEET John Flint Harrisburg,_ Pennsylvania i
September 2,'1980 PAGE LINE CHANGE V3 6
"Erbein" should be "Herbein" i
- 5 20 "Mid-Ed" should be " Met-Ed" l
7 14
" site"-
~hould be " side" s
- 7 14
" lead" should be "leck" i
"If 1
" RTE's" should be "RTD's" v1) 10
" borate" should be "boration"
'12 23 "to attend the second pressuization" should read "to i
attempt the second re-pressurization"
[
- '16 14
" thermal couple" should be one word vl6 18
" indicating prior scale," should read " indicating the prior up-scale reading,"
vl6 23-
" thermal. couple" should be one-word
'l6 23
" reading" should be " readings" v8 19 "I am certain" should read "I am not certain"
~
O 12 "Oconey" should be "Oconee"
'Nf20 13 "for full-power" should read "for fuel-power" 17 "Oconey" should be "Oconee"
\\' 'f20 1
l L2,1 14 "and why they set" should read "and why they are set" L24 12
" RTE" should be "RTD" v25 23
" RTE's" should be "RTD's" v26 24 "the south powered" should read "the self-powered" L27 4
"a period monitoring that" should read "a periodic monitor that" i
0 29 13 "the outer-core detectors" should read "the out-of-core detectors"
'd 0 4
"did not" should be added to the end of the sentence i
p33 2
5
" leaks" should be " peaks" l
7
" report" should be " reported" LI5 10 "was the usual date" should read "was usable data" t
l l
l l
I 4
4 I
i
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-