Text

Proposed Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law in Form of Initial Decision.Notice of Appearances & Certificate of Svc Encl
	ML19343D381
Person / Time
Site:	Zimmer
Issue date:	04/24/1981
From:	Conner T, Wetterhahn M; CINCINNATI GAS & ELECTRIC CO., CONNER, MOORE & CORBER
To:	;
References
	NUDOCS 8105040375
	Download: ML19343D381 (99)
	v • d • e

~

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY CCMMISSION In the Matter of

)

The Cincinnati Gas & Electric

)

Docket No. 50-358 Company, et,al.

)

i<tif C ff f g d g, m

)

g'{((Gl (1

(Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power

)

Station)

)

f lu,'[' O 1 198 k '~

~

APPLICANTS' PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT Q'jsou,o,,

.-f AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW IN THE FORM OF AN INITIAL DECISION N4 The Cincinnati Gas & Electric Company, et al., Ap-plicants in the captioned proceeding, in accordance with 10 C.F.R.

52.754 and the Atomic Safety and Licensing Scard's Schedule for Filing Proposed Findings and Conclusions of March 20, 1981, hereby submit the attached proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law in the form of an initial decision with respect to these issues for which the hearing has been completed.

Respectfully submitted, CONNER & MOORE Tro O venner, Jr.

Mark J.

detterhahn Counsel for the Applicants j

Of Counsel:

William J.

Moran, Esq.

e 1

Jerome A.

Vennemann, Esq.

4 O

l The Cincinnati Gas & Electric 139 E'.

Fourth Street

[}E Comcanv UOOKETED 1

usNac p

Cincinnati, Ohio 45201 APR 27 ;ggg, T g

81 l[ne 4%

N Bran %

3 f

81650403 75 6 0il i

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION c

g ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD E

g Before Administrative Judges:

3 A?R 271981> "[

3

' (($)ndths Charles Bechhoefer, Esq., Chairman Dr. M.

Stanley Living.ston, Member

\\

Dr. Frank F.

Hooper, Member g

In the Matter of

)

The Cincinnati Gas & 1;lectric

)

Docket No. 50-358 Company, et al.

)

(Wm. H.

Zimmer Nuclear Power

)

Station)

)

1981 APPEARANCES TROY B. CONNER, JR., Esq. and MARK J. WETTERHAHN, Esq., of Conner & Moore, Washington, D.C.,

and WILLIAM J. MORAN, F.sq., General Counsel, and JEROME A.

VENNEMANN, Esq., Counsel, for The Cincinnati Gas & Electric Company, et al.

CHARLES A.

BARTH, Esq., Office of the Executive Legal Director, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C.

for the NRC Staff.

WILLIAM PETER HEILE, Esq., Assistant City Solicitor, for the City of Cincinnati.

JOHN D. WOLIVER, Esq., for Dr. David B. Fankhauser.

JAMES H.

FELDMAN, JR., Esq., for the Miami Valley Power Project.

ANDREW B.

DENNISON, Esq., for Zimmer Area Citizens and Zimmer Area Citizens of Kentucky.

DAVID K. MARTIN, Esq., Assistant Attorney General for the Commonwealth of Kentucky.

GEORGE E. PATTISON, Esq., Prosecuting Attorney and LAWRENCE R.

FISSE, Esq., Assistant Prosecuting Attorney for Clermont County, Ohio.

MRS. MARY REDER and MR. DONALD REDER, for the City of Mentor, Kentucky.

i TABLE OF CONTENTS i

j Page Introduction.

2 Findings of Fact 9

Contested Issues 9

Contention 6.

9 Contention 14 21 Contention 15 33 Contention 16 44 Contention 17 48 Contention 13 56 Construction Costs.

56 TMI Capital Costs 61 Costs of Operation.

62 Decommissioning 64 The Costs of an Accident 77 Uncontested Matters.

80 Pressure Testing of Doors 80 Bolts for the Traveling Screen.

81 t

l Alleged Electrical Deficiencies 82 l

Grinding of Control Rod l

Velocity Limiter.

85 1

Conclusions of Law.

89 Order 90 l'

Appendix A - Exhibits l

i f

1 l

.- INITIAL DECISION

{

(OPERATING LICENSE-PROCEEDING)

I.

INTRODUCTION 1.

This initial decision concerns the application filed with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission by The Cincinnati-Gas & Electric Company,-for itself and as agent for Columbus

& Southern Ohio Electric Company and The Dayton Power &

Light Company, (hereinafter collectively " Applicants") for a facility operating license which would authorize the opera-tion of the Wm. H.

Zimmer Nuclear Power Station (hereinafter "Zimmer Station" or " facility").

The Cincinnati Gas &

Electric Company is responsible for operation of the' facility which utilizes a boiling water reactor designed to operate at a core power level up to 2436 thermal. megawatts with a net electrical output of approximately 800 megawatts.

The J

facility is located on Applicants' site on the eastern shore of the Ohio River, one-half mile north of Moscow and about 24 miles southeast of Cincinnati, in Washington Township, Clermont County, Ohio.

Ccmmercial operation of the facility is projected for 1982.

2.

On April 6, 1970, the Applicants filed an applica-tion with the Atomic Energy Commission, now the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (here!.after " Commission" or "NRC")

for permits to construct and operate the Zimmer facility.

Following reviews by the Commission's Staff (hereinafter

" Staff") and the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, as well as public hearings before an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, a permit to construct the Zimmer facility was authorized.

Pursuant thereto, Construction Permit No.

CPPR-88 was issued on October 27, 1972.

3.

The application for an operating license was doc-keted by the NRC on September 10, 1975.

On September 28, 1975, the Commission published " Receipt of Application for Facility Operating License; Availability of Applicants' Environmental Report; and Consideration of Issuance of Facility Operating License and Opportunity for Hearing (40 Fed. Reg. 43959).

In response to the notice, petitions for leave to intervene were filed by the Miami Valley Power Project ("MVPP"), Dr. David B. Fankhauser, Mrs. Marie B.

Leigh and the City of Cincinnati.

On November 3, 1975, this Atomic Safety and Licensing Board

(" Licensing Board" or 1/

" Board") was established to rule on the petitions.--

2/

After a prehearing conference held on January 23, 1976,--

the Board issued a Notice of. Hearing and admitted all of the 1

l l

--1/

Establishment Of Atomic Safety and Licensing Board l

to Rule on Petitions (November 3, 1975).

--2/

Notice of Hearing and Order Concerning Special Pre-hearing Conference (December 24, 1975).

I l

3/

l petitioners as parties to the proceeding-~ and specified the 4/

contentions at issue.

4.

By letter from'the. Staff dated September 9, 1977, the Board learned that Mrs. Leigh had died.

While the Board t

considers that under the Commission's Rules and Regulations there is no need to pursue such contentions, they were encompassed within the remaining contentions of the other intervenors in the proceeding.

Thus, the topics were given 5/

adequate consideration during the course of the proceeding.-~

5.

This Board was reconstituted on three occasions due to the illness of one member, the retirement of another, and

-6/

a conflict in schedule. -

6.

Discovery in this proceeding took place over a period of approximately three years, with the Board permitting additional discovery in certain instances when new contentions were admitted or new matters arose.

3/

Order Granting Petitions for Intervention and Providing for Hearing (March 19, 1976).

The Board's " Order Grant-ing Petitions to Intervene" (November 28, 1975) had been reversed by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board in ALAB-305, 3 NRC 8 (1976).

~~4/

These contentions were modified in part by Order Grant-ing Motion for Reconsideration of Form of Intervenor Contentions (April 13, 1976) and Order Denying in Part and Granting in Part Applicants' Objections to Order Specifying Contentions (June 17, 1976).

1 l

5/

Cf. Public Service Company of Indiana (Marble Hill l

Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-77-52, 6 NRC 294, 300-01 (1977).

--6/

See Notices of Reconstitution of Board dated November 2, IF77 (4 2 Fed. Reg. 58583), October 2, 1978 (4 3 Fed. Reg.

46911), and March 5, 1981 (46 Fed. Reg. 16382).

{'

l.

~ - * -

i 7.

The prehearing conference required by 10 C.F.R.

S2.752 was held on May 21-23, 1979.- During the course of the conference, the Board, accompanied by representatives of the parties, toured the Zimmer facility and the surrounding environs, including the Moscow Elementary School.

During that prehearing conference as well as a number of times during the course of the evidentiary hearings, limited ap-pearance statements were heard.

The sessions for receipt of limited appearance statements which were held in Moscow, Ohio and in Cincinnati, occurred during the evening, in ad-dition to daytime hours, to accommodate as many people as possible.

The Board asked the Staff to respond to.a number s

of the issues raised and the Board is satisfied that the 7/

Staff has adequately addressed the identified concerns.--

8.

During the course of the prehearing and evidentiary _

phases of the proceeding, resulting in part from the oc-currence of the accident at the Three Mile Island Nuclear.

Station, Unit 2 ("TMI"), the Board admitted a number of new parties and participants.

The Board admitted Zimmer Area Citizens /Zimmer Area Citizens of Kentucky, as an intervenor pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 52.714 and the Commonwealth cf Kentucky, l

Clermont County, Ohio and the City of Mentor, Kentucky, as

--7/

The Boa'rd is mindful cf the burden that such requests place upon the NRC Staff, particularly the Office of

. Inspection and Enforcement, in investigating such al-legations and reporting back to the Board.

a

,-n e.

--,,,,,,-..--,-n.-.

1 8/

participants pursuant to 10 C.F.R. S2. 715 (c). -- Additional contentions dealing with cable trays (Contention 14),

9/

control rods (Contentions 15 and -16),'- fire protection of cable trays (Contention 17), monitoring (Contentions-18 and 10/

19),- and emergency planning (Contentions 20-32) were admitted and discovery on these issues was permitted.

9.

The NRC Staff prepared a draft and a final environ-i mental impact statement pursuant to the requirements of'the National Environmental Policy Act and 10 C.F.R. Part 51 (Staff Exh. 2).

Pursuant to 10 C.F.R.

551. 5 2 (b) (1), the Staff introduced into evidence material which supplemented or amended the FES (Staff Exh. 2-6).

This ma terial consisted of an NRC Staff Supplement to the Final Environmental State-ment relating to the radiological impact of Radon-222 re-leases (Staff Exh. 3), a comparison of health effects at-tributable to coal and nuclear fuel cycle alternatives (Staff Exh. 4) with certain revised information pertinent thereto (Staff Exh. 5) and a statement addressing risk 8/

Memorandum and Order, LBP-80-14, 11 NRC 570 (April 22, 1980); Memorandum and Order Admitting Kentuchy as an l

" Interested State," (April 1, 1980): Memorandura and i

Order Admitting Clermont County, Ohio Pursuant to 10 C.F.R.

S2. 715 (c) (June 11, 1980); Memorandum and Order Admitting Mentor, Kentucky, Pursuant to 10 C.F.R.

52. 715 (c), LEP-80-6, 11 NRC 148 (January 29, 1980).

9/

Order Admitting New Contentions and Establishing Discovery Schedule with Regard,Thereto (April 9, 1979).

10/

Memorandum and Order Admitting New Contentions, L3P l 22, 10 NRC 213 (August 7, 1979); Memorandum and Order l

Ruling on Contentions of ZAC-ZACK, L3P-80-19, 12 NRC 67 (July 2, 1980).

l

[

.. j assessment methodology mandated by a January 19, 1979 Commission statement of policy concerning the Reactor Safety Study and Review Group report (Staff Exh. 6) also modifying Staff Exh.

4.

10.

The decisional record in this proceeding consists 4

of the following:

a.

The material pleadings filed herein, including the petitions and other pleadings filed by the parties, and the orders issued by the Board during the course of this proceeding; b.

The transcripts of the prehearing conferences on January 23, 1976 (Tr. 1-120) and May 21-23, 1979 (Tr. 121-532), and the transcript of testimony of the evidentiary hearings with pagination from 533 to

11/

c.

All of the exhibits received into evidence which are identified in Appendix (A) to this Initial Deci-sion.

11.

The Applicants filed three motions for summary dis-12/

position-with regard to a number of the contentions.

The Board granted the motions with respect to Contentions 1, 5,

11/

Intersperced in these transcripts are limited appearance statements which of course do not constitute a part of the decisional record.

10 C.F.R.

S 2. 715 (a) ; Iowa Electric Licht & Power Company (Duane Arnold Energy Center, ALAB-108, 6 AEC 195, 196 n.4 (1973).

Pages 3600-3900 were skipped by the reporter in preparing this transcript.

12/

Applicants' Motion for Summary Disposition (April 6, 1979); Applicants' Supplemental Motion for Summary Dispo-sition (April 23, 1979); and Applicants' Motion for Sum-mary Disposition Relating to Contention 17 (Septemb2r 21, 1979).

-- 13/

11 and 12.--

The remainder of the contentions were con-sidered during evidentiary hearings held on June 19-22, 1979, June 26-29, 1979, August 7-10, 1979, November 14-15, 1979 and March 2-4, 1981.

12.

During the course of the proceeding, MVPP and Dr.

Fankhauser moved to delay delivery of unirradiated fuel to the site of the facility.

The Applicants. opposed the mo-tions, both on jurisdictional grounds and on the merits.

The NRC Staff supported the Licensing Board's jurisdiction to consider the motions, but urged denial on the merits.

While the Board found it had jurisdiction to consider the matter, it found that the intervenors provided no informa-tion which would warrant granting-the requested relief, i.e.,

the Applicants' actions fail to conform with the re-quirements of the regulation or the outstanding materials license or that the NRC Staff is failing to exercise properly 14/

its authority in this area.

13.

In making the findings of fact and conclusions of l

law which f ollow, the Board considered the entire record of l

13/

Prehearing Conference Order (June 4, 1979) at 13-18; I

Applicants' Renewed Motion for Summary Disposition or, in the Alternative, fo Certification (July 25, 1979);

and Memorandum and Order (granting motion for summary disposition of contention 5), LEP-81-2, 13 NRC (January 23, 1981).

14/

Memorandum and Order Denying Motion to Delay Delivery of Fuel to the Site, LBp-79-24, 10 NRC 226 (August 15, 1979).

While the Board deemed such order to be ap-pealable, no review by the Atomic Safety and Licensing j

Appeal Board was sought.

i I

i n '

j the proceeding and all of the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law submitted by the parties..

Each of the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law which is not incorporated directly or inferentially in this InitiIl Decision is rejected as being unsupported in law or fact or as being unnecessary to the rendering of this Decision.

14.

The Board is guided in this_ operating license pro-ceeding by Appendix A,Section VIII of 10 C.F.R.

Part 2, which in subsection (b) provides that the Board will make findings on matters in controversy among the parties.

II.

FINDINGS OF FACT A.

Contested Issues Compliance with 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix I Contention 6 The Applicants will not meet the design objectives of Appendix I to 10 C.F.R. Part 50 because the dose levels to the children at the Moscow Elementary School will exceed those which are permissible.

15.

Pursuant to the requirements of 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix I, the Applicants and Staff independently demon-strated that the design objectives of Section II.A-C were met for operation of the Zrmmer Station (Applicants' Exhibit l

1 (hereinaf ter " Appl. Exh. __")

(Environmental Report Operating License Stage (hereinafter "ER") at S5.2; Staff Exh.

2, Final Environmental Statement (hereinafter "FES") at 55.4; 1

1 l

1

. Tr. 767-68).

Accepted methodology, including the use of Regulatory Guides 1.109, 1.111 and NUREG-0016, was used in-o calculating the doses to individuals who are determined to have the highest exposure due to various pathways (Testimony Relating to Contention 6, Calculations of Potential Doses at the Moscow Elementary School Resulting from Releases from the Zimmer Nuclear Power Station, following Tr. 610 (herein-after " Contention 6 Testimony") at 1-4; Tr. 613-615).

None of the critical doses were to individuals at the Moscow Elementary School (Affidavit of Kevin L.

Rooney, following Tr. 607 (hereinafter "Rooney") at 4).

This contention has no merit inasmuch as the calculated emissions from the facility comply with the design objectives of 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix I and the doses at the school were not " critical,"-

i.e., were less restrictive.

16.

Even considering the very low level of the doses calculated at

.e site of the school (Tr. 829-30), because of the pro:'imity of this school to the facility (approxi-mately 1/2 mile), and because of its use at that time as a school, the Board sought to assure itself that the calcula-tions were conservatively done.

The Board has satisfied itself that the assumptions and the calculational methods utilized lead to suitably conservative dose calculations (Contention 6 Testimony at 2-4).

In particular, the Board is satisfied that the use of a two year period for meteoro-

. logical data collection in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.23 leads to suitably conservative meteorological values as correlated with data taken at other nearby locations (Tr.

9 679-82).

17.

The Applicants utilized a conservative occupancy factor of 0.25 in their calculations (Contention 6 Testimony at 3; Rooney at 4).

Compared to the number of hours of attendance derived from multiplying the length of the school year (180 days) by the length of the school day (approxi-mately 6 1/3 hours),

i.e.,

1140 hours0.0132 days 0.317 hours 0.00188 weeks 4.3377e-4 months , the value of 2200 hours0.0255 days 0.611 hours 0.00364 weeks 8.371e-4 months utilized in the analysis is suitably conservative (Tr.

631-32).

Even if the students were assumed to spend their entire time at the school, i.e.,

a 100% occupancy factor, the calculated doses still would be an extremely small fraction of the Appendix I design oL]ectives (Tr. 636-37).

~

The age of the children was also suitably taken into account (Tr. 619-20, 656-57).

l 18.

It has come to the attention of the Licensing Board that subsequent to its consideration of this issue, the Moscow Elementary School was closed (See Tr. 4246-47).

While the issue is thus seemingly moot, the Board has pre-sented its findings for completeness of the record.

During cross-examination, counsel for Dr. Fankhauser attempted to infer that a' higher dose to a critical individual would 1

result if that individual were assumed to attend the school.

. There is no basis for such an assumption; in fact, because the school is not a critical location for any pathway, an individual's dose by way of gaseous effluents would be by, definition reduced by virtue of his absence from the location of the highest concentration of effluents (Tr. 628).

More-over, on examination by the Board, it became evident that Dr. Fankhauser had taken a statement of an expert upon which he relied out of context.

While quoting a statement that children have an increased sensitivity to radiation, Dr.

i Fankhauser failed to recognize the next sentence which stated that nationally recognized standard setting organizations had already taken this factor into account (Tr. 729-33).

Dr. Fankhauser referred to an asserted accumulation of spent fuel as causing doses in excess of the guideline values of Appendix I, but was unable to point to any error in the assumptions used by Applicants in their calculations (Tr.

15/

7 3 4 -3 5 ). --

19.

One of the stations for routine environmental monitoring is located near the Moscow Elementary School.

During its site visit, the Board examined this station and i

is satisfied that the appropriate provisions of Appendix I can be met during the life of the facility and that the dose to the children at the Moscow Elementary School, if occupied, will be appropriately taken into account.

~~/

The Board had previously granted the Applicants' motion 15 for summary disposition with. regard to Dr. Fankhauser's contention regarding doses resulting from the storage of spent fuel.

See n.13, supra.

20.

The ultimate test of compliance with 10 C.F.R Part 50, Appendix I is not a function of the conservatism of the calculations.

In accordance with'Section IV of Appendix,I, actual environmental measurements will be taken over the lifetime of the facility (Tr. 663).

The Technical Specifica-tions for the facility will take into account direct radi tion and shina doses ev'.a though Appendix I, by its terms, does not take these sources into account (Tr. 725) in order to demonstrate compliance with 40 C.F.R. Part 190 (Tr. 769-71).

21.

The question of the necessity to show compliance with Section II.D of Appendix I was raised by the Licensing Board.

Based upon its review of 10 C.F.R.

Part 50, Appendix 16/

I and its underlying decision,-~ the Board has concluded that it was the Commission's intent that plants in the category of Zimmer be given even more latitude than newer plants in meeting the as-low-ac-reasonably-achievable-standard.

In fact, plants such as Zimmer, i.e.,

those for which an application filed prior to January 2, 1971, are not l

technically bound by the guides on design objectives con-17/

tained in Section II to Appendix D.

Thus, rather than a

-~

l l

limitation on use of the Annex to Appendix I, the January 2,

--16/

Rule Making Hearing - Numerical Guides for Design Objectives and Limiting Conditions for Operation to Meet the Criterion "As Low As Practicable" for Radio-active Material in Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Reactor Effluents, CLI-75-5, 1 NRC 277 (1975).

17/

Id. at 292, 328-32.

1971 date is a recognition that the entire section is not a direct-requirement to be' applied to cases filed before January 2, 1971.

However, if a plant can voluntarily meet the design objectives which are intended for newer plants, i.e.,Section II.A-C and demonstrate compliance with the Annex to Appendix I which is a more stringent. demonstration than would otherwise be required, the Board sees no reason 4

why such standards, being more stringent, should not be applicable to facilities such as Zimmer.

Thus, the demon-stration of compliance with the Staff Concluding Statement Position as shown in Appl. Exh.

1, Environmental Report, 55.2, and FES 55.4 is an appropriate substituts for a demonstration of compliance with the SII.D cost-benefit p

provisions.

In any event, NUREG-0389, of which the Board has taken official notice (Tr. 835-36)~, demonstrates that Zimmer, as well as other facilities of its class, could not achieve a favorable cost-benefit ratio by the inclusion in the radwaste system of all items of reasonably demonstrable technology when added to the system sequentially and in j

order of diminishing cost-benefit return.

This showing is itself a demonstration of compliance with the cost-benefit provisions of Section II.D.

22.

In spite of the evidence presented with regard to compliance with the Commission's as-low-as reasonably achiev-able requirements, because of the proximity of the school, I

l l

the Board raised.the following questions related to whether scheduling of operations could result in a favorable cost.

benefit ratio:

a.

With respect to the cost-benefit balance contemplated by 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix I,Section II.D, the Board wishes to be advised whether scheduling of releases from non-continuous sources (i.e., the mechanical vacuum pump and the dry well purge) could effect reductions in man-rem and/or man-thyroid-rem dose to the population reasonably expected to be within 50 miles of the reactor.

In this con-text population includes but is not limited to school children; tran-sients should be included.

By scheduling of releases, rhe Board has in mind:

1.

time:

day / night for the dry well purge and variation of days (e. c., week-ends / weekdays / seasons) for both the dry well purge and the operation of the mechanical vacuum pump.

In other words, in this enalysis the parties should take into account the number of people at various directions and distances frcm the plant site at night versus the day and on weekends versus week days.

23.

Because of the closing of the Moscow Elementary School, this question now has significantly less importance to the Board.

However, for completeness of the record, the l

Board has included its findings tere.

The Board recognized l

from the outset the inherent difficulty in responding to its I

l l

_. 4 i

question.

Accurate prediction of wind speed, wind direction and atmospheric stability which may persist during a given.

release and the prediction of cha'nges in these factors which actually occur away from the plant over the course of time is virtually impossible (Applicants' Response to the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board's Two Questions Relating to 10 C. F. R.

Part 50, Appendix I, following~Tr. 2937 (hereinafter

" Applicants' App. I Response") at 1-2).

Thus, it is not really possible to produce a decisional model which could reliably and effectively tell an operator whether to operate the mechanical vacuum pump or drywell purge at some time or to wait for scme unspecified additional given time.

Thus, even were it theoretically possible that a positive cost-benefit ratio could be achieved, it is extremely unlikely that it would have any real-life utility.

Fortunately, the Board was not faced with this question.

Both the Applicants and the Staff approached the Board's question in a similar manner by bounding the problem and demonstrating that, with respect to 10 C.F.R.

Part 50', Appendix I, it is clearly not cost beneficial to attempt to schedule releases from non-continuous sources undar any reasonable set of assumptions (pd. at 3).

24.

Inasmuch as the Board requested that the cost-benefit balance as established by the Commission in 10 C.F. R.

Part 50, Appendix I,Section II.D be a framework for

_ evaluating the efficacy of scheduling non-continous releases.

i of gaseous radioactive materials, the values of $1,000 per total body man rem and $1,000 per man thyroid rem were utilized as required by the Commission's rule, and the methodology described in Regulatory Guide 1.109, Revision 1 and population estimates for the year 2010 were used in a conservative manner to calculate the population dose result-ing from the non-continuous release of gaseous materials (pi. at 2-5, 5; Tr. 2938-42).

25.

The population wheel within 50 miles of the Zimmer i

Station is highly skewed, with the total population and the calculated population dose dominated by the Cincinnati area (see FES, Fig. 2.1, page 2-3; Applicants' Appendix I Re-sponse at 3; Tr. 2939-40).

This area lies between twenty and thirty miles from the Station in the NW and NNW sectors.

Of a total estimated population of the area for the year 2010 of 2.4 million people, approximately 1.6 million people are estimated to reside in these sectors (Applicants' Ap-pendix I Response at 3).

If a significant reduction in population dose could be potentially realized from the scheduling of non-continuous releases, it would be when the wind blows in the NW or NNW sectors immediately before these releases were otherwise scheduled.

The maximum potential reduction in population dose would result if one waited for extreme shifts in direction and atmospheric stability from i

s# #

4,N\\Y; lll gk////;+p[h/

+

Yk g,

_ E --

TEST TARGET (MT-3) l 1.0 gmen 5 5 Illn a

==

w l,l ', $ # hb

/

l.8 1.25 IA i.6 1

6"

/

4

+4%

'S 437h//)/

tA,9,),

37,p

3 18 -

the NW rnd NNW so the total calculated man rem dose would be minimized (pi. at 3-4; Tr. 2943-44, 2948).

Less signifi-cant reductions in population would be calculated for other wind directions regardless of other meteorological conditions because of the skew in population (Applicants' Appendix I Response at 3-4).

26.

Man rem and man thyroid rem doses resulting from mechanical vacuum pump and drywell purge releases have been calculated using the most favorable and least favorable meteorological conditions.

Under the most unfavorable meteorological conditions, a calculated population dose of 6 man rem by immersion and inhalation dose of 3.0 man thyroid rem would be experienced.

This condition would occur 0.46%

of the time.

Similarly, under most favorable meteorological conditions, the calculated population dose is 0.008 man rem by immersion and 0.004 man thyroid rem by inhalation (Id. at 5-6).

Using the guidance of the cost-benefit balance selected by the Commission of $1000 per man rem or man thyroid rem, and as the benefits from scheduled releases are additive, a conceivable (but extremely unlikely) benefit would then be

$8,988 if the mechanical vacuum pump operation were delayed until conditions changed from the worst to the best in terms of reducing man-rem (Id.).

Similarly, the benefit in dollars for the drywell purge dose is S462 (Id. at 5).

In order for these benefits to be realized, an extreme shift in both wind w

,w r-

,----c v

-va--

.v---

a e-

,n-w-

---n-ev

,- -- ~

1 i i

l I

i direction and meteorological stability must take place; the wind direction must shift frc= a SE wind to a NW wind, and the stability. must c.c from a stability Class G to a stabilitv Class A.

Shifts less than these will produce correspondingly smaller benefits (Id. at 6).

2.

[I]f a reduction in population dose may be achieved by one or =cre of the scheduling methods referenced above, either alone or in ec=bination, the Scard wishes to be further apprised of the cost thereof; in doing an es-timate with respect to drv. well curce o the parties may wish to segregate purges which =ay be rescheduled with little er no difficulty or expense frc= those where greater difficulty or expense is entailed.

(Tr. 1429).

27.

The mechanical vacuu= pump is used during startup to re=cve noncendensible gases frc= the main ccndenser.

A delay in mechanical vacuum pu=p cperatien te allcw for shifts in =eteorological conditions wculd therefore cause a delay in plant operation (Tr. 2972-73).

The ecs: of such a delav would decend.crimarily on whether the over required e

to re-lace the Zi==er cutput could be supplied bv units en e

the Applicants' generating systems or whether the replace-

=ent power would have to be purchased frc= cther utility i

systems (Applicants' Appendix I Response at 7).

28.

The Applicants calculated that if replacement pcwer could be supplied b.v c:her units en the Ac.clicants' generat-ing syste=s, the fuel cost penalty (i.e.,

the cost cf generat-ing replacement electricity utilizing =cre costly fuel)

20 -

associated with a one da'J' dela"J in =lant creration estimated at that time was $169,135.

Similarly, the esti=ated-cost of a cne day delav. in plant operation if all replace =ent power is purchased frc= cther utility syste=s was S960,000 (M. ).

29.

If the one dav delav. cost of $169,133 associated with utilizin other units on the Applicants' syste= is used w

toc.e:her with the =ethodology of Section II.D cf A=.cendix I, the cost of each minute of delay in s.artup would be 5118.

If the 9 =an re= reduction was converted ec dellars b,v multiplying by Si,000/=an re=, it can be seen that even in the extre=e case presented, the Ac.clicants could e.cssibiv ce,av en_,v. e e : nutes :.:

coul,- be assured that u.e ex-trene change discussed above would cccur.

If the pcwer was

,....= sed,.= "a i. ^." ^...' v.'.' ~ 4..".. e s c. _' e s. ".." ' A be ca,s.

beneficial in the extre=e case discussed (y. at 7-6).

.O.

..". a C-="#

,co.d.. ed mu. u.___i.'..3 s _'. _' _' a _-

e.. hod.o.'.,-v,

, 3

.w...a.

.w

...e

~ s.

.e _...e a.e cc.-

4..,.s

_, cw.e.,.. w...e.a

.,f

.,_4a_

_r w,

.a,-

v

.w c

re= dose wculd be to wait until the wind direction was in the e_ _, e.. 4..

^#

.".e

.V-s -.,w 7.' e a...a. v,

.c.. ". w i

(.c.a.".

ces c.se..,

~.

Appendix I Questien, fellowing Tr. 2967, at 4).

Ecwever, i

I l

,.w.e c,

., 3 _, 4. e

.s.,cu. e..cy c.4

.-..... e v

. 4..4 wi y.4..3 4..

such c.,eneral directicn is 2.2% cr S davs =er vear for S.a c' _' _t _' *- ' - C _t _= s s n'

(-d.

a *...* ).

... a c' d ' ~ d...,

.'.e n'

.., _' _4 - a... s '

\\

study revealed that it wculd take 152 hours0.00176 days 0.0422 hours 2.513228e-4 weeks 5.7836e-5 months for the wind te l

l go frc= the northeast to the southeast and frc= G stability ec A (Tr. 2963).

i l

i I

I f

I r

+-- -

-'=

~' - - - "-

31.

Thus the scheduling of releases according to time and wind direction is not practical because of the small cest-benefit time frame, because of the small frequency during which very favorable wind conditions occur to benefit from the scheduling and because of the small magnitudc of the reduction of the population dose to be achieved by such scheduling and the comparative small magnitude of the re-duction to natural background (Staf f Response to Appendix I Question at 5; Tr. 2964).

Considering these facts and recognizing that there does not appear to be any benefit of scheduling releases either en a day or night basis (Tr.

2970-71), and recognizing the flexibility of cperation centemplated by 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix I, and con-sidering the extreme difficulty in formulating an-enforce-able license condition, the Scard finds tha*. no limitation ir. cperation beyond that presently contemplated by Appendix

-18/

I for inclusion in the Technical Specifications is neces-i sary in this case.

1 Contention 14 Cable trays containing electrical wires have been inadequately welded by improp-erly qualified welders, contrary to NRC regulations.

More specifically, three piece verticals and two piece channels were welded by people not fully ASMI certified.

These welders were not con-4 l

sistently able to produce a quality weld l

with good fusion, a situation aggravated by Eusky Product's incentive system which i

18/

The 30ard also notes that as a legal matter it is doubtful

{

whether any reasonable interpretation of Appendix I con-templates that startup of a facility be delayed even were the result otherwise cost beneficial under Section II.D of Appendix I.

induced quick blasting techniques to be employed.

Further disregarding standard procedures production welding techniques and test welding techniques were not identical.

Any meaningful inspection-of the crucial three piece vertical welds is impossible because the trays have been galvanized.

Therefore, the existing sys-tem of cable trays must be dismantled and a new set, welded by fully certified welders, installed.

32.

Cable trays used in the Zimmer facility were manufactured by Strndy-Husky Incorporated of Florence, Kentucky and consist of three types of trays: (1) three piece straight tray used horizontally, having two side channels and a corrugated bettem plate (solid) welded to-gether by resistance spots welds by an automatic resistance spot weld machine, (2) three piece vertical tray utilized in straight vertical runs also having two side channels but with a flat plate for the back of the tray.

These trays are also welded with the same autcmatic resistance spot weld machine, and (3) fittings that provide the transition trays from horizontal to vertical, changes in direction horizontally cr vertically or T-sections.-

These transition travs mav.

have either single piece side charmt_s or three piece side channels fabricated from three separate pieces by welding, this welding being done by a manual Tungsten Inert Gas (TIG) process by a qualified welder.

The fillet welds are apprcxi-

=ately one inch long and are spaced every two to three inches along the welded joint.

These side channels are then l

l i

i

t

. spot welded to a corrugated solid bottom plate.

This weld-ing is done by either a resistance spot weld machine or by.

semiautomatic metal inert gas (MIG) process as necessary (Direct Testimony of Thomas Vandel and Harvey Wescott Re-garding Contention 14, Cable Tray Welding, Tr. following i

1643 (hereinafter "Staf f Cable Tray Testimony) at 7-8).

33.

These trays, when installed in the Zimmer facility, are supported by seismically designed hangers with support spacing of straight runs not to exceed 9 feet in length.

Fittings are supported on both ends by seismically designed hangers (jgi. at 8).

The designer, Sargent and Lundy Engineers,

(" S & L" ) specified that the cable raceway system for Zimmer (both conduits as well as cable trays) will be designed adequately to sustain a seismic event by reliance on the support hanger system, not the trays themselves.

The basic purpose of the trays is to separate and direct the wires.

The support for the wires ccmes from the seismically designed i

hangers anchored in the structures themselves.

The electrical l

cables would therefore remain in place on the supports even in the unlikely event that the cable trays disappeared (jgi. ).

Considering these factors, the quality of welds in fittings would havc no established relation to the safety of the facility.

Indeed, MVPP has provided no probative evidence which would indicate that these trays have safety significance.

)

As such, there is no warrant whatsoever for the assertion 1

that these cable trays must be dismantled and a new set welded.

This alone is sufficient to decide the issue in, favor of the Applicants.

34.

The cable trays were manufactured in accordance with design specifications requiring steel having a minimum yield of 30,000 pounds per square inch.

When this material is received at Husky, the receiver documentation is in-spected to verify that the shipment meets these specifica-tions (Applicants' Testimony Relating to Contention 14 Cable Trays, following Tr. 985 (hereinafter " Applicants' Cable Tray Testimony") at 1).

Design specifications further required the cable trays to sustain a working load of 40 lbs. per square fo'ot plus a load equivalent to 200 lbs. at the mid-point of a 10 foot span with a minimum load (safety factor of 2.0) when treated in accordance with NEMA Standard VE-1-3.01 (Applicants' Cable Tray Testimony at 1; Tr. 1807).

The safety factor was determined by means of structural tests at Husky (Tr. 1090).

35.

Cable trays for the Zimmer Station were manufactured by the Burndy-Husky Corporation in accordance with a quality assurance program approved by the Applicants (Tr. 990, 1104-05).

However, cable trays at Zi=mer are not ASME Class 1 (Applicants' Cable Tray Testimony at 1; Tr. 1097).

Ac-cordingly, there is no requirement for " certification" of

- welders as is required by the ASME Code Section III for pressure vessels, for example.

However, each Husky welder was required to have a qualification test to establish his competence for the type of welds made on Zimmer cable trays (Applicants' Cable Tray Testinony at 1; Tr. 987).

Each welder underwent a qualification test required for each position and process (Tr. 988, 1035).

If necessary, training was provided to enable welders to pass qualification tests (Tr. 1027).

During an internal audit by Burndy-Husky, it was determined that due to an oversight, one procedure had not been qualified.

From all evidence, this situation was rectified by the Cc=pany (Tr. 1045).

There is no indication that this deficiency led to any reduction in the quality of the welding of cable trays for Zi=mer.

Even Mr. Hof stadter, rhe witness for MVPP, agreed that there was no difference in weld quality between a certified and a non-certified welder (Tr. 1458-59).

l 36.

Mr. Hofstadter claimed that some welders were falsely certified (Testimony of Edwin P.

Ecfstadter Cen-cerning Contention 14, following Tr. 1153, Response to l

Question 7 at 2).

He first claimed that a welder had to l

pass eight tests before he would be " fully certified" to perform anv work in any of the eight positions (Id.).

He I

j could not present any justification for such view (Or. 1302-06; See also Tr. 1825).

During the hearing, he atte=pted to

i change his testimony of what he meant by " falsely certified" (Tr. 1179).

He claimed, that as the result of a technicality, because the procedure qualification and welder qualification tests were done at the same time, the welder could not be qualified.

The Scard had expert testimony by a disinterested outside expert that this interpretation is not necessarily-correct (Tr. 2173-76).

In any event, inasmuch as the uncon-tradicted testimony is that the correct procedures were followed by welders taking the test, the Board sees no violation.

The Board can see no diminuation in safety even had ch technical violation been established.

Any cable tray which did not meet specifications was cted following quality assurance visual inspections at Husky such that only trays meeting specifications were shipped to Zimmer (Applicants' Cable Tray Testimony at 1:

Tr. 1032-33, 1086, 1092).

Even Mr. Hofstadter acknowledged the existence of inspection records (Tr. 1445).

Additional inspection was made upon receipt at the Zi=mer plant to assure that there was no Camage in shipment (Applicants' Cable Tray Testimony at 1; Tr. 1098-99).

38.

Mr. Hof stadter, the witness for the MVPP who had been laid off by Burndy-Husky, stated that he was motivated to report the alleged " deficiencies" four years after they occurred because he perceived that the cable trays were

" overloaded" on the basis of the area the cable occupied (Tr. 1182, 1186-87).

This was based on at best a tour last-ing not more than an hour and a half of the facility (Tr.

1325).

However, even after his visit to the plant, he made no effort to tell anyone at the NRC cr at-CG&E of his concerns until four months later, after he was laid off by the Cc=pany (Tr. 1245-47).

39.

With regard to cable tray leading, what Mr. Hofstadter failed to appreciate was that the design loading was based upon weight and not on how high the cable vas piled (Tr.

1187, 1227-28, 1722-23, 1728, 1806).

The neaviest loading the facility is approximately 36 lbs..per foot (Tr. 1073, at 1857) as cc= pared to the design allowable of 40 lbs. per foot (Tr. 1857).

See also Paragraphs 150-156, infra.

64.

Mr. Martin, a millright who was empicyed by RCI, testified for the intervenor, MVPP.

While he testified that he conducted certain " inspections" such as the manipulation of the testing fixture and a micrometer, it was clear that I

he was being directly supervised by qualified quality control personnel from RCI who were responsible for the inspection.

l Eis testimony regarding inspection of the blades did not i

i differ in any substantial way from that presented by the Applicants or Staff.

i l

l l

l L

65.

Mr. Martin testified that, while he had no proof, he suspected that the crew he was werking on was laid off because they reported the discovery of specks in the control rods.

Frem the facts in this record this accusation hrs no support.

Millrights are hired from the union hall on a daily, "as needed" basis.

They are not regularly assigned workers at the Zimmer Station.

The work the crew which Mr.

Martin was a part had performed had come to a logical step-ping point and further inspections were not scheduled for seme tine (Tr. 2664-65, 2677-80).

Mr. Martin admitted that he was not in the union hiring hall when the second crew was hired to do the reinspecticns and that, were he there, he could have been selected in accordance with union procedures (Tr. 2471-72).

On the other hand, the responsible corporate officer stated that it was the Applicants' policy to en-courage openness en the Zi==er project and no workers or other individuals bringing problems to the attentien of the Company have been suppressed ner has any centractor er subcontractor been instructed to the contrary.

He stated that it is not only good safety and construction practice, but also good business practice to attack problems at their source (Tr. 2659-61).

A representative of RC: specifically testified that no empicyees were laid off frcm the Zimmer 3

jos as the resu1* of cc=ments they had made (Tr. 2661).

The Scard finds no basis for Mr. Martin's charge that he was

" fired" for reporting the flecks in the centrol rods.

~a

- ~

w w

w

--w-w--

-w w

~

q 66.

A witness for the Applicants testified that while an attempt was made to explain in sc=e detail the operation of the control rods to the =illrights, the prccess becama toc i-involved and cc= plicated (Tr. 2405-06).

It is the conclu-sien of the Scard, based upon Mr. Martin's testimony and his demeanor.as a witness, that ht had an insufficient understand-ing of the design, manufacture and cperation of the_ systems or cc=ponents en which he was working to ecme to any valid conclusions concerning safety =atters.

He appeared to be generally resentful of authority, apparently thought he knew

=cre than his supervisors and did not think any ' raining was necessary for him.

His testi=cny was discounted appropriately.

67.

The 3 card has considered all the evidence of record, including the testimony of Mr. Martin.

The Scard is satisfied that the control rods were designed, constructed, inspected, and will be tested in a manner which assures that they can perform their intended function over their useful l

life.

There has been no ecmpetent testi=cny to the centrary.

The = cst that can be said is that Mr. Martin did not under-stand the nature of the design of these control reds, was unaware of the prototypical testing of this design and the pre-and post-operational testing to be conducted at the Zi==er facil,ity.

Thus the Scard finds that Cententien 15 has no = erit.

Contention 16

. Almost all of the seals on the control rods, which when properly set prevent radioactive water frcm leaking out when the reactor is shut down for maintenance, do not meet mininum specifications for smoothness.

Rough seals cannot set properly, making servicing more difficult and unnecessarily endangering workers and the general public by causing leakage of radioactive water.

68.

Under normal conditions, the primary seal which retains water in the reactor is that created by the mating surfaces of the control rod drive and control rod drive housing flanges.

The seal noted in MVPP Contentien 16 is the velocity limiter to guide tube backseat.

These seals are shown in Applicant's Exhibit 1, FSAR, Section 4.2 in Figures 4. 2-12, 13 and 14.

The only function that these control red seals in question serve is to limit the leakage of water from the reactor vessel during the time when the drive mechanism is disassembled for maintenance (Applicants' Testimony Relating to Contention 16 Control Rod Seals, following Tr. 2209 (hereinafter " Applicants' Centrol Rod Seal Testimony") at 1; Staff Centrol Rod Testimony at S; Tr.

2745-46, 2766-67).

Therefore, these seals would only see the pressure caused by the head of water in the vessel and are not subject Oc cperating pressure.

They serve no other function (Applicants ' Centrol Rod Seal Testimony at 1).

69.

The specilications for the seals, which are AISI Type 304 stainless steel, are a 63 RMS finish and dimen-sional constraints in size.and shape. (Applicants' Control Rod Seal Testimony at 1).

70.

Since these are not perfect metal-to-metal seals, a

small amount of leakage must be expected until the drive is removed at which time a blind flange can be installed on the control rod drive housing, if needed.

This small leakage may create an inconvenience to maintenance personnel during removal and subsequent reinstallation of control rod drives but, in no case, does it. create a safety problem (Staff Control Rod Testimony at 8-9; Tr. 2746, 2763-64, 2765-66).

71.

To determine that the specifications were met, all control rod seals were subjected to visual inspection with a comparator and a dimensional check in a special inspection fixture.

These inspections are performed at Wilmington as a planned part of General Electric's Quality Assurance program (Applicants ' Control Rod Seal Testimony at 2).

72.

After the control rods were shipped to the site, the seals were inspected for possible damage in shipment (Tr. 2742).

The visual inspection was conducted with a comparator (pi. ).

One control rod was returned to General Electric and rep. aced because of a scratch across the seal surface.

All control rod seals installed at the Zinmer reactor meet design specifications for operation (Appli-Contbol Rod Seal Testimony at 2; Staff Control Rod cants' Testimony at 8).

There was no requirement imposed by the

{

General Electric Company, the supplier of the seals, that they be inspected at all at the site, let alone with a comparator (Tr. 2923).

The RCI inspection form did not re-quire checking the seals with a comparator (Attachment B to Staff Control Rod Testimony).

Thus, inspection of the seals was not specified as a safety requirement -(Tr. 2923).

In any event, it would require a gross deformity in the seals to create any sort of problem (Tr. 2925).

Even in that case, other elements of the control rods would prevent a maximum outflow of water (I_d. ).

73.

Mr. Martin testified on behalf of the intervenors, MVPP.

Boiled down to the essentials, Mr. Martin thought the specified roughness of the seal was too great to permit it to meet its design function (Tr. 2798, 2851).

Apparently, he thought that the seal had to be " polished" to work ade-quately (Tr. 2798, 2841, 2851).

However, Mr. Martin had no basis for his conclusion; there is nothing in his background which would indicate that he was an expert with regard to control rod seal design such that the Board could give chis unsupported assertion any weight.

Mr. Martin testified that none of the seals that he inspected met specifications (Tr.

2803).

It is stretching credulity beyond any reasonable limit to say that none of the ecals met specifications when they had been independently checked at the factory and at

1

~

l '

4 i

the site because it would imply that all had been falsely or -

erroneously passed.

There is no reason to suspect that the roughness. changed from after manufacture to field inspection (Tr. 2841-42).

The Board's view of this matter is rein-forced by the fact that NRC inspectors looked at the seals on the six control blades inspected on April 10, 1979, and found them to be satisfactory (Staff Control Rod Testimony at 8).

74.

From the Board's perspective, Mr. Martin had a predetermined misconception that the seal had to be polished, and, while he admitted he did not have the credentials to know the purpose or operation of the seal (Tr. 2798, 2841),

he continued to cling to his position that the design of the

seal, i.e.,

surface finish, was inadequate.

Furthermore, Mr. Martin could not even identify the seal when a drawing was presented to him at the hearing (Tr. 28 27, 2829).

Mr.

Martin admitted that he did not know that the seal was designed to leak until the NRC inspector told him ('tr.

2871).

75.

In fact, Mr. Martin admitted that his instructions were consistent during the entire inspection process were to check for scratches, nicks, etc. and at no time was he told to use a comparator as a roughness check (Tr. 2838-39, 2856, 2858).

The' Board's observations regarding Mr. Martin stated in 166, supra are relevant here.

The Board is totally un-impressed with his testimony and has discounted it completely.

48 -

i 6.

C ns4e-e 4 n.,.,

.w...e e,J.4 4.e..

e,. w...e.= a e

.e.4..4 s

.w.a.

the centrol red seals in questien have been desi ned and v

. a.,e...ac...

e2.,.,.

ee.c.

w...e.4 4 n,,.a e.

.s.,.c 4 c...

.w.e,ca e a

.~

r 4 4 m. A s.tNP.3 Cc..~.e.. 4.c..

1 "o

.m be.a.4. w e.t...e 4.

Cententien 17 I' ire insulation aterial which is being used to protect the cables in the cable trays frem fire is inadec.uate

., ec

.w..e ca.x.e s

.4..

.4,w.

e c

.w...e

.e e

cable tray installation design and cable trav icad.

The tests of the

.#.i - a.d.. s..' a *..i -.. a.e..i a.'. e. e.i.

.-c r..' v.

r e

,e.'.c..ed

. '.. "..'.a. c..d.'..' c. s w.*..'..". w.'.'.'

exist durine. c=.eratien were not adequat.elv.

s.i."*.'.'.' a *.' e A.

77.

The Applicants' witness presenting testi=cny with regard Oc IUPP Contention 17 was Mr. Melvin S. Abrams, an ackncwledged expert in the testing cf fire resistant aterials

( n. : i d a..i. c.#.v.e.v.4.. S. n'.'. ar.s,

.'.'.,w.'.3.~ "..

. e.' e' a.

1-2, o..

34.e. ".es 4

...v c#. G. ec, w. ;" n'.

..a... s c..,

e.-

.V.. C.".., a..d a

s

....,.u e. m. :a es nen,a a.t C,,.. e.. ~. 4 c

,=c.

9-

...i e,

na.,wwo., as n

. 4.- a.

B a.~..' e.

.# ^ - Ca"..l e ".. a v. s # o.'.' cw.3

.~3 "... 3 2,*,*

(.".e. e.i..a.#.e.-

" Staff.rire Prcrection Cesti=cnv.") at 7-5).

Messrs. Cctra aa c

a

., n--1.4 1

.s, e

.4

.,sses,..e e a.,s.,.

r:

~w a.

well qualified.

(S tate =ent of Professicnal Qualifications, nu no,e.-.

=. cw-.,

. -, e

..ny.4

.n,,

3.,.}.

..u.g

= n,g a g., g s., e g.a.

.n 43 e.e

. ".e S =.#.# ' s a.. e.'.c be ae.'.'

.a.' i.#.4 a d.

( S. =.#.# ?.'. e

'.--,.e ~4.~.

z.

a s

~4.t^..v a,.' - 7 ).

.v.v P o,

".e w-..", e..". a..d,,~. e s e..a d, w.,

w.3..e s s e s "w.'.."..- a. ; w=. -

d ~~

C.. a....'....'..

w

__ 78.

With regard to assuring that an adequate level of fire protection is provided, the principal concern is in areas where wiring and equipment serve safety equipment and could be subject to damage from a single fire incident.

In assuring that an adequate level of fire protection is achieved, the NRC uses the defense in depth concept which recognizes that no single echelon of fire safety in and of itself =ay be adequate to protect nuclear plants and there-fore a number of different measures regarding fire prevention, fire detection, fire protection and fire supression are taken.

In the situation of cable trays, the location of each tray to the other, the location of trays within the space, the separation between redundant divisions, the presence of materials and equipment creating a fire exposure, the accessibility of the space for firefighting, the presence of fire detection and fire suppression equipment, and other factors are considered in determining whether additional protective measures, such as fire barriers or insulation are required, and if so, what those additional protective mea-sures should be.

These determinations are made by the NRC experts-who review and inspect the facility in detail utiliz-ing recognized standards and guidance (Staff Fire Protection Testimony at 1-5, 6-8; Tr. 3369-71).

79.

Based upon NRC review, the Applicants have agreed to the installation of fire barriers, protective insulation, l

autcmatic sprinklers, or combinations thereof in those places recc= mended by the Staff for additional protection.

The Applicants preposed to use a ceramic fiber blanket thermal insulation material manufactured by the Babcock and Wilcox Cc=pany under the trademark name "Kaowool" as a protective insulation material to be wrapped in a specified manner around selected cable trays and conducted tests to show its adequacy for the purpose (Staff Fire Protection Testimony at 8; Appl. Exh. 7A at 4 and Appendix A.2).

80.

Although time periods required by the NRC for fire

, protection of cable trays vary frem 30 to 60 to 90 minutes based on location, nearby combustibles, ceiling heights, room dimensions, etc., Applicants will coccen all cable trays requiring protection with three one-inch layers of Kaowcol, giving each tray a 90 minute rating (Affidavit of Robert E.

Cotta, following Tr. 3414 at 2-3; Tr. 3245-46, 3377-18, 3425).

The 90 minute fire rating was provided for extreme conservatism inasmuch as the Staff has concluded that it would not take more than 15 minutes to detect and extinguish a fire at Zimmer (Tr. 3278, 3378).

81.

To qualify Kacwcol wrapped trays, the Applicants rely on a test conducted by the Portland Ce=ent Association at Construct,1cn Technology Laboratories ("CTL") on June 6, 1979.

Four cable tray specimens consisting of 16 foot-long sections with 40% fill of IPR-insulated, Hypalon jacketed IEEE-383 grade seven conductor control cables similar in type to those used at Zimmer were placed randomly in the trays (Applicants' Exh. 7A at 1: Tr. 3420-22; Affidavit of Robert E. Cotta following Tr. 3414 at 2).

The particular cable configuration was chosen as the most susceptible to an outside fire, with the result that other cables at Zimmer would be expected to achieve even better results (Tr. 3421).

i 82.

Cable tray specimens were exposed to the standard time-temperature fire exposure of ASTM E119 (Applicants' Exh. 7A at 2).

Eight shielded thermocouples protected in accordance with the requirements of ASTM were used to mea-i sure and control furnace atmosphere temperatures (pa. at 13).

Average furnace atmosphere temperature was controlled with only a 1.5% variation frem the standard time-temperature curve throughout the test (pi. at 14).

The particular time i

temperature standard of E-119 is more severe than conditions i

possible during a fire at Zi==er (Tr. 3280-81, 3301).

The severity is to bound any and all reasonable errors that could be implicit in the model (Tr. 3281).

83.

The CTL test was also more severe than a spot fire 1

at Zimmer since it involved continued complete engulfment and possible impingement of the flame on the bottom of the lower two cable trays (Tr. 3316, 3315-16).

The test cable l

trays were wrapped in a manner identical to the installation procedure at the Station (App. Exh. 7A at 8, Appendix A and f

Figures 1-14; Tr. 3316, Affidavit of Robert E. Cotta at 2).

The position of the trays was to simulate to the extent possible in the limited space available in the furnace, the configuration of trays at Zimmer (Tr. 3451-57).

A change in spacing of the trays would not have had any significant changes in the results of the test (Tr. 3456).

If only two trays were tested, the test would still be valid but would be less severe because of the positioning of the trays in relation to the burners (Tr. 3449-51).

84.

The testing of horizontal cable trays is also suffi-cient ce qualify a vertical cable-tray since a vertical tray would actually be less exposed than a horizontal tray sus-pended above the fire (Tr. 3314-16).

85.

Electrical continuity of 15 cables at the bottom sides, top and middle of each tray was monitored by ob-serving lamps in a panel connected to 120 volts that were wired to conductors in each cable.

The circuit was designed l

to indicate short circuits from the outer conductors to the center conductor within each cable (Appl. Exh. 7A at 1, 8,

12).

86.

Prior to the start of the fire test, all 60 cir-cuits were meggered and no short circuits were found.

The light panel also indicated a lack of short circuits at the start of the tests (][ci. at 14).

The cables which were moni+ored were those in positions known to fall first (Tr.

1 3301-94).

t 87.

The test proceeded without incida.nt for 90. minutes.

During that time no short circuits occurred (Appl. Exh. 7A at 15).

Af ter the test period had been completed, at 94 minutes, a short circuit was indicated for one cable (pd. ).

As a result of the test, Kaowool was qualified as a fire thermal barrier between the enclosed cable tray system and external area of exposure fire for the arrangement used during the testing program and the 90 minutes required by the Staff (Staff Fire Protection Testimony at 8-9; SER Supp.. -

No. 1-Zimmer Facility; Letter to Greg Harrison, Division of Systems Safety, NRC, from Bert M. Cohn, Gage-Babcock &

Associates, both following Tr. 3244; Tr. 3250-53, 3579).

88.

MVPP asserted that because the cables in the trays were net energized, this somehow invalidated the test.

How-ever, the Applicants testified that were the cables energized there would be no significant effect on the results.

The Applicants have imposed a heat generation limitation on cable trays wrapped in Kaowool of 13 watts per foot ir-respective of whether there is power or control cable present (Tr. 3422, 3424-25, 3560-62, 3599).

Thus, calcu-lating the internal heat generation asseming this maximum value and comparing it to the heat conducted from the ex-tornal fire through the Kaowool during the test, it was t

conservatively determined that the test period would be at the most changed by approximately 1 minute 20 seconds 1

1

, 1 1

(Tr. 3422-23).

Since the first cable failure occurred at 94 minutes, the results of the tests would not be affected.

89.

MVPP alleged that the fill of the cable tray would make some difference in the results.

However, the uncon-tradicted testimony is that the effect of the amount of fill would be negligible (Tr. 3374-76, 3424, 3602-06).

In fact, additional fill may be semewhat advantageous (Tr. 3424).

In addition, both the Applicants and Staff witnesses testified that the test run by CTL need not be repeated because variance among tests would be small and not significant frc=

a fire protection engineering standpoint (Tr. 3384-85, 3486-88).

Looking at the matter from a sc=ewhat different perspective, the conservatism in these tests is based upon the extreme heat input into the test furnace ccmpared to any fire at tne plant in the protected areas and the fact that the test period of 90 minutes is significantly greater than the length of time a real fire could burn in these areas at Zi=mer (Tr. 3280, 3301, 3316).

90.

With regard to another issue related to fire pro-l tection of cable trays, the Applicants testified that the design of the Station utilizes concrete curbs around pene-traticus of floors through which cable trays are routed such that any fla=mable or other liquids spilled on a floor cannot cot :act a vertical cable tray or penetrate into the Kaowcol cocoon.

In addition, when Kaowool butts to a flocr i

l L

ceiling or wall, a qualified fire retardant sealant will be used to further avent penetration of any fla-mable liquid (Affidavit of Rober'. E. Cotta at 3).

91.

The ' petus for such a design was the test con-ducted under the auspices of Sandia Laboratories at Undex-writers Laboratories on September 15, 1978, reported in NUREG/CR-0596, A Preliminary Report en Fire Protection.

This test was to demonstrate the effectiveness of Kaowool and autcmatic sprinklers in protecting cables in vertical cable trays.

The fuel, 2 gal. of a fla==able liquid (heptane),

was poured on the ficer, and some of it seeped under and through the Kaowool which was wrapped around the vertical cable tray.

Because of this, sc=e of the heptane burned within and inside the Kacwool blanket and damaged sc=e of the electrical cables.

The Kacwcol is totally nonce =bustible (cc= posed primarily of silica and alumina cc= pounds [SiO2 and A1 0 ]), cannot burn, and did not contribute to the 23 fire.

The effectiveness of this =aterial as a fire protec-i tive insulation was not challenged by this test, and it did not fail.

The Staff has determined that the Applicants'

=easures to preclude an occurrence of this type are adequate (Staf f Fire Protection Testi=cny at 9-10; Tr. 3345-46).

The Board concurs.

9 92.

Based upon the evidence of record, the Board finds that Kaowool, the fire insulation material used to protect

1 cables in cable trays in the configuration proposed is adequate, considering the cable and cable tray design and the other fire protection features of the facility.

The Board finds the test which the Applicants rely upon to qualify Kaowool to have been properly performed and the results to be acceptable.

The Board therefore finds no merit in MVPP Contention 17.

Contention 13 The equipment used in the construc-tion and operation of the plant will be excessively costly and, in effect, beycnd the financial capability of Applicants.

Applicants are financially unqualified to operate the plant be-cause of esc &lating costs.

93.

This contention has been broken into its consti-tuent parts and each part treated separately.

The Board j

will first consider the portion of the contention dealing with the costs related to completion of tae construction of the facility and the question which it raised sua sponte regarding additional capital costs resulting from the TliI i

accident.

It will then consider the qualification of the Applicants to operate and decommission the Zimmer facility.

Construction Costs 94.

The question of the financial qualifications of an applicant to construct a nuclear power station is a matter for determination at the construction permit stage, 10 C.F.R. 550.33 (f) and Public Service Company of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-78-1, 7 NRC 1, 8 (January 6, 1978).

Such finding has already been made in this docket (L3P-72-27, 5 AIC 133, 136 (1972)).

The finding to be made by this Licensing Board at the operating license stage is set forth in 50.33 (f), to wit:

If the application is for an operat-ing-license, such information shall show that the applicant possesses of has reason-able assurance of obtaining.the funds necessary to cover the estimated costs of operation.

. plus the estimated costs of permanently shutting the facility down and maintaining it in a safe con-dition.

95.

Inasmuch as the Board derives its authority from the Commission Notice of Hearing, a convincing argument can be made that this Board is precluded from reexamining the Commission's findings at the construction permit stage.

The fact that the construction costs may have risen does not change this result.

It is common knowledge that costs of construction of nuclear power plants have risen rapidly for a number of reasons and nothing has been shown to make the l

Board believe that the Zinmer facility is atypical.

In any event, the Board, for completeness of the record, has set l

forth herein its findings regarding the financial qualifi-cationa to ccmplete construction of the facility.

96.

The total estimated, unexpended costs (including

(

unexpended capital costs associated with NRC requirements arising from the TMI accident exclusive of AFUDC) to com-

. plete the constructier. of the Zimmer Station is $204 million.

Of these costs, S81.4 million represents CG&E's share.

Of this amount, additional AFUDC will amount to $32.1 million and the balance of $49.3 million represents additional money that will have to be raised by CG&E (Appl. Exh. 8, Response-to Question 3).

97.

C&SOE's share of these costs represents S57.1 million.

Additional AFUDC will amount to $22 million and the balance of $35.1 million represents additonal money that will have to be raised (Ed.).

98.

DP&L's share of these costs is S65.5 million.

Approximately $46 million of the 565.5 million will have to be raised with the remainder being non-cash AFUDC (p!.).

99.

Construction costs for Zimmer Station are included in the everall requirements for capital and have been or will be financed as a part of the Applicants' overall needs.

In 1980, CG&E issued 500,000 shares of 10.20% series S100 par value preferred stock, an additional 3.4 million shares I

of common stock at a price of S16.125 per share, and $100 l

l million of 12% first mortgage bonds to finance part of its construction program including Zimmer Station.

The issuance of additional cc= mon stock through the Employee Incentive Thrift Plan, Employee Stock Ownership Plan and Dividend Reinvestment and Stock Purchase Plan raised approximately l

S14 million in 1980 and is expected to raise S16 million in

=_.

l 1981.

In January, 1981, CG&E issued 300,000 shares of 12.52% series $100 par value preferred stock.

Presently, CG&E is raising capital through the issuance of short-term debt obligations at interest rates ranging from 17 7/8% to 20 1/2% (Id.).

100.

In 1980, C&SOE ' issued $80 million of 13 5/8% first mortgage bonds, $30 million of which was new capital, and received a $30 million capital contribution from its parent company, American Electric Power Company, Inc. ("AEP") to finance part of its construction program including-Zimmer Station (Id_. ).

101.

For DP&L, construction costs for Zimmer Station are included in the overall requirements for capital and have been financed as a part of that company's overall needs (Id.).

102.

Determination of future financings for the three co=panies are subject to several factors, including the l

amount and timing of rate increases, internal generation of i

funds, and the course of construction program of each t

company.

Present estimates indicate that CG&E will sell t

(

l approximately 2,500,000 shares of common stock in the first

' half cf 1981 and will sell debt securities later in the year.

It is presently expected that any additional capital which may be' required in 1981 by CG&E would be provided from short-term bank loans or the issuance of commercial paper.

1 l

. Prices and te==s of these securities would be determined by the financial =arket at the time of the sale (M. ).

103.

The record indicates that C&SOE will sell apprcxi-mately 560 million of first =ortgage bonds in the first half of 1981 and will receive a 540 million capital contribution frc= AEP sc=etime during the year.

It presently is expected that any additional capital which may be required in 1981 would be provided frc= short-term bank loans.

Prices and terms of there securities would be determined by the finan-cial market at the time of the sale (21.).

104.

DP&L's future needs will be fulfilled by the is-suance of varying types and amounts of securities, including debt, cc==cn and preferred equity, leasing arrangements, and, in the interi=, short-ter= borrowings.

The ti=ing, accunt, and type of specific financings has not been deter-mined and is subject to several facters, including the a= cunt and timing of rate increases, the a= cunt of internally generated funds, market conditions and the a= cunt of the total construction program (M. ).

105.

The unexpended costs to ec=plete construction of Zi==er will be incurred during 1981 and 1982.

CG&E's share of these costs, S81.4 =illion cc= pares to the Cc=pany'c total estimated construction costs of S411 million for 1981 and 1982.

Ier these years, costs to cc=plete Zi==er Station will represent approximately 19.8% of total estimated construction costs (Id.).

._ __ 106.

C&SOE's share of remaining construction costs during 1981 and 1982 is $57.1 million which compares to the Company's total estimaced construction costs of $302 million for 1981 and 1982.

For these years, costs to complete Zimmer Station will represent approximately 18.9% of total estimated construction costs (Id.).

107.

During 1981 and 1982, DP&L's total estimated con-struction_ costs are $521 million.

Therefore, the unexpended costs will represent about 12.6% of the overall construction budcat for the period involved (Id.).

108.

Considering the Applicaurs' ability to finance the capital costs of the Zimmer Station, their bond ratings, their record of obtaining rate relief, and in view of the lack of any evidence to the contrary, the Board finds that the Applicants have the financial qualifications to complete construction of the Station.

TMI Capital Costs l

109.

As a result of the TMI accident, the NRC imposed i

i requirements with regard to additional training, equipment, l

systems, structures and facilities, including those relating to emergency planning, for facilities such as Zi=mer.

The Board asked that it be informed of the specific capital e its to be expended by these Applicants to fulfill NRC requirements.

This information is provided in Applicants' Exhibit 8, Response to Question 1.

A further breakdown of

= _ _

h these costs were given during the proceeding (Tr. 4124-4133,

~4200-03, 4237-41, 4287-88).

Included in the S30 million total TMI capital costs was an approximate 5% contingency fee.

Since certain equipment hasnot;beenprocuredand total agreement has not been reached with all government I

agencies regarding emergency planning, certain of these figures represent best estimates.

As an example, witnesses for the Applicants stated that costs associated with develop-ment of the emergency plan could increase as an upper limit by $2 million.

On the other hand, construction of the Technical Support Center was proceeding on the basis of detailed estimates and drawings (Tr. 424 9).

Approximately half of the items are proceeding on a similar basis (Tr.

4132).

110.

Inasmuch as the estimatas appear reasonable, con-sidering the contingency added, and giving due allowance fo:

possible added costs and viewing the TMI costs against the total capital costs of the facility and the construction budgets of the three ccmpanies, and their proven ability to finance the project, the Board concludes that there is reasonable assurance that from a financial viewpoint the TMI items can be constructed (Appl. Exh.

8, Response to Question 2).

Costs of Operation 111.

The Applicants have provided costs of operating the facility in accordance with 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix C in

63 -

Appl. Exh. 7, Response to Question 1.A.

The figures include nuclear fuel expense, operating and maintenance expense, taxes and return on investment.

A return on investment of 10.52% was used which represents a weighted average of the present return of the three owners (Tr. 4270-71).

The rate of return would be expected to rise in the future (Tr.

4271).

Included in the fuel expense is an allowance, based upon the latest Department of Energy estimates for disposal of the spent fuel (Tr. 4034-35).

The depreciation expense category includes an allowance for decommissioning costs (Tr. 3679).

The cost of servicing the debt associated with the financing of the construction of the Station is included in the return figures (Tr. 3679-81).

112.

The costs of operation of the facility would be recovered from the ratepayers of the three companies (Tr.

4219-20).

That portion of the costs of Zi=mer not already included in the rate base would be included in the rate base of the three companies by ratemaking proceedings, l

probably in 1983 (Tr. 4220,.4233).

With regard to these three utilities, the Public Utility Commission of Ohio

(" PUCO" ) has acted favorably in each of the ratemaking 1

I proceedings brought before them (See, e.c.,

Tr. 4231 and Appl. Exh. 7, Response to Question 5.b.).

When a request for emergenc'y rate relief was requested, PUCO has acted on i

an expedited basis (Tr. 4231).

The three companies have in the past demonstrated an improved and improving financial I

I i

picture, due in part to the actions of PUCO (Tr. 4062; 4065-66; 4075-76; 4085; 4159-60; 4221-22; 4276).

Based upon these factors and the evaluation of the Staff, the Board finds that the standard of reasonable assurance set forth in 1

P theCcnjmission'srulesandregulationshasbeenmet.

Decommissionine 113.

The Applicants' plans for decommissioning are based upon the Atomic Industrial Forum

(" AIF") report published in Ncvember, 1376, entitled, "An Engineering Evaluation of Nuclear Power Reactor Decommissioning Alternatives."

This study provided cost esuimates in 1975 dollars for several decc=missioning alternatives for BWR plants of both 1160 MWe and 550 MWe sizes.

This study utilized previous decc= mission-ing experience in developing the medes and costs of decem-missicning (Appl. Exh.

7, Response to Questions 2 and 3 at 1: Tr. 4009).

In plannine for decc=missioning of the Zi=mer Station, the Applicants selected the "entemhment" mode which censists of te=porarily entombing the facility for a cooling period of about 104 years, followed by dismantling and removal of the structures which were radioactive at the end l

of life of the facility.

It was assumed that a security force will be required to guard the entombed facility for the 104 year cooling period (Appl. Exh.

7, Response to Questions 2 and 3 at 1).

The methodology utilized in the AIF study was found to be still valid today (Tr. 4003).

Temporary entembment has already been utilized in decem-i i

i 1

missioning nuclear reactors (Tr. 4008).

The selected mode minimizes occupational exposure and the environmental impact (Tr. 4026).

114.

There are four components of total decommission $ng cost:

(1) cost of prompt dismantling and removing non-radioactive structures at the end of the 33 year life; and (2) initial' entombment cost; (3) annual surveillance and maintenance costs for the next 104 years; and (4) cost of dismantling and removing remaining structures at the end of the 104 year cooling period.

This final step includes the final disposal of structures as well as their dismantling and removal (Tr. 4022-23).

No further expenses are incurred after this final dismantling / removal.

The AIF estimates for these four components for an 1160 MWe HWR and for a 550 MWe SWR were interpolated between to obtain the estimates for the 800 NWe Zimmer plant (Appl. Exh.

7, Response to Questions 2 and 3 at 1; Tr. 3638).

Credit for the value of the land r

after the decommissioning project is complete was also taken into account.

The estimate for decommissioning the Zimmer Station is $35.88 million in 1983 dollars (App. Exh.

7, Response to Questions 2 and 3, Table I).

A 6% annual infla-tion rate was utilized from 1975 through 1979.

A 6.5%

annual inflation rate has been used after 1979 in calculat-ing the cost in 1983 dollars (pd. at 2).

l i

115.

During the course of the hearing it was noted that Battelle Me=crial Institute had prepared for the NRC a study regarding the decommissioning of a boiling water reactor (NUREG/CR-0672) (Testimeny of Michael L. Karlowicz, Jr. Ad-dressing the Financial Qualifications of The Cincinnati Gas and Electric Company, Columbus &. Southern Ohio Electric Company and The Dayton Power & Light Cc=pany to Operate the Zi==er Facility, following Tr. 4428-4429 (hereinafter "Karlcwic: Testimony") at 11).

116.

The Staff utilized costs derived frc= the Battelle study in evaluating decc=missioning costs tKaricwic: Testi-many at 10-11, 18-20).

The study utilized a 100 year period between initial entemb=ent and the starting of dis-

=antlement.

For the initial entemb=ent and deferred dis-mantle =ent decc==issicning nethod, which apprcaches the Applicants' proposed methed most cicsely, the cost used by the Staff was $64.5 millien (pi. at 11).

According tt the Staff, this would, utilizing its methodology, translate into an annual total sinking fund, payment of S4.5 millien to be split a=cng the three owners (M. at 19-201.

117.

The Applicants have cc= pared cost estimates and other aspects cf the AIF and Ecttelle studies and have concluded that the AIF study is still the best basis for analysis (Tr'. 4616, 4632-33).

Fcr example, the Battelle study allowed six years for the initial entemh=ent while the

i l

l AIF study allows a 34 month period.

The difference is based upon more decontamination work, including cutting, packaging and shipment of radioactive material offsite associated with the Battelle study, leading to additional administrative and rental cos s as well as direct costs, as well as a number of other factors (Tr. 4617-18).

The Applicants testified that the AIF Study methodology is also better environmentally because it reduces the occupational dose (Tr. 4626-29, 4630-31).

The AIF approach is based upon the physical fact that if left in place, the radiation on certain systems will decay down to a point, after 104 years, that conventional techniques may be used for demolition and the occupational exposures would be reduced (Tr. 4583-34).

The Board finds that the estimates utilized by the Applicants in analyzing decommissioning costs to be reasonable.

118.

On cross-examination, counsel for ZAC-ZACK attempted to demonstrate some inconsistency between estimates of de-commissioning costs appearing in the present testimony and i

l those previously found in the Staff's Safety Evaluation i

(Appl. Exh.

9, for identification).

owever, Applicants' d

witnesses were able to reconcile these figures.

The scope of the original estimate was limited to the dismantlement of structures and systems over and above those found at an equivalent fossil plant.

This basis has now been changed to t

allow the sinking fund estimate to be based upon the l

i

,. entire costs of decc==issioning the plant (Tr. 4600-02).

Considering this and utilizing the same base year, there does not appear to be a discrepancy (pi. ).

119.

The 6.5% inflation rate projection utilized by the Applicants is conservative considering past experience and projections utilized by the NRC itself (Tr. 4 013 ).

Between 1965 and 1980, the Consumer Price Index rose at a cc=peunded average rate of 6.3% a year.

In cc=parisen, the NRC utilized an inflation rate of 6.2% per year between 1980 and 1990, and

5. 6 % per year between 1990 and 2017 (Id.).

The Applicants' expert witness termed the rate utilized as ultracenservative, tending to increase the projected annual fund payment (ld. ).

The Applicants' expert wicnesses also testified it was not proper to project short term current inflatien rates into the future inasmuch as, based upon historical data, they appeared to be an aberration (Tr. 4017).

120.

Intervencrs would apply the same rate of escalation of costs of construction of nuclear power plants to costs of decc==issiening.

Ecwever, such approach is invalid.

The increased costs of construction of a nuclear plant are associated not only with escalation, but with interest en investment, changes in scope and increased design require-

=ents (Tr. 4004).

Such experience has no relevance to decc=rissioning which is better defined and =cre limited in scope (tr. 4012).

In fact, even if an examination of the ecst studies for construction of the Zi==er Station is made,

_,,-4 t-=

"p.w--+

"'h considering the time frames for operation and the original secpe of the esti=ates, they were not far in error (Tr.

4010, 4583-84).

Thus, the Scard. finds no valid basis for attempting to correlate the rise in criginal ccnstruction costs with decc==issioning costs (Tr. 4583-84).

In fact, inas=uch as other plants would be scheduled to be decccmissioned prior to Zimmar, the efficiency of the operation would be expe.cted to i=preve and the costs thereby reduced (Tr.

4005).

Such credit was not taken in est -ating costs.

4 121.

The Applicants' witnesses freely agreed that it is not possible to predict the inflation rate in the future and it may rise er fall (Tr. 4021-22).

Based upon historical data and the fact that investors would not centinue to invest en a rate 10wer than the inflation rate, the inflation rate may not be locked at in isolation.

It must be reviewed in conjunction with the assu=ed earning rate en the fund (Tr. 4017-18, 4573-75).

Fcr example, the Applicants used a tax free rate of return of 6.0% associated with the 6.5%

inflation rate.

Similarly, the Applicants testified an inflation rate of 8 % should be correlated with a tax free rate of return of 7.'.t.

Changing these two assc=ptions only, the calculated annual payment was S4,766,005 (Tr. 4047-48). For a 10% inflation rate and a correlated 9.2% tax free earning

~

rate, the annual contribution is $8,886,100 (Tr. 4049).

These figures were not advanced by the Applicants as realistic inflation rates or return rates upon which to determine the sinking fund payment, but merely to illustrate the error in Dr. Estes' testimony.

The Board' views such values as an indication of the gross overstatement of sinking fund payments proposed by the witness for MVPP, Dr. Estes (up to S123 million per year) who ignored this correlation completely.

122.

The companies presently plan on obtaining the funds required for decommissioning the plant by collecting from their customers through annual depreciation charges during the service life of the facility amounts which will be deposited with a trustee (Tr. 3679-80).

The sum of the amounts so deposited plus earnings thereon would be adequate to pay the decommissioning costs.

Based on a 6.5% annual inflation rate from 1983 through the final dismantling /

removal of remaining structures in the year 2120, and a 6%

tax-free interest rate on funds deposited with the decommis-sioning trustee, the annual payments to the decommissioning i

trustee over the 33 year plant life required to provide the necessary funds for each of the four components of decommis-sioning is $3.55 million dollars (Appl. Exh. 7 Response to Questions 2 and 3, Table II).

123.

The S3.55 million payment is determined by looking at the four cost components of decommissioning as determined in 1983 dollars (Exh.

7, Response to Questions 2 and 3, Table I) and utilizing basic, well accepted, financial and l

I

. engineering ecenc=ics =ethods to determine the annual pay-ments.

The first two ec=ponents, prc=pt dis =antling and ente =bment, will be acec=plished at the end of useful lif.e assumed to be 33 years.

Thus the 1953 costs have to be escalated into 2016 dellar costs utilizing an inflation rate t

of 6.5%.

Then utilizing a sinking fund equation, the annual contributien invested at 6% which would produce these a= cunts is calculated (See Table II, cc=penents (a) and (b)).

The third cc=penent, ' the annual cost f or surveillance and maintenance (Table I, cc=penent (C) divided by 104) is first escalated to the end cf the useful life cf the facility.

Next the fund at the end of useful life which will fund these m.nual payments considering a 6.5% inflation and an invest =ent ra :e of 6% is dete.. ined.

The annual pa"=ents to 1

2 accumulate this fund at the end of the 33 year life is determined as for the first two elements.

The fourth 4

element, dis =antling costs, are escalated for 137 years (33 year useful life plus 104 years cf cooling) at 6.5%.

Then 1,

the fund which when invested at the end of useful life at 6i to produce this c= cunt is determined.

The annual payments which would produce this fund is determined.

The land value is determined in a similar =anner, but it is a credit.

The four cc=penents are su==ed to product the 53.55 million I

annual pay =ent (Exh. 7, Respense to Questions 2 and 3; Tr.

4019-21).

Dr. Estes, a witness for MVPP used the same methodology and the basic algorithm does not appear to be in dispute.

124.

Dr. Estes, an accountant, testified on behalf of the MVPP with regard to decommissioning costs.

He candidly admitted that he was not an expert with regard to nuclear

. power decommissioning (Tr. 44 03, 4350), the design of the Zimmer Station (Tr. 4393-94) and economic cycles (Tr. 4317).

While, as noted above, his computations sere arithmetically correct, the Board substantially discounted his testimony because of his admitted lack of expertise, his inability to justify in terms of economic reality his assumptions and because of his seeming bias and prejudice as demonstrated by his attempt to exaggerate the costs of decc=missioning to the residential customers of the Applicants.

If not inten-tional, it ir licated his complete lack of understanding of i

l utility operation, financing practices, and economics.

l 125.

The calculations presented by Dr. Estes with regard to the effect of Zinmer decommissioning costs on residential customers are simply in error.

He assumed that residential customers of the three companies utilized 7000 Kw hrs annually, i

not based upon actual experience of the Applicants, but upon statistics from other distant utilities 9.nd in some part upon his own electrical usage in Wichita, Kansas (Tr. 4 419-21).

He then determined a per kilowatt hour cost for decem-l l

1 73 i

1 missioning and multiplied this by 7000 Kw hr per residential customer and deemed this to be the cost to customers.

126.

The error in this calculation can be viewed in a number of ways.

If the number of residential customera of the Applicants were multiplied by Dr. Estes' calculated annual charge, it would far exceed the sinking fund payment of $3.588 million.

The effect of the calculation would be to assume that Zimmer's output is many times its rated capacity.

Looked at another way, inasmuch as Zimmer supplies approximately 8% of the Applicants' capacity, and it is not possible to identify where consumed electricity has been generated, the charges calculated by Zimmer should be multiplied by that factor (Tr. 4329-30).

Viewed from still a different perspective, Dr. Este; has artificially attributed a severe penalty to Zimmer without recognizing the 1cuer operating costs associated with it.

Viewed in any light, Dr. Estes' work is simply erroneous.

He himself admitted the error during the hearing (Tr. 4332-33, 4421-).

127.

During the hearing,.Dr. Estes admitted that there was a correlation between the inflation rate and the rate of return on earnings although his prefiled testimony increased the interest rate while keeping the earnings rate constant (Tr. 4318-20), thereby shedding doubt on his entire testimony.

While he tried to rehabilitate himself by stating that the values in his testimony represented after tax yields based m--T-y ? ry4w P

y

g e i v.

e-peoy--

m,r-we+y-evw----w

-tw-+<wavr=+-

---4~rgg-Mn - g er-g-t-4-++

g

-m?--ew-'-pu -g w-r

--w-w y

v- ' -vr-M

- +

-- upon a pretax yield of 2% above the inflation rate with an effective tax rate of 40%, this does not represent a realistic-case (Tr. 4322, 4338, 4575).

Dr. Estes stated he was not aware of returns on municipal bonds and therefore it was not possible for him to come to a valid conclusion regarding investment choices for the sinking fund (Tr. 433 9).

128.

The Applicants' expert witnesses demonstrated why Dr. Estes' calculations showing a gross deficiency in the Applicants' accumulated decommissioning fund was in error.

They showed that for a variety of realistic assumptions there would be a surplus abcve that predicted by Dr. Estes (Tr. 4578).

The first example was with the investment rate equaling the inflation rate.

Such assumptions are justified based upcn the investment experience that investors will not accept too low a return for any sustained period (Tr. 4575).

The witnesses testified that no trustee would invest in taxable securities when tax free bonds will have a greater yield (pi. ).

Thus the Applicants examined the fund built up i

using a 9.61% rate for tax free bonds available in November 1980 (Tr. 4576).

A further example yielded an af ter-tax yield of 11.77% when preferred stocks were invested (Tr.

4576-78).

As a final example, if the IRS gave tax free status to such funds, presently available investments at 15%

would accumu' late a large surplus (Tr. 4578).

r e-

,-.---w-,,n

~,w

-,,e

,,r,-n-,,-,,-r,r-<,,--

,-,--v--,,,v

,-,.e------

-an r-n-

- -, - - -,, +

129.

While inflation and earnings rates cannot be pre-dicted into the future, the Board finds that the approach utilized by the Applicants for developing the sinking fund payments to be a reasonable one.

The fund trust will be an institutional fiduciary who will be constantly monitoring the investments to assure the greatest return (Tr. 4606, 4613-14), a goal in which even Dr. Estes concurs (Tr. 4395, 4397).

Meanwhile, the Company would be reviewing the fund payments and adjusting them periodically to take into ac-count changes in a number of areas, e.g.,

to reflect new or different technology and changes in service life and to assure that the necessary fund is being accumulated (Tr.

4022, 4014, 4257-58, 4579, 4619).

Inasmuch as the funds for deccmmissioning would be part of the rate =aking pro-ceedings, the PUCO would monitor and regulate contributions tc the decc==issioning fund (Tr. 4258, 4613-15).

130.

In any event, the NRC has no requirement that the sinking fund method could be used (Tr. 4515).

The Appli-cants could provide for the entire a= cunt of decommissioning or any shortfall of the sinking fund at the time the money would be needed frcm the current operations (Or. 4515-16, 4586, 4598).

Approximately half the funds would be spent after 33 years and the remaining balance used to fund the 1

remaining steps.

It should be pointed out that toward the end of the 104 year ente =bment period, the radicactivity

l

)

l will have decayed to levels which would permit unlimited access.

131.

The Board thus finds that the Applicants have taken a reasonable approach to decommissioning.

The Board is satisfied that PUCO will monitor the fund to assure that it is responsive to changing conditions.

In addition, the NRC will continue in its monitoring function to assure that necessary steps for funding decommissioning are being taken.

132.

As a final matter, the Board will take official notice of the pendency of ar. NRC rulemaking proceeding with regard to decommissioning to determine, inter alia, whether to censider developing more definitive decommissioning criteria for utilization facility licenses and to consider whether funding or other surety arrangments should be required before the issuance of licenses (Decc=missioning Criteria for Nuclear Facilities, Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 43 Fed. Reg. 10370, 10371 (March 13, 1978)).

Thus, considering the steps taken by the Applicants, the i.

regulatory climate, and the fact that definitive Commission l

guidelines on decc=missioning methods and financing should be coming out in the near future, the Board finds it inap-propriate to condition the license to require any specific method of funding decommissioning or require any specific amount be set aside.

Such action would be generic in

_ nature and should await the completion of the Commission's ruler.aking proceeding.

Pennsylvania Power & Licht Company (Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-79-6, 9 NRC 231, 314 (March 6, : 979).

The Board finds the actions taken by Applicants to be appropriate.

The Costs of An Accident s

133.

The Licensing Board asked that the question of the ability of the Applicants to withstand the costs of various contingencies, including extended shutdowns of the reactor caused by problems arising at the Zimmer reactor (up to a maximum of a TMI-type accident) or by generic problems similar to those which have arisen at existing reactors and which have caused shutdowns at other reactors potentially subject to those problems, be addressed (Tr. 3653).

134.

The Applicants emphasized the difficulty in ad-dressing the question in specific terms, but discussed a number of generic considerations in detail which were re-sponsive to the Board's question.

The Applicants stated that as a result of operating experience and the TMI ac-cident there have been significant improvements to minimize extended outages and reduce the risk of accidents (Tr.

3654).

The fundamental point is that any accident or long term outage would have unique characteristics and would have to be dealt with as it developed.

The companies would have to resolve financial considerations associated with an accident or outage to the satisfaction of PUCO (L'.).

. 135.

It was emphasized that since the Zimmer Station is a BWR, a TMI type accident could not occur.

Nevertheless, improvements are being incorporated into the facility to aid i

the operators in general accident prevention and mitigation (Tr. 3655).

136.

If nonetheless the TMI-type accident is hypothesized to occur, the Applicants calculated that it would cost ap-proximately $835 million to decontaminate and decommission the Zimmer Station reactor (Tr. 3655, 4042-43).

Of that amount, $300 million would be paid for by insurance proceeds (Tr. 3662).

Next the accumulated decommissioning fund would be used to offset the remainder.

This money would have to be raised over a period of 4-5 years (Tr. 4 08 0, 4095).

The remainder would be borne by the three owners in proportion to their cwnership of the facility (Tr. 3656, 4041-42, 4060).

Such costs when distributed among the three companies would not have a substantial effect on rates or on the companies' financial picture (Tr. 4056, 4072, 4304).

137.

With regard to replacement power costs, the Zimmer l

Station is a single unit facility.

In contrast, the acci-dent at TMI-2 caused the sister unit to be shutdown and taken cut of the ratebase (Tr. 4507-08).

Zi==er represents a smaller portion of the CCD system ins alled capacity 1

(approximately 7. 4%) than TMI Units 1 and 2 did of the GPU system (approximately 21.5%) (Tr. 3656).

Thus the owners should be in a better financial position to respond to a TMI-type accident (Id,. ).

-c

. 138.

The Applicants testified that under Ohio law the PUCO includes property considered "used and useful" in rendering electric service in the electric utility's rate-base.

There are no laws or regulations in Ohio that specify the period of time that a plant may be taken cut of service and still qualify for inclusion in the utility's ratebase.

l The Applicants stated that they assumed that the PUCO would act responsibly under the circumstances existing at the time of its decision (Tr. 3659).

139.

In similar situations where a unit has been out of service for a long time for maintenance er other repairs, the PUCO has not removed the generating unit frcm plant in-service when it is anticipated that the unit will be re-turned to service following maintenance or repairs (Tr.

3659, 4266-67).

There is also precedent for PUCO allowing costs to be amortized ever a period of time (Tr. 4076).

Thus if the Zimmer Station were per anently shutdown, the r

i Applicants would look toward amortizing the undepreciated value of the plant (Tr. 4076-77).

140.

The Applicants testified that replacement power l

were Zimmer shutdown would come from their own units and their systems would still have reliable reserve capacity (Tr. 3683, 4046, 4223-24, 4294-95).

t 141.

Considering all the testimony at the hearing, the Board believes its questions have been adequately addressed.

. The Board recognizes that it is not possible to give a precise answer to its somewhat speculative questions.

The Board recognizes that it must presume a rational regulatory environment in viewing the response to its questions.

The Board has not identified any significant deficiency in the response which would demonstrate that the owners of the Zimmer Station could not respond following a hypothetical shutdown or accident.

142.

Based upon the evidence bef ore it, the Board finds that there is reasonable assurance that the Applicants are financially qualified to complete construction, operate and decommission the Zi=mer Station.

We therefore decide that Centention 13 advanced by MVPP has no merit.

B.

Uncontested Matters Pressure Testinc of Decrs 143.

During the prehearing conference, an af fidavit executed by Robert Andersen,, an ircnworker who was employed to install and pressure check watertight doors at the Zimmer site, was submitted to the Board.

The affidavit stated that during the course of a pressure test conducted by the contractor, 10 watertight doors leaked between the concrete and the steel angle which was imbedded into the concrete so that the door frame could be hung (Affidavit of Robert Anderson attached to the Direct Testimony of Thomas Vandel Regarding the Pressure Testing of Doors, following Tr. 1643 (hereinafter "Vandel Pressure esting Testimony")).

1 l

144.

The Office of Inspection and Enforcement ("I&E"),

at the request of the Board, investigated this matter.

Based upon this investigation, it' was determined that the pressure test witnessed by Mr. Anderson -was only a contrac-tor proof test and not a license quality acceptance test.

Subsequently the door frames were successfully repaired utilizing an epoxy plastic material.

At the time of the initial inspection, some but not all of the quality ac-ceptance tests had been successfully performed (Vandel Pressure Testing Testimony at 1-2; Tr. 2198-2200).

Sub-sequently, I&E conducted a followup inspection, whereby it witnessed the final testing of the doors.

Three of four decrs tested passed the leak rate test.

Necessary repairs will be made to the fourth door to correct two pinhole leaks and the necessary followup leak testing will verify l

adequate repairs undertaken (Direct Testimony of Thomas Vandel Regarding Pressure Testing of Decrs and the Use of Improper Bolts for the Traveling Screen, folicwing Tr. 3140 (hereinaf ter "vandel Door and Bolt Testi=cny") at 1 and Inspection Report 50-358/79-23 appended thereto at 5-6).

The Board has concluded that no safety problem exists or r

ever existed.

The Board considers this matter to have been adequately resolved.

Solts for the Traveline Screen 145.

During the hearings held in June 1979, an affidavit was submitted to the Licensing Board alleging that stainless

. steel nuts and bolts were not used in the installation of the " drag line" as was required.

This item was reviewed by the NRC I&E during a site visit on" July 17-20, 1979.

It was established that the " drag line" is the terminology used by the affiant for the set of traveling screr.ns installed in the water intake structure at the site, a non-safety related piece of equipment.

This classification of. equipment is usually not inspected by the NRC.

Nonetheless, the stain-less bolt and nuts concern was reviewed by the NRC inspector who determined that stainless steel cap screws and lock washers were used in the installation as specified by the manufacturer and that no installation errors regarding substitution of material occurred (Vandel Decr and Bolt Testimony at 2 and Inspection Report 50-358/79-23 appended thereto at 4-5).

The Scard considers that this matter has been adequately resolved.

Alleged Electrical Deficiencies 146.

MVPP surmitted to the hearing board on June 29, 1979 an affidavit of an electrician who alleged that during l

the course of his employment at the Zi=mer site he had observed problems and/or possible problems in seven areas.

l Pursuant to a request of the Licensing Board, the worker was interviewed by I&E and a site visit arranged.

As a result l

of its inves'tigation I&E determined that while sc=e of the worker's allegations related to safety ccmponents, they had l

83 -

been reviousiv identified a.d analvsed b.v the liRC cr h.v che e

Applicants or by both.

The NRC concluded that the identi-fied concerns were being adequately resolved by the Appli-cants (Direct Testi=cny of Jack Hughes and Thc=as -I.

Vandel Regarding Electrical Deficiencies, following Tr. 3116 (here-inafter " Staff Testi=cny Regarding Electrical Deficiencies")

at 1-7 and Inspection Report No. 50-358/ 79-19 (hereinafter

" Re.cer: 79-19")) an.eended thereto.

147.

The 3 card ad=itted the Staff Testimony Regarding Elec rical Deficiencies only as it related to Cententien 14.

A 4..-w 4 3 e..w...

.., C a a a 4..e4a.

.w.

,. e. a 4..a. e c.<

..w.e c c,..

e.,,..

e.c

-".=.

u r,.,se c' s".^w.'.,

'a.

.'.e S~.a.##

e #.. ed

.k.e

.4.ves-i-r r

cation as rec.uested bv the Licensing Scardr it has perused the document and believes the Staff has done =cre than an afeguate jcb in following up the 3 card's request (Tr. 3117).

.8.

4

.u.

e,a a.c.w...ese c

4,ns

e..w.

a.< < 4 2. a,.,.4.

e relevant Oc Contention 14, it was established that centrary o.".e a.#.###av#

's ai'e a.i

..e,

..k.e Na i c.a.a ' :"..a- -.' ca C.,d e 3

i dces.. a..':-

-ka '. 4 -- e.

.#.= c.4. ' 4

v..

..".e a-

.'4 a"'e e

ge limitations regarding cable tray leading are (1) FSAR cc=-

I

..e...

(. cec.4 ^. o) ~'=

- ="

4

w4 '.'

.c. a.x eed 60%

^

cross sectional area, (2) Sargent & Lundv scecified limita-I i

.d c..s c.# ". o'"_ e

.#.47',

..-." - ~"~.ds

^#.

.=.".'e

e. s

_= e.#cc.

n l

( A.cclicants ' Exh. 1, FSARr Section 3) cf cable tray maximum and allewable thermal heat (a=cacitv).

S&L selected 33 I

1 l

l l

l 1

l computer selected cable routing points known to be the worst loading cases for designer review.

In addition the NRC l

inspector observed and randomly selected 20 other points for i

review, i.e., both safety and nonsafety related, cable trays which appeared to be heavily loaded (Tr. 3118).

The NRC inspector reviewed the results of the designers' calculations regarding the above stated limitations and verified the designer's determination that in one instance the percent I

cross sectional area fill for a non-safety related tray exceeded 60%; however, no other instance of the limitations being exceeded (Staff Testimony Regarding Electrical Defi-ciences at 5; Tr. 3127-30).

The single instance of overfill in a non-safety related tray was being corrected.

It was determined that the worst condition for volume fill (identi-fied by the S&L review) is one tray that is loaded to 36 lbs/sq ft, the worst condition found of the NRC inspector's random sample was 29 lbs/sq ft, with the overall average in the neighborhood of 1/2 the 40 lbs/sq ft.

The worst case ampacity was found to be 48 watts /ft, well below the allowable limitation.

The results of the Staff's seismic hanger loading review was essentially the same as for the cable trays and no problems were found (Staff Testimony Regarding Electrical Deficiencies at 5-6 and Report 79-19 at 6-8).

149.

The question of the addition of side rails was raised during the cross examination of the Staff witnesses

1 j

85 -

as well as the practice of Aay.ng in the cables on a random basis rather than laying the cables down in neat rows (Tr.

3125).- Even if side rails are added to cable trays, the 60%

fill limitation for cross sectional' area is still based upon the original cross sectional area (Tr. 3124-25).

By randomly laying the cables there is additional void space which

)

permits a better dissipation of heat buildup (Tr. 3133-34).

The random placement has no adverse effects on safety (Tr.

4 1

3136-37).

Moreover, this type of fill does not affect the use of Kellum grips discussed previously (Tr. 3129-31, 3135).

The Scard finds that the additional evidence raised nothing to affect its conclusions regarding Contention 14.

Granding of Control Rod Velocity Limiter 150.

As a result of an affidavit given to the Licensing Scard, an inspection was conducted by the Staff regarding the grinding of a chamfer in the upper corner of the control 4

rod velocity limiter at the Zi=mer Station.

The modifica-tion was required to eliminate potential interference between i

I the control rod and the fuel channel during the end of its insert travel.

The workman executing the affidavit was interviewed to dssure that his concerns **re fully under-stood.

The workman's concern related to metal chips al-1 legedly left inside the control rods.

These chips had been generated during grinding done in late February 1979 to i

i I

f ea-,-n,-~,,--,,---.

---,---,.w.,,

-,.---,,-,,-.-a---

--,n.

--,e

- - ~ - - -

remove an oversized weld in the control rods.

The affiant informed the Staff investigation that he was satisfied with the pregrinding cleaning job done to remove metal shavings left by the manufacturer (Direct Testimony of Federico A.

Maura Regarding Metal Chips in Control Rods following Tr.

3497 (hereinafter " Maura Testinony) at 1-2).

151.

The records of the modification, which was per-formed during the period of February 21-23, 1979, were re-viewed by the NRC inspector who also interviewed Reactor Controls Inc., General Electric Co. and licensee personnel involved in the performance of the modification.

Based upon the records and interviews, the Staff inspector determined that 80 control rods required grinding of a chamfer in one or more corners of the velocity limiter; all such =cdi-fication work was done with the control rods in the vertical position; during the work, the corner holes and lower holes in the sheath were covered with tape or shim stock; poly-I ethylene was used to cover approximately the lower 3 to 4 i

feet of the blades (I_d. at 2-3 ).

152.

The NRC inspector reported that Reactor Controls, i

Inc. and licensee personnel at tne job clain no orre :_nformed them that metal chips had entered the sheath b-les during the modification.

They also stated the chips traveled away from the blade due to the position of the blade and grinder, and they personally did not see any chips in the blades after the modification was ccmpleted and prior to reinstall-ing the blades in the reactor (;gi. at 3).

153.

At the request of the NRC inspector, a mockup of the grinding was made using a stainless steel 3 x 3 inch channel, half inch thick.

Using the same grinder, burring tools and techniques used during the actual modification the inspector determined the direction of travel of the metal particles.

In addition, the metal being removed was col-lected to determine the size of the particles (Maura Testi-many at 3; Tr. 3501-02).

Based upon such test the inspector concluded that most particles traveled at an angle away from the blade with a fett particles traveling in the near vertical direction and no particles traveled in the direction of the b12de (Maura cestimony at 3; Tr. 3518-20); and the largest particle found was approximately 1/4 inch long x 3/64 inch wide.

The thickness was a few mils.

Most particles were the size of sugar grain particles (;gi. at 3-4).

154.

Based upon analysis of this matter,- it was determined that there is no heat transfer problem even if enough metal chips succeed in blocking the flow path between the absorber rods and sheath (Tr. 3502-05).

However, relatively l ege chips trapped between absorber rods and the sheath, in the area where the control rod experiences the highest neutron flux exposu$e, could possibly generate small cracks after the absorber rod beccmes less ductile (Maura Testimony at 4-

i 5, Tr. 3508-09, 3513-14, 3521-22, 3524-25).

No safety problem exists because leaching of 3 C through wall cracks 4

does not occur until after 50% local 310 burnup exists (Maura Testimony. at 4-5 and attachments 3 and C thereto, Tr.

3510-12, 3526).

155.

The design life of a control blade is defined as the time when its calculated reactivity worth has decreased I

by 10% of its original value.

This value, which takes into account boron leaching, is equivalent to an average B10 depletion over the upper one fourth of the blade, of 34%.

]

The safety significance of the boron loss with regard to shut-down capability and scram reactivity was evaluated and has been determined to be negligible (Maura Testimony, M. at - 5; Tr. 3528).

156.

Based on review of the modification-records, interviews with personnel who performed the modification, the results of the mockup of the grinding done on the l

blades, the results of up-to-date studies regarding 3 C 4

leaching through cracks in the stainless steel tubing of the control blades, the conservative specification of the design i

life of the control rods (Tr. 3530-31), and the steps being taken by the NRC to continue monitoring this situation (Tr.

3531-33), it was the NRC Staff conclusion that any chips which may be' left in the contrcl rod blades at Zimmer Station do not represent a safety concern.

The Board concurs, i

1 1

I,

i III.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 157.

In an operating license proceeding, the Board is called upon to decide only the issues in controversy among the parties (10 C.F.R.

52.760a and Appendix A to 10 C.F.R.

Part 2,Section VIII).

In this case, the contentions and evidence have placed in issue the general subjects of com-pliance with 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix I, cable tray manu-facture, control rod design and manufacture, fire protection of cable trays, financial qualifications, emergency planning and environmental =cnitoring.

150.

Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact which are supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence as required by the Administrative Procedure Act and the Commission's Rules of Practice, and upon consideration of the entire evidentiary record in this proceeding, the Board makes the following Conclusions of Law:

(1)

The requirements of 10 C.F.R.

Part 51 have been met; (2)

The requirements of Section 102 (2) (A),

(C) and (E) of the National Policy Act have been met; (3)

The Board has thoroughly con-sidered the foregoing Findings of Fact concerning the issues in contro-versy in this operating license proceed-ing and other matters which have been addressed in this Initial Decision and l

has concluded that the operating license j

should be issued as proposed.

(4)

Control rods as manufactured and installed are capable of adequately performing their intended function.

i l

5 L

90 -

(5)

Cable trays as manufactured and installed are capable of adequately perfornting their intended ""-*4on.

(6)

Cable trays for which additional fire protection is required have been wrapped in a mate. rial which was quali-fied to perform its intended funcuion.

(7)

Even were the Moscow Elementary School to be in use, the requirements of 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix I would still be met.

(8)

The Applicants are financially qualified to engage in the activities to be authorized by the operating li-cense in accordance with the Cc-ais-sion's regulations.

(9)

Having considered and decided all matters in controversy a=cng the parties related to operation, the Director of Nuclear Reacter Regulation should be authorized to make such additional findings en uncontested issues as may be necessary to determine whether er not to issue a full-ter= cperating license for the W=.

H.

Zi==er Nuclear Power Station.

(10s This decision shall not becc=e effective until the requirements cf Appendix 3, 10 C.F.R.

Part 2 have been j

.# u.' #.d.' A' ed.

w t

IV.

ORDER I

l l

159.

WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the Director, Office l

i of Nuclear Regulation, is authorized upon making requisite l

i findings with respect to matters not e= braced in this Initial racision in accordance with the Cc==ission's regulations, to i

i issue to Applicants an cperating license for a ter= of not

=cre than forty (40) years, authorizing operation of the Wm.

H. Zi==er Nuclear Power Station at steady sate power

,-v g

r e,

- - - - ~ ~ - -

A

>,1J. levels not to exceed 2436 megawatts thermal; such license may be in such form and content as is appropriate in light of such findings, provided that such license is consistent with the conclusions of the Board herein.

160.

In view of the Ccmmission's Rules of Practice limiting the Board's jurisdiction in a contested operating license proceeding, the Board has made Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on matters actually put into controversy by the parties to the proceeding.

As required by the Com-f mission's Regulations, the NRC Staff will inspect the Zimmer_ f acility prior to issuance of any operating license to determine whether it has been construed in accordance with the application, as amended,. and the provisions of che construction permit.

In addition, the license will not be issued until the NRC Staff has made the findings reflecting its review of the application under the Atcmic Energy Act, which will be set forth in the proposed license, and has I

concluded that the issuance of the license will not be i

j inimical to the cc= mon defense and security and to the t

l health and safety of the public.

Upon issuance of the license, the Applicants will be required to execute an in-l demnity agreement as required by Section 170 of the Act and 10 C.F.R. 140 of the Commisson's Regulations.

i l

161.

Exceptions to this Initial Decision may be filed within ten' (10) days after service of this Initial Decision.

l A brief in support of the exceptions shall be filed within thirty (30) days thereafter (forty (40) days in the case of the NRC Staff].

Within thirty (30) days of the filing and service of the brief of the Appellant (forty (40) days in the case of the Staff] any other party =ay file a brief in support of, or in opposition to, the exceptions.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

FOR THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD

-s Charles Bechhoefer, Chairman Dr. M.

Stanley Livingston, Member Dr. Frank F. Hooper, Member Dated at Bethesda, Maryland, this day of

, 1981

f, N h @ er b

e_

ds ri

.o.

~

APPENDIX A

8 Exhibits N

6 Applicants' Exhibits sd5.\\

No.

Identified Received Description 3

1 597 605 Application, including FSAR, ER and FPER (with amendments) 2 1123 1125 Letter to R.F. Heishman from Earl Borgmann re IE Inspection Report 50-358/78-21 3A-3L 1532 Welding Procedure and Performance Qualifications Test Sheets 4

2007 Page 9-1, Husky Products, Inc.

Quality Control Manual 5

2559 List of Individuals Receiving Quality Assurance Training from RCI dated June 27, 1978 6

2560 List of Individuals Receiving Quality Assurance Training from RCI dated July 26, 1978 7A*

3411 3417 Rev. 13 to Fire Protection Evaluation Report i

l 8A*

3411 3419 Rev. 14 to Fire Protection Evaluation Report 7

3618 3652 Additional Financial Information and Page Changes to the Formal Application, submitted November 14 1981 8

3618 3652 Letter to Harold Denton from Earl Borgmann Responding to Three Staff Financial Questions 9

4483 4483 Chapter 20 - Staff Safety Evaluation Report - Financial l

Qualifications

/

Inasmuch as two exhibits were given the same designation, j

these exhibits have been designated 7A and 8A and have been referred to as such in this Initial Decision.

I i

. No.

Identified Received Description 10A-10C 4498 4609 Summary of Rate Increases for Applicants llA-11D 4570 Deccmmissioning Costs for Zimmer Unit 1 - Four Tables Prepared at the Request of the Licensing Board 12 4572 Decommissioning FUNP Balances for Various Earned Investment l

Rates Staff 's Exhibits 1

745 745 Professional Qualifications of Richard S.

Cleveland 2

754 754 Final Environmental Statement 3

754 754 Staff Supplement to Final Environmental Statement Regarding Radon 4

754 754 NUREG-0332, Health Effects Attributable to Coal and Nuclear Fuel Cycle Alternatives 5

754 754 Revised Tables, Summary and Conclusion to Draft NUREG-0332 6

754 754 Update of NUREG-0332 1

7 762 762 Letter to Earl Borgmann from Ronald Ballard enclosing revised l

draft Environmental Technical Specifications t

l Dr. Fankhauser's Exhibits 1

854 861 Enrollment Figures for Moscow Elementary School t

l 1

i l

l l

. Miami Valley Power Project's Exhibits s.c -

.,enticlec Received Description 1

1057 1119 List of Certified Welders Englcyed by Eusky Products 2

1842 1849 Welder Qualification Progra:

3 1947 1950 Me=c tc E. McClung frc= Randy Prat: re Welding Qualification for J. Allen and M. 3rcck 4

1956 1970 Field Cc= plaint of Crater Cracks in TIG Welding 5

2043 Affidavi cf Ccnald Blanch l

j

F t

.@ l 19,

r 4

4 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA cCC#

ess~

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION E

og27. c,gp

~

5

1 Q*

D N CM, e.. ee-:C:ge In the matter of

)

ved The Cincinnati Gas & Electric

)

Docket No. 50

8

\\

Cc=pany, et al.

)

til15

)

-(Wm. E.

Z i = e r N u c l e a r P o w e.-

)

Station)

}

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of " Applicants' Pro-posed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in the Form of An Initial Decision," dated April 24, 1981, in the captioned matter, have been served upon the follcwing by deposit in the United Statec = ail this 24th day of April,

. 9 8.,.

Charles Bechhoefer, Esq.

Chairman, Atomic Safety and Chairman, Atomic Safety Licensing Appeal Board Panel and Licensing Scard U.S. Nuclear Regulatory U.S. Nuclear Regula: Cry Cc==ission Cc==ission Washinc. ron,

D.C.

20555 Washington, D.C.

20555 Chairman, Arc =ic Safety and Dr. Frank F.

Ecoper, Me=ber Licensing Scard Panel Atc=ic Safety and Licensing U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Scard Cc==ission Schcol of Natural Rescurces Washing:cn, D.C.

20555 University of Michigan Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109 Charles A.

Barth, Esq.

Counsel for the NRC Staff Dr.

M.

Stanley Livingston Office of the Executive Legal Arc =ic Safety and Licensing Director 3 card U.S.

Nuclear Regula: cry 1005 Calle Largo Cc==ission Santa Fe, New Mexice 87501 Washing:cn, D.C.

20555 1

Richard S.

Saloman, Esq.

William J. Moran, Esc..

Chairman, Atc=ic Safety and General Counsel Licensing Appeal 3 card Cincinnati Gas & Electric U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Cc=pany Cc==iscien Post Office Sex 960 Washington, D.C.

20555 Cincinnati, Chic 45201 Dr. Lawrence R. Quarles Mr. Chase R.

Stephens Atomic Cafety and Licensing Docketing and Service Branch Appeal Ecard U.S. Nuclear Regulatory U.S. Nuclear Enc.ulatorv.

Cc==ission Cc==ission Washington, D.C.

20555 Washington, D.C.

20555

William Peter Heile, Esq.

John D. Woliver, Esq.

Assistant City Solicitor Clermont County Community City of Cincinnati Council Box 214 Box 181 Cincinnati, Ohio 45202 Batavia, Ohio 45103 Mrs. Mary Reder David K. Martin, Esq.

Box 270 Assistant Attorney General

. Route 2 Acting Director California, Kentucky 41007 Division of Environmental Law Office of Attorney General Andrew 3.

Dennison, Esq.

209 St. Clair Street Attorney at Law Frankfort, Kentucky 40601 200 Main Street Satavia, Ohio 45103 George E. Pattison, Esq.

Prosecuting Attorney of James R.

Feldman, Jr.,

Esq.

Clermont County, Ohio 216 East Ninth Street 462 Main Street Cincinnati, Ohio 45202 Batavia, Ohio 45103

@.fO Ma J.

Wetternann l

t l

I I

i r

P f

l.

-

ML19343D381

Text

Navigation menu

Search