ML19343D100
| ML19343D100 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hartsville  |
| Issue date: | 03/25/1981 |
| From: | Mills L TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| References | |
| REF-PT21-81-391-000 10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, NCR-HTN-CDB-800, NRC-HTN-CDB-800, PT21-81-391, PT21-81-391-000, NUDOCS 8104090362 | |
| Download: ML19343D100 (3) | |
Text
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TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY I/""~
CH ATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 374ot h),
f 400 Chestnut Street Tower II 4/-
March 25, 1981 Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director Office of Ir.apection and Enforcem'ent U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Concission '
Regice II - Suite 3100
.101 Marietta Street Atlanta, Georgia 30303
Dear Mr. O'Reilly:
HARTSVILLE NUCLEAR PLANT - REPORTABLE DEFICIENCY - INADEQUATE WEDGE BOLT EXPANSION ANCHORS BY RAWLPLUG (NCR HIN CDB 8002)
Initial. notification of the subject deficiency was made to NRC-0IE, Region II, Inspector R. W. Wright on November 6, 1980.
The first interim report was submitted on December 4, 1980.
In comp 1.4ance with paragraph 50.55(e)~ of 10 CFR Part 50, we are' enclosing the final report on the subject deficiency. We consider 10 CFE Part 21 d
applicable to this nonconformance. If you have any questions regarding this matter, please call Jim Domer at FTS 857-2014 Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY A.UTHORITY L. M. Mills, Mitnager Nuclear Regulation and. Safety Enclosure
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cc:
Mr. Victer Stello, Director (Enclosure)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 i
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An Equal Opportunity Erroloyer I
ENCLOSURE
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HARTSVILLE NUCLEAR PLAh'?
INADEQUATE WEDGE BOLT EXPANSION ANCHORS BY RAWLPLUG 10CFR50.55(e) REPORT NO. -2 (FINAL)
I NCR HTHCDB8002 Descriotion of Condition TVA General Construction Specification No. G-32 for Bolt Anchors Set
' n Hardened Concrete requires qualification tests to be performed on i
wedge bolt expansion anchors (hereinafter referred to'as anchors) before their initial use. The qualification tests on Rawl-Stud
^ anchors manufactured by the Raw 1 plug Company were performed in 1978.
The test results were acceptable, and the anchors were qualified.
In recent qualification tests for another brand of ' anchors, all sizes of Pawl-Stud anchors were also tested for comparison with another brand.
All sizes of Rawl-Stud anchors exceeded the qualification requirements except the one-inch, which developed only 75 percent of the required ultimate tensile capacity. Followup tests in inplace concrete were also unacceptable.
Further investigation indicates that at some time since initial qualification, the manufacturer has made a change to the wedging device on the anchor. These anchors are used to install safety-related, surface-mounted plates throughout the plant and were only being used at Hartsville.
Safety Imolications The anchors in questien are used to support various st 5ty-related surface-mounted plates.
The failure of one of these p ites could result in the failure of a safety-related system.
Corrective Actions
.For anchors designed for STRIDE structures, the factor o tafety for one-inch Rawl-Stud anchors is adequate for those already stalled.. The factor of safety is adequate beca.use the. STRIDE design ust lower design loads than TVA. The qualification load requirement ire based on TVA design loads.
Recently, at TVA's request, the STRIDL designer increased the design loads for anchors for some piping syste 3 to better utilize the anc'.1or.
Insta11xtion of these systems hat not yet begun. The one-inch Fawl-Stud anchosa do not have.an adequat. factor of safety for thore piping systems.
Therefore, before any ancho.
for those systems are installed, the field will remove all one-inc.
Rawl-Stud andhers from the site.
This removal will be completed
April 10, 1981.
For TVA-designed systems using Raw 1 plug anchor. in b'alance-of-plant (BOP) structures, the factor 'f safety for the'one-inch Rawl-Stud o
anchors would'be inadequate if the full allowabic design loads were utilized.
Therefore, all one-inch Rawl-Stud anchcrs installed in BOP structures were located and reviewed. This review of the designs for these anchoes showed that the anchors had an adequate factor of safety when the actual design loads are applied.
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