ML19343A579
| ML19343A579 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 09/15/1980 |
| From: | Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Eilperin S NRC OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL (OGC) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19343A580 | List: |
| References | |
| FRN-43FR48621, FRN-44FR32489, RULE-PR-21, RULE-PRM-2-8, RULE-PRM-2-8-44FR32489 NUDOCS 8011190038 | |
| Download: ML19343A579 (3) | |
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'C UNITED STATES y
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WASHINGTON. D. C. 20555 c
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SEP 151950 l
1 MEMORANDUM FOR:
S. Eilpern, Solicitor FROM:
H. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
SUBJECT:
INFORMATION FOR DEFENSE OF THE 1978 AMENDMENTS TO CFR PART 21 AGAINST NRDC'S LAWSUIT
REFERENCES:
1.
Memorandum dated 8/8/80 from S. E11perin, Solicitor to H. Denten regarding NRDC's suit challenging 1978 amendments to Part 21.
2.
Reports to Congress on Abnonnal Occurrences, NUREG-0090, for the years 1977,1978 and 1979.
In response to your request for information in Reference 1, we obtained a listing of all of the Licensee Event Reports (LER's) since 1974 which identi-fied cogonent failure as the event cause (Cause Code Item E) and copies of all Abnormal Occurrence Reports (Reference 2) since 10 CFR 21 became final (i.e., June 6,1977).
From the listing of the LER's per se, it is generally not possible to determine whether or not an event was due to the failure of a consercial-grade component.
However, since the subject of these LER's is the failure of one or more compo-nents which could prevent the fulfillment of the functional requirements of systems used to cope with accidents analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report (SAR); i.e., safety systems, these cogonents are necessarily covered by 10 Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, Appendix B which, inter alia, establishes the quality assurance requirements for their design, construction, and opera-tion.Section VIII of this regulation states that measures shall be established for the identification and control of materials, parts, and components and that these identification and control measures shall be designed to prevent the use of incorrect or defective material, parts and cogonents. Thus, the licensee has the ultimate responsibility for the performance of systems which are needed to maintain the safety of the plant. By using its quality assurance organization, the licensee of a nuclear power plant often delegates this quality assurance function to other organizations, but in all cases a clearly established chain of responsibility is maintained.
If one of the organizations in this chain should decide to use a comnercial-grade component, it then becomes the responsi-1 bility of that organization to make certain that that cogonent will be entirely adequate for the job. Thus, the quality assurance of a.y commercial-grade cego-a nent in a safety system is the user's responsibility.
If a part does not meet its advertised specifications, the quality assurance program of the user should guarantee that it is not accepted and used in a safety system. It appears that the only legal responsibility the manufacturer has for a connercial-grade 60111,9 0 @
SLt'.aiid0 S. Eilpern cogonent is for it to meet its advertised specifications. Thus, all of the cogonent failures in this list of LER's are the responsibility of organizations from the initial user on and not the responsibility of the manufacturer of a comercial-grade cogonent.
The NRC has been continually reviewing and comparing LER's with established cri-teria to determine if they are significant enough to be classified as Abnormal Occurrences. The attached Table i shows the result of this review, i.e., all of Abnormal Occurrences that occurred for the operating power reactors in the years 1977,1978, and 1979. None of these ADnormal Occurrences were caused by a defect in a comercial-grade component. Subsequent to 1979 there was one significant LER which involved a comercial-grade cogonent. This is for the Crystal River Unit 3 plant event on February 27, 1980 when it lost about 701, of its non-nuclear i nstrumentation. This was due to a short to ground which was caused by a Bailey Meter Cogany voltage buffer card being misaligned in its receptacle while adja-cent connectors were bent. However, this was not classified as a manufacturing defect.
Since, in general, the manufacturer of a commercial-grade product will not know that its product is going to be used in a nuclear plant, it would be very unusual for anyone involved in the manufacture of it to report a defect to the Nuclear Regulatory Comission. We do not know of any instance where a defect in a comercial-grade part used in a nuclear plant was known and would have been reportad to the Nuclear Regulatory Comission if Part 21 had applied.
In view of the above, we know of no valid reason for extending Part 21 to comer-cial-grade cogonents that are used in nuclear plants.
~,
h Ent c r Office of duclear Reactor Regulation
Enclosures:
As Stated l
l
TABLE 1 ABNORMAL OCCURRENCES AT OPERATING POWER REACTORS IN 1977, 1978. AND 1979 DATE ABNORMAL OCCURENCE 4/18/77 Breach of physical security system at Ft. St. Vrain.
5/15/77 Fuel rod failures at the La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor.
i 7/8/77 Management and procedural control deficiencies at Zion Uni t 1.
8/10/77 Design deficiency in Low Head Safety Injection (LHSI) pumps.
9/30/77 Insulation failures in containment electrical penetrations at Millstone Unit 2.
12/13/77 Excessive wear in fuel assembly control rod guide tubos at Millstone Unit 2.
4/6/78 Overexposure of two workers at Trojan Nuclear Plant.
6/17/78 Cracks in primary coolant recirculation pipe at Duane Arnold.
7/26/78 Loss of automatic containment valve closure capability at Millstone Unit 2 and at Salem linit 1.
9/16/78 Deficiencies in guaranteed source of electrical power at Millstone Unit 2 and Salem Unit 1.
3/8/79 Deficiencies in piping design.
3/28/79 Loss of core cooling at Three Mile Islaiid Unit 2.
5/2/79 Low water level in Oyster Creek reactor.
5/7/79 Sabotage of new fuel assemblies at Surry.
6/2/79 Deficient procedures at ANO-1.
9/14/79 Locked open containment valves at Palisades.
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