ML19341D542
| ML19341D542 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 02/13/1981 |
| From: | Gilinsky V NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | Udall M HOUSE OF REP., INTERIOR & INSULAR AFFAIRS |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19341D532 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8103050788 | |
| Download: ML19341D542 (2) | |
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION s
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OFFt0E O8 THE cow.uss er,E n February 13, 1981 The Honorable Morris K.
Udall Chairman Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs U.S.
House of Representatives Washington, D. C.
20515
Dear Mr. Chairman:
I am responding to your letter of Tanuary 30, 1981 on the conclusion reached by the NRC staf investigation of infor-mation reporting during the TMI accident.
You asked for the views of individual Commissioners on whether information was intentionally withheld by Metropolitan Edison Company and on the truthfulness of statements made durine subsequent investigations.
' the various The NRC staff investigation report's conclusion that "information was not intentionally withheld" from the State or from NRC is more an assertion than a conclusion.
I do not find in the report the reasoning that led the investigators to make this statement.
Moreover, it is inconsistent with another of the report's conclusions that:
" Met Ed was nou fully forthcoming on March 28, 1979, in that they did not appraise the Commonwealth of Pennsylvani; of either the uncertainty concerning the adequacy of core cooling or the potential for degradation of plant conditions."
To say that Met Ed was not " fully forthcoming" is to say it consciously held back significant information on the accident.
My own judgment is that Met Ed, in dealing with the State l
and the NRC on March 28, 1979, probably withheld information which would have made the accident appear more serious and the reactor situation more precarious.
It is perhaps under-standable that company officials should have tried to dampen public excitement by playing down the severity of the accident in briefing State and federal officials, but it is not excusable in view of the responsibility of government officials for public protection.
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s The sta'ff's conclusion that "none of the conflicts examined were the result of lying" is apparently based in large part on the investigators' personal impressionc of the witnesses.
I must base my own assessment find the staff's report does noton the written record, and I deal with the numerous incensistencies in the testimony in a way that persuades me that none of the witnesses were lying.
As you know the NRC recently took enforcement action on the basis of the TMI investigation report.
I would like to add that I do not agree with the other Commissioners' conclusion that Met Ed's failure to report accident information to the NRC and the State was caused by the failure of the Station Superintendent evaluate the situation".to "obtain necessary information to properly Nor do I agree that this should be a mitigating factor in taking enforcement action on the failure to report ~.
The fact is that a good deal cf important information was available and was not reported.
The Commission should have dealt more severely with Met Ed's failure to report.
Sincerely, r
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dictor Gilinsky Corsissioner a
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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January 27, 1931 Docket No. 50-320 EA-81-17 Metropolitan Edison Company ATTN:
Mr. R. C. Arnold Senior Vice President 260 Cherry Hill Road Parsippany, NJ 07054 Gentlemen:
On April 1,1980, the Office of Inspection and Enforcement (IE) resumed its investigation into the flow of information on March 28, 1979 surrounding the accident which occurred at your Three Mile Island Unit 2 facility (TMI-2).
That effort has now been completed and a copy of the report (NUREG-0760) is enclosed for your use.
Two items of noncompliance identifiec curing inis investigation are set ferth in Appendix A.
These icems relate te the failure of the licensee to implement an adequate system to ettain, evaluate and communicate information within the onsite organication and between the onsite and responsible offsite agencies.
It is the responsibility of each licensee to msure that information is adequately transmitted to management personn.1 curing normal, as well as emergency, conditions.
Each licensee is responsible that procedures provice for and are implemented to assure that information and interpretation of it are immediately available to plant managers as well as responsible offsite agencies during emergency conditions.
Our decision to take enforcement action based on the findings of this investigation reflects the judgment that Metropolitan Edison Company as a licensee has a unique and direct responsibility for protecting the health and safety of the public during an emergency.
While other entities play a signi-ficant role in responding to an emergency situation, it is the licensee who must ef fectively gather data and analy:e the incident for its own emergency response, as well as those of supporting local, state and federal agencies, to be effective..It is in this particular area that on the day of the TMI-2 accident, there was a clear failure in Metropolitan Edison Company's respense.
Tha attached Notice of Violation specifies the items of noncompliance involved.
Because of statutory limits in effect at the time of the accioent, no further civil penalties are proposed.
Since your corrective actions will be assessed Dy the NRC Staff in conjunction with the issues related to restart of your TMI-1 f acility, no response to the Notice of Violation is required.
A copy of this letter and our investigation report will be forwarded to the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board for use in tnat proceeding.
Should you wish to respond to my office with respect to the identified items of noncompliance, your comments will certainly be considered.
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Mett:politan Edison Company Januar" 27, 1951 In a::ctdan:e with Section 2.790 of the NR-'s " Rules cf Practice," Part 1, Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, a ecpy of this letter and the enciesures will be placed in the NRC's Public Decument Room.
i Sincerely, F/
f H'NStelkoJ/ /:' i
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Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement Enclesures:
1.
Appendix A - Notice of Violation 2.
Investigation Report - NUREG-0760 J
1 4
l APPEND 2X A NOTTCE OF VIOLATION Metropolitan Edison Company Docket Nc. 50-320 ~
Three Mile Island Unit 2 EA-81-17 A.
Operation of the Three Mile Island Unit 2 facility is authorized by License No. DPR-73 which requires that the facility be operated in accordance with its Technical Specifications and the Rules and Regulations of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Section IV,10 CFR 50, Appendix E, " Content of Emergency Plans," requires that emergency plans shall contain, but not necessarily be limited to:
"A. The organization for coping with radiation emergencies, in which specific authorities, responsibilities, and duties are defined and assigned..."
i Section 6.E.1, Three Mile Island Unit 2 Technical Specifications, requires that written procedures be estaclished, implenented and maintained covering Emergency Plan implementation.
The Radiation Emergency Plan for Three Mile Island, Section 3.2.1, "Responsicilities and Duties," cefines tne responsibilities and duties of plant persennel assigned to the emergency organization.
Under the terms cf this section, the Station Superintencent, or Snif t Supervisor will, upon being notified of any emergency,
..b.
Obtain necessary informa. ion to properly evaluate t.he situation."
Contrary te the above requirements, on March 28, 1979, following the trip of Unit 2 and the subsequent degradation of plant conditions, examples of instances where information was not obtained and evaluated by responsible individuals, include:
1.
Information concerning the extended period during which the EMOV was open and the changes in system status associated with closure of the block valve was available to plant personnel before 8 a.m., but was either not gathered or not adequately evaluated in a timely manner by responsible licensee supervisors.
2.
Readings taken from the core exit thermocouples (which could indicate some' temperatures in the range where the zirconium water reaction is of concern) were improperly evcluated by responsible licensee supervisors at the time they were measured.
3.
Tne cccurrence and validity of the containment pressure spike was not communicated to responsibie indiviouals in a timely manner, nor was the information on the pressure spike properly evaluated by subordinates.
This is a violation.
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l Appendix A (Continued) January 27, 1981 Onsite supervisory personnel contributed to the above-described f ailures in implementing the f acility emergency procedures.
However, in particular, the Emergency Director, in his unique position as overall coordinator, and the responsible indivicual for managing the emergency, failed to effectively utilize onsite and offsite resources to:
1.
Obtain accurate information describing the accioent and plant status; 2.
Analyze acquired information to plan corrective action, and 1
3.
Ad,equately notify federal and state officials.
Finally, while the Emergency Dire: tor did tarc prudent actions to ensure continued management of the =mergency prior to leaving the site to brief the Lieutenant Governor, on balance, he should not have left the site curing an ongoing a:cioent.
E.
Section 6.E of Three Mile Island Unit 2 Technical Specifications states that written procedures shall be established, implemented anc maintained coverin; Emergency Plan Implementation.
Radiation Emergency Proce ure 1670.3, which implements the Three Mile Island Unit 2 Emergen:y Plan, states that, in a General Emergency, it shall be the responsibility of licensee personnel "...
to provide maximum assistance and inf:rmation possible..." to the NRC (among others).
Contrary to the above requirement, the follosing are examples of issues which were not reported to the NRC or to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania:
1.
Uncertainty cf core cooling and potential for degradation.
2.
Pressure spike.
3.
Incore thermo:ouple readings.
4.
EMOV status during the initial phase of the accident.
Because this item was caused by the violation in Item A, it is considered to be an infracticn, in this case.
Uncer other circumstances, such a failure, in itself, would be a serious violation.
/Y V i cte r Etel ic,w;a-
,w u d
Dire: tor l
Office of Inspection and Enfercement l
t Cated at Bethesda, Maryland this 27th day of January,1951 l
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