ML19341A366
| ML19341A366 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 12/08/1980 |
| From: | Dircks W NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| FRN-45FR40101, RULE-PR-50, RULE-PR-51, TASK-IR, TASK-SE SECY-80-131A, NUDOCS 8101230181 | |
| Download: ML19341A366 (8) | |
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4 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION SEdY-80-131 A December 8, 1980 WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 h
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INFORMATION REPORT N
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For:
The Commissioners n
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Executive Director for Operations
Subject:
COMMENTS ON COMMISSION ACTION ON SECY-80-131, " NUCLEAR POWER PLANT ACCIDENT CONSIDERATIONS UNDER NEPA" Category:
Information Report
Purpose:
To summarize for the Commission the subject comments.
Background:
Infonnation Report SECY-79-594 of October 31, 1979 infomed the Commission of staff activities relating to consideration of Class 9 accidents in NEPA and Safety Reviews. Consent Calendar Item SECY-80-131 of March 11, 1980 proposed a Statement of Interim Policy (SIP) on Accident Considerations Under NEPA for the Commis-sion decision.
By Federal Register Notice 45 FR 40101 of June 13, 1980 (copy attached), the Statement of Interim Policy was 'promul-gated, with a public comment period ending on September 11, 1980.
The Interim Policy Statement included the Commission position that its Environmental Impact Statements shall include considJra-tion of the site specific environmental impacts attributable to accident sequences that lead to releases of radiation and/or radioactive materials, includi.ng sequences.that can result in inadequate cooling of reactor fuel and to melting of the reactor Core.
Discussion:
Twenty-four separate letters of comment (attached) have been received regarding the subject Interim Policy Statement, These letters represented nine utility companies, two reactor system
. vendors, five public inttrest groups, five city, county or state groups or representatives, two individuals (one twice), two law firms, and CEQ.
The comments can be summarized as follows:
1.
The greatest number of letters (9) express concern that the policy statement indicates the Commission intention that the staff will initiate treatments of accident considerations for any proceeding at a licensing stage where a Final Envi-l ronmental Impact Statement has not yet been issued. These letters argue that such reviews should also be done right
Contact:
W. E. Kreger l
NRR 28026 E30.:"
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s ab The Connissioners away for several cases that are at an early licensing stage, such as Pilgrim 2, Black Fox, Skagit, Perkins, Allens Creek and Pebble Springs.
Some suggest adding Comanche Peak, Shoreham, and South Texas.
One letter asks that all plants be reviewed, with an absolute standard of safety specified for acceptability.
This kind of comment came mostly from public interest groups and intervenors. Under the SIP, Comanche Peak and South Texas will be getting the new EIS treatment, while Shoreham will not.
It should be noted that the staff is currently preparing a Commission Information Report on performance of probabilistic risk assessment or other types of special analyses at high population density sites, which is to include cases at an early licensing stage.
2.
From the utility and vendor groups, primarily, came a set of comments that indicate concern about lack of NRC detailed guidance on the accidents that will now have to.be considered.
Some argue that until the NRC has issued guidelines on the range of situations that need to be considered, and on its evaluation and acceptance criteria, no applicant ER's should be required to contain a probabilistic accident impact evaluation.
In this regard, the staff believes that its issuances for the first several cases should provide adequate guidance.
3.
The Council on Environmental Quality specifically states that where reactor construction is still in initial steps, the NRC should prepare as early as possible a supplemental EIS containing analysis of major accidents.
In making this statement, the counsel of CEQ cites 40 CFR 51500.11(b)(1978) and 40 CFR 51502.9(c)(1979) as its bases for this conclusion.
This item is similar to 1. above.
It shou's be stated here that this was an issue that the Comi% ion considered in the review of SECY-80-131 CEQ also states that they will carefully review the draft of the first NEPA analysis under the SIP and public comments thereon with a view toward providing the Commission with com-ments that would be useful in the preparation of a final analysis for NEPA review purposes.
This opportunity came when NRR issued a draft supplement to the Summer EIS for comment (NUPEG-0534, Supplement dated November 1980).
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a The Connissioners -
4 There are a number of letters that argue for retention of the annex or withdrawal of the SIP. One such argument states
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that Commission policy on accidents should not be linked to l
the -TMI-2 accident because it was not really a Class C accident. That letter urges broader public education on i
risk and consequences of accidents.
The staff believes that due to the wide distribution given NRC environmental impact statements, the treatment of acci-dent risks and consequences given under the SIP will contrib-ute toward broader public education and understanding of nuclear power plant accidents.
5.
One letter argues for clarifying modifications of the SIP regarding applicability of the SIP to licensing decisions other than CP and OL issuances.
It also argues for adoption 1
of the SIP so modified as a rule.
The SIP guidance for future NEPA reviews directs that acci-dents are to be considered "within the scope of each such (environmental impact) statement." The staff believes that the provisions for the process of scoping environmental impact statements contained in the proposed changes.to 10 CFR Part 51 to implement CEQ regulations s.hould resolve such ~ questions of applicability.
The staff is proceedira with Draft Supplemental EIS's regarding accidents foi San Oncn e 2 and 3 and Susquehanna, as well as with a DES for Comanche Peak. These will use the same assessment meth-odology as for the Summer draft supplement to the EIS, mentioned above.
As mentioned above, some of the comments will be addressed by actions in process and soon to be issued.
It is the staff's conclusion that there need be no change at this time in the SIP as a result of the comments summarized herein.
/
L Williahr'J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations
Enclosures:
Commissioners, SECT, PE & GC only.
1.
FR Notice 45 FR 40101 2.
24 Comment Letters DISTRIBUTION Commissioners Commission Staff Offices ACRS Secretariat 1
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,Jederal hg!sier./ Vol. 45 No. I16 / Friday,.fune 13 19aC / Rulei; add Regtilanons "
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- 8. Section M3.93 is amended by analysis of results of titrations of the sequences that can result in 'nadequate
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revising paragraphs (c)(1) and (c)(2) to challenge material.The vaccinates and cooling of reactor fuel and to melting of re:d:
controls shallbe observed fcr 3 days the reactor core. In this regard, attention postchallenge and all dees.s recorded.
shall be given both to the probability of g g3,,3 occurrence of such relsases and to the (22 U.S.C.151 sad 154: 37 FR 2e477. 2e646: 3e environmental consequences of such FR 19141) releases.This statement ofinterim (c),,,
Done at Washington. D.C this 6th day of policy is taken in coordination with (1) Each of at least a but not more June teso.
other ongoing safety.related activities tha 10 guinea pigs, each weighing 300 g,,j,,
that are directly related to accident to 500 grams, shall be injected Acting Deputy Adginistator. Veterinary considerations in the areas of plant subcutaneously with a guinea pig dose.
Service.
design, operational safety, siting policy, A s:cond guinea pig dose shallbe tre on.e
.4e-twaav 1 and emergency planning. The Commission intends to continue the injIcted 21 to 23 days after the first dose. Each guinea pig dose shall be one-rulemaking on this matter when new fifth of the dose recommended on the e
siting requirements and other safety j
labzl for a calf.
CLEAR REGULATORY related requirements incorporating (2) Clostridium novyichallenge COMMISSION accident considerations are F ' lace.
m:t: rial, available upon request from Wt:rinary Services, shall be used for 10 CFR Parts 50 and 51 OATas: This statement of interim policy 1
ch:llenge 14 to 15 days following the is effective June 13,1980 Comment l
1:st injection of the product. Each of Nuclear Power Plant Accident period expires September 11,1980.
cight vaccinates and each of five Considerations Under the National cdditional nonvaccinated guinea pigs for Environmental Policy Act of 1969 Aponessas:The Commission intends the interim policy guidance contained controls shall be injected AnaNCY:U.S Nuclear Regalatory herein to be immediately effective.
intr musculatly with approximately100 Commission LD of challenge material.nis dose However, allinterested persons who ACnoN: Statement ofInterim Policy.
desire to submit written comments or i
shall be determined by statistical cn: lysis of results of titrations of the suasesAnY:The Nuclear Regulatory suggestions for consideratioriin challenge material.ne vaccinates an'd Commissiori(NRC) is revising its policy connection with this statement should controls shall be observed for 3 days for considering the more severe kinds of send them to the Secretary of the postchallenge and all deaths recorded.
very low probability accidents that are Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory physically possible in environmental Commission, Washington. D.C. 20555,
- 9. Section 113.94 is amended by impact assessments required by the Attention: Docketing and Service revising the introductory portion of National Environmental Policy Act Branch.
p ragraph (c) and paragraphs (c)(1) and (NEPA). Such accidents are commonly FOR PURTHER IMPontsATioN CONTACT:
(c)(2) to read:
referred to as Class 9 accidents.
R. Wayne Houston, Chief. Accident following an accident classification Evaluation Branch Office of Nuclear scheme proposed by the Atomic Energy Reactor Regulation. U.S. Nuclear Commission (predecessor to NRC)in Regulatory Commission.. Washington, 1971 for purposes ofimplementing D.C. 20555. Telephone: (301) 492-7323.
(c) Po sney test Bulk or fing NEPA.8 The March 28,1979 accident at summassNTARY INAMON:
cont aer samples of completed product Unit 2 of the Three Mile Island nuclear from each serial shallbe tested for plant has emphasized the need for Accident Considerations in Past NEPA p:tency by one of the following changes in NRC policies regarding the Reviews m:thods: A host animal test written into considerations to be given to serious th) filed Outline of Production, or the accidents from an environmental as well The proposed Annex to Appendix D two-stage test provided in this as a safety point of view, of10 CFR Part 50 (hereafter the pmgraph.
This statement of Interim policy
" Annex") was published for comment (1) Each of at least a but not more announces the withdrawalof the n December 1,1971 by the (former) th.n 10 guinea pigs, each weighing 100 proposed Annex to Appendix D of to Atomic Energy Commission. It proposed to 500 grams, shall be injected CFR Part 50 and the suspension of the to specify a set of standardized accident subcutaneously with a guinea pig dose.
rulemaking proceeding that began with assumptions to be used in A second guinea pig dose shall be the publication of that proposed Annex Environmental Reports submitted by injected 21 to 23 days after the first on December 1,1971. It is the applicants for construction permits or d:s2. Each guinea pig dose shall be one-Commission's position that its operating licenses for nuclear power fifth of the dose recommended on the Environmental Impact Statements shall reactors. It also included a system for libil for a calf.
include considerations of the site.
classifying accidents according to a (2) Clostridium sordellii challenge specific environmentalimpacts graded scale of severity and probability miterial, available upon request from attributable to accident sequences that of occurrence. Nine classes of accidents Vst:rinary Services, shall be used for ead to releases of radiation and/or were defined, ranging from trivial to chdlenge 14 to ts days following the radioactive materials, including very serious. It directed that "for each second injection of the product. Each of class, except classes 1 and 9, the eight vaccinates and each of five a pn, posed u an Annex to 10 Cm Pen so.
environmental consequences shall be cdditional nonveccinated guinea pigs for Appendia D. Je m mast. The Comuniwion's NEPA.
evalueled as indicated." Class 1 events knP umuns ressuonnue abwquady Guly were not to be Considered because of l
controls shall be injected intramuscularly with approximately 100 2"2[ %'"dgode their trivial consequences, whereas in Cm t
u LD of challenge material.This dose Annen a enn under mdw uon *
- as m regard to Class 9 events, the Annex shall be determined by statistical
- asas, stated as follows:
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40182 Federal Register / Vol. 45. No.110 / Friday, June 13. 1980 / ules and Regulations j
ne oc:urrences in Class e involve within a 50-mile radius of the plant, and body on which the plant floats. Here the sequences of postulated successive failures some differences between boiling water staff emphasized its focus on risk to the more severe than those postulated for the reactors (BWR) and pressurized water environment but did not find that the l
[,*,'f',,,'Q',e$csyms and reactors (PWR). Beyond these few probability of a core melt event consequences could be severe. However, the specifics, the discussions have occurring in the first place was probability of their occurrence is so small reiterated the guidance of the Annex essentially any different than for land-that their environmental Sk is extremely and have relied upon the Annex's based plant. In its Memorandum and 1
low. Defense in depth (multiple physical conclusion that the probability of Order In the Matter of Offshore Power barriers), quality assurance for design.
cccurrence of a Class 9 event is too low Systems.* the Commission concurred in i l manufacture and operation. continued to warrant consideration, a conclusion the staff's judgment.Thus, the Reactor a
surveillance and testing. and conservative based upon generally stated safety Safety Study and NRC experience with lesign are all applied to provide and considerations, these cases has served to refocus riaintain the required high degree of With the publication of the Reactor attention on the need to reemphasize Safety Study (WASH-1400),in draft th'at environmental risk entails both class are, a ir ain, ee y mote in probability that the environmental risk is form in August 1974 and final form in probabilities and consequences, a point cxtren'ely low. For these reasons. It is not October 1975, the accident discussions that was made in the publication of the necessary to discuss such events in in EnvironmentalImpact Statements Annex. but was not given adequate rpplicants' Environmental Reports.
began to refer to this first detailed study emphasis.
A footnote to the Annex stated:
of the risks associated with nuclear In July 1977 the NRC commissioned a powerplant accidents particularly Risk Assessment Review Group to Afthough this annex refers to applicant's events which can lead to the melting of clarify the achievements and limitations Environmental Reports, the current the fuelinside a reactor.8 The references of the Reactor Safety Study." One of the to this study were in keeping with the conclusions of this study, published in acable excep as t te t m y otherwise require to AEC draft and final intent and spirit of NEPA "to disclose" September 1978, as NUREG/CR.0400.
Detailed Statements, relevant information, but it is obvious
" Risk Assessment Review Group Report that WASH-1400 did not form the basis to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory During the pub!Ic comment period that for the conclusion expressed in the Commission." was that "The Review followed publication of the Annex a Annex in 1971 that the probability of G oup was unable to determine whether number of criticisms of the Annex were occurrence of Class 9 events was too the absolute probabilities of accident received. Principal among these were low to warrant their (site-specific) sequences in WASH-1400 are high or the following.
consideration under NEPA.
low, but believes that the error bounds (1)The philosophy of prescribing The Commission's staff has, however on those estimates are in general.
assumptions does not lead to objective identified in certain cases unique greatly understated." This and other circumstances which it felt warranted findings of the Review Group have also (2)It tiled to treat the probabilities of 0
t d detailed subsequently been referred to in accidents in any but the most general
{0n f Class 9 events. One of Environmental Impact Statements, along era reeder Re ctor P a RP). I uld icy s a e ent th R or fety
'8 to s w at I es 9 accid t are sufficiently low in probability that their metal cooled fast breeder reactor very different from the more conventional Review Group Report, published o,n consequences in terms of environmental risks need not be discussed light water reactor plants for which the January 18.1979.T e Commission s s
p e the fin in s of the (4) No guidance was given as to how safety experience base is much broader.
R G ou bo Saf 5t dy's achievements and as to a tive efflu n d ng plant r the RP.
ta lu le a operation should be factored into the discussion of the consideratics it had A few Draft Environmental cost-benefit analysis.
given to Class 9 events.
Statements have been published (5) The accfdent assumptions are not In the early site review for the subsequent to the Three hiile Island generally applicable to gas cooled or Perryman site, the staff performed an accident.These were for conventional liquid metal cooled reactors.
Informal assessment of the relative land-based light water reactor plants (6) Safety and environmental risks are differences in Class 9 accident and continued to reflect the past not essentia.lly different consideratio' s.
consequences among the alternative practice with respect to accidents at n
Neither the Atomic Energy sites. (SECY-78-137) such plants, but noted that the Commission nor the NRC took any in the case of the application by experience gained from the Three Mile further action on this rulemaking except Offshore Power Systems to manufacture Island accident was not factored into in 1974 when 10 CFR Part 51 was floating nuclear power plants, the staff the discussion.
jud ed that the environmental risks of Our experience with past NEPA promulgated. Over the intervening years -
d the accident considerations discussed in some Class 9 events warranted special reviews of accidents and the TMI EnvironmentalImpact Statements for consideration.The special accident clearly leads us to believe that
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proposed nuclear power plants reflected circumstances were the potentially a change is needed.
the guidance of the Annex with few serious consequences associated with Accordingly, the proposed Annex to cxceptions. Typically, the discussions of water (liquid) pathways leading to Appendix D of to CFR Part 50. published I
cccident consequences through Class a radiological exposures if a molten on December 1,1971 is hereb'
-(design basis accidents) for each case reactor core were to fallinto the water withdrawn and shall not here'after be l
have reflected specific site used by applicants nor by the staff.The l
characteristics associated with 81t le of interest that the Reactor Safety Study reasons for the withdrawal are as I0lIOW8:
$" '."to a core melt accident.
meteorology (the dispersion of releases sed ss y
of redinactive material 1.1to the equivalen ttmospliere), the actual population
- NURECA139. February 19n.
' Docket No. STN 50-437. September 14.1979.
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t Federal Register / Vol. 45. No.116 / Friday, June 13. 1980 / Rules and Regulations 40103
- 1. He Annex proscribes na environmental consequences of issued Statemsnts, nor, absent a consideration of the kinds of accidents releases whose probability of occurence showing of similar special (Class 9) that, according to the Reactor has been estimated shallalso be circumstances, as a basis for opening.
Safety Study, dominate the accident discussed in probabilistic terms. Such reopening, or expanding any previous or risk.
consequences shall be characterized in ongoing proceediag.*
?.
1 He definition of Class 9 accidents terms of potential radiological However,it is also the intent of the in the Annex is not sufficiently precise exposures to individuals, to population Commission that the staff take steps to to warrant its further use in Commission groups, and, where applicable, to biota.
identify addit!onal cases that might 0
policy, rules, and regulations, nor as a Health and safety risks that may be warrant early consideration of either 0
decision criterion in agency practice.
associated with exposures to people additional features or other actions
- 3. He Annex's prescription of shall be discussed in a manner that which would prevent or mitigate the cssumptions to be used in the analysis fairly reflects the current state of consequences of serious accidents.
cf the environmental consequences of knowledge regarding such risks.
Cases for such consideration are those cccidents does not centribute to Socioeconomic impacts that might be for which a Final Environmental cbjective consideration-associated with emergency measures Statement has already been issued at
- 4. He Annex does not give adequate during or following an accident should the Construction Permit stage but for c nsideration to the detailed treatment also be discussed.The environmental which the Operatirg License review cf measures taken to prevent and to risk of racidents shoutialso be stage has not yet been reachnd. in mitwate the consequences of accidents compared to and contrasted with carrying out this directive. the staff in th) safety review of each application.
radiological risks associated with should consider retcvant site features.
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Tha classification of accidents normal and anticipated operational including population density, associated with accident risk in comparison to such
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proposed in that Annex shall no longer releases.
be used. In its place the following In promulgating this interim guidance, features at presently operating plants.
intirim guidance is given for the the Commission is aware that there are Staff should also consider the likelihood and willlikely remain for some time to that substantive changes in plant design tfo in A reviews.
come many uncertainties in the features which may compensate further e
Accident Considerations in Future application of risk assessment methods, for adverse site features may be more NEPA Reviews and it expects that its Environmental easily incorporated in plants when Impact Statements willidentify major construction has not yet prngret. sed very Itis the position of the Commission uncertainties in its probabilistic far.
th:t its EnvironmentalImpact estimates. On the other hand the Environmental Repnrts submitted by St.tements, pursuant to Section 102(c)(i)
Commission believes that the state of applicants for construction permits and of the National Environmental Policy the art is suffit.ientl/ advanced that a for operating licenses on or after July 1.
Act cf1989, shallinclude a reasoned beatn,ing should now be made in the 1980 should include a discussion of the consideration of the environmental risks use of these methodologies in the environmental risks associated with (impacts) attributable to accidents at the regulatory process, and that such use accidents that follows the guidance pirticular facility or facilities within the will represent a contructive and rational given herein.
scope of each such statement. In the forward step in the discharge of its Related Policy Matters Under En: lysis and discussion of such risks.
.reponsibilities.
Consideration tpproximately equal attention shall be it is the mtent of the Commission in given to the probability of occurrence of issuing this Statement of Interim Policy In addition to its responsibilities reltses and to the probability of I
occurrence of the environmental that the staff willinitiate treatments of under NEPA the NRC also bears l
accident considerations, in accordance responsibility under the Atomic Energy consequences of those releases.
Act for the protection of the public R:1:ases refer to radiation and/or with the foregoing guidance,in its health and safety from the hazards rrdioactive materials entering ongoing NEPA reviews,i.e., for any associated with the use of nuclear snvironmental exposure pathways, proceeding at a licensing stage where a energy. Pursuant to this responsibility including air, water, and ground water.
Final EnvironmentalImpact Statement the Commission notes that there are Events or accident sequences that has not yet been issued.These new 1sd to releases shallinclude but not be treatments, which will take into account currently a number of ongoing activities limited to those that can reasonably be significant site-and plant-specific being considered by the Commission expicted to occur. In. plant accident features, will result in more detailed and its staff which latimately relate to s quences that can lead to a spectrum of discussions of accident risks than in the " Class 9 accident" question and which are either the subject of current releases shall be discussed and shall previous environmental statements, rulemaking or are candidate subjects for include sequences that can result in particularly for those related to inadequate cooling of reactor fuel and to conventionallight water plants at land-rulemaking.
m21 ting of the reactor core.The extent to based sites. it is expected that these On December 19.1979 the which events ansing from causes revised treatments willlead to Commission issued for public comment
- exttrnal to the plant which are conclusions regarding the environmental a proposed rule which would
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considered possible contributors to the risks of accidents similar to those that significantly revise its requirements in risk associated with the particular plant would be reached by a continuation of to CFR Part 50 for emergency planning shill also be discussed. Detailed current practices, particularly for cases for nuclear power planta. One of the quintitative considerations that form involving special circumstances where considerations in this rulemaking was the basis of probabilistic estimates of Class 9 risks have been considered by r;llases need not be incorporated in the the staff, as described above. Thus, this
'comnunion.r. caiin ky and ernerned dis.sr with the inclusion at the peerMine two sentences.
Environmentallmpact Statements but change in policy is not to be construed shill be referenced therein. Such as any lack of confidence in c;nclusions 3',@,'ded re.'pp' h* 'N[NeN['" ""
f references shallinclude, as applicable, regarding the environmental risks of erroneo, po.nion on c:.., a.cnaen, re
.ts on safety evaluations.
accidents expressed in any previously
'M FR rs16r.
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4 40104
. Federal Register / Vol. 45, No.116 / Friday, June 13, 1980 / Rules and Regulations tha potential consequences of Class 9 For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
resellers and reseller-retailers of accidents in a genenc sense.'
Samuel J. Chilk, gasoline. Generally, the new rules In August 1979, pursuant to the Secretary of the Commission.
permit resellers and reseller-retailers to compute maximum lawful selling prices Commission's request. a Siting Policy ini ooc so-ima nad e-sme s es.=1 based on the acaoisitm, n ccat of the type Tcsk Force made recommendations with m wna cooris.*o w or grade of gasoline, plus a fixed cents respect to possible changes in NRC per gallon markup depending on the re ctor s; ting policy and criteria,e type of sale, plus tax costs.'The new currently set forth in to CFR Part 100. As DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY rules are similar to the retailer price st:ted therein,its recommendations Economic Regulatory Administration rules adopted in July 1979.
e were made to accomplish (among Under the new rules, acquisition cost th he fall 1
10 CFR Parts 210,212 is defined as the last purchase price for T ake into con derat on in siting the risk seHen 4 gasohne sales oh don tssociated with accidents beyond the design (Docket No. ERA-R-79-32El gallons or less in calendar year 1979. For basis (Class 9) by establishing population sellers with sales of more than 5 million density and distribution criteria.
RoseHers' and Reseller-Retailers' Price gallons of gasoline in calendar year Rules for Gasoline This matter is currently before the 1979, acquisition cost is defined as the Commission.
Asanct Economic Regulatory cost of product in inventory computed "Ihis and other recommendations that Administration. Department of Energy.
pursuant to the seller's historical h va been made as a result of th*
Action: Final rule.
accounting practices consistently investigations into the Three Mile Island applied.'
cccident are currently being brought sumwann The Department of Energy Generally, the retailer price rules together by the Commission's staffin (DOE) hereby adopts three amendments adopted in July 1979 permit retailers to tha form of proposed Action Plans.'
to its reseller and reseller-retailer price alter their normal business practices Among other matters, these incorporate rules. First, small resellers and reseller-with respect to sales et gasoline.The recommendations for rulemaking related retailers (sales in calendar year 1979 of new reseller-retailer rules do not contain t3 degraded core cooling and core melt 5 million gallons of gasoline or less) are a similar provision. However, in most eccidents. The Commission expects to permitted the option of computing other respects the July 1979 price rules issue decisions on these Action Plans in
" acquisition cost" using the firm's for independent retailers and the new th2 near futum. It is the Commission's historical a : counting nractices reseller-retailer price rules are similar.
policy and intent to devote NRC's major consistently applied. Second, the normal Finally, the restriction on the amount resources to matters which the business practices rule is amended to ofincreased commissions that may be Commission believes will make existing treat reseller retailers consistently with passed through in price increases by and future nuclear power plants safer, independent retailers with respect to refiners was removed. In doing so, and to prevent a recurrence of the kind retail gasoline sales. Third, the however, the provision that perrnitted of accident that occurred at Three Mile exception to the refiner equal refiners an exception to the equal Island. In the interim however, and application rule regarding retail sales by application rule to reflect increased pending completion of mlemaking consignee-agents is reinstated.
commissions in the retail selling price ectivities in the areas of emergency DATE: Effective May 1,1980.
charged by commission agents was deleted.
pl'nning, siting criteria, and design and Pon FunTHen INronuATion coNTAcr.
Robert C. Gillette (Hearing Procedures),
II. Amendments e tions o e ous et Economic Regulatory Administration.
Comments received by DOE since the potential, the Commission finds it Room 2214,2000 M Street, NW.,
issuance of the rule indicate that a few essential to improve its procedures for Washington. D.C. 20461 (202) 653-3757 small sellers would prefer to use the describing and disclosing to the public William L Webb (Office of Public cost of product in inventory rather than tha basis for arriving at conclusions Inf rmation), Economic Regulatory the last purchase price to determine regarding the environmental risks due to Administration, Ro,om 110.-B,2000 M acquisition cost. Generally these sellers recidents at nuclear power plants. On Street, NW., Washmgton, D.C. 20461 purchase prcduct from more than one completion of the rulemaking activities (202) 653-4055 supplier at widely varying prices.
in these areas, and based also upon the Chuck Boehl(Regulations and cxperience gained with this state.nent of Emergency Planning). Economic iwith,,,pect to establishing the maximum interim policy and guidance, the Regulatory Admmistration Room lawful sellins price for gasohol. which is the subject Commission m. tends to pursue possible 7204,2000 M Street. NW., Washington, of a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (4s FR 34546, May 22. m) notwithstanans statemente to me ch'nges or additions to 10 CFR Part 51 D.C. 20481 (202) 653-3202
- contrary in that rulemaking. the new price rules for to codify its position cn the role of William Funk or William Mayo 1.ee reneuers res.11er. retailers. and retailus permit accident risks under NEPA.
(Office of General Counsel),
allers that blend Sasohol to establish a maximum Dated at Washington, D.C this 9th day of Department of Energy, Room BA-127, lawful sellins price for saschot in a manner that treats the Sasoline and alcohol components of June 1980.
1000 Independence Avenue, SW.,
gasohol as separate products under the price rules.
3 Washington. D.C. 20585 (202) 252-6730 Accorangiy. the acquaition cost of uch a a
- Cf. NUREG o30s. " Planning Basis for the or 252-6754 comoonent of the blender's maximum lawful sellins De slopment of State andlocalCovernment pnce forgasohol Radiological Emersency Response Plans in Support SUPPt.EasENTARY INFonMATloN:
all a firm has consistently and historically used of L!sht Water Nuclear Power Plants." November
- 1. Back' ground more than one accounting practice for determining 197s.
. 'NUREG-cots. " Report of the Siting Policy Task II. Amendments the cost of product in inventory (e.g. one for DOE's Force," August 1979.
III. procedural Requirements price rulee and one for income tax purposes), the
' Draft NUREG4000. " Action Plans for firm may choose either of these accoonting laplementing Recomunendations of the Presidents I. hackground practices to determine the cost of psduct in inventory under the new, Axed merstn reseller and comedesion and Other Studsee of the 36-2 On April 26,1980 (45 FR 29546, May 2 renun. retailer rule. ne rirm. of couru. must Accident." December 10.1979.
1980) DOE issued new price rules for consistently apply that practice under the new rule.
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Office of the Soestsy t
9 Docketing & Service M
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fl April 22, 1980 g cn y
PJt0PostD BULE H5 FR. 40101) e e
Chairman John Ahearne Commissioner Richard T. Kennedy U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Washington, D.C. 20555 Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Commissioner Victor Gilinsky U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Commissioner Peter A. 3radford Washington, D.C. 20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Commissioner Josech M. Hendrie Washington, D.C. 20555 U.S. Nuclear Regu.latory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Re:
Com:nission Actn on SECY-80-131, " Accident Considerations nder NEPA" Gentlem)n:
In SECY-80-131,. " Accident Consideracions L'nder NEPA", the NRC Staff has recommended that the proposed Annex to Appendix D of 10 CFR Part 50 be withdrawn.
In the future, the Staff has concluded, NEPA environmental reviews should include analysis of the consequences of all possible radiological accidents, including the so-called Class 9 events that were heretofore deemed to be so imprchable as to not warrant consideration.
The Commonwealth of Massac usetts, an intervenor in the ongoing Pilgrim 2 construction permit proceedings, took the
-position two years ago that the Pilgrim 2 FES was defective in j
its failure to address the issue of Class 9 accident 9
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T$YPIRG Box 1892 Rice Memorial Center Rice University WR Houston, Texas 77001 Texas Public Interest Research Group (713) 527-81 4099 April 30, 1980 In Reply, Write to:
TexPIRG State Office 1
Box 237 U.C. M e!
N NG
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University RRORCSED M LE; l
Houston, /
77004 g
j Chairman John rne Mr. Victor Gilinsky g
gu 151380 P @
Mr. Joseph Hendrie p
Mr. Richard Kennedy Ot(se e ggepce 9 j!
Mr. Peter Bradford g
004 gg 3
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission g
9 Washington, D.C.
20555 N
m oj Re:
Commission Action on SECY-80-131, " Accident Consideration y
Under NEPA" J
3j
Dear Sirs:
i The Commis-Staff has recommended that the annex to a
5, Appendix D of 10 CFR 50 be withdrawn.
With that conclusion,'
TexPIRG concurs.
The legal and policymaking basis for including analyses of Class-9 accidents in the environmental impact
}
statement process is cogently stated by the Council on Environ-l-
mental Quality in their transmittal to you (letter from Mr. Gus 5
Speth to Mr. Ahearne, Mar. 20, 1980).
We, however, find the staff's further position that such g
analyses be applied only to future impact statements to be 3
unacceptable and without merit.
In most respects, TexPIRG would associate its position with that of the Attorney-General of a
Massachusetts as stated in the. transmittal of Francis S. Wright on April 22, 1980.
At a minimum, TexPIRG believes the further analyses should 3
be applied'to those applications which must still undergo con-3 struction permit hearings.
We believe it indefensible to simuel-taneously conclude that NEPA confers an obligation to review a
possible, but improbable Class 9 accidents, while also deciding s
l that applications which have not been reviewed by the licensing
- j board are excluded from such a review.
TexPIRG is a student-funded non-profit consumer and environ-mental advocacy organization.
As an intervonor in docket 50-466 (HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER COMPANY, Allens Creek Unit 1), TexPIRG has repeatedly raised contentions alleging NEPA defects due to
.the failure to consider the effects of various accidents classed by the staff as " incredible."
Each time, of course, the licensing board denied the request.
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i NEPA-mandated impact statements must contain adequate information to allow the public, Congress, and other agencies "to all know possible environmental consequences of proposed agency action." Environmental Defense Fund v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 325 F. Supp. 749, 759 (E.D. Ark. 19711 Most of the applications pending in the construction permit Unlike Three Mile Island stage are Boiling Water Reactor designs.
Unit 2, these plants are likely to incur atmospheric releases via a breach of the containment in the event of substantial As WASH-740 Update and other documents would core melting.
indicate, such an event would entail massive environmental damage--over a scope of population and space which exceeds the LPZ or EPZ siting rules otherwise to be exercised in these construction permit hearings.
Rational and consistent decision-making would ensure that the site analyses to be considered at these hearings,-as required should balance all of the possible impacts of all by NEPA, accidents prior to selecting an obviously superior site.
As the Appeal Board stated:
"Perhaps the most important environmentally-related task the staff has under NEPA is to determine whether an application should be turned down because there is some other site at which l
No other environmental question the plant ought to be located.
is both so significant in terms of the ultimate outcome and Florida so dependent upon facts particular to the application."
Power & Licht Company (St. LuOie Unit 2) ALAB-435, 6 NRC 541, 543, 544 (1977).
With the most crucial issues of the construction permit stage tied to the severity of accidents, TexPIRG sees no sense
?y in holding back on the Laplementation of this policy for pro-ceedings where the construction permit issues such as site suita-f bility are still active.
3 TexPIRG particularly objects to this staff recommendation as 3-In the instance it relates to the proposed Allens Creek Unit 1.
e of Allens Creek, the staff is preparing a detailed alternative Yet the staff's policy 9
site study and supplement to the FES.
would apparently preclude the consideration of what most of the public considers to be the most important issues during that i
process, which already includes publication of supplementary T
documents. */
Y t
There is some question in our minds as to where Allens Creel t
A Final EIS has been l
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lies in the staff's recommendation.
J submitted, as has a Final Supplement to the FES, with anoth' There is obviously
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final supplement to follow, apparently.
a nuestion of what is meant by " final
3.
In this instance, where the staff is already engaged in preparation of supplemental environmental analysis, there is absolutely no excuse for stopping short in reviewing class 9 accidents.
To proceed on the present course of the staff is to admit that the staff analysis is nothing more than a continuation of.the "boilerplate" work referred to by the Council on Environmental Quality.
As the construction permit hearings begin without the review of these serious accidents, the citizens of Houston or Portland or Massachusetts might rightfully ask "why do we merit less serious safety consideration than the residents surrounding newer plants?"
Finally, not only do we ask that the NRC require a review of Class 9 accidents in these pending applications, but we also urge you to require the submission of supplemental EIS documentation--rather than merely leaving it to the Licensing Board to correct the EIS.
The Appeal Board noted in Allied-General Nuclear Services (Barnwell Facility) ALAB-296, 2 NRC 671 (1975) that truly substantial modifications to the FES requires recircu-lation of the document.
Certainly, there can be no question that the inclusion of these severe accident possibilities is not a trivial or minor modification to the environmental review.
By submitting supplemental EIS documentation, the public and intervenors can more ably participate in the hearing process on this issue through clearer definition of the staff position and facts.
In summary, Tr2PIRG believes that a Nuclear Regulatory Commission which
.s truly committed to improving its scrutiny of' applications--a stated on numerous occasions since TMI-2--
will begin applying the new staff recommendations on Class 9 accidents, when it can, where it can, which means pending construction permit applications.
I Thank you for your consideration, i
Sincerely,
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Clarence Johnson Executiv'3 Direcgr TexPIRG l
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May a,
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L{j a voffke dNg.
3 Chairman John Aherne Dx5g gg
[Ir. Peter Bradford or. Joseon nendra.e N
Bam nr. Victor Gilansky NJ IIr. Richard Kennedy o
G 23: CCICIS3ICli ivTIOli Gli S20Y S0-131, "AC'IDE:!T CCI!SID2R-ATIO!! UIID2R ITATICIIiL E!iVIRGU 1E: TAL POLICY ACT" Gentlemen:
As a pro-se Intervenor in the Allens Creek ruclear GenerwM-- Sution proceedings, Docket 50-466, I am deeply disturoed at recom.nendations that the 111 ens Cra
- be encluded from Consideration of the environmental effects of Class 9 accidents as recommended by the Comnission Staff.
I as disturbed because this reccommendation ignores us.
This plant is in no less need of these considerations than a plant for which an environmental statement has not been published.
The Allens n=eek plant has had a statement to Applicant financial inadequacy)g a two year delay due and suuplement published (followin Yet, the Staff for the Allens Creak licensing has stated it, intends to pub-lish another supple =ent.
b"cen this supplement is published, it 1111, unless the Staff position to omit consideration of Class 9 for this licensing is chan6ed, contain no such studies.
is a result of these facts, I am urging that the Staff has been too reticent in applying the recuirement to consider Class 9 accidents retroactively. That the 111 ens Creek site has not been fully determined is but another reason the 111 ens Creek proceeding does not belong among the six licensings chosen by staff to not be subject to Class 9 accident considerations.
M.7self, and Tenas ?ublic Intereht Research Groups have had several contentions denied admission-because they are based on Class 9 accidents also. If the Staff's recommm-dation is accented, the Commission will have produced an anomaly for the six reactors involved.
In the case of Allens Creek, I believe the anomaly will 'oe greater, be cause the suitability and selection of site'are not fully determined for it.
2espectfully submitted Yh&IA ohn 2. Doherty k
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June 17,-1980 PROPOSED RULE l
M5 FR,40100 Chairman John Ahearne Commissioner Richard T. Kennedy U.S. Nuclear Regulatory U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C.
20555 Commissioner Victor Gilinsky Commissioner Peter A. Bradford U.S. Nuclear Regulatory U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Washington, D.C.
20555 g.
De Commissioner Joseph M. Hendrie s
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission CCClGTED g
USNRC Washington, D.C.
20555 6'
JUN 2 o ggN > :
-3 Re:
Commission Action on SECY-80-131
" Accident Considerations Under NhPA"
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Branch y
Gentlemen:
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Skagitonians Colicerned About Nuclear Plants (SCANP), inter venors in the ongoing Skagit LWA proceedings, Docket Nos.
50-522 and 50-523, and the Swinomish Tribal Community submit this letter to demonstrate their full' support of the request by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts that the potential for and consequences of Class 9 accidents be considered fully under NEPA in every ongoing proceeding, including the Skagit procseding.
SCANP, a nonprofit association of Skagit County residents, intervened in the Skagit proceeding at the outset, and has maintained throughout the proceeding that NEPA requires full consideration of Class 9 accidents in the staff's environ-
-mental impace statement, and throughout the hearing process.
Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
The Swinomish Tribal Community is a federally recognized l
Indian tribe organized under the Indian Reorganization Act.
The tribe's reservation was established at the mouth of the l
Skagit River pursuant to the Treaty of Point Elliott, 12 Stat. 927 (Jan. 22, 1855), a treaty which also recognized and preserved the fishing rights of the Swinomish in Skagit River l
and Puget Sound waters.
See Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 99 S. Ct. 3055 (1979).
The Swinomish Tribal Community's petition to inter-vene in the Skagit proceeding presently is pending before the Commission.
"C* W
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Chairman John Ahearne and Commissioners June 17, 1980 Page Two SCANP and the Swinomish Tribal Community fully endorse the posi-tion of the Commonwealth that NEPA requires full consideration of Class 9 accidents.
The need for addressing Class 9 accidents is especially compelling in the Skagit proceeding, where the potential for natural catastrophe (earthquake, upstream dam collapse, Mt.
Baker eruption) combines with the potential for extraordinarily serious consequences (contamination of Skagit River liquid pathway, complete loss of local Indian tribe populations, inability to evacuate river valley enclosed by mountains and Sound) to render the possibility and consequences of a Class 9 accident far too great to be ignored.
Accordingly, SCANP and the Swinomish Tribal Community urge tPe Commission to direct its staff to address the potential for and consequences of Class 9 accidents in the Skagit proceeding and in other ongoing proceedings on an individual basis which takes into full account the unique situations attendant to each plant site.
The staff should be directed to prepare supplemental draf t environmental impact statements addressing the Class 9 issue for Skagit and each of the other ongoing proceedings. and to circulate this EIS in accordance with NEPA.
40 CFR 51502.9(c)(1)(ii),(c)(4). ~ After cirulating these draf t statements and evaluating the comments received in response thereto, the staff should issue supplemental final statements for each proceeding, and thereafter introduce the supplemental statements into evidence in the licensing proceedings, to enable the licensing boards to consider the Class 9 issue, based upon full information.
40 CFR 51502.9 (c) (3), (4).
Thank you for your cons ideration.
Very truly yours,,
l.t.. &( / f Michael W. Gendler Counsel for Skagitonians i
Concerned About Nuclear Plants Wh Donald S. Means Counsel for Swinomish Tribal Community 140/A19
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o UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC ShFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of PUGET SOUND POWER & LIGHT
)
DOCK ET '.NOS.
STN 50-522 COMPANY, et al.,
)
50-523
)
)
(Skagit Nuclear Power Project, )
Units 1 and 2)
)
June 17, 1980
)
)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify 'that copies of:
A LETTER TO THE COMMISSION dated June 17, 1980, have been served on the following by depositing the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, on this 17th day of June, 1980.
Valent ine B. Deale, Esq., Chairman Docketing and Service Section Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Office of the Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Commission 1001 Connect icut Avenue N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20555 Washington, D.C. 20036 Richard L. Black, Esq.
Dr. Frank F. Hooper, Member Counsel for NRC Staff Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory School of Natural Resources Commission Univers ity of Michigan Office of the Executive Legal Ann Arbor, MI.
48104 Director l
Gustave A. Linenberger, Member Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Nicholas D. Lewis, Chairma n U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Energy Facility Site Evaluation Commission Council Washington, D.C.
20555 820 East Fif th Avenue Oly mp ia, Washington 98504 Certificate - 1 w
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-w w
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Richard M. Sandvik, Esq.,
Russel W. Busch Assistant Attorney General Evergreen Legal Services Department of Justice 520 Smith Tower
~500 Pacific Building Seattle, Washington 98104 j
520 S. W. Yamh ill Portland, oregon 97204 Thomas Moser i
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney Robert Lowenstein, Esq.
Skagit County Courthouse Lowens tein, Newman, Reis &
Mt. Vernon, Washington -98273 Axelrad 1025 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Warren Hastings Washington, D.C.
20036 Portland General Electric.Co.
121 S.W. Salmon S treet TB 13 James W. Durham, Esq.
Portland General Electric Co.
Portland, Oregon 97204 121 S.W.
Salmon Street TB 17 Portland, Oregon 97204 CESP and F0B E. Stachon & L. Marbet 19142 S. Bakers Ferry Road Boring, Oregon 97009 Canadian Consulate General Peter A. van B rak.el Vice-Consul 412 Plaza 600 6th and S tewart S treet Seattle, Washington 98101 F. Theodore Thoms en Perk ins, Cole, Stone, Ols en
& Williams 1900 Washington B uilding Seattle, Washington 98101 Alan P. O' Kelly Paine, Lowe, Coffin, Herman
& 0' Kelly 1400 Washington Trust Financial Center Spokane, Washington 99204
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DATED:
ROGERM.[EED By
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990F03ED RULE
. 51 cc:mm 3 July 1980 g}
d tMnc Ra==1 J. Chilk, Secretary f
j((th Sep.y Nuclear Regulatory Comission Ne Washington, D.C. 20555 p
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I have ', cst read the recently released Statement of Interim Policy re-garding Nuclear Power Plant Accident Considerations Under NEPA and have sme questions and cmments for your review.
First, on my copy, I could not find a citation for Footnote 4 (Memorandum and Order In the Matter of Offshore Power Systems). I would appreciate re-iving a copy of that par +4cnlar memo.
Seccmdly, I want to offer my personal support of the revised policy as presented in this Interim Policy. I hcpe that it is not weakened in any way as a result of cmments you may receive through the Sepicuber had14ne. In s fact, my request is for the strongest regulations possible to be applied to-the develogrent of any EIS required by IEPA. If the NEPA documents are to be of value, then they must be more than perfunctory exercises that are vulnerable to subjective decision-making.
In this regard, I want to strongly su; port Cmmis5icners Gilinsky and Bradford (footnote 5) in their opposition to the inclusion of of the seatences which seem to state a disclaimr on the Mof the NPC for past deficiencies. As I was reading the Interim Policy and the historical information concerning such policy, I was personally bothered by the inplications of the revised policy. I was quite astonished to read that Class 9 accidents were not even lightly considered in the'IEPA process because their probability of occurence was so small!!! I-wonder now hcw such a subjective, unscientific policy could have been applied to such inportant undertakings as the placement into the lives of the people of this country of potentially harmful power plant facilities. In any case, I concur with Gilinsky and Bradford that those two sentences are definitely inconsistent with an "even-handed reappraisal of the forner, erron&s position cn Class 9 acx:idents."
For your records, I am a private citizen bo has haerra inforned on nuclear issues by studying as nuch related information as time permits.
Sin rely, ksw & '
Jean B. Curry 302 otis Street Santa Cruz, cali#. 95060 P.S. I trust that Cmmissioners Bradford and Gilinsky will be inforned of these canents in support of their position.
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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES gN l
LILL KEESE P. O. BOX 2910 AUSTIN TEXAS 78769 l
Comminter on Agrssulture & Livestock Commit ~ G-ortation G
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DO N FROF05ED RULEl_M)olol) t, JUL 221980 > :-10 l
July 18, 1980
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(% F Secretary of the Commission I. '
Office of the Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
\\C.,
Dccheting & SeMCS
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Washington, D.C.
20555
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V Re:
Consideration of Accidents at Nuclear Power Plants Under the National Environmental Policy Act of 196,9, 45 F.R. 40103.
Dear Commission Secretary,
I would like to' express concern, both for myself and my constituents, as to the NRC's policy.of addressing so-called Class 9, or " core melt", accidents at nuclear power plants in the required' environmental impact statement for such plants.
Itam distressed to learn that the proposed Allen's Creek Nuclear Project of my legislative district is now exempt from the required inclusion of analyses regarding the impact of a Class 9 accident on the local population.
The Allen's Creek Project has not started construction, nor a construction permit hearing held as yet.
I also understand that your own staff has not as yet completed their own environmental review of the proposed site.
I firmly believe that tihe Allen's Creek Project, and all other nuclear projects where a construction permit has not been issued, be required to undergo an investigation of the full range of consequences possible from.a Class 9 accident.
Such investigation should determine pessible acquifer contamination; farmland contamination; and the impact on the local population as a result of a Class 9 accident.
In my opinion as a lawmaker, to do otherwise is not in the best interests of the public.
Once again, I strongly urge the Commission to require the Allen's Creek Project to include the full range of accident scenarios before a construction permit hearing is held.
The constituents of my legislative district should have a full and complete understanding of all the ramifications of such a project.
With sincerest regards, B*ll Keese
]
k>sstrict 29 J
Counties of: Austin. Burleson. Grimes Aradison. Waller Washington
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s N88 SAN DIEGO GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY P.o. box 1831 SAN DIEGo. CAUFoRNIA 92112 (714)232-4252
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=0 m to au m 3 - 5 0 5l July 14, 1980 me o rvR 000 H5 FR 40lOl)
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Mr. Samuel J. Chilk UOSEE D Secretary of the Commission 6
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
?>0555 JUI,,
g ) OfficStilhSDM d Attention: Docketing and Service Branch 4 ggg:gG36ct.
Br2dl
Dear Sir:
b v
7 c) p The San Diego Gas & Electric Company is pleased to submit the following comments in response to the NRC Statement of Interim Policy published in the Federal Register of Friday, June 13, 1980.
SDG&E is co-owner of the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station and in vitally interested in Commission licensing policy.
The Statement of Interim Policy announces that the NRC is revising its policy, effective immediately, to include consideration of
" Class 9" accidents in environmental impact assessments.
The NRC cites the TMI-2 accident as emphasizing the need for the chan8es in policy and consideration of Class 9 accidents in reviews of the Clinch River Breeder and Offshore Power Systems Plants as precedent for broadening its policies.
SDG&E considers broader environmental examination of more serious potential accidents reasonable and within the normal purview of NRC licensing activities.
However, we regret the linkage between such activities and the TMI-2 accident or the other unconventional licensing reviews.
We do not believe that the TMI-2 accident qualifies as a Class 9 event, despite extensive core overheating.
We, together with others, have long ago cautioned the NRC that more frequent operational incidents i
were potentially of greater risk (frequency x consequences) than the i
1 hypothetical, maximum credible events on which the NRC har' i
its concerns.
concentrated It is for such reasons that many knowledgeable individuals have, for some time, urged that the NRC adopt probabilistic risk assess-ment methodology and more realism when considering potential accident risks.
In its discussion (Fed. Reg. 40103), the NRC directs that "approximately equal attention shall be given to the probability of occurrence of releases and to the probability of occurrence of the envi-ronmental consequences of those releases."
Since to the intervenors the latter probability is assigned a value of unity, two responsibilitias fall l
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Acknowledged by card..
80.ynh ti j
P O([) 4 4
ANINVESToR oWNEO CORPORA Tion
SDfE CAN DIEGO GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY Mr. S. J. Chilk July 14, 1980 upon the NRC with the adoption of this policy. The first requires a thorough and concerted effort to educate the entire United States population of the c'.aficance of probability estimates in relation to nuclear hazards; the second requires similar treatment of the risks and hazards of other technologies that could be employed to satisfy the electrical demand. Since the public perceives the nuclear industry as not credible and since the NRC-through the,NEPA process-is charged with protecting the public health and safety re nuclear plant deployment, it is incumbent on the NRC to provide the public with a factual assess-ment of the risks in proper context, i.e. the probability of public harm
~
in satisfying the public need. We urge the NRC to undertake a vigorous program of public education so that NRC actions will be understandable, meaningful and credible to the interested public. In further clarifi-cation, it is incumbent upon the NRC to provide factual information to the public on the nature of radiation hazards. For example, the venting of Krypton-85 at TMI-2 needlessly agitated the local populace since they were not adequately informed of the very low hazard of Krypton gas, the meaning of the term " curie," the fact that Krypton is routinely released from nuclear facilities of all kinds all over the world, etc.
The NRC may wish to enlist the National Institutes of Health, or some similar authoritat.ive medical body, in conducting a portion of this education program, in order to enhance its own credibility.
SDG&E sincerely recommends the program described above, since it will matter little to the public that the "NRC's major resources" are devoted to making future nuclear plants safer, if it cannot comprehend how safe the plants are. Until the public realizes (a) that safety is relative, (b) that absolute safety is both unattainable and undesirable, and (c) that the benefits of energy production cetweigh the risks (for all proven technologies), the ef forts and activities of the NRC (as well as those of industry) are unlikely to be widely accepted.
I Sincerely, l
j L. Bernath, Manager Research & Reliability f
LB:ph cc: Jerry Haynes - SCE Dr. Carl Walske - AIF Dr. Ed Zebroski - EPRI-NSAC
s Commonwealth Edison one First National Plaza. Chicago, minois Address Reply to: Post Office Box 767 Chicago, lilinois 60690 August 11 00CKU M R gg/
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Of DOCmu a Secretary of the Commission j 2 gg 1 M80 * $
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 6;
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Washington, D.C.
20555
((yh Attention: ' Docketing and Service Branch N
Dear Sir:
CD D
In the Federal Register Notice of June 13, 1980 (45 FR 40101) the NRC revised its policy on nuclear power plant accident considerations under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969.
This change requires the consideration of class 9 events in Environmental Reports for construction permits or operating license applications filed on or after July 1, 1980.
It further provides for consideration of a spectrum of accident sequences and a spectrum of effects including risks and socio-economic impacts.
Given that the the NRC has not yet set forth a notice of proposed rulemaking for class 9 events in the safety phase of licensing, we find this policy statement premature.
Until such a rulemaking is initiated and investigations reveal a need for consideration of class 9 events, such a need cannot be assumed.
A definite need exists to unify the safety and environmental aspects of licensing relative to class 9 events.
The policy statement should be revoked and held in abeyance until a coherent, overall policy on this matter is developed, noticed, and opportunity is provided for public comment.
In any event, the policy statement itself represents an impossible requirement for both the NRC staff and potential applicants.
It merely requires an evaluation of the probability of occurence of an essentially open ended spectrum of events with corresponding evaluations of consequences and soci-economic effects.
No guidance is provided for the applicants or the staff regarding methodology, scope, evaluation criteria, or acceptance levels relative to the work to be done.
No requirement has been placed on NRC staff to develop uniform, acceptable guidance for staff members and applicants in these areas.
Given the essentially open ended nature of this policy statement and the wide potential variati.ons in interpretation, no consistency in application can be expected from applicants and, worse still, no consistency in review can be expected from NRC Staff.
This will lead to substantial i
confusion, licensing delays, uncontrolled ratcheting and unnecessary expenditure of resources with no identifiable benefits from the entire process.
Ob?
l e
Commonwealth Edison
^
2 The' Commission is urged to remove the requirement for Environmental Report submittals on this issue.
No such submittals should be required until after the staff has prepared (and the Commission has approved) appropriate guidance regarding the methodology, scope, evaluation criteria and acceptance levels for the evaluations required.
We appreciate having been given this opportunity to J. S. Abel Director of Nuclear Licensing 5860A 1
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COdNTY OF SUFFOLK
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9 DAVID J. GILMARTIN COUNTY ATTORNEY DEPARTMENT OF l AW 4B+
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Secretary of the Commission W -
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Washington, D.C. 20555 3 Swie, b
Attention: Docketing D rvice Branch
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,,,,.g Re: Proposed Annex to Appendix D of 10CFR Part 50
Dear Sir:
On behalf of the County of Suffolk, a neutral intervenor in the NRC Nuclear Licensing Proceedings for the LILCO nuclear facility at Shoreham, Case 50-322, I would like to address the following comments to the proposed Rule:
1)
The distinction between construction permit and operating license applications contained in the proposed regu-lation is superfluous for purposes of determining the NEPA duties that attach to an agency at a given time. If the analysis concerning the possible environmental impact related to Class 9 accidents needs to be done, there should be no time limit attached thereto.
It is the County's contention, therefore, that the Rule change should not automatically exempt applications in the OL stage.
2)
Should the distinction continue, each individual case should be considered. Consequently, in the case of Shoreham, the status of the applicant should not be placed technically in the OL exempt stage because the SER has yet co be issued, and the operation date is almost 3 years away.
In fact, both dates for said events are not yet firm.
3)
There are significant factors relating to the Shoreham nuclear power plant that qualify it for consideration of Class 9 Accidents, including the following:
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Secretary of the Commission August 14, 1980 a)
The age of the Shoreham NSSS and plant design; b)
The failure of the plant to be designed for a Class 9 Accident; c)
Groundwater problems; d)
Emergency Planning problems relating,to the plant's siting on the east and of an island; e)
The failure to account for the unique meteorology of the coastal site; f)
The possible detrimental impact of an accident en the local economy, specifically agriculture and tourism, and the economic and sociological impact
]
of the clean-up of the disabled plant.
1 l
Since the proposed Rule change is now based on a recommendation that Class 9 Accidents are possible, for all of the foregoing reasons, Shoreham is an appropriate plant for consideration cf the possible consequences of a Class 9 Accident in the conte.xt of its Environmental Impact Statement.
Very truly yours, PATRICIA A. DEMPSEY Assistant County Attorney PAD:ek 1
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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
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COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QU ALITY 8
4 722 JACKSON PLACE. N. W.
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A ter August 14, 1980 us,.
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The Honorable John Ahearne g
Sw Chairman U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission s
Cl-Washington, D.C.
20555 VhukD haf ik [0,f ~
Dear Chairman Ahearne:
WYk Ye/0/'
The Council was gratified by the positive response informally expressed by the Comission for the views set forth in our letter and attachment to you, dated March 20, 1980, concerning accident analyses in the Comis-sion's environmental impact statements ("EISs") for nuclear reactors.
We believe that the subsequent formal announcement of Interim Policy on the issue by the Commission is the most significant and encouraging step you have taken to rectify the serious problems in accident analysis inherited from the Atomic Energy Commission.
I am writing to you at this ti=e to convey the Council's specific views on the Interim Policy and the steps which must be taken to fulfill the Cornission's obliga-tions under the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA").
The accident considerations to be included in future NEPA reviews described by the Commission in the June 13th policy statement (45 Fed. Reg. 40101, at 40103) appear to conform to the basic outline for the required accident analysis prescribed in the Council's letter of March 20, 1980. However, such an analysis is difficult to describe accurately in purely abstract For that reason we look forward to the issuance of the first terms.
such NEPA analysis for a reac. tor in the licensing process. W
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h As the Interim Policy indicates, consideration of the environmental con-sequences of severe reactor accidents night warrant the need "for additional features or other actions which would prevent or mitigate the consequences of serious accidents." 45 Fed. Reg. at 40103. Consideration of such information might indicate, among other things, the need to modify plant design, select an alternative site, implement emergency preparedness measures, or reconsider a construction permit altogether. In this regard, the Council strongly disapproves of the Commission majority's statement that such new NEPA reviews "will lead to conclusions regarding the environmental risks of accidents similar to those that would be reached by a continuation of current practices..
45 Fed. Reg. at 40103., Two members of the Comission disagreed with the majority on this point and concluded that that position is " absolutely inconsistent with an even-handed reappraisal of the former erroneous position on Class 9 accidents." 45 Fed. Reg. at 40103. The Council agrees. The two sentences 1
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GENER AL h ELECTRIC NUCLEAR POWER SYSTEMS DIVISION GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY,175 CURTNER AVE., SAN JOSE, CALIFORNIA 95125 MFN 151-80 MC 682, (408) 925-5722
@tI14 August 28, 1980 4
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Secretary of the Commission SEP - 21960 > ~.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 6'
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3 Omce ct the :actetM Washington, DC 20555 C:chN i Mc8 drancs g/
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Attention:
Docketing and Service Branch d>>g\\&
Gentlemen:
SUBJECT:
STATEMENT OF INTERIM POLICY PURSUANT TO NUCLEAR POWER PLANT ACCIDENT CONSIDERATION UNDER THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT OF 1969 On June 9, 1980 the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, in a statement of interim policy, announced the withdrawal of the proposed Annex to Appen-dix D of 1GCFR Part 50 and the suspension of the rulemaking proceeding that began with the publication of that proposed annex on December 1, 1971.
While the interim policy guidanca provided in this announcement is intended to be immediately effective, interested persons were provided the opportunity to submit written comment or suggestions for consideration.
The Attachment to this letter contains the comments of the General Electric Company on the interim policy guidance.
Based on our review it is concluded that current NRC practices with regard to source terms for radiological release, equipment failure criteria and plant siting criteria provide protection well into the realm of Class 9 accidents, thus making the interim action unnecessary.
The General Electric perspective is that the withdrawal of the proposed Annex along with the new need to address site-specific impacts attributable to hypothetical accident.
sequences in Environmental Impact Statements is not necessary and will lead to confusion in the period before implementation of a final policy is completed.
Very truly yours, MNLLt MH R. H. Buchholz, Manager BWR Systems Licensing Safety & Licensing Operation RHB:ggo/105 W:M 312r :d...f.5.1R.a Attachment cc:
L. S. Gifford (Bethesda)
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ATTACHMENT General Electric comments concerning the withdrawal of the proposed Annex to Appendix 0 of 10CFR50, and the substitution of this Annex by a Statement of Interim Policy are as follows i
1.
Four reasons are offered foi Nithdrawal of the Annex.
The first is that "the Annex prescribes consideration of the kinds of accidents (Class 9) that, according to the reactor safety study, dominate the accident risk." This " domination" is the result of overly conservative assessments of consequences for postt lated events.
A.ase in point is the TMI event in which the consequences both to the environment and to public safety were to small to be measureable.
It is a convolution of logic to base the removal of the Annex on an argument which utilizes conservatively postulated consequences to justify additional analysis of these postulated consequences.
The second basis offered for withdrawr of the Annex is that "The definition of Class 9 accidents in the Annex is not sufficiently precise to warrant its further use in Commission policy, rules and regulations, nor as a decision criterion in agency practice."
General Electric disagrees.
The definition of Class 9 as an event l
beyond those assumed for the Design Basis Accident appear quite precise.
Should the Commission require further definition then it would seem appropriate to provide that expansion within the context of the rulemaking associated with the Annex.
i The third basis for removal of the Annex is that "The Annex's prescription of assumptions to be used in the analysis of the environmental consequences of accident does not contribute to objectiveconsiderations."
Since the Commission does not note in this basis the subject of this " objective consideration"' it is difficult to offer comments.
However, it would appear that the classification of accident events and the considerations that need to be made with respect to the environmental consequences from each event are separate and distinct facets of the safety issue.
There-fore, this does not appear to be a justifiable basis for withdrawing the Anne t.
The last basis provided for the withdrawal of the Annex is that "The Annex does not give adequate consideration to the detailed I
treatment of measures taken to prevent and mitigate the consequences of accidents and a safety review of each application." The Annex was never intended to perform such a function; therefore, to criticize it on this ground is not appropriate.
Furthermore, accident prevention I
measures are the major emphasize of 10CFR50 Appendix A and mitigating l
consequences are the principal objective of 10CFR50 Appendix E.
Therefore this basis for the removal of the Annex is already addressed through other means.
2.
The Interim Policy Statement says, in part, that " events or accidents or accident sequences that lead to releases shall include but not l
be limited to those that can reasonably be expected to occur."
i l
I.
ATTACMENT l There are two problems with this sentence.
The first problem is that it is all encompassing.
Under the proposed Annex an applicant was not required to address events which were acknowledged to have trivial consequences.
Under the proposed interim policy the app 11-cant will be mandated to address all and every release, no matter how trivial or in-consequential.
This increase in effort cannot be defended.
A second problem is the lack of definition of " reasonably."
What is " reasonable" in the mind of one person may not be " reasonable" in the mind of others.
This lack in specificity can only extend the licensing process without an appreciable concurrent increase in safety.
3.
The requirement to address sequences of events which can lead to core melt conditions is unbounded.
This plarn an applicant in the situation wherein he is forced to address events which could have vanishingly small probabilities of occurrence.
The Commission ch that the events needstoboundthedepthoftherequirementig/yearneednotbe with probability of occurrences less than 10 addressed.
I 4.
If the Commission is going to require the identification of major uncertainties and probabilistic estimates, the Commission should provide applicants, the staff and Hearing Boards guidance on accept-able levels of uncertainties.
5.
In requiring a PRA to support future Environmental Impact Statements, quantitative safety goals are required.
Realistically, it is unlikely that a broad base safety policy (WASH-1400 comparison of nuclear versus non-nuclear risk) will be adopted in the near future, however, in order to further the objective, the NRC should be pressed to develop risk criteria and quantitative safety goals for use in conjunction with PRA methodology to aid in nuclear power plant regulation decision making.
The safety goals should contain elements similar to those in the Reactor Suety Study (i.e., indi-vidual and population health effects criterion and cost benefit criterion).
6.
The requirement for additional probabilistic risk analyses focuses on an extremely important need for an agreed upon PRA methodology l
to be established for use by NRC and industry.
A consistent treat-ment for system event / fault trees, component failure data bases, common mode failures, system interactions, consequence modeling, value impact methodology, human factors and the quantification of t
conservatisms and uncertainties is necessary.
Joint NRC-industry approaches to these aspects of PRA methodology should be developed i
with the recognition of the evolutionary status of the technology, so that provisions can be made for introducing improvements in an orderly fashion.
7.
The issue of accident considerations under NEPA must be appropriately integrated with pending revisions and/or rulemaking activities on emergency planning, siting criteria and degraded core cooling and core melt accidents.
There is a significant degree of commonalty in these issues and in order to avoid grecedents being set in a
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ATTACHMENT particular area, which may have adverse effects on others, efforts covering all four will have to be carefully managed and integrated.
8.
Via incorporation of the release fractions included in Regulatory Guide 1.3 GE already performs an analysis of an event which bounds all reasonable events and is the equivalent of a pipe break plus an ECCS failure (i.e., a Class 9 event).
Current NRC siting requirements include implicit considerations of the con:equences of a large number of events currently classified as " Class 9."
NCS:ggo/106-8 8/27/80 O
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Mr. Samuel J. Chilk M
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Secretary U. S. Nuclear Regulatory
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Dear Mr. Chilk:
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On June 13, 1980, the Commission published in 1.ne Federal Register (45 Fed. Reg. 40101) its Statement of Interim Policy regarding Nuclear Power Plant Accident Con-sideration Under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969.
It requested that comments be submitted by September 10, 1980 but made the Statement of Policy effective in the interim.
We oppose adoption of the Statement for the reasons discussed below.
The new Policy is transparently a cosmetic accommoda-tion reacting to the Three Mile Island accident.
As the Staff candidly admitted in presenting the proposed Statement in SECY-80-131, the new Policy was intended to " respond positively to criticisms of past NRC practices" so as to end the " severe criticism" of the NRC on its past position that Class 9 accidents need not be considered in licensing pro-cedures, absent extraordinary circumstances.
Although yielding to limited but vocal criticism on rhis point may have some apparent short-term benefits to the Commission's public image, such an accommodation will result in signifi-cant confusion and loss of credibility in the long run.
It is disappointing that the Commission would reverse its well-settled position on Class 9 accidents in licensing pro-ceedings even though, in announcing its new Po.licy, the Commission concedes that the environmental risk of such accidents has not significantly increased. J/
We are
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Although the Staff has taken the position that the TMI-2 occurrence was a Class 9 accident, Pennsylvania Power & Light Company (Susquehanna Steam Electric Sta-tion, Units 1 and 2), LBP-79-29, 10 NRC 586,.589 (1979),
its position is not based on any analysis of Class 9 accident consequences but rather upon the strict and i
literal definition of such accidents as involving a sequence of " multiple failures."
Thus, any succession of failures would in the Staff's views, be a Class 9 accidenteveniftherewerenoresulting) radioactive
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releases.
e Mr. Samuol J. Chilk September 10, 1980 Page 2 therefore concerned that the Commission's action has been j
taken in response to a perceived atmosphere of dissatisfac-tion of a limited public segment rather than a genuine belief that either NEPA's disclosure requirements or the public health and safety require Class 9 analysis.
There are many other elements of accident analysis such as the announced rulanaking on degraded core cooling which must be integrated into the considerations governing Class 9 acci-dents before a comprehensive policy can be developed.
In this regard, the Statement of Interim Policy com-pletely blurs the distinction between the Commission's health and safety responsibilities under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and its responsibilities for disclosing probable I
environmental impact under the National Environmental Policy Act.
It is far from clear which Act the Commission believes is the regulatory basis for its new policy.
Although the Statement initially refers to NEPA as the basis for its re-vised policy, the Statement later switches gears to discuss "early consideration of additional features or other actions to prevent or to mitigate the consequences of serious ac-cidents."
The Commission then goes on to describe "related" policy matters under consideration regarding emergency plan-ning, reactor siting policy and criteria, and the TMI Action Plan.
The discussion of health and safety issues under the
+
Atomic Energy Act in the same breath with NEPA obscures the crucial point that NEPA is only a procedural or " full disclosure" statute, "which does not impose substantive duties upon a federal agency and does not invest it with in-dependent authority beyond that which has been granted by the agency's organic statute." 2/
In court actions, the Commission has always relied upon its authority under the Atomic Energy Act, rather than NEPA, as the basis for imposing license conditions. 3/
The proposed Statement sheds no light, however, on tee question of whether the Commission is merely making NEPA disclosures or intends to implement substantive health and safety measures.
Even assuming, arguendo, that the Commission had clear-ly stated the statutory basis for its action, the Interim 2/
See Stryker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlan, 100 S.Ct. 497, 500 (1980); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Co rp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S.
519, 553 (1978).
j
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Public Service Company of New Hampshire v.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 582 F.2d 27 (1st 19 78) ; Gage v.
U.S.
Atomic Energy Commission, 479 F.2d 1214, 1220 n.19 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ("NEPA does not mandate action which goes beyond the agency's organic jurisdiction.")
See also, Kitchen v. FCC, 466 F.2d 801 iD.C. Cir. 1972).
Mr. Samu 1 J. Chilk September 10, 1980 Page 3 Policy is absolutely devoid of any guidelines by which the applicant or, for that matter, the Staff can determine the scope and extent of the required analysis.
For example, the Policy expressly states that the accident analysis must extend even to radioactive releases that can not reasonably be expected to occur.
On its face, the Policy sets no lower bound of probability beyond which the applicant need not examine.
Reductio ad absurdum, the applicant should analyze the probability and consequences of the moon hitting a nuclear reactor. facility.
Far from offering any guidance, the Statement admits that there are "many uncertainties" that "are and will likely remain for some time to come."
The Commission merely promises that the Staff's environ-mental impact statements "will identify major uncertain-ties."
Such vague and open-ended licensing requirements impose an unfair burden on applicants, particularly those who are initially subjected to this novel procedure.
Since there are no statutory standards, let alone implementing regulations or guidelines, compliance with the new accident analysis requirement is left completely to the whim of the reviewer or licensing or Appeal Board.
Regardless of the Commission's ultimate authority to conduct this kind of analysis, it is patently unfair to require applicants to comply with such novel and ill-defined requirements on an "immediately effective" basis.
It is obvious that the Staff will require several months or even years to develop the complete format it will require for the applicant's environmental report and its own environmental impact statement with regard to the new accident analysis.
It is unfair for the Commission to ask applicants to incur substantial additional expense and delay in licensing cases by performing what is essentially the Commission's respon-sibility to mark off the contours of this new, amorphous policy.
At a bare minimum, the Commission should rescind the Interim Statement's immediate effectiveness and move forward to informal rulemaking when all aspects of this matter have been sufficiently developed.
Sincerely, J
Mark J. Wetterhahn MJW:sdd
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Houston, Texas Secretary of the Commission U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington D. C. 20555
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RE: A PU3LIC COMMENT WITHDRAWAL OF THE PROPOSED AH'.iEX T @
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APPENDIX D OF 10 CFR 50 AS ORDERED ON JULY 9,1980 To the Honorable Commission:
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John F. Doherty, of Houston, Texas, and Interveno A
in the Construction License Proceedings for the Allens Creek Nuclear Generatine Station, (50-466) comments as
~,,g follows on the Withdrawal of the Proposed Annex to Appendix D of 10 CFR 50, as noticed in 45 Federal Register 40,103:
By this ruling, the Commission has excluded the Allens Creek Nuclear Generatine Station (hereafter: ACNGS) from a new rule requiring censideration of Class 9 Accidents, because of a firm belief that its NEPA review has been completed.
However, the Commission in the same Announce-ment indicates the NEPA review which the ACMGS proceeding had completed is inadecuate in several respects, one of which is, "The Annex does not give adequate consideration to the detailed treat-ent of measures taken to prevent and to =ltigate the consequences of accidents in the safety review of each application."
It appears the Commission has engaged in balancing the amount of delay that would be involved in adding this review against the value of it to the public safety.
- However, it has not presented anywhere by what standards it has arrived at the conclusion that the amount of delay involved bears more heavily than the need tc assess and make public the effects of the most serious accidents (Class 9) on the public health and safety, and the environment. Indeed, the only clue we have is that the several plants are "near term ecnstruction permit"(NTCP) plants.
There is no indi-cation of any other consideration,.such as the possibility
_the utility might be uncble'to supply its grid if the con-struction per.it were kept awa,y'.until after.a class 9 accident review and agency comment analysis.
The failure to provide a basis for making the above de-
- er-ination to proceed without the class 9 analysis violates the Administr'tive Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. B 557, which ctates in part, "All decisions, including ititial... [p-cisions nre a nort~ of the record and shall include a state-
~.ent of- (A) findings and conclusions the reascn or baris
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therefor..."
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Mcnco, 'I ur63 %DMu14hww&9sr vg ussfwtse suu divicicn' cf the varicuc liccnaings within the Agency in thic ac yat un3xplainsd mann;r bringa the dccision to not ccnaidcr Cloco 9 Accidonto for the dix nuclocr plants (the so called near ter, construction permit Allens Creek, Pilgrim-II, Black Fox I & II, plants:
Perkins, Pebble Springs, and Skagit) within the ambit of Agriculture v. United Staten, 347 U.S. 645 of Secretary Aeronautics Board, (1954) and Northeast. Airlines v. Civil' 331 F.2d 579 (1st cir. 1964).
In those cases, agency decisions for Mhich no standards or other basis were ar-ticulated were sent back for reconsideration.
Because it appears the Commission.has not shown why a licensing that is "near term" over-rides the public's right to knowledge of the environmental effects of Class 9 accidents under NEPA, to say nothing of their own health and safety, I believe it must take a course of greater re-If it does, view or explaination than it has demonstrated.
I believe in the case of ACNGS, a review of Class 9 Accidents is proper through an Environmental Impact Supplement.
Respectfully Submitted, dA&o John 7. Doherty
5 REPRESENTATI A E RAY HUCSoN U
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OR. P UP TAFSoN j
SECRETARY
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Y& / JOHN F. RYAN LARRY LAWLER EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR DAN L WILUAMS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY oR. PHluP P. GUSTAFSoN STAFF SECRETARY DANIEL F. HANG FAY STUB 8LEFIELD N
DR V H LAN ER REPRESENT E GEo Y HUCSoN SENATOR SAM M. VACALABENE ATOMIC ENERGY OR. JAN B. VAN ERP SEN AD UN GE S
LINCOLN TOWER PLAZA WILUAU H.'PE NS, JR.
J TECHNICAL CONSULTANT 524 SOUTH SECOND STREET LEGAL DR. DONALD T. EGGEN ROOM 415 WILUAM L WATSON l
SPRINGFIELD, ILLINOIS 62706 TELEPHONE: 2171782 5057
)
September 9, 1980 g
w Secretary of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission CCXETED Attention
- Docketing and Service Branch Lsm0 Washington, D.C. 20555 l94 SEP 121960 > Q i
" ""s tecebry
Dear Sir:
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Subject:
Statement of Interim Policy Concerning Nuclear Pow g[
Plant Accident Considerations Under the National
/p 3r Emergency Protection Act of 1969 The Illinois Commission on Atomic Energy (ICAE) wishes to avail itself of the opportunity to provide comments on the Statement of Interim Policy j
published in the Federal Register, Volume 45, #116, of Friday, June 13, 1980, as follows:
1,.
The NRC is currently considering to introduce changes in Regulatory Policy through hearings on a number of issues, including Class 9 Accidents (Degraded Cores), Siting, and Environmental Impact Statements.
These issues are closely interrelated and should for that reason be addressed in a coherent and logical sequence.
To address the potential environmental impacts due to postulated Class 9 Accidents prior to addressing Class 9 Accidents may not be the most logical and effective
- approach, l
2.
The development of societal safety goals and the definition of criteria l
for acceptabls societal risk levels for energy technologies is l
urgently needed.
This has been pointed out by numerous organi::ations and concerned groups including the ACRS (Letter from Max Carbon, Chairman, ACRS, to Joseph Hendrie, Chairman, NRC, on May 1979).
To consider the i
potential environmental impact of postulated Class 9 Accidents without 1
reference to criteria to acceptable risk levels may not place this issue in the proper perspective.
3.
The NEPA addresses primarily environmental impacts due to normally occuring events (i.e. events with probability equal to 1, or close to 1).
To our knowledge, the inclusion of rare events in environmental impact considerations constitutes a substantial departure from current practice.
The extension of NEPA to low probabibility events for a single technology (nuclear energy) and not to other technologies (e.g. chemical industry, j
air transportation, etc.) raises numerous questions, including many of a legal nature.
O W by ca rd,. /,,,,f,t,,
Secretary, l
Nuclear Regulatory Commission September 9, 1980 4.
In view of the issues brought up and items 1 through 3, the Illinois Commission on Atomic Energy questions the wisdom of the establishment
, at this time of the Proposed Interim Policy on Environmental Impact Statements, and suggests that any decision on this matter be postponed, at the minimum, until the proposed hearings on the Class 9 Accidents and Siting have been completed.
5.
The ICAE wishes to participate in the rule making hearings planned for degraded cores and siting, and intends to provide comments on these subjects at a later time.
The Illinois Commission on Atomic Energy appreciates this opportunity to provide comments and looks forward to future constructive interaction and cooperation with the NRC concerning this and other related i=portant issues.
Sincer ly r 1
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m_ T George Ray Hudson \\, Chairman Illinois Commission on Atomic Energy Illinois Representative, 41st District GRH:gfs i
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p-cn Federal' Register Comments JWL-385-80 Secretary of the Commission f[
ATIN:
Docketing and Service Branch U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
20555
Dear Sir:
Portland General Electric Company, Construction Permit applicant for the proposed Pebble Springs Nuclear Plant, offers the following comments related to the Statement of Interim Policy regarding nuclear power plant accident considerations under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, as promulgated in the June 13, 1980 Federal Register (Volume 45,.
40101).
We generally espport the approach taken by thei ommission as interim C
guidance for the treatment of accident risk considerations in NEPA reviews.
In the longer term, however, we would expect that compliance with requirements flowing from rulemakings for emergency planning, siting and degraded core cooling would constitute an acceptable basis for eliminating, as an interim requiren. nt,'the need to include the kind of probablistic assessments envisioned by this policy statement in Environmental Impact Statements and Environmental Reports.
Sincerely, l
J. W. Lentsch Manager of Generation Licensing & Analysis Generation Engineering-Construction Division JWL/DRS/41m8B15.
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Mr. Lynn Frank, Director g,,[,[d..I k ' "'
State of Oregon Department *of Energy Atkno*M
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(CITIZENS ASSN. FOR SOUND ENERGY)
September 11, 1930 6}
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6 CCCK W usNRC Secretary of the Comission g7 SEP iS1580 > 9, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Cc=ission g mes elthe S d M D Washington, D. C.
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Attention: Docketing and Service Branch g
P Ic,n g Gentlemen:
Subject:
Cc=ents Regarding the Cc=missica's Proposed Chanses to 10 CFR Parts 50 and 51, Nuclear Power Plant Accident Considerations Under the National Envircr:sental Policy Act of 19c9 In accordance with the Cc::rnission's June 9,1980 Statement of Interim Policy, we are sub~ltting herewith CASE's cc=ents on subject proposed changes.
Sincerely, CASE (CITIZENS ASSCCIATICN FOR SCUND ENERGY)
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-(Mrs.) Juanita Ellis President l'
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' Sr.?d c> l l lc COMMENT TO THE COMMISSION STATEMENT OF INTERIM POLICY Dated June 9, 1980 Docket No.80-108 Nuclear Power Plant Accident Considerations Under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 September 10, 1980
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J The New York PutNic Interest Research Group, Inc. (NYPIRG) is a not for profit, nonoamsan researen and advocacy crganization estabhshed.
cirected and supported by New Yorx State SW and university stu$ents NYPIAG s staff of lawyers. researeners, scientists and organizers I
~
NYPIRG Coment page 1
~
In response to the Comission's invitation for public coment, the New York Public Interest Research Group, Inc. (NYPIRG) submits the following comments:
On the whole, NYPIRG approves of the Statement of Interim Policy on severe accidents. This major change in policy represents a long overdue effort on the part of the Comission to face he reality of serious nuclear accidents.
The statement's arguments are cogent and its conclusions sound, with the exception of the two sentences on which Comissioners Bradford and Gilinsky I
dissented, and one other which concerns us.
The new policy means that, for the first time, the Comission is reco;-
nizing that operating a nuclear plant is one of the most dangerous enterprises ever undertaken. The old practice of considering all really serious accidents as beyond credibility, so that the plant's design and siting could ignore them, was wishful thinking at best, irresponsibility at worst.
Under that convention, many plants were built that currently endanger huge nunbers of people.
It is of course reassuring to think that this will stop; but if one accepts the plain logic of it, the worst offenders are the older reactors already operating, those of earlier design built to looser standards.
There should be no attempt to exempt existing plants and those currently under construction from the implications of this fundamental change in Comission i
policy on severe accidents.
The only defensible approach to these plants is to l
require them to apply for new licenses, suspending operation or construction until they can meet the new standards, permanently closing down those that cannot.
It may be hard on the investors that the old rules were too lax, just as it has been difficult for chemical manufacturers who have had to give up certain profitable drugs which proved to seriously threaten public health.
But the
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NYPIRG Cossent page 2 Consission has a clear obligation to put the protection of the citizenry above solicitude for investors.
NYPIRG believes that the following sentence from the Statement of Interim Policy is inconsistent with the rest of it:
In carrying out this directive, the staff should cor. sider relevant site features, including population density, associated with accident risk in cogarison to such features
)
at presently operating plants.
While the apparent intent of this sentence, to ensure that future reactors will not be located in areas of high population density, is desirable and neces-sary, we reject the notion of comparison with " presently operating plants" and 4
their siting as an iglicit standard.
Even if the intent is to do better, without an absolute criterion for siting, merely surpassing such wholly unaccept-able sites as Indian Point and Zion could still leave too many people imperilled.
The underlying logic seems to be as follows: The public has tolerated existing plants, for the most part; hence the degree of endangerment they pose may be taken as a socially accepted level.
But there is a basic fallacy in this answer to the very difficult question: How safe is safe enough? What people have been willing to accept is not the actual risk they are running (which has not yet been determined anyway), but the level of risk they believed the existing plants would present at the time they were licensed (before Three Mile Island and the daily reports in the press of " unplanned events" at nuclear plants).
In the early days of nuclear plant licensing, when everyone was led to believe that all serious accidents were too improbable to be worth considering credible, the risk was taken to be extremely trivial.
We know differently now.
Sunnary:
NYPIRG supports the general intent of requirina that all serious accident possibilities be considered in environmentr.1 imoact statements --
- more -
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NYPIRG Cosuent page 3 and in all other policies pertainino to nuclear plants -- but object to two specific points.
The rew standards must apply to all reactors, old as well as new.
And they must be based on absolute standards of safety for the present and futum generations, not on a comparison to what exists at currently operating plants.
Respectfully submitted, K
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5 Beekman Street New York, New York 10038 (212) 349-6460 Dated:
Septenber 10,1980 I
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Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Docket'ng and Service Branch i
Attention:
Re:
Statement of Interim Policy
Dear Sir:
This refers to the Statement of Interim Policy published in the-June 13, 1980, issue of the Federal Register (45 Fed.
Reg. 40131), and relating to accidents to be considered in environmental impact statements.
In accordance with the Statement the comments of Florida Power & Light Company, Houston Lighting & Power Company, Iowa Electric Light &
Power Company, and Puget Sound Power & Light Company are enclosed.
Sincerely, E7 Jack R.
Newman enc.
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Washington, DC 20555 ATTENTION:
Docketing and Service Branch
Dear Mr. Chilk:
Subject:
Nuclear Power Plant Accident Considerations Under The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (45 Fed. Reg. 40101, June 13, 1980)
By the subject notice, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission published an interim policy statement regarding consideration of Class 9 accidents in environmental reviews associated with licensing of nuclear power facilities. The Commission announced that its Environmental Impact Statements ("EIS") "shall include considerations of the site specific environmental impacts attributable to accident sequences that lead to releases of radiation and/or radioactive materials, including sequences that can result in inadequate cooling of reactor fuel and to melting of the reactor core [ loosely categorized as Class 9 accidents]." While the interim policy guidance was immediately effective, the Commission noted that coments submitted in response to such guidance would be considered by the Commission.
I.
BACKGROUND In 1971, the Atomic Energy Commission promulgated a proposed Annex to Appendix D to 10 CFR Part 50 (" Annex") which set forth Commission policy regarding consideration of Class 9 accidents in environmental reviews, viz., the environmental risks associated with Class 9 accidents are ex-tremely low, and thus, consideration of such accidents in the environ-mental review is not required.
45 Fed. Reg. at 40102.
Since issuance of the Annex, the technological basis for the Commission policy set m
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Statement of Interim Policy Withdrawing Annex to 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix D
Dear Mr. Chilk:
On June 13, 1980, the Commission published a state-ment of interim policy concerning the consideration of Class 9 accidents in environmental impact stateme'ts.
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Fed. Reg. 40,101.
The statemenc of interim policy was made effective immediately, but the Commission provided for the submission of comments concerning it.
As sttorneys representing a number of utilities involved in the Commis-sion's licensing process, we wish to offer comments on the new policy.
On May 2, 1980, we filed comments with respect to the proposed amendments to the Commission's regulations governing environmental review, 10 C.F.R. Part 51.
In our May 2 letter, we addressed the treatment of Class 9 accidents in environ-mental impact statements.
We would ask that our May 2 comments be considered by the Commission in its assessment of the statement of interim policy published on June 13.
Samuel J. Chilk, Esq.
September 11, 1980 Page 2 The effect of the Commission's new policy is to require the consideration in environmental impact state-mants of events that cannot reasonably be expected to occur.
It is clearly counter-productive to require detailed consideration of unrealistic possibilities, unless it is legally required.
Such is not the case.
The exclusion of class 9 accidents from detailed con-sideration has repeatedly been upheld by the courts.
l E.., Hodder v. NRC, 13 ERC 1711 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert.
enled, 444 U.S.E79 (1979).
Having obtained express judicial sanction for its application of the " rule of reason" under the National Environmental Policy Act, the Commission should adhere to that policy and require detailed consideration only of events that can reasonably be expected to occur.
We would also note that it is difficult, in light of such court decisions, to see how the commission's former policy can fairly be characterized as " erroneous".
See 45 Fed. Reg. 40,103 n.5.
Another troublesome aspect of the statement of interim policy is its invitation to the Commission's staff to backfit the design of plants under construction through the mechanism of an environmental review.
We believe that changes in the approved design of a plant should be initiated by the commission's staff only in connection with the safety evaluation of the plant.
To invite con-sideration of design modifications in the environmental review process confuses two functions of the Commission which have, in the past, been* fairly carefully separated.
The distinction between safety evaluation and environmental analysis should be maintained, not blurred.
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Dear Joes As you are undoubtedly aware, prior to the Three Mile Island accident, the probability of a public catastrophe resulting from such an event was considered to be negligible, although it always'has been a continuing subject of professional study.
Since ntI, there has been a fresh flood
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The %nclosed draft study is an attempt to step back and take a realistic look at the basic scientific processes which are the fundamental determiners of what these public risks might really be.
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The main thrust of this study is that the natural laws of physics and k
chemistry substantially, limit the distribution of radioactive af fluents fran any nuclear accident, no ratter how severe. This study makes the point that the empirical information that can be garrerad from a variety Mq of large-scale accidents that have already occurred, when ecchined with
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known physical and chemical laws, tends to confirm that the theoretical p
" source term" traditionally used in nuclear risk evaluations is one to two orders of magnitude greater than'the realistic magnitude which might actually result from the ultimate accidentse
%,b Because of the relevance of this issue to the current flurry of federal and state emergency planning and evacuation criteria, I am forwarding this draft to you prior to publication for both your consideration and your comment. The study will be presenteid as a paper at the ANS International meeting in Washington, D.C., November 17-21.
Sincerely, E
Mwe Chauncey starr vice chairman I
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Dear Secretary:
Please permit me to add my support of the proposed policy regarding nuclsar power plant EIS's.
Planning for nuclear power plants must include discussion of the serious accident possibilities, and will lead to more realistic economic and political attitudes toward nuclear po-wer, including their potential risks.
i Environmental and socioeconomic impacts during and following a serious accident must be considered in NEPA safety reviews, along with proposed mitigation measures.
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Carol Ruth Silver Supervisor City and County of San Francisco CRS/rbl
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10 CFR PARTS 50 AND 51 CO.TfENTS ON TE NRC INTERIM POLICY CONCERNING NUCLEAR POWER PLANT ACCIDENT CONSIDERATIONS UNDER TE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT OF 1969 FILE: 0505.5 UFI:
99*03*01 SERIAL:
9578 Consumers Power Company has reviewed the interim policy statement, " NUCLEAR POWER PLANT ACCIDENT CONSIDERATIONS UNDER TE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT OF 1969" that appeared in the June 13, 1980 Federal Register ai: 45 FR 40101. The following comments on this interim policy statement are provided for your consideration.
1.
OVERALL APPROACH The interim policy statement emphasizes the consideration of significant site-and plant-specific features in an effort to develop more detailed discussions of accident risks in future Environmental Impact Statements.
However, the exploration of new low probability accident considerations may be of little rest benefit in assessing the environmental impact of nuclear power plants. This is especially true in light of the absence of comparable assessments for alternative technologies and the absence of a clear definition by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission of a safety goal.
In view of these factors, it appears that a detailed exploration of this issue on a generic basis would be more beneficial than site-specific consideration as provided in the interim policy.
2.
SCOPE The interim policy statement's scope of application is identified in the
" Accident Considerations in Future NEPA Reviews" Section. Unfortunately, there appears to be an error in the stated application of this policy in l
Paragraph Three of Column Two at 45 FR 40103. A clarified version of the affected sentence in this paragraph would read "... ie for any construction permit proceeding at a licensing stage where a Final Environmental Impact Statement has not yet been issued...." This clarification would make Paragraph Three of Column Two ' consistent with the oc0980a-0008100
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3.
APPLICATION As stated in the June 13, 1980 Federal Register, the interim policy clearly provides that Environmental Reports (ER) submitted for an operating license (OL) on or after July 1, 1980 should include a discussion of the environmental risks associated with accidents at the particular facility based on the application of risk assessment methods.
The clear is. plication of such a provision is that ER's submitted prior to that time need not contain such a discussion.
As noted at 45 7R 40103, "... this change in. policy is not to be construed as any lack of confidence in conclusions regarding the environmental risks of accidents expressed in any previously issued statement, nor, absent a showing of similar special circumstances, as a basis for opening, reopening or expanding any previous or ongoing proceeding.
." This comment is qualified somewhat by statements appearing in the next paragraph of the policy statement. However, the qualification is limited to directing the staff to identify additional cases that might warrant early consideration of accident mitigation features or consequences.
It appears that the staff has, in recent times, disregarded the clear thrust of the above policy while supposedly applying the policy (ie The San Onofre OL case). Nothing in the above policy suggests that the staff must consider Class IX events in all cases for which an FES at the OL stage has not been issued. To reach such a conclusion, the staff must disregard the requirement of demonstrating "special circumstances",
disregard the NRC mandate not to disrupt, expand or reopen previous or ongoing proceedings and disregard the necessity of identifying " additional cases" according to some reasonable criteria. Also, we expect that the clear impact of any policy whereby the staff considers Class IX accidents for FES purposes will be to in: pose additioral analysis and reporting burdens on applicants.
This would clearly violate the spirit, if not the letter of the provision requiring Class IX consideration in only those ER's submitted for an OL on or after July 1, 1980.
The provision of the guideline quoted above was adopted by a majority of the commissioners with two dissenting voices. The staif, by taking a pesition opposite to that expressed in the policy statement, violates the mandate of the NRC Commissioners on an issue which was obviously specifically ;onsidered.
While the impact of possible Class IX occurrences creates questions (which were identified in the text of the June 13, 1980 NRC issuance), the Commission itself has obviously we'ighted the impact of those questions against the analytical burdens to be imposed on licensees which had previously operated under different NRC commitments. The staff should not ignore this mandate in that respect.
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3 We thank you for this opportunity to submit these comments and hope that they will be useful in your future deliberations concerning the interim policy statement.
Terence J Sullivan TJS/RJL/pg CC SHHowell JWCook DPHoffman CJMaynard oc0980a-0008100
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Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Secretary of the Comission U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission J
1717 H Street Washington, D. C.
20555
Dear Mr. Chilk:
Subject:
10CFR Parts 50 and 51 Nuclear Power Plant Accident Considerations Under the National Environmental Policy Act - Statement of Interim Policy - 45 Fed. Reg. 40101 The subject Comission statement of interim policy announced the withdrawal
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of the proposed Annex to Appendix 0 of 10CFR50 published in December 1971 and a position of the Comission that its Environmental Impact Statements shall include a reasoned consideration of the environmental risks (impacts) attributable to accidents at the particular facility. Westinghouse wishes j
to provide coments related to this interim policy.
In particular, Westinghouse believes that the statement of interim policy has not been adequately coordinated with other ongoing safety activities, 1
that the interim policy goes too far in withdrawing the entire annex, and that inadequate guidance is provided with respect to methods or criteria.
Each of these is separately addressed below.
First, adequate coordination with other ongoing activities should mean that a rational overall structure exists for consideration by the Comission of safety goals and methodology, minimum engineered safety features, degraded core, siting and emergency planning including the use of probabilistic risk evaluations in Environmental Impact Statements. Westinghouse previously provided recommendations (
Reference:
NS-TMA-2267, Anderson to Chilk, June 19, 1980, copy attached) related to the need for an interim rule and to the inter-relationship and timing cf these proposed rulemakings.
Guidance regarding the content of the Environmental Impact Statement should logically succeed these other rulemakings.
Interim guidance, related to consideration of acci-dent sequences not previously considered in environmental reports, should be addressed in an interim rule or policy adopted pnding the completion of l
the generic rulemaking proceedings, not in the freestanding manner of the Comission's notice of policy.
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Mr. Samuel J. Chilk September 29, 1980 NS-TMA-2305 Second, even if this separated policy were allowed to stand, the Commission has gone further than required. The entire annex is withdrawn when only those aspects related to treatment of accident scenarios not previously considered in environmental statements are really being treated. Absent the guidance provided by the annex for. treatment of the other classes of acci-dents, additional efforts which are unlikely to promote better environmental
~
or safety considerations must be expended. Requiring that certain accidents i
previously considered to be Class 9 be addressed in a prescribed fashion in addition to the current requirements for the other classes would be a more effective course.
Finally, withdrawal of the annex and substitution of the interim policy results in inadequate guidance relating what must be treated, how it can be acceptably treated, and what constitutes an acceptable balancing.
It is surely not the intent of the Commis'sion to require a complete probabilistic risk assessment of each plant through the mechanism of an interim policy statement.
The interim policy statement, however, provides no delimitation and may infer that all sequences, whether trivial or not, must be considered. The interim policy i
statement is also silent on what constitutes the limits or impacts although it requires that health and safety risks and socioeconomic impacts of emergency measures be included. To ensure consistency of' treatment, the development of the necessary guidance in these areas through generic consideration is highly recomended.
Summarizing, Westinghouse recomends that the interim policy be amended to:
1.
Directly consider the other ongoing efforts by identifying specifically the ordering and interrlationship of these (siting, emergency planning, degraded core, minimum engineered safety features, Class 9 EIS considera-tions) in a manner equivalent to that of the attached letter to the Secretary of the NRC; 2.
Require, at most, that in the interim the EIS will include discussion of the risks of events previously not included; 3.
Retain the annex otherwise pending the completion of the generic considerations; and 4.
Provide more specific guidance for the scope, methods and criteria to be used in consideration of previously excluded events in this interim period. A suggested interim criteria is presented in the attached letter to the Secretary of the NRC.
Ver-ruly yo, Ad-T. M. Anderson, Manager Nuclear Safety Department j
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June 19, 1980 NS-TMA-2267 j
Mr. Samuel J. Chilk, Secretary U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccmission 1717 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20055
Subject:
Ccmissicn Order dated May 30, 1980 in the Matter of Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc. (Indian Point, Unit No. 2) and Power Authority of the State of New York (Indian Point, Unit No. 3);
Docket Nos. 50-247 and 50-286.
i
Dear Mr. Chilk:
'l Tne subject Ccmission order announced a four-pronged approach for resolving the issues raised by the UCS petition and requested the views of interested memcers of the public to the end of better defining one part of the approach, the discretionary adjudicatory proceeding.
Westinghouse wishes to incorporate by reference and expand upon the cements filed in response to the February 15, 1980 notice in connection with the Director's denial of the UCS petition in a letter dated March 10, 1980 from T. M. Anderson to Samual J. Chilk.
l In particular, we wish to reemphasize the need to fannulate the discretionary
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adjudicatory proceeding for Indian Point in the light of the intended generic consideration of the question of operation of reactors in areas of high popula-tion density announced in the Comission's Indian Point order, as well as the other related generic proceedings now in various stages of implementation or under consideration by the Comission. It is important to note that the Ccmission's Indian Point order raises generic issues other than the high popu-lation density issue.
The Ccmission should separate these generic issues from the plant specific issues and defer them to the generic proceeding.
In con-sidering the generic issues, an integrated course of action addressing the central issues in the procer sequence is essential to avoid the risk of relitigation based on perturbations caused by later rulemaking proceedings and to properly focus the application of resources so that the record and results of each proceeding logically leads to and provides a sound technical base for the next.
i Five basic issues have been identified for generic proceedings.
These five basic issues in the order in which they should be addressed are-n nr i.
Safety Goals and Methodology, rM C
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