ML19340F189
| ML19340F189 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 10/28/1980 |
| From: | Kelly W, Whitesell D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19340F186 | List: |
| References | |
| REF-QA-99900721 NUDOCS 8101210262 | |
| Download: ML19340F189 (9) | |
Text
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\\.,i U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 0FFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT REGION IV Report No. 99900721/80-01 Program 51300 Company: Kerotest Manufacturing Corporation 2525 Liberty Avenue Pittsburg, Pennsylvania 15222 Inspection Conducted: October 8, 1980 Inspectors:
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Wm. D. Kelley, Cont'ractor In ector Date '
ComponentsSection I Vendor Inspection Branch
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&/ $8 fffo D. E. Whitese11, Chief Date' ComponentsSection I Vendor Inspection Branch Approvea b hj Y dei 24,/9/0 D. E. khitesell, Chief Date ComponentsSection I Vendor Inspection Branch Summarv Inspection on Cctober 8, 1980 (99900721/80-01)
Areas Inspected:
Implementation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B and applicable codes and standards including, quality assurance program review. Also conducted initial management meeting, reviewed documents pertaining to Tennessee Valley Authority reported deficiencies of valves of their Vatts Bar Nuclear Plant and reportability in conformance with 10 CFR Part 21, and conducted and exit interview. The inspection involved eight (8) inspector-hours on site by two (2) NRC inspectors.
Results:
In the areas inspected, no deviations or unresolved items were identified.
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2 DETAILS A.
Persons Contacted Kerotest Manufacturing Corporau!on (KMC)
- D. J. Zolkos, Quality Assurance Manag?r
- Denotes those persons who attended the exit interview (See paragraph D).
B.
Initial Management Meeting 1.
Objectives The objectives of this meeting were to accomplish the following:
a.
To meet with the Kerotest Manufacturing Corporation management and those. persons responsible for the administration of the Quality Assurance program, and to establish channels of communication.
b.
To determine the extent of the company's involvement in the commercial nuclear business.
c.
To explain NRC direct inspection program including the LCVIP organization, VIB inspection method and documentation.
d.
To describe the NRC evaluation or the ASME inspection system.
2.
Method of Accomplishment The preceding objectives were accomplished by a meeting on October 8, 1980. The following is a summary of the meeting:
a.
The attendee was:
D. J. Zolkos, Quality Assurance Manager b.
The VIB organization was described and its relationship to NRC Region IV and the NRC Headquarters component of the Office of Inspection and Enforcement.
i c.
The VIB function was described inclu Jing the reasons for its establishment, its objectives, its organizational structure, and the more significant program changes.
d.
The conduct of VIB inspections was described, and how the inspections results are documented and reported, and what the responses to report findings should include.
How pro-prietary information is handled, the Public Document Room, and the White Book were also explained.
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e.
The company's contribution to the nuclear industry was dis-cussed including current and projected activities, the status of the ASME certification of authorization, and the third party inspection services.
3.
Results Management acknowledged the NRC presentation as being understood by them, and provided the inspector with the following information concerning the company's activities and products.
a.
The Kerotest Manufacturing Corporation holds valid ASME Certificates of Authorization Numbers N-1902, and N-1903, for Class 1, 2 and 3 valves, valve parts and appurtenances.
The certificates do not specify range of sizes, or pressure classes, and they expire on April 25, 1983.
b.
The Kerotest Manufacturing Corporation presently manufactures wye pattern diaphragm globe valves and wye pattern check valves for nuclear plants. However, an estimate as to the amount of the company's work load was for the nuclear industry was not specified.
c.
The Authorized Inspection Agency is Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection and Insurance Company and the Authorized Nuclear Inspector provides inspection services on an itinerant basis.
d.
The Inspectors were conducted on an orientation tour of the plant.
C.
QA Program Review 1.
Objectives The objectives of this inspection were to ascertain whether the QA program has been documented in writing, and if properly implemented, will reasonably ensure that the specified quality of completed com-ponents will have been achieved, in compliance with A..C rules and regulations, code and contract requirements and the commitments in the Quality Assurance Manual. Also, ascertain whether the program provides for the following:
a.
Management's policy statements concerning QA.
b.
Delineates how the QA organization is structures, within the company, to achieve appropriate independence from the pressures of scheduling and costs, the freedom and independence to iden-tify quality problems, initiate appropriate resolutions, and verify corrective action.
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4 c.
Whether the duties and authority of the QA staff is clearly delineated in writing, and that they have access to a level of management who can ensure effective implementation of the QA program elements, and to enforce positive and timely cor-rective action.
d.
Jetailed written procedures are properly reviewed, approved, released, and issued to control quality activities, as appropriate.
e.
A training and indoctrination program to improve or maintain the proficiency of personnel performing' quality activities, and personnel verifying that quality activities have been correctly performed.
2.
Method of Accomplishment The preceding objectives were accomplished by:
Review of the ASME accepted Quality Assurance Manual.
a.
b.
Revie'w of appropriate organization charts.
Review of the documents concerning the authority and duties c.
assigned to the QA staff.
Specifically the authority to stop work or otherwise control processing of items until all quality problems are appropriately dispositioned.
d.
Review of Statement of Authority, and Responsibility, dated February 29, 1980, signed by L. R. Lenarz, President.
Review of documents to verify that they had been reviewed e.
and approved by authorized personnel.
f.
Review of the training and indoctrination program require-ment and documentation.
g.
Interviews with cognizant personnel.
h.
Observation of work and test in progress.
3.
Findings The evidence demonstrates that the QA program has been documented in writing and clearly defines the duties, authority, and organiza-tional independence and freedom.of the QA staff. Detailed written implementing documents are appropriately reviewed, approved, released and issued by authorized personnel. The QA staff has access to a level of management to ensure effective implementation of the program and timely and positive corrective action of enforcement
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5 items. A viable training and indoctrination program has been provided for upgrading, and naintaining, the proficiencies of perscnnel involved in quality activities.
Within this area of the inspection no deviations or unresolved items were identified.
D.
Licensee Reported Deficiency of Kerotest Manufacturing Corporation Valves 1.
packground The Tennessee Valley Authority notified the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) IE RII by telephone on April 25, 1980 and August 20, 1980, of a potential defective ene inch globe valve at Watts 3ar Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2.
The valves were manufactured by Kerotest Manufacturing Corporation.
The April 25, 1980 report identified the potential defective valves as three 1" globe valves located in the safety injection system, which leaked in the closed position. The initial enmination of the valves appeared to indi-care that the bearings, and the diaphragms were destroyed.
The August 20, 1980 report identified the problems as the valve being hydrostaticly trsted, packed wet, sealed and shipped to the site a
where they were not unpacked when received, consequently they corroded in storage.
2.
Objectives The objectives of this area of the inspection were to ascertain whether icfC had determined the cause of the problem and whether the potential deficiencies had been processed, evaluated, and reported in a manner consistent with NRC regulations.
3.
Method of Accomolishment The objectives of the inspection were accomplished by:
Review of the Dravo Corporation pur;hase order E-2397-LN dated a.
July 31, 1975, to determine:
(1) The applicable ASME Code Sectica and Editions and Addenda.
J (2) The ASME Valve Classes and Design Temperatures and pressures.
(3) The service conditions identified; and (4) Whether 10 C7R Part 21 had been inposed.
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6 b.
Review of tha following KMC Drawings:
(1) TVD-D-9954X03-(l) "Y-Type Globe Valve 3/4" to Section III of the ASME Nuclear Code Class 1," (2) TVD-D-9913X03(1)
"Y-Type Globe Valve 1" to Section III of the ASME Nuclear Code Class I;" to evaluate whether the reported deficiencies could cause malfunction of the valves.
c.
Reveiw of KMC's letter of May 29, 1980 to TVA (Knoxville, TN) to verify that KMC had evaluated the problem and identified their recommendation for correcting the probable cause and had recommend soluticas for the specific problem.
d.
Review of T7A's Nonconforming Condition Report NCR 250lR datad August 4,1980 to ascertain whether the deficiencies reported by TVA, recommended disposition, and action to prevent recurrence.
e.
Review of KMC's letter dated August 29, 1980 to TVA in response to NCR 250lR, stating KMC evaluation and deter =1 nations con-cerning the items identified in TVA's Nonconforming Condition Report (NCR).
f.
Review of KMC's letters dated September 9,1980 and September 15, 1980 to TVA (Knoxville IN) reiterating KMC's evaluation that the internal corrosion of the valve yoke would not affect the valves function, integrity or operability, g.
Interview with cognizant personnel to verify their concurrence that the TVA reported deficiencies would act impact on the health and safety of the public.
4 Findings a.
Seat Leakage KMC reported in
- eir letter of May 29, 1980 to IVA that upon their representative visiting the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant i
approximately 23 valve had been disassembled with seven or eight being cut out of the lines.
KMC reported that their inspecticus of valves in question revealed i=pressions on the hardfaced disc and body seats.
It was determined that these were caused by dirt in the systems entrapped between the disc and body seat.
The letter states ".
.This was verified by some of the field personnel who indicated valves shut off tight several times then leaked during later operations.
We selected a valve L
7 that seemed to have the worst seat scoring, and relapp( d the body seat and disc seat.
The valve was then air tested with 1500 psi air mad shut-off bubble tight."
KMC stated they att:1 outed the cause of seat leakage as being the results of foreign matter which was in the piping system during errection and ultimately being trapped between the body seat and the disc.
KMC recommended that TVA consider retrofitting all valves in air, nitrogen or CO2 service with soft seat disc, rather than metal to metal discs.
b.
Wet Packing KMC performed a hydrostatic test of the TVA valves with the packing in place, and with a dummy diaphragm installed.
After tha hydrostatic test, the valves were disassembled, except for the packing, the parts dried, and reassembled with the diaphragm in place.
The valves with desicant bags were then placed in heat sealed plastic bags and shipped to the site (in 1976). When the valve were received at Watts Bar Nuclear Plant the valves were removed f cm the heat sealed places bags, and placed in storage.
KMC is now investigating the optimum solution to the moisture problem on current production.
They are investigating packing replacement af ter hydro, warm air drying, and corrosion inhibitors.
As soon as the solution is de: ermined procedures will be developed or revised to implement the ~;rreceive action.
KMC has recommended that TVA store their valves without removing them from the heat sealed plastics bags, c.
Failed Searing and Diaphragm TVA reported to NRC in their telecon of April 28, 1980, that initial examination of the valves revealed that the bearings and diaphragms had been destroyed.
Subsequently, TVA issued their Nonconforming Ccudition Report NCR 250lR which reported
.2 3 earing assemblies were found with varying degrees of rotational freedem caused by the corrosion and pitting of the bearing assemblies.
Three of the four valves were found to be extreme cases of absolute cero rotation.
the four valves had diaphragas which had failed to flex back to their normal position." KMC stated in their evaluation of the problem, that flexed diaphragms are normal occurences of the valve when it is disassembled in the closed or partially closed positica.
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8 KMC advised TVA that field persnorel vera overtorquing the valves in an effort to obtain a leak tight shut off when dirt and/or grit was trapped between the disc and seat which resulted in a couple of cases, in a broken bearing and mush-roomed disc assemblies. Also, excessive moisture was observed above the diaphragms of two valve which was attributed to the 187-1 packing becoming saturated during hydrostatic testing.
This excessive moisture had caused severe corrosin on two of the carbon steel bearing assemblies.
To determine whether the corrosion and pitting of the bearing /
stem assemblies would affect the operation or integrity of the valve, two of the worse case correded bearing-stem assemblies were returned to KMC for testing and the assemblies were tested through 4050 cycles, at 2500 psi, and 650 F to demonstrate that the assemblies would meet KMC's guranteed life of 4000 cycles.
The test also demonstrated that the valve with the bearing corroded sufficiently to prevent its turning, had, at some time during the cycling of the valve, freed itself and began functioning.
5.
Evaluation of Reportability a.
TMC stated that its evalcation and tests demonstrated that the function, that operability and integrity of the valve was not affected, by the moisture, and therefore the deficiency did not pose a threat to safety, and had no generic impact. Therefore, the problem was not reportable under 10 CFR 21.
The reported deficiency concerning the valves was attributed to improper storage, length of storage, length of storage, and the fact that the valves that did leak were abused through overtorquing, and were considered as an isolated case.
b.
KMC's letter to TVA dated September 15, 1980, Subject NRC 2501R reiterates KMC's determination that a safety-related problem does not exist and states in part; "This position was addition-ally established with TVA agreement at the September 11, 1980 meeting at the Watts 3ar Site."
From the drawings and documents reviewed, the NRC Inspector c.
determined that the reported potential deficiency had been processed and evaluated by the vendor in a manner which is consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR 21.
Also the drawings and documents reviewed provided reasonable assurance that the reported potential deficiency did not jeopardice safety, and that the valves leaks were due to overtorquing the valves and was considered an isolated event.
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l d.
It was also verified that Section 206.had been posted on the bulletin boards and included information identifying KP.C procedure Q-66 for reporting defects and identified the QA manager as the responsible officer to whom defects should be reported and who was also the custodian at Q-66 procedure.
D.
Exit Interview At the conclusion of the inspection on October 8,1980, the inspector met with the company's management, identified in paragraph A, for the purpose of informing them as to the results of the inspection.
During this meeting aanagement was informed no deviations or unresolved items were identified.
The company's management acknowledged the inspector's statement and had no additional comments.
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