ML19340E920
| ML19340E920 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Indian Point  |
| Issue date: | 01/08/1981 |
| From: | Chilk S NRC OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SECY) |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| FOIA-81-155 NUDOCS 8101160246 | |
| Download: ML19340E920 (23) | |
Text
.'
h s
G
%n b
[
.6 7
usu-
% - 8 gN A UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.
,9-f
-2.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
~' %
]
k J/
L COMMISSIONERS:
I. John F. Ahearne, Chaiman C9p#O
. Victor Gilinsky Joseph M. Hendrie 4m Peter A. Bradford g
h
)
CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY OF NEW
)
YORK (Indian Point, Unit No. 2)
)
)
Docket Nos. 50-247 POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW
)
50-286 YORK (Indian Point, Unit No. 3)
)
)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER E
Background
On May 30,1980, the Commission issued an order establishing a four-pronged approach for resolving the issues raised by the Union of Concerned Scientists' petition regarding the Indian Point nuclear facilities, and by the decision of the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR),
granting in part and denying in part that petition.
The order announced the Commission's intention to hold a discretionary adjudication for the resolution of safety issues concerning the plants; initiated an infomal proceeding for the purpose of defining the questions to be answered in that 2
M The Commission has received a motion from the Union of Concerned D
Scientists, dated June 23, 1980, requesting the disqualification of 5
Commissioner Hendrie from participation in this matter.
In its
/
Diablo Canyon decision (In the Matter of Pacific Gas and Electric,
///
11 NRC 411 (1980), the Commission, with Commissioner Bradford dis-senting, stated that requests for the disqualification of a Commis-sioner would not be entertained by the Commission as a whole but would be referred to the Commissioner whose disqualification was requested. By memorandt:m of April 23, 1980, Commissioner Hendrie has denied the request for his disoualification.
8101160 2 $
g
2 adjudication, as well as the criteria to be applied; announced the Commis-sion's plan to address the generic question of the operation of nuclear reactors in areas of high population density through a generic proceeding, to be decided at a later date; E and directed the Commission's General Counsel and Director, Office of Policy Evaluation, to establish a Task Force to address the question of the status of the reactors during the pendency of the planned adjudication.
In this order, we will deal with the issue of interim operation of the Indian Point units during the adjudicatory hearing and will take the steps necessary to initiate that adjudicatory hearing.
Interim Operation The Commission must decide whether the Indian Point Units 2 and 3 should continue to operate on an interim basis during the time it takes to complete the adjudicatory hearing we order today.
A decision on interim operation is not a decision about the long-tem safety of the Indian Point plants.
In his decision on February 11,1980, the Director of Nuclear Peactor i
Regulation found that the interim risk of the continued operation of the Indian Point units did not warrant their shutdown while the matter was being further considered. Additionally, the Task Force, famed to conduct a separate investigation of comparative risks of interim operation, completed its work in June.
The conclusion of the Task Force was that the overall risk of the Indian Point reactors is about the same as the typical reactor on a typical. site.
The Task Force found that although the Indian Point site was considerably more risky than the average nuclear power plant site because of the density of the E
By this Order, we direct the NRC staff to prepare, as a matter of high i
l priority, a paper setting for options for addressing this generic issue.
~.-,
3 surrounding population, the design features of the plants reduced the acci-dent risk from Indian Point by a comparable factor. The report acknowledged, however, that the degree of uncertainty for the design comparison was much greater than for the site comparison.
Based upon this report, as well as the Director's previous decision, we concluded on July 15 that the risk posed by the operation of the Indian Point facilities did not warrant the suspension of the operating licenses during the adjudicatory proceedings. The Task Force findings and the Director's findings are not the final judgment on the safety of Indian Point Units 2 and 3.
That final judgment may only be made after all parties have had the opportunity to examine in detail the Task Force report and other evidence presented by the NRC staff and present additional evidence of their own.
In the event that the Licensing Board conducting the adjudica-tion determines that new evidence warrants interim relief, it may at any time recommend a course of action to the Commission. The Task Force Report itself will be distributed free upon a written request to the NRC.
In making this decision, we considered the positions taken by the many commenters.
Certain of those positions warrant specific discussion.
UCS has alleged that there are specific safety defects in the Indian Point units which raise questions about whether or not the units comply with NRC regulations. The Director responded to these allegations in his Febru-ary ll,1980 Order and UCS responded in turn in the submittal of March 10, 1980.
We believe these specific allegations raise issues which are best resolved in the forthcoming adjudicatory proceedings. We have not made a judgment about these allegations and rely in the interim upon the judgment of the Director of NRR.
However, we do note that the Task Force report found
4 no significant difference in risk between the Indian Point 2 and 3 designs.
It also found that the technical fixes ordered in the Director's decision would be clearly beneficial in reducing risk, but questioned whether the factor of improvement was significant in light of the uncertainties in estimating overall risk.
If the Board at any time during the proceeding believes that any of these issues are, serious enough to warrant.immediate action, it should make an appropriate recommendation to the Commission.
Several commenters contended that the Commission should not pemit continued operation because of the lack of an emergency plan for the surrounding area. While a successful plan for evacuation at Indian Point would probably reduce overall risk, the fact is that most operating reactor sites do not yet have an approved plan and Indian Point is not different in this regard.
New York PIRG requested that we make no decision on interim operation until Senate confimation of a new chaiman. We cannot delay Commission business pending a confimation process which is beyond our control.
Furthermore, such delay would not make a significant difference in this case since the decision on interim operation was unanimous.
New York PIRG also requested that the Commission examine a copy of the FEMA review on the status of state and local emergency planning ordered by the President. We 1
l have examined this report and it does not change the opinion on emergency planning we expressed above.
We note that the Governor of New York has strongly urged that the plants remain in operation pending the outcome of the proceeding.
Both UCS and New York PIRG sought to address the Commission orally on the subject of interim operation. By a vote of 2-2, that request was denied.
5 The recent leaks of large amounts of water into the containment and reactor vessel cavity at Indian Point Unit 2 are still being reviewed by the Commission's Office of Inspection and Enforcement.
On November 14, 1980, the Commission received a briefing on the status of the investigation at Indian Point Unit 2, and on the implications of the problem for Unit 3.
Unit 2 is currently shut down, and must remain so for a period of months, for repair of the fan cooler units and refueling. With respect to Unit 2, prior to resumption of operations, the Commission will detemine whether its decision of July 15, 1980, to pemit continued operation remains valid. With respect to Unit 3, we decided to stand by our earlier determination to allow operation during the pendency of the adjudication. Our judgment is based upon the infomation received in the November 14 briefing from the Director of the Office of Inspection and Enforce-ment, who advised that the containment fan cooler units at Unit 3 are in markedly better condition than those which have been the source of problems at Unit 2, and that Unit 3 has additional safety features not present in Unit 2 in this regard. E Our judgment also reflects the fact that the two units are owned and operated by separate entities.
Adjudicatory Proceeding The Commission has received a motion for reconsideration of that portion of the Commission's order dated May 30, 1980 which directs that an adjudicatory hearing be held on the long-tem safety of the Indian Point units.
The basis for the petition is the Task Force's conclusions that Indian Point poses the same overall societal risk and less of an individual risk than a typical reactor on a typical site. The licensees also contend that the population density is E
See Appendix A, " Comparison of Indian Point Units 2 and 3."
6 not materially dissimilar from numerous other sites not subject to adjudicatory hearings.
We deny the motion for reconsideration. The licensees would have us treat the Task Force report as the final word on the risks of the Indian Point site, instead of a document designed to aid the Commission in its decision on interim operation. As we stated previously in this order, the Task Force report, compiled in a short time period and not disclosing it$ detailed metnodology and underlying data, will be tested in an adjudicatory setting where parties may present additional or rebuttal evidence.
Furthemore, the Task Force report, even if perfectly accurate, does not answer all of the questions the Commis-sion wishes explored by the Licensing Board in a full proceeding.
In short, we will not turn a decision on interim operation into a final decision on the long-tem acceptability on the Indian Point site.
Licensees also contend that the Indian Point demography is not different from other sites.
In fact, according to the Task Force report, Indian Point has the highest population within 10, 30 and 50 miles of any nuclear power plant site in the United States. At 50 miles, its population is more than double any other plant site.
The Commission directs that the discretionary proceeding will be con-ducted in the vicinity of Indian Point by an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, using the full procedural famat of a trial-type adjudication, including dis-covery and cross-examination. O The purpose of the proceeding will be to take f
O Because of the investigative nature of this proceeding, further guidance is necessary with *espect to certain procedural matters. Because the proceeding, although adjudicatory in fom, is not mandated by the Atomic Energy Act, it is not an "on the record" proceeding within the meaning of the Atomic Energy Act.
Although nomal g parte constraints will (Continued on following.page) l
i 7
evidence and make recommended findings and conclusions on disputed issues material to the question whether the Indian Point Units 2 and 3 plants should be shut down or other action taken. The record of the proceeding, together with recommendations, will then be forwarded to the Commission for the final agency action on the merits of the proceeding.
In view of the complexity of this proceeding, and in onfer that the Commission may make its decision within a reasonable period of time, we stress that the Board should focus clearly upon the questions asked by the Commission.
The Commission's primary concern is the extent to which the population around Indian Point affects the risk posed by Indian Point as compared to the O
(Continued from preceding page) apply to communications to the Licensing Board, the Commission will not be limited in its ability to obtain information with respect to Indian Point from any source.
Becau3e the Commission itself is designating by this Order the issues it wishes to be addressed in the adjudication, it is particularly important that the Licensing Board have discretion to fomulate contentions and subissues, upon the advice of the parties, so as to effectuate that purpose.
In admitting and fomulating contentions and subissues, therefore, the Licensing Board will not be bound by the provisions of 10 CFR Part 2.
The Licensing Board may also, without regard to the provisions of 10 CFR Part 2 establish whatever order of presentation it deems best suited to the proceeding's investigative pu rposes.
Except as provided above or elsewhere in this Order,10 CFR Part 2 will control.
If the Board concludes that further relaxation of the rules is necessary for the efficient conduct of the hearing, we expect it to request such authorization from the Commission. The Commis-sion expects the Licensing Board to use its authority under Part 2 to assure the relevance and efficency of discovery and cross-examination.
The Licensing Board shall not reach an initial decision, but as noted in the Order, shall instead fomulate recommendations on the ouestions posed by the Commission.
No party will have the " burden of persuasion" as the tem is nomally used in adjudicatory proceedings; if evidence on a particular matter is in equipoise, the Board's recommendation may be expected to reflect that fact.
The staff will be a party to the pro-ceeding, and the licensees will be admitted as parties upon request filed within 30 days of Fed:ral Register notice of the appointment of a Licensing Board. All others wishing to intervene shall file petitions for intervention within 30 days of Federal Register notice of the appoint-ment of a Licensing Board. The appointment of the Licensing Board will be anounced by subsequent order of the Commission.
1
8 spectrum of risks posed by other nuclear plants.
The Commission is concerned with both the total risk to persons and property posed by the Indian Point plants and the risk to individuals living in the vicinity of the Indian Point site, including that resulting from the difficulty of evacuation in an ener-gency.
The Commission intends to compare Indian Point to the spectrum of risks from other nuclear power plants, since the primary basis for the Commis-sion's decision will be how extreme are the individual and societal risks associated with Indian Point compared to the spectrum of risks from other operating stations.
The Commission is also interested in the current state of emergency plann!ng in the vicinity of the Indian Point site and in future improvements in that planning as well as in resolving the specific contentions in the UCS Petition to the effect that s'ome of our regulations are not met in one or both units.
Risks from nuclear power reactors are defined by the probabilities and consequences associated with potential accidents.
In directing a comparison of the risks of the Indian Point units with those from a representative group of other operating units, the Commission is fully aware of the uncertainties that attend such quantitative risk assessment calculations (reference NUREG-CR-0400, the Lewis Report, and the Commission policy statement on it.)
Despite these uncertainties, risk assessment methods offer the best means available for objective and quantitative comparison of the kind needed here.
Further, some of the uncertainty that is associated with risk assessment estimates of the absolute values of accident probabilities and consequences does not apply to comparisons such as those sought here.
1 l
9 Several measures of risk are useful for the comparisons the Commission seeks.
For individual risks, these include the probabilities of early effects
-- fatalities and injuries that could occur soon after an accident -- and of long-term effects -- cancers and genetic effects that couId occur more than a year after an accident, all as a function of distance from the reactor.
For societal risks the useful measures include early effects, long-term effects, and property damage and costs in terms of interdiction, decontamina-tion, and crop and milk losses and the possibility that some areas affected by an accident might be uninhabitable for long periods.
Societal risk measures should include the distributions of probabilities and consequences as well as the expected risks or mean annual values of the consequences.
Risk measures of these kinds for the Indian Point units and for a representative group of other operating nuclear power plants were presented in the report of the Commission's Task Force on Interim Operation of the Indian Point, NUREG-0715, and were found useful by the Commission in its consideration of the interim operation matter.
In developing the record of the proceeding, the Board should address a series of questions as follows:
1.
What risk may be posed by serious accidents at Indian Point 2 and 3, including accidents not considered in the plants' design basis, pending and after any improvements described in (2) and (4) below?
2.
What improvements in the level of safety will result from measures required or referenced in the Director's Order to the licensee, dated February 11, 1980?
(A contention by a party that one or more specific safety measures, in addition to those identified or referenced by the Of rector, should 6
10 be required as a condition of operation of the facility or facilities, would be within the scope of this inquiry.)
3.
What is the current status and degree of confomance with NRC/ FEMA guidelines of state and local emergency planning within a 10-mile radius of the site and, of the extent that it is relevant to risks posed by the two I
plants, beyond a 10-mile radius?
In this context, an effort should be made to establish what the minimum number of hours warning for an effective evauation.of a 10-mile quadrant at Indian Point would be. The FEMA position should be taken as a rebuttable presumption for this estimate.
4.
What improvements in the level of emergency planning can be expected in the near future, and on what time schedule, and are there other specific offsite emergency procedures that are feasible and should be taken to protect the public?
l 5.
Based on the foregoing, how do the risks posed by Indian Point Units 2 and 3 compare with the range of risks posed by other nuclear power plants licensed to operate by the Commission? (The Board should limit its inquiry l
l to generic examination of the range of risks and not go into any site-specific examination other than for Indian Point itself, except to the extent raised by the Task Force.
6.
What would be the energy, environmental, economic or other conse-quences of a shutdown of Indian Point Unit 2 and/or Unit 37 7.
Does the Governor of the State of New York wish to express an official position with regard to the long-term operation of the units?
The Commission would like to receive the Board's recomendations no later than one year from this date.
11 It is so ORDERED.
g m
o I
o DI n%
g SAMUEL J ILK
% * +0 Secretary of he Commission Dated at Washington, D.C.
this 8th day of January,1981.
m
12 Aotendix'A -- Comoarison of Indian Point Units 2 and 3 In the aftermath of the event at Indian Point Unit 2 resulting from contain=ent fan cooler leakage, an analysis was made to determine whether Indian Point Unit 3, which is of a nearly identical design, had any features which would preclude the type of event which had occurred at Indian Poiit Unit 2.
At the time of that event, Indian Point Unit 3 was shut down for maintenance and inspection.
The analysis indicated the following:
1.
The maintenance history on the containment fan coolers is signi-ficantly better at IP-3 compared to IP-2; therefore, major leakage inside containment is much less likely to occur. Although the better condition is probably largely because IP-3 fan coolers are newer, at the present time the fact is they are in significantly better condition and are expected to remain so during the upcoming cycl e.
At IP-3, there have been no leaks in the piping assceiated with the fan coolers (such as the =ain contributing leak to the IF-2 l
event in a 10" service water return pipe).
IP-3 has replaced five motor cooler. units in their history after experiencing leakages up to approximately 2 gpn maximum from those uni'a.
Al,so, there are no "episaal" or " adams clamp" patches on the IP-3 coolers (there are numerous patches of both types on IP-2, some of which have had to be re-repaired).
IP-3 has used "hard" solder (90/5/5) to build up a patch over several small leaks. Those patches, while. net considered persanent, have proven more satisfactory than the IP-2 method.
Finally, the fan-cooler service water isolation valves at IF-3 have all been rebuilt even though no recent problems have been experienced, and each fan eccler unit has passed the Technical Specification required 0.36 gpn/ cooler leak rate tes' (this includes all valves, coils, pipes, etc., not just the isolation valves).
2.
There are more indications in the control room of t'te sump levels
.in containment than there were at IP-2.
The sump pump on/off leveks of the vapor containnent (VC) sump a.
are adjusted so that five level lights (three on one column and two on another column) will turn on before water spills onts the 46' elevation floor (as opposed to four at IP-2).
Since two are normally on even after the sump pumps have pumped the sump at each plant (the lowest 2 lights) that means 3 additional lights will c:ce on at IP-3 as opposed to 2 at IP-2, before water spills onts the 46' elevation floor.
b.
A new capacitive detector device will detect approximately 1" of water on -Jte 46' floor, with an audible control rocm alar.n.
.g G
-.-+------p
,n
13 c.
At IP-3, the recirculation su=p is normally, kept dry so that increasing levels in containment will also 'be detected by the two additional level indicating columns in that suop before water could flow into the reactor cavity (at IP-2, the recir-culation sump is kept full of barated water, thereby negating usefulness of these indicators).
One of the two level indicating columns in each sump must be operable by Technical Specifications for continued plant operation.,
3.
Several features are present in the reactor cavity to prevent and detect collection of water there.
a.
Two new pumps.have been installed which will not operate in,such a way as to be subject to trips on thermal overload, as might have been the case with the previous pumps.
The pumps have been installed with a " siphon breaker" (3/4" vacuum relief line in the discharge loop above the 46' floor, l
where it will discharge into the VC sump).
j b.
A column has been installed in the cavity that will activate i
two independent audible alar =s in the control room when approxi-mately 1" and approximately 3" of water respectively are in the bottom of the cavity.
A s'atrch has beiin conducted for other siphori' paths'into'th'a c.
.. ;reactat cavity,_tesulting in sealing of one conduit connection on the 46' floor which represented a potential siphon path.
d.
T%c unlabeled lights inside containment that were incorrectly assumed to indicate cavity pump operation (when on) at IP-2 have been properly labeled at IP-3 (they djt ndicate cavity i
pump operation at IP-3, unlike IP-2 where they indicate moisture i
in the cavity).
l e.
The 46' floor has been " surveyed" using a watar-fil. led tygen hose, with the result that water depth on the 46' _ floor at the sump before watar would flow into the cavity would be approximately 5-1/2" (compared to variously reported 2" to 4" at IP-2 cue to a reverse slope in th6 IP-2 46' floor).
4.
In addition to Technical Specification requirements already mentioned (0.36 gpm leakage / fan cooler, one floa: column operable / sump) several plant requirements, some with calibration procedures, exis:
for equipment important for detection / prevention of "IP-2" type events.
A m
,--,,,-..,,--------a-.
,-e.-~--
.----..u
...,,.,,-,, + -. -. -. ---,--, -,
.w
14
~
Level switches and the capacitive levei indicator must be a.
calibrated by procedure each refueling cutage.
Dew point detectors and weir level (containment fan cooler b.
condensata and/or leakage flow detector) must be calibrated i
every two years.
Plant procedures require each shift recording and superviscry review of trends on the rotometer flow meter /totali:er installed c.
on the line frca the VC sumps to tanks outside containment.
Changes in that flow would signal leaks in containment (by an increase) er the possibility of pump failure (by a decrease).
l 3.
Long Term With the above noted exceptions, many of the preventative and mitigative features described above are not defined as " safety-related" and/or they do not have formal operability requirements.
However, IP-3 personnel have been " tuned" 'a lock for this type of event' by II Information Notice 80-37 concerning the IP-2 event, and l
by extensive discussion with NRC personnel. The NRC staff believes that in the near tarm, a f1 coding event at IP-3 is unif kely, and that if it did happen it would be promptly detected and corrected long before consequences become,as severe as they did at IP '2.
4 9
e
- F=-
-r
=w
g
'=-
Gu:::i2:~
- _=.
UNITED STATES'0F AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY C01D11SSION
~~
~
2.
' In the Matter of
)
~
~
- M5
~-
)
2".""~'
CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY
)
Docket No.(s) 50-247 i OF NEW YORK, INC.
)
50-286
==
)
(Indian Point St.ation, Unit No. 2 )
m
-.m.
~
and 3)
)
)
m.
)
- =
- ==:
t :. :-----
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE w.:
I hereby certify that I have this day served the foregoing document (s) upon each person designated on the official service list compiled by
,..J.?
the Office of the Secretary of the Connission in this proceeding in accordance with the' requirements of Section 2.712 of 10 CFR Part 2 -
i= =
Rules of Practice, of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Rules and
,,_Qlll Regulations.
"_~...
i.....
1.=: =.
u~..
l Dated at Washington
.C.
this
- .m..
day of bb 19
~~'
U
=.,
C.5. ".-
x--
u.:.. n a=.: -....
Officej of the Secretary of the Commission p.,
V 11:=
h *"*'*ll
' ntr t.nnn:.
g....
t.wz:
- :.=--
h.L :..
zil:.
.=: ::
=:.
w 1
- iE:~
Ea th..m l'
Ie
. _.. m
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the Matter cf
)
)
CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY OF
)
Decket No. (s)
)
50-247
)
50-286 (Indian Point, Units 2 and 3)
)
)
)
)
SERVICE LIST Counsel for NRC Staff Ellyn R.
Weiss, Esq.
Office of the Executive Legal Director Sheldon, Harmon and Weiss U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1725 I Street, N.W.,
Suite 506 Washington, D.C.
20555 Washington, D.C.
20006 Consolidated Edison Company of Brent L.
Brandenberg, Esq.
New York, Inc.
Consolidated Edison Company ATTN:
Mr. William J.
Cahill, Jr.
of New York, Inc.
Vice President 4 Irving Place 4 Irving Place New York, New York 10003 New York, New York 10003 Thomas R.
Frey, Esq.
LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae General Counsel 1333 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Power Authority of the State Washington, D.C.
20036 of New York 10 Columbus Circle New York, New York 10019 6
e w
,w-,,,
l Ms. A. Susan Basilo Francoise Brun2tte
'Ms. Mary S. Guggenheia
' 692.4 S:uth 221 E. Avtnue 6301 Riverdale Avenue
' Treasure Hill Road Broken Arrow, Olka. 74012 Bronx, New York 10471 South Kent, Connecticut 06785 l
l Mrs. Cla'ir Fuchs ~ ~
! Carolyn D. King Ms. Andrea Gordon
~
- James F. King i
Box 635 SUNY 7220 West Park Avenue 101 Westwood Avenue Purchase, New York 10577 Waterbury, Connecticut 06708 St. Louis, Missouri 63117 f
Miro M. TodnaovichTExec. Se Mr. Ari Sommer j Mr. Richard Perl cient h c Engineers for Office of Energy Conservation Department of General Services ! Institute for World Order
" C"
"*"97' "C'
' Municipal Building, Room 2113 New York, New York 10018 New York, New York.10007
__-__.i___.
Mr. Jacob Grobstein, Chainnan Mr. Marc Gross.
Heritage Village Peace Council !
Brooklyn SHAD P.O. Box 693 305A President Street Southbury, Connecticut 06488 Brooklyn, New York 11231
..________.___.y.
Mrs. Jane Reynolds Mr. John A. Phillips, Chairman Ms. Joyce H. Dopkeen The Fund for Secure Energy, Inc.'
Sonja F. Fox 178 Cowles Road i
4 21 Charles Street i
24 Aqueduct Lane Woodbury, Connecticut 06798 Westport, Connecticut 06E80 j
Hastings-on-Hudson, N. Y.
i B
s, o
n.
hsg {bara Queens Safe Energy Coalition Ro rt b ams ttorney Gene:
ygy 9
y 160 Claremont Avenue 140-10 Franklin Avenue Environmental-Protection Bur-New York, New York 10027 l Flushing, New York 11355 2 World Trade Center j
New York, New York 10047 Mr. Sal Z. Gdanski i
Chailes M. Pratt, Attorney Rockland County Legislature Power Authority of the State 2 N;w Hempstead Road of New York Ncw York, New York 10956 10 Columbus Circle New York New York 10019._
Mr. & Mrs. Jay Hubelband Benjamin S. Rosenthal Ms. Joan Holt, Project Dir.
em er, Democrade Steering NYPIRG WocJbury Road and Policy Committee 2372'Rayburn Building Washington; Connecticut 06293, Washington, D.C. 20515 i
k rk 10038 Ms. Karen Eberhardt Hon. Shirley Chisholm Brent L. Brandenburg, Esq.
U.S. House of Representatives Consolidated Edison Company 21 Boulderbrook Road 2182 Rayburn Buildin9 4 Irving Place - 1822 Wilton, Connecticut 06897 Washington, D.C. 20515 New York, New York 10003 Hon. Mario Biaggi Mr. T. ii. Anderson, Manager Ms. A. Patricia Posner 22 Park Trail U.S. House of Representatives Nuclear Safety Division 2428 Rayburn Building Westinghouse Corp.
Croton, New York 10520 Washington, D.C. 20515 Box 355 Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 152
'Ms. Ellen Saltzman Ms. Nancy Bredesky Mr. Michael Walsh 3091 Hickory Street l 675 Avenue Z - Apt. 2K Box 705
,,........._,,_4.u.
b-.. v -.
' Mr. Stanley Fink, Speaker J. J. MacNulty, Secretary Mr. & Mrs. Uedon Farrey Fritnds of the Hudson 304 Rinzq)1d Street New York State Assembly
! P.O. Box 619 Peekskill, New York 10566 Albany, New York 12247
' Wardstock, New York 12498
~
Toby Moffett, Com. Chairman Ms. Vicky G. deMonterey Ms Mitzi S*
Checkerb Comittee on Government Opers.
Box 359 SUNY
' Rayburn House Office Building Purchase, New York 10577 Sandy Ho Co n 06482 Room B-371-B-C
,y Washington, D.C. 20515 l Ms. Phyllis Rodri;uez Mr. Shel Horowitz Ms. Claudette Barif
' 64 Elmore Avenue Gray Panthers of Brooklyn
' Croton, New York 10520 c/o Generations Porter Avenue 55 Flatbush Avenue l
Brooklyn.:.New York 11217 Middlebury, Connecticut 06762 Ms. Lorna Salzman
~ '!
- s. Stella Murphy, Co-Covener M
Ms. Pamela Fletcher l Mid-Atlantic Representative Gray Panthers 656 Sherman Avenue
- criends of the Earth 15 West 65th Street Thornwood, New York 10594 72 Jana Street New York, New York 10023
, hw York, New York 10014 Mr. Lawrence Plotkin t
Co-Chairman Jonathan Bingham, Chairman Ms. Elsa Fletcher Subcommittee on Economic Policy 38 Ridgewood Terrace i E2 Ethics & Energy Committee and Trade Chappaqua, New York 10514 2 West 64th Street U.S. House of Representatives New York, New York 10023 Washington, D.C.
20515 Ms. Camille Truchel Mrs. Phyllis Sakalian Mr. Donald Williams City of New York Corresponding Secretary 44 Hollywood Avenue Community Board No. 4 1464 Summit Avenue Yonkers, New York 10707 326 West 42nd Street Peekskill, New York 105.66 l New York, New York 10036 Mr. Edward J. Clery Westchester Peoples Action l Ncw York State Bldg. and Coalition, Inc.
Mr. & Mrs. D. Harrison l Construction Trades Council 255 Grove Street Box 104
' 211 East 43rd Street White Plains, New York 10601 Roxbury, Connecticut 06783 New York, New York 10017 Ms. Nora James Percival Ms. Amy Lanier Braunhut Ms. Ervine Kimerling Zenith Design State University of New York 37 Piney Point Avenue New Preston, Connecticut 06777 Purchase, New York 10577 Croton-on-Hudson, N. Y.10520
~
Ms. Eva Marmorstein ACTSANE
~
Ms. Sarita Copeland Mr. Donald L. Sapir Post Office Box 404 60 East Mount Airy Road Planetarium Station 16 Windsor Road Croton, New York 10520
' Mw York, New York 10024 Hastingg.On-Hudson. N.Y._10706.
Mrs. John C. Besson i
I
]nitedCitizensAgainstNukes lMs.HildaCashman Mr.StephenWright 30 St. John Place 199 Larchmont Avenue
- Church Street i
.New Canaan, Connecticut 06840 Larchmont, N. Y.10.438 Roxbury, Connecticut 06783 C.r. James Haughton, Director right Back Kyra Sabasiabudhe Ms. Diana L. Wright
' East 125th Street
. Box 1622 SUNY
. Church Street
s Ms., Susan Griffrida Ellyn R. Waiss, Esq.
Ms. Janet Sonnenfeld S
dn H n
Wei 54 Truxton Road
)
e 506 76-22 Grand Central Parkway
. Island Park, t'ew York 11558
- Washington, D.C. 20006 Forest Hills, New York 11375 i.
l Mr. Peter D.G. Brown
-~
Mr. David Schnall Mr. Leonard Insigne
' 7-24160th Street
!ChairmanoftheBoard Waterbury People Against Mid-Hudson Nuclear Opponents Nuclear Energy Whitestone, New York i
P.O. Box 666 103 Hickory Lane i New Paltz, New York 12561 Waterbury, Connecticut 06716 Ms. Lisa Cabell Ms. Debrahl F. Levy Ms. Lauren Beth Stem 105-10 66th Avenue rc ase Ne ork 10577 57 Elysing Avenue Forest Hills, New York 11375 Myack, New York 10960
.....l.-..-.
Rockland Citizens for Safe Ener'l Ms. Judith Kessler Ms. Kathy Engel
'P.O. Box 74 Mobilization for Survival New York, New York 10956 135 West 4th Street New York, New York 10012 l
Robart M. Berk M D.
- Ms. Sharon E. Persinger Ms. Maura N. Haslett 5ernice Berk, Box 724 - SUNY 3530 Henry Hudson Parkway l 211 Henry Street, Apt. 4B Purchase, New York 10577 Bronx, New York 10463 New York, New York 10002 arn jf Miriam Friedlander, Esq.
Mrs. James Atkinson
,Ru R D. il
- Council Member, 2nd District Glenmoore, Pennsylvania 19343 Y
24 Westminister c.oad I rk, tiew York 10007 Scarsdale.New York 10583 Dean R. Corren, Director Ms. Kathleen Hood Hon. Robert Garcia Greater New York Council Box 288, R.D. #1 U.S. House of Representatives on Energy Morgantown, Pennsylvania 19543 Longworth Building - Room 1722 26-36 Stuyvesant Street (NewYork,N.Y.10003 Washington, D.C. 20515 Mr. Larry Heisler, Director Ms. Linda Winikow, State Sen.
Brooklyn Alternative Counseling l State of New York 154 Bay 49th Street l Albany, New York 12247 Brooklyn, New York 11214 Ms. Francesca Burgess Hon. Fred Richmond Wayne Avenue U.S. House of Representatives 1707 Longworth Building Stoney Point, N. Y'.10980 Washington, D.C. 20515 Ms. Maureen Her;-uk
' Hon. Ted Weiss iox 0897, SUNY iU.S. House of Representatives Purchase, New York 10577
'132 Cannon Building Washington, D.C. 20515 Mr.
G2rald A. Navratil Andrew Stein, President j
j E 4 r, Ne Yr 02 rk N or 0007
--