ML19340E899
| ML19340E899 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 11/13/1979 |
| From: | Rathburn D NRC OFFICE OF POLICY EVALUATIONS (OPE) |
| To: | Hystad C NRC OFFICE OF POLICY EVALUATIONS (OPE) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19340E885 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8101160164 | |
| Download: ML19340E899 (23) | |
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UNITED STATES efE.
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November 13, 1979 O
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Carlyle Hystad
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FROM:
..s Dennis Rathbun,. Assistant Direct,ct, OPE
SUBJECT:
NRC CONTRIBUTION'TO D'OMESTIC INIiIATIVES TO RESPOND TO
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POTEhTIAL OIL SHORTAGES Attached for your use is the draft NRC paper for Tasks 5 and 25. We believe this paper should be reviewed and comented on by DOE's Economic Regulatory Administration.
Attachment:
As-stated l
cc.. Chairman Hendrie Comissioner Gilinsky Commissioner Kennedy Comissioner Bradford Comissioner Ahearne Leonard Bickwit Sam Chilk Lee V. Gossick l
Harold Denton Norm Hall'er Ed Hanrahan CONTACT:
Faul Goldberg (OPE) 534-3295 Jim Beckerley (OPE)
C34-3295 0101160 \\ f
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.I.
OVERVIEW At$. GENERAL COMENTS l.
Attached is the NRC staff draft of options to increase nuclear productivity in response to an energy emergency precipitated by a reduction in petroleum imports.
It should be emphasized that.the analysis of options is; preliminary and has not been reviewed and' approved by the Comission --although the Comissioners have been' supplied copies for information.
2.
The development of options to increase nuclear productivity procee'ded from the assumption of two fundamental scenarios:
Scenario I
- A U.S. Government decision to li.mit oil imports to a specified level.
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Scenario II - An energy emergency resulting from curtailment of oil exports to the U.S. from producing nations.
3.
Presumably the range of consequences _in a Scenario I-I situation would be considerably larger (e.g. from mild economic stress to majcr adverse social and economic effects such as rotating blackouts, homes without heat, substantial curtailment of industrial production, etc.) than in a Scenario I situation.
However, the consequences of either situation i
could probably be mitigated by Federal planning and control.
4.
During the first nine months of 1979 the relevant nuclear energy production statistics are as follows:*
January. September /nr 1979 Annual Rate'1979 In m1Tllons of M In millions of CE A.
Potential Power Production 314.6 41g,4 Net Power Production 191.9 255.2 l
B.
Enerov Not Produced:
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'Due to Scheduled Outages 36.2 4g,3 Due to Forced Outages 28.1 l
Due to System Load Following 37:4 and Other Reasons 49.6 65.0
' Total Energy Not Produced Due to NRC Restrictions 20.1 26.7 (included in categories for energy lost through both scheduled and forced outages listed above) 5.
Task 5 assigned to NRC was analysis of options for " start / restart of nuclear power plants."
Under the scenarios assumed above, the attached draft paper identifies two. options under Task 5.
Move forward to issue operating licenses for plants whose operation will be delayed during calendar year 1980 as a result. of the TMI accident.
There are 12,187 MWe potentially affected.
Starting these l
- See monthly cata in Table 3.
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plants when they are projected to be ready for commerciu oper'ation could produce an additional 31 million MWhr during 1980.
This assumes that the " pause" in reactor licensing extends through 1980.
Of course, a pause of shorter duration would reduce the potential " gain".in nuclear operation.
However, difficult policy and perhaps legal issues would be raised by such'a course of action -- in particular, the appearance of "short-circuiting" the recomendations of the recent Kemeny Comission.
NRC has completed 5taff analyses of Lessons Learned and has an extensive set of technical and admini.strative improvements
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which are deemed essential. In addition, tl8 res'ults from NRC Special Investigation is expected early nextd ear and a further set of corrective actions are anticipated.
. -Move forward to reducA reactor unit outage time due to NRC restrictions.
As the data above shows, about 20 million MWhr were not produced
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during January-September 1979 because of NRC restrictions. This option assumes that, in response to a true energy emergency, regulatory.
decision-making with regard to shutdown and restart of reactors for safety reasons would take into account the national policy to conserve oil.
Implementing this option also presents difficult legal and policy issues for resolution.
Nonetheless, if one were to assume that impact on oil supplies were considered in reaching regulatory decisions,_ the time during which nuclear plants were shutdown because of NRC restrictions could, in theory, be reduced.
In the attached paper, we have assumed a one-third reduction might be realized. To the extent that the regulatory-related' outages for 1979 will be typical for next year, this assumption would translate into 9 million MWhr (annual rate).
It should be noted that energy loss due to NRC restriction in prior years was materially lower (that is, 3 to 6 million MWhr/
j year).
Evaluation:
Both of the above options would contemplate a shift in NRC's approach to regulatory decision-making so as to take into account hardship resulting from dependence on foreign oil.
It may be difficult to justify such a change -- without statutory amendment to the Atomic Energy Act and Energy Reorganization Act -- under Scenario I where l
restriction in oil import would be expected'to be comparatively modest. -
Similarly,. under Scenario II, before the embargo, it may be difficult to justify a change -- without a statutory amendment.
However,'should an embargo be' imposed, and it becomes clear that (a) major social and economic dislocations are going to occ'ur and (b) prompt regulatory action could significantly mitigate the damage, the NRC would have a strong argument for finding that expeditious restart / start of reactors would not violate the " adequate protection" requirement of existing statutes.-
6.
Task 25 assigned to NRC for analysis calls for development of " Plans to maximize nuclear plant capability." The principle here would be to increase nuclear reactor productivity to the extent practicable under the scenarios outlined above.
We have assumed that the approaches to be considered are short terrh (that is, implementable within the next year),
and thus have ruled out measures to increase nuclear plant capacity factors such as requiring utilities to adopt an 18-month refueling cycle instead of the 12-month cycle now used.
Altering the refueling cycle 1
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_3 would require increased enrichment of fuel and additional energy to achieve the; enrichment, as well as revised fuel management procedures; these would be difficult to accomplish within the assumed time frame for options developed here.
Under the two scenarios described above, the attached draft paper identifies four options:
-.. Utilities act to shorten down-time for refueling.
The 1979-data above for January-September indicates that about 34 million MWhr of electrical energy were not. produced b.ecause,0f scheduled and non-scheduled outages.
On the average, reactors are taken out of service for about 55 days per year for refueling and performance of routine maintenance (i.e.15 percent of down time). At very best PWRs and BWRs can be refueled in 23 and 15 days respectively.
The attached paper assumes for purposes of development of this option, that the present refueling time can be reduced by about 20 percent. (Note:
This implies the reduction in down time for refueling and other work from 55 days to 44 days or somewhat less than two' weeks.)
Similarly, it is assumed that other non-NRC related outages (i.e. performance of routine maintenance and repairs from equipment failures) can be reduced by this amount.
It should be emphasized that NRC does not possess the direct statutory authority to require action by the utilities to carry outi this option.
Using its. authority under Section 202(c) o'f the Federal Power Act to require wheeling of power in emergencies, DOE might be able to bring pressure upon utilities'to increase capacity' factors on nuclear plants for both this and the following options.
Reduction in scheduled ~outa 12 million MWhr (ges by 20 percent would allow production of an additional annual. rate) with nuclear power.
Utilities act to increase the period of reactor operation between -
refueling cycles.
What is envisioned here is essentially an emergency measure -- that is, in response to an oil energency operators of nuclear power plants delay shutting plants down for refueling for several months and operate in a " coasting down" mode.
In this mode the reactor full power might be gradually reduced to 60-80 percent over a few months period as the core looses reactivity.. It should be.
emphasized.that this would be an emergency measure and would r,.esult in production of an additional few million MWhr primarily' during the normal fall and spring refueling periods.
Als6, implementation of this option could lead to a potential capacity shortage for meeting
.the following winter or summer peak at which time reactor refueling would be absolutely mandatory because of loss of reactivity.
NRC would not have authority to require such aGions by utilities.
As in the previcus option DOE might be able to press for utility action.
Initial estimates are that roughly one-quarter million MWhr additional generation per 1,000 MWe plant might be achievable for.each 10 days delay in refueling -- however, the potential additional generation would require detailed analysis of fuel management for individual reactor units.
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Utilities act to minimize or eliminate use of nuclear plants for load following and other losses due to operation at less than full power.
In some systems, elimination of load-following might conserve oil.
y During January-September 1979, around'50 million MWhr of energy were not produced for reasons related to load following and operation at less than 100 percent.
While the exact extent of reactor load following is not readily available, we have assumed that it might be possible to reduce this category by one. third, which is equivalent to 22 million~
, MWhr.
Again NRC would have no authority to, dire,ct utilities use of reactors.
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y' Another option is for NRC to minimize mandated derating of units.
At any one time, a number of nuclear power plants are operating at less than full design power, e.g. because of environmental or safety-1 l
related constraints.
Although it might be possible to increase nuclear capacity by minimizing mandated derating, preliminary con-sideration of this option indicates its value in responding to oil
' supply emergencies is probably much smaller than the other options we have noted.
We have been unable to quantify the potential additional generation from this option.
Evaluation:
The authority which NRC would have to compel implementation or tne options listed above is indirect and, if exerted, might be subject to effective challenge. Thus, implementation of these options would require action by the utilities to increase nuclear generation (perhaps under some pressure from DDE through its authority to require wheeling" of power; Section 202(c) of the Federal Power Act).
However, it should be noted
-that radical change by utilities in reactor operating practices designed to maximize nuclear generation could have health and safety implications which wou1d require NRC review and approval.
7.
We have tabulated below the potential for additional nuclear generatio'n' in the near term (i.e. through 1980).
Also shown is the equivalent Bb1 of oil for the potential additional generation (assumes 1.8 Bbl oil /MWhr).
It should be noted that this savings expressed in terms of oil is not likely te be fully realized because the additional nuclear generation will not reduce oil consumption in a one-for-one relationship.
Additional analysis yith a focus on fuel consumption within individual electric reliability subregions and transmission capabilities within and between these regions will be needed to determine how much nuclear substitution for oil-is technically feasible and mi'ght be achieved in practice.
- Also, the residual oil generally used to fire generating plants which might be saved by substitution of nuclear for oil may not be efficiently converted to supply other oil use needs (e.g. for " lighter" weight petroleum needs such as gasoline).
Clearly, demand forecasts as altered by tne conditions described.in the scenarios would be a factor.
(Follow-up task by DOE's ERA.),
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Potential
- Equivalency
- AJditional generation to oil (millions MWhr)
(millions.Ebl/ oil) 1.
Brino new plants on-line d 31'-
4 56 in19801/
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2.
As practicable, reduce
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energy loss due to NRC restriction 2/
3.
Utilities reduced forced /
N 34 w 61 scheduled outages and utilitie:; required to avoid use of nuclear for " load foilowing" and operation at less than full power 4.
Uti.lities " coast down"
- 12 L 22 (rather thqq shutdown for refueling)d/
TOTAL h 86 h155
- Annual rate; note that 176 million Bbl is an upper limit since the actual
. amount of nuclear generation which can be substituted for oil-fired generation will be smaller than indicated.
t 1/ sssmes " pause" in reactor licensing continues through 1980.-
A 2_/ ased upon 1979 experience which is significantly higher than previous B
years (1976-78).
Thus, the potential additional nuclear g.eneration may be overstated for both item 1 and 2.
3_/Of course, if the oil consumption is merely delayed from a period of shortage (as during an embar real net oil " savings may, go) to a future period of plentiful supply, no in fact, be realized.
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II.
ANALYSIS:
TASK 5..- ' RESTART / START NUCLEAR POWER PLAtiTS There are a' number of nuclear units which are typically shut down at any time during the year.
For instance, as of 0:tober 25, 1979, 24 units representing 16,600 MWe capacity were in shutdown status. IMuch of this generating capacity is shut down for refueling (typically done du' ring non-peak fall or spring periods),
repair, and maintenance (13 units at 16:500 We).
A smaller amount is down in order to make changes to meet regulatory requirements (7 units at 4,800 MWe).
In addition, there are 11 units representing 12,187 MWe which would be ready to go on line during calendar year 1980 -- but whose operating licenses are held up pending resolution of TMI related safety questions.
There are three flants which are now shut down for safety-related reasons.
These are Dresden 1, Indian Point.1, and Humboldt Bay (combined capacity, 528 MWe). These plants could not be restarted on short notice and should be considered unavailable for restart even in an emergency.
For example, the reactor core internals have been removed from Indian Point 1.
Three Mile
Island 1 is also shutdown because of the TMI 2 accident.
Until the hazard associated with TMI 2 is fully evaluated and the implications for renewed operation of pI 1 completely understood, this unit should not be considered
, available except perhaps in the most extreme national emergency.
Options to restart existing plants or start up new plants are considered under two scenarios:
in Scenario I the U.S. Government decides as a matter
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of policy'to limit imports tc a specified level which would result in some restriction on supply of petroleum to the U.S. economy; in Scenario II the U.S. petroleum r"pply is restricted by the significant curtailment of oil exports to the U.S. from the producing nations.
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. Scenario I:
U.S. Government policy decision to limit o.il imports to a specified level.
Pursuant to this decision, it is assumed that the President, inter alia, specifically requests the NRC to expedite actions which would' substitute nuclear electric energy generated capacity for. oil-fired capacity.
Expediting would include prompt decisions on pending licenses,. coop rative action of S
industry and regulatory agencies to maximize nuclear unit productivity, etc.
It is assumed that the. shortfall in the U.S. petroleum. supply resulting from the decision to limit imports leads to moderate, but not extreme stress in the U.S. economy.
Scenario I implies a fairly methodical and planned ' approach -
to accomodate that stress.
It also implies that there would be not substantial changes.in the regulatory process.
Option I
- Move forward to issue operating licenses for plants whose operation will be delayed during calendar year 1980 as a result of the TMI accident.
Table i shows the plants that would be ready for comercial operation and their fuel loading dates.
In the aftermath of the TMI 2 accident the NRC,,
comitted itself to a thorough evaluation of the implications of that accident
.for other plants which would be licensed in the future by NRC.
The " lessons learned" from the accident would then be factored into regulatory actions on t
all nuclear pfants -- either through backfitting or imposition of new requirements.
In addition, the reccmendations of the Presidential Comission are being used to develop new regulatory practices and licensing requirements.
Many of the technical measures and actions recomended by the Presidential Comission were anticipated by NRC staff and are being implemented.
At the present time the NRC staff has a " pause" in work on reactor li. censing cases which would lead to operating licenses for new plants during 1980.
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Table 1
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NUCLEAR UNITS WHICH COULD BEGIN COMMERCIAL.0PERATION IN 1980 Projected. fuel loadino date Unit Power Level 1/80
.Sequoyah 1 1,148 MWe Salem 2 1,115
+
Liablo Canyon 1 1,084 3,347 MWe 2/80 North Anna 2 907 MWe 5/80 La Salle 1 1,078 MWe 7/80 McGuire 1 1,180 MWe Zinner 810
'Farley 2 829 2,819 MWe 11/80 San Onofre 2 1,140 MWe Shoreham 819 Summer 900 2,859 MWe 12/80 Watts Bar 1 1,177 MWe TOTAL 12,187 MWe Source:
HRC orf1ce or Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
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' The NRC staff does not. foresee being in a position to resume work on these cases (Table 1) until sometime. next year. Thus, to license and bring these units into. comercial operation would involve a radical departure from the currently planned course of action.
Such a change in NRC approach would require:
Under existing statutes (i.e. particularly the Atomic Energy Act and the Energy Reorganization Act), establishment of a policy position by the Comission that, in response to the President's call on the NRC to expedite licensing as a means of petroleum conservation, NRC would con-sider such an oil emergency as a balancing factor in licensing decisions with a view toward prompt action on pending operating licenses.
(Note:
An NRC policy decision to sumarily truncate the post-TMI safety aluation process and the associated response to the Kemeny recomendations may require statutory support.)
In the event that the course 'above was challenged successfully in court, an amendment to the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) to clarify the Comission's l
responsibilities and Congressional intent regarding consideration in NRC
-licensing actions of non-radiological public health and sa'f'ety matters I
(e.g. consideration of the contribution of nuclear power in reducing petroleum demand and thereby avoiding rotating blackouts, shortages of-fuel for heating homes and other consequences of the oil import restriction which would clearly have health and safety implications ).
Assuming that the NRC'is..in a position to act expeditiously on the pending licenses, the following are the " pros".and " cons" of Option I.
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PROS:
(1). Operation of generating capacity listed in Table 1 would* add 12,187 MWe over calendar year 1980 (assumes no delay in startup due to plant problems).
(2) Assuminganinitialtwomonthsofstartup.(estingatessentially zero power and an additiona? four months to get to full power about 31 million MWhr could be generated during 1980.
(See Figure 1 and Table 2 for details.)l/
CONS:
(1)
Expedited NRC action on operating licenses before complete analysis and implementation of the TMI follow-up and additional action necessitated by the Kemeny report may result in plants coming on line which may subsequently require extehsive backfitting and/or power derating. (Note:
All of the short-term " lessons learned" NRC follow-up actions after the TMI accident will have been implemented by the time that the reactors are otherwise ready for comercial o: tration.
However, long-term recomendations.
resulting from the reports of the NRC staff, the President's Comission, the independent NRC investigation and other inquiries w'ill not have been incorporated by this point.
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,(2)
Potent'ial diminution of reactor safety margins.
l Option II, - Move forward to reduce reactor unit outage time caused by NRC restrictions.
In response to the potential oil shortages, NRC would permit 1/In the summary, conversion of additional MWhr nuclear generation to oil equivalency.is made and necessary caveats noted regarding such conversion.
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";; 'j Figure 1 ASSUMED POWER ASCENSION
~DURING START-UP 100-75
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50 5
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25 I
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t 0
30' 60 90 120 150 180 210 DAYS During the first two months testing is conducted t
without appreciable power generation. During the following four months the nuclear unit is brought up to full power.
For simplicity the ascension is assumed to be linear with time.
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TABLE 2 ELECTRXC ENERGY GENERATI0ti BY UNITS STARTING UP IN 1980 Average capacity Energy generatG Month Units beginning startup during month
- during month **
(1980) cycle on first of month
'(M4e)
(105 MWhr)
Janucry Sequoyah'1 0
0 Salem 2 Diablo Canyon 1 (3,347 KWe)
February North Anna 2 0
0 (907 MWe)
March' None 41 8 0.30 April None 1,367 0.98 May LaSalle 1 2,430 1.75 (1,078 MWe)
June None 3,493 2.52 July McGuire 1 4,275 3.08 Zimer Farley 2 (2,819 KWe)
August None 4,658 3.35 September Hone 5,280 3.80 0ctober None 6,254 4.50 Plovember
' San Onofre 2 7,094 5.11 Shoreham
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Sumer (2,859 KJe)
December Watts Bar 1 7,799 5*62 L1,177 MWe)
TOTAL 31 x' 106 MWhr See Figure ) for startup cycle.
30-day months assumed.
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. 13 earlier startup of units that are shut down because of regulatory restrictions by reducing the e: tent of NRC verification of licensee compliance with regulatory requirements.
As with Option I, a change in NRC's approa' h to nuclear regulation would likely be necessary,in order to permit explicit NRC consideration of non-radiological health and safety factors in reactor shutdown and restart decisions.
The precise mechanism for consideration of non-radiological health and safety factors will,'in itself, be a very difficult issue for future resolution. As was discussed in Option I, this might be supported by (a)
Commission policy statement under current statutes or (b) amendment to the AEA and ERA.
During January through September, 1979, nuclear units shutdown by NRC would have produced about 20 million MWhr assuming nine months operation at 60 percent capacity factor.
It is, of course, highly speculative to predict exactly what fraction of this energy potential would have been generated if the policy underlying Option II had been in place during 1979.
Moreover,.it is very difficult to predict how much capacity may, in fact, be removed from
' service because of future regulatory actions.
However, if one were to assume that -- with a new policy toward nuclear regulation which put great emphasis on oil conservation -- the outage was reduced by about one-third, this would be equivalent to the generation of about 9 million MWhr per year.
i Assuming that the NRC is in a position to act in the manner described above, the following are " pros" and " cons" of Option II.
i PROS:
(1)
Production of additional millions of MWhr electrical energy with nuclear.
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(1)
Some reduction in conservatism in application of NPC regulatory requirements might reduce' the margin of safety for the o~perating reactors involved.'
Scenario II:
An energy emergency resulting from curtailment of oil exports to'the U.S'. from producing nations.
Under this scenario it is assumed that the degree of restriction of foreign oil available for U.S. consumption is not subject to U.S. Government control (as would logically be the case
' under S,cenario I); but rather could be the result of, action by foreign governments.
Since the supply shortfall cannot be known exactly in
?dvance, the resulting economic stress could range from moderate to severe.
Two periods can.be envi~sioned in which actions might be taken:
Anticipatory planning and actions taken to mitigate the social and economic damage in the event oil exports to U.S. were curtailed.
In that case Options I and II discussed above under Scenario I would be appropriate.
However, the actions envisioned in Options I and II would probably be more difficult to justify since the embargo would be a speculative future In this regard stronger arguments might be made that any additional event.
risk resulting-from expediting actions to bring more nuclear capacity on line or making any change in the way safety judgments are made in shutting
down or restarting nuclear units would not be warranted.
Actions which would be taken only if the embargo were actually imposed.
In anticipation that"an embargo might be imposed, a groundwork
(--
[N for establishment of Comission policy position might be appropriate to lay out in advance the way in which NRC safety decision-making we'uld respond tc an energy emergency.
For instance, the framework of the NRC response to a Presidential call on NRC after an embargo was imposed would spellouthowsafetydecision-makingYightconsideroilimpacts.
The more sei-ious the consequences of the oil embargo (e.g. rotating blackouts, homes without heat, substantial curtailment of industrial prod'uction),
the greater weight that might be attached to the oil factor. Under Option II this would translate in practical terms into greater "RC reluctance to-.
shut down plants and accelerated action to complete needed regulatory related work.
For reasons of lead time necessary to review' licenses of new plants, the practical value of Option I if no action were taken.to implement the option prior to the embargo would probably be very small.
Evaluation:
Both of the above options' would contemplate a shift in NRC's approach to regulatory decision-making so as to take into account hardship resulting from dependence on foreign oil.
It may be difficult to justify
'such a change ~-- without statutory amendment to the Atomic Energy Act and Energy Reorganization Act -- under Scenario I where restriction in oil import would be expected to be comparatively modest.
Similarly, under Scenario II, before the embargo, it may be difficult to justify a change -- without a
- tatutory amendment.
However, should an embargo be imposed, and it becomes clear that (a) major social and er nomic dislocations are going to occur and (b) prompt regulatory action could significantly r5itigate the damage, the NRC would have a strong argument for finding that expeditious restart / start of reactors would not violate the " adequate protection" requirement of ex.isting statutes.
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III.
AtiALYSISi. ' TASK 25 -- MAXIMIZE tiUCLEAR PLAtiT CADASILITY
' The actual energy production of nuclear power plants during the first nine months of 1979 was abou; 61 percent of the energy they would have produ:ed had each plant operated full time at its design power level.
Under Task 5 we considered options for recovering that ;iart of the " lost" energy production
-s which resulted from shutting down units for safet'y-reasons.
In the present task we consider what options are availabl for minimizing the reduction in energy production resulting from other causes, i.e. from scheduled and forced outages, refueling cycle time, operation in load-following mode and mandated power level reductions.
The options are analyzed in terms of their value in responding to the two scenarios described in Task 5.
Scenario I:
U.S. Government decision to limit oil imports to a specified level. (See discussion of the scenario under Task 5.)
,0ption I - Utilities act to decrease time spent in scheduled outages, including refuelings and performance of routine maintenance and repairs necessitated by forced outages.
A significant part of the scheduled outage time is taken in. refueling -- an average of about 55 days each year for each nuclear unit.
With maximum effort and no allowance-for contingencies (including more than minimum maintenance efforts) this time can be reduced to about three weeks.
However, it is not reasonable to expect that such a drastic reduction in refueling time could be achieved as a routine matter.
A more reasonable goal would be to reduce refueling time by 20 percent, i.e. by about 11 days.
It seems clear that, in order to achieve a shorter down time for' refueling, e
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'. NRC would have to expedite its performance of regulatory related inspections normally required before units go back en line.
No additional statutory authority would be required to achieve this reduction.
However, it'should be emphasized that ;iRC does not have the statutory authority to require util.ities to act to reduce scheduled and' forced outages from nuclear plants.
Action by DDE under Section 20-(c) ef the Federal Power Act to require 2
" wheeling" of power might put pressure on utilities to distribut'e power so as to minimize oil consumption in various electric subregions.
Similarly, other scheduled and forced outages that are not related to imposition of NRC. restrictions -- e.g. outages to repair and maintain equipment --
result in down time that could be reduced assuming effective cooperation and coordination (with the stimulus of a Presidential mandate or DOE action under the Federal Power Act) of NRC'and the utilities.
In the absence of detailed studies, a precise estimate of the possible energy gained by such action cannot be cited.
However, assuming better planning and preventive maintenance on the part of the utilities, tentative staff judgment is that
- one may expect a 20 percent reduction in the non-NRC related outage times.
In this case the additional energy generated would be about 12 x 106 MWhr
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per year.
The following are " pros" and "cens."
PROS: Would increase energy generation of all nuclear units resulting in an additional 12 x 106 MWhr per year.
CONS:
Unless carefully monitored by NRC and the utilities, the " hurry up" approach could lead to less-than optimum performance of maintenance
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and repairs with a potential for reducing safety margins or for reducino reliability (thereby defeating the purpose of the expediting).
Option II - Increasing time between refueling. As noted in the Option I dis}cussion, the annual down time for refueling is substantial.
The effect
-s of' refueling on total energy production can be refuced by extending the time between refueling operations.
Itispossibletooperateina"coastdown"'
mode delaying the refueling for a few extra months. Although some penalty in operating powar level is taken, the use of this technique could be effective in a short-term context.
The value of the technique lies in its applicability to all units.
Each 10 days that can be added to the roughly 12-month refueling interval would add about 10/365 or 3 percent to the potential energy generation, i.e. about 0.25 x 106 MWhr per year for each 1,000 MWe unit.
Because the
^
coast-down technique does involve some operational constraints particularly near the end of the cycie, NRC would not have authority to require operation in this mode.
The " pros" and " cons" for this option are:
l PROS:
Would increase annual energy generation by at least several millions.
of MWhr (a plant-by-plant analysis would be required to establish a reliable estimate).
e
CON 3:
Involv'es alteration of utilities' usual plant operating mode and could limit operation capability, e.g. ability to follow significant changes in load, near the end of the cycle.
Option III - Minimizing utilities' operation of nuclear power plants in the load-following mode and operation at full power whenever possible.
The power level of some nuclear plants may be adjusted to follow the load on the utility's system or it may be operated in a baseload mode where the power levels of other non-nuclear power plants are adjusted to compensate for system load variations.
Ususally the high cost of oil forces utilities to keep their oil-fired power plants off-line as much as possible and to put the nuclear and coal-fired plants on line as much as possible.
The extent to which this practice is observed should be determined in order to sie whether there are cases where nuclear generation could be substitute for generation by oil-fired power plants.
The extent of possible conservation of oil is not known.
However, Table 3 notes that some part of the " energy not produced for other reasons" is associated with load following.
It would appear that a potential annual additional electric energy generation of a
-few tens of millions of megawatt hours might be realized if utilities acted.
to minimiz'e operation.of ' nuclear plants as load followers.
Of.~cours'e, it is. clear that no conservation cf oil would result in areas where additional nuclear merely substituted for coal-fired generation.
As with the previous two options, NRC has no authority"to require a. utility to adopt any particular m.ethod for meeting the demands of the customers in e
TABLE 3 NUCLEAR ENERGY PRODUCTION 51 Ail 5 TICS (JN(UART - SEri[M1[R 1979)*
(NILLIONS OF Mille ROUllDED 10 ffEAREST TENill)
' Total January February
..Harch.
April May June July August Septerter Year to Dat; s.
1.
Potential Power 35.6 32.2.
35.6 34.4 35.6 34.5 35.9 35.9 35.2 3tq,pll
. Production 2.
Piet Power Pro &actioh 27.1.
25.6 23.9 17.9 15.0 16.1 21.0 24.0 21.4 393,g 3.
Capacity factor 14.45 75;1%
63 45 50.9%
42;81 48.21 56.4%
65.9%
59.41 4.
Energy flot Produced 1.3 1.9 3.2 5.3 9.0 6.9 3.7 2.0 2.9 36.2 Due to Scheduled Outages 3.6%g 6.01 9.01
,15.5%
25.2%
20.05 10.45 5.6%
0.31 S.
Energy flot Produced 2.3
.9 1.9 3.7 4.0 3.8 3.9 4.0 3.5 20.0 Due to forced Outages 6.6%
3.9%
5.4%
10.81 11.1%
11.1%
10.55 11.11 9.0%
6 Energy flot Produced 3.6 2.5 5;5 6.9 7.0 6.8 6.3 4.7 6.3 49.6 for other Reasonsy 10.11 7.91 15.5%
20.01 19.65 19.61 17.51 13.1%
10.01 7.
Total Energy ifat 0.1
.02 1.4 2.4 4il
.3.8 3.4 2.7-2.4 ~
20.53 Produced Due to NRC
.01
.0%
3.9%
- 7.01 11.61 10.91 9.4%
1.61 6.7%
Restrictinns (Inclmfes energy lost through bothscheduledand i
,j],
forced outages) g D
Q
=
~
If (Percentage figures represent the percentige of potential power production Haximum Dependable Capactty Met % ilours in Month) Ioiit.In s'agh eatege;y;.
y includes energy production not needed by specific willities (load following) g.
and production lost through operation at less than 100 pertent.
g.
Ilota: Reduction due to NRC restrfctions during 1979 is considerably higher than m
experlence in thls category for prior years.
g 85ource: NRC Cray Book Licensed Operetfnq Reactors't Data for Decisions b
tf W
l
21 -
P its service area.
Recourse to other authority, such as DOE acting under the Federal Power Act, would be necessary.
PROS:
(1) May conserve a few tens of millions of barrels of oil per year.
\\
(5~ Has no direct safety implication's.
)
Option IV - Reducing mandated derating.
Many nuclear power plants do not
' operate at full design power level.
The Technical Specifications for each
. nuclear plant prescribe certain (mandatory) limiting conditions for operation, some of which require power level reductions because of enviro'nmental con-straints (e.g. low flow of natural source of cooling water during late.sumer, icingduringwinter,coolingtowergroundfoggenera$ ion)orsafety-related factbrs.
Granting exemptions from the environmental constraints could increase energy generation but the amount would likely be rather small because of almost universal use of cooling towers (required by water pollution control laws).,
With respect to safety-related limits (operatio'n below design power level),
these are intermi.ttently applied and the potential for waiving these or minimizing the time they are applied is not clear.
Evaluation:
The authority which NRC would have to compel implementation of l
the options listed above is indirect and, if exerted, might be subject to effective challenge.
Thus, implementation of these options would require action ~by the utilities to increase nuclear generation.
However, it.should' be.noted that r? dical change by utilit'ies in reactor operat.ing practices
.,,m y,
,m-_
r-
,s=
- y..-
22 -
desicned to maximize nuclear generation could have health and safety impli-cations which would require NRC.. review and approval.
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