ML19340E345
| ML19340E345 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 12/08/1980 |
| From: | Sege G NRC OFFICE OF POLICY EVALUATIONS (OPE) |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF POLICY EVALUATIONS (OPE) |
| References | |
| FRN-45FR71023, RULE-PR-50 NUDOCS 8101140102 | |
| Download: ML19340E345 (2) | |
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December 8, 1980 NRC PUBUC DOGEENT RO'R.t MEMORANDUM FOR: Fi1e u[
George Sege [ [
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FROM:
SUBJECT:
INTERVIEW WITH V0JIN J0KSIMOVIC ET AL., OF GENERAL ATOMIC, CONCERNING NRC SAFETY GOAL Interviewees:
Dr. Vojin Joksimovic, Manager Safety, Reliability, and Systems Branch William J. Houghton g
Senior Staff Engineer HTGR Safety Design t
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occxtrro Colin R. Fisher, Director y
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Licensing Division
!g Interviewers:
Edward Hanrahan and George Sege N,h{%'7 g/
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Interview date: November 4, 1980
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f The discussion with Dr. Joksimovic et al. was arranged to gain the benefit of the interviewees' preliminary thoughts and views. The discussion was exploratory, intended to convey current thoughts, rather than any established corporate or personal positions.
The following are highlights of views expressed by Messrs. Joksimovic, Houghton, and Fisher:
Quantitative safety goals should be set before other major rulemakings are completed (such as siting and degraded core).
NRC's safety goal should be addressed to public safety alone. Responsi-bility for protecting plant investment should be left to the utilities and their bankers.
NRC should not be concerned about core damage as long as it does not release radiation to the public. However, NRC should have the right to spot check, to see that utilities meet their reliability objectives. Otherwise, NRC should not be performing plant design reviews.
The agency should not be overly prescriptive, so as not to stifle innovation.
-- NRC should be tough on applicants with regard to containment function, but allow more flexibility in plant design to meet the quantitative safety goals.
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, Probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) of certain functions should be required as a condition for getting a construction permit. There should, however, be a mechanism for settling issues of data-base or other uncer-tainties before Licensing Boards. Perhaps Boards should retain an expert PRA practitioner to advise them.
-- It was noted that PRA is the discipline that handles uncertainties i
adequately.
On balance a numerical safety goal -- clear and implementable -- would definitely be a benefit rather than a problem.
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-- HTGR suffered in the past from the absence of quantitative safety goals in relation to LWRs, because the NRC's detailed requirements were written with LWR technology in mind (in most cases).
Industry universally supports PRA.
Some regulatory guides and standard review plans could be phased out as PRA is phased in.
(Some existing regulatory guides do not make sense from a PRA standpoint.)
Fear was expressed that numerical safety criteria for nuclear plants would be made more stringent than risks of competing technologies.
Nuclear power should get credit for lives saved in alternatives avoided (coal, solar,etc.).
Dr. Joksimovic suggested that his approach to quantitative safety goals, as presented to the ACRS Subcommittee and further clarified in the Stockholm paper, should receive NRC attention in addition to the approach proposed by the ACRS.
Dr. Joksimovic is collaborating with Kenneth Solomon, of Rand, on a risk paper.
He will send NRC/ Office of Policy Evaluation a copy when the paper is finished.
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