ML19340E340
| ML19340E340 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 12/04/1980 |
| From: | Sege G NRC OFFICE OF POLICY EVALUATIONS (OPE) |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF POLICY EVALUATIONS (OPE) |
| References | |
| FRN-45FR71023, RULE-PR-50 NUDOCS 8101140090 | |
| Download: ML19340E340 (2) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES 8
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION a
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December 4, 1980 NRC PUBLIC DOCU.\\1hMT RcvM
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MEMORANDUM FOR: File y,a GeorgeSegeg[~[
FROM:
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SUBJECT:
INTERVIEW WITH DALE BRIDENBAUGH AND RICHARD HUBBARD, Of MHB TECHNICAL ASSOCIATES, CONCERNING NRC SAFETY GOAL Messrs. Bridenbaugh and Hubbard were interviewed by Edward Hanrahan and George Sege, on November 5, 1980, to gain the benefit of their current, tentative views. The following are highlights of views expressed:
As background to safety-goal formulation, the following observations were made:
-- Safety assurance effectiveness depends to an important extent on factors that involve direct costs to utilities, coming directly out of utility profits.
These include:
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-- Major problems are land and water contamination (not people killed).
Large areas and long periods are involved.
There should be a special safety goal for site characteristics.
In response to a question, all of the following were viewed as important safety-goal objectives:
some general approach to risk acceptability; quantitative safety goals; qualitative -- even subjective -- standards, approach to safety cost tradeoffs; standards for determining when new requirements should be applied retroactively. Public perception is also #
important, as well as civil-liberties issues (if addressable).
A minimum standard was not favored. The goal statement should provide an overall guideline to take licensing beyond review by rote and to build in incentive to continual improvement.
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"As low as reasonably achievable" is a good goal, but quantification has destroyed the principle.
($1,000/ man-rem is not high enough.)
Pool-type research reactors were viewed as representing a degree of safety that can be clearly acceptable.
-- Since one can never really prove very low accident probabilities, one should try for designs that never have to face the problem.
Characteristics of safety requirements should include:
-- Consideration of benefits and costs, including power reliability and entailed impacts (such as TMI impacts in terms of plants not licensed ornotordered).
-- Worker exposure.
-- The whole plant life cycle.
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-- The whole fuel cycle.
-- Different goals for old and new plants and a well-thought-out decision process concerning backfitting new requirements to old plants.
A large accident is viewed with more alarm than a number of little ones.
People near a plant perceive risks and benefits differently than larger-area populations.
Nuclear-plant risks should be compared to energy alternatives (notably coal); not automobiles.
MBH is interested in working with NRC and will consider specific areas of contribution.
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