ML19340D979
| ML19340D979 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 12/05/1980 |
| From: | Gilinsky V NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | Ahearne J, Bradford P, Hendrie J NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8101060052 | |
| Download: ML19340D979 (2) | |
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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OFFIC'E OF THE COMMISSIONE R December 5, 1980 MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN AHEARNE COMMISSIONER HENDRIE COMMISSIONER BRADFORD DIRECTOR, OPE GENERAL COUNSEL EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS
SUBJECT:
WHAT NRC MIGHT DO IN A NATIONAL ENERGY EMERGENCY The continued hostilities in the Middle East make a major or even total cutoff of Persian Gulf oil a possibility that has to be taken seriously.
In the national emergency that would follow, the NRC might well be asked to temporarily modify normal practices in order to allow nuclear energy to help replace residual oil in electric ge,nerating plants.
Such replacement would help free up the residual oil for use elsewhere, such as Japan and Western Europe, which would be especially hard hit.
We need to consider in advance what emergency measures NRC could reasonably take.
(1)
Two types of actions suggest themselves.
The first involves approving operation of reactors which are operable but are not permitted to operate, either because the operating license proceeding is not completed or because of other restrictions.
At any one time, there would likely be no more than a few of these, and the reactors which had.not previously operated could not immediately generate commercial power.
Nevertheless, the possibility of expanding emergency capacity in this way needs looking into.
At one time, we approved a proposed change in the law which would allow granting interim operating licenses in the event of a national emergency.
We may want to resurrect that.
(2)
The other type of action would involve trying to increase the load factor of the operating plants by reducing down time.
I don't know what can be achieved here but, again, we should examine the possibility while we can do so calmly.
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In both areas we would be balancing emergency need for energy against reduced safety factors, whether that involves licensing some plants even though they do not meet all regulations and have not passed all hurdles, or whether it involves lengthening maintenance intervals.
There may be ways to compensate for such safety reductions by increasing surveillance.
In any case, it is particularly important that we review in advance the safety implications of these and other measures to determine at what point safety or practical implications would outweigh emergency production benefits.
I would like OPE to examine what could be done along these lines, what could be gained in terms of freeing up residual oil (in consultation with DOE), and what the costs of such actions would be.
I would like OGC to determine what legislation would be necessary to permit us to take these measures.
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