ML19340D977
| ML19340D977 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 11/24/1980 |
| From: | NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19340D976 | List: |
| References | |
| REF-10CFR9.7 NUDOCS 8101060044 | |
| Download: ML19340D977 (66) | |
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSICN o
3 Briefing by DOS /ACDA on hI Nonproliferation and Safeguards Matters 6
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(Closed to Public Attendance) r 7
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Chairman's Conference Room 1717 H Street, N.W.
O Washington, D. C.
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11 Thursday, July 13, 1978
.2 V
i The Commission met, pursuant to notice, at 2:45 p.m.,
13 Joseph Hendrie, Chairman of the Commission, presiding.
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14 i:
d p333337 15 i.u Chairman Hendrie 16 Commissioner Gilinsky ii Commissioner Kennedy 17
[i Commissioner Bradford 11
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18 d
ALSO PRESENT:
19 J. Boright, Department of State S. Ceja, Department of Energy 20 F. Houck, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency l
1 21 I
NRC STAFF PRESENT:
J. Becher H. Shapar i
R.
Burnett J.
Shea I
22 J. Devine C.
Smith 23 i
G. Eysymott J.
Stephens i<
p T. Gibbon C. Stoiber I
24 i!
L. Gossick R.
Stratford I
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D. Hassel H. Thompson i
f 25 G. Oplinger J. Partlow l
K. Pedersen l
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1 PROCEEDINGS h
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Okay, I have punched'the tape,
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t it we are on the air, we have three and another one about to l!
- l arrive.
Why don't we go shead.
I'm sure by the time --
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Commissioner Kennedy will be here before we get more than 6
a fi a word or two down the line.
The Commission is meeting this afternoon to have i
h a briefing by the Department of State and ACDA on Nonprolifer-9 ation and Safeguards Matters.
10 Mr. Boright and Houc we welcome you.
Why don't 11 i
you go ahead.
li li MR. SHEA:
If I might just note before we start
~~
13 that the classification level that we are set up to handle 1
14
(( is up to TOP SECRET, but not beyond that to any special 15 I
intelligence classification of material, but it wasn't I
16 expected that we would get into that.
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17 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Okay.
1 18 MR. BORIGHT:
On that, I think what I told you l
19 people is that we weren't going to get into that, but I i
20 assume you are going to ask some questions, and it may be l
l 21 that ---
22 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Well, if we ask some questions l
23 that carry a little toc far, please caution and, I guess what t
24 we will do is back down and do a classification level 25 l
that is available of this meeting tape.
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I should have noted, by the way, before we go liji, very much further, that I ought to ask my colleagues to join 2
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} me in voting, first to hold this meeting, and then to 4
close it on the grounds of classified information. So if 5
you would agree with me, (a) to hold, and (b) close?
9 6
(Chorus of " Ayes". )
CEAIRMAN HENDRIE: So ordered.
Now I can mark l
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Now, you can go ahead.
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MR. BCRIGH: Okay, now we can start.
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11 Actually, Frank Houck is going to do most of 9
into a ques' tion
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period.
4 14 I gather that there is both the general question 15
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of IAEA safeguards, what is in the SSIR, how do we feel n
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CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Yes, I think that's a fair --
i 20 Peter, does that hit it?
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COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Yes.
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-l CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Good.
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MR. BORIGHT: So I wanted to mention, perhaps three 24 or four general points, which I really wouldn' t discuss or h
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7 So just to start I wanted to point out a couple l'
of things.
One is that this is obvious, but it is in a way 9
Y the most basic' f act, or these two points are.
s 10 i'i One is that the IAEA, right now, is in a single
[j year doubling of its load in terms of inspection of 11 1
that it has to cover.
It also is moving, in the
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same year, new facilities.
That is, f acility types that A
h,t are more sensitive and that it hasn' t had to handle before.
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15 Right at this time, and we will return to this, ti y
the agency is struggling on completion of the facility l
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So 17 18 this is about the most transitional moment you could imagine 19 i
in IAEA safeguards.
20 Quite a lot of our attention tends to be focused on
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21 the EURATOM /IAEA situation, both because of its political i
l 22 sensitivity, and because of the facility types that are involved on the precedent that we see there.
That is more so;;
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the finali:ation of those arrangements with Japan by two 1
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steps, and Japan is kind of following along behind.
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So I think, with those introductory comments, I i
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21 status and what is in the SSIR or the S1R.
22 MR. HOUCK:
Well, the reference to goals by John 23 brings up the first point that I witnted to make, namely, u
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25 INFCIRC 153, there was no stated technical objective to i
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agency safeguards.
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quantities as being the objective, but the quantification 6
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of what that would have been was never seriously attempted, li 7
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and certainly not successfully attempted until fairly I,!
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11 But behind the objective, or the reason for the il 12 objective, there are two types of purposes.
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made explicit, sometimes only implicit.
14 One of them is to deter diversion, and the other il 15 1
is to provide assurance to member states that other states
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'l 18 ll Now, these two purposes, to date, and there has il 19 been no success of any quantification of them, in fact, 20 there hasn't really been a serious attempt to quantify these.
Il 21 y They are political, but one can take a look briefly in terms n
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I 22 ti 23 li Certainly, if you look at the Board record from n
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facilities that are not under safeguards, taking into A
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do not relate to facilities that cre under safeguards.
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In one sense -- it is not a very complete answer --
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safeguards by looking at the extent to which states resort l.
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to other means, that is, unsafeguarded facilities, if they 7
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are going to try to produce material for purposes that would i
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be prescribed by a safeguards agreement.
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COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
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You know, a long time ago.
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if you have just got a fundamental problem in terms of
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a way to both apply surveillance and containment effectively,
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and to reflect that in the results.
That's the key thing.
18 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
You talked several times I
about the difficulties and how they were falling short.
19 20 What are the specific obstacles that you come across?
21 MR. BORIGHT:
That's a lot of what you were about i
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to say, isn't it?
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MR. HOUCK:
Yes.
I think that depends on the i
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Frank is going to go through by 3
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The SSIR originated, to a fairly large 6
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routine basis, more factual information on the implementation
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16 Even though there were no surprises in it, in 17
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could come to the answer is that I did bring along a letter 2
that we sent to some people giving ---
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COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
I know, but there is C
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an Executive Order that covers classification.
These either i
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Okay, the grounds ---
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COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
It has got to be duly I'ii 8
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classified by somebody who has the authority to do so.
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paragraph?
This is ---
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I think I have read it.
'i 12 MR. BORIGHT:
Okay, it is a letter signed by i
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COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: But the question still 15
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remains.
Is there a piece of paper with a little dash l
j en it that says 11652, 16 17 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
What did he say?
18 MR. BORIGHT:
He says, "In its Board meeting of 19 February 1978 the IAEA decided that the SSIR should not be 20 released to the public and that the ' restricted' status I
21 of the SSIR should not be changed.
Consequently, the U.S.
22 Government will continue to respect the wishes of the IAEA 3
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by not making the SSIR document available to the public.
24 This determination is made in accordance with Executive
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COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Okay, now they certainly
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6 MR. BORIGHT:
You are saying, does this 7
constitute a classification act?
8 ij I will have to send somebody else over to talk h
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COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
I mean, there is a way h
11 to classify things.
We do it all of the time.
You write 12 Ii a letter and there is a little blank and you put your 3
13 initials in it and you sign it and it is downgraded at e
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such and such a time.
15 il MR. BORIGHT:
I don' t know the answer to that.
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16 ll MR. DEVINE : Commissioner, our Division of
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Security has been in contact with State and they recently --
18 ij they reviewed the SIR and classified it.
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Who did, State did or your a
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Division of Security?
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I think it was State, but I know 22 that apparently Ray Brady had to -- felt that the link l
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24 (Simultaneous voices.)
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I don't know.
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MR. BORIGHT:
I understand vou sent us a letter 6
9 and it hasn't been answered, but it will be.
I'm just 9
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I don't know what the legal h
answer to that question is.
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jl MR. HOUCK:
I didn't classify it.
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Is it or is it not
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All right.
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Now, coming back to the SSIR, I think
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Well, one of the ways to do that, and 6
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the information in the document in such a way that you can't 9
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tell what member state you are talking about.
11 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Now, once you have done 12
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13 MR. HOUCK:
Well ---
14 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
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19 Now, the document that we have received this year 20
, is only a part of the 1977 SIR.
I don't really know why, il 21
( but the Secretariat chose to split the SIR this year into 22 1, two parts.
The first part was issued back in, I guess, i
.i 23 ij early June or late May, the second part is in preparation, I
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24 the Director General has promised to have it in time for the a
i 25
!! September Board, if they are up no that promise, we should I
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28
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.k receive it some time in early August.
The Director General, 1
2 promised also that there would, this year as last year, be lasafeguardsconfidentialannexthatwouldbeavailableto 3
1 4
h governors on their request.
f 5
y Now, last year, we got the document just before 6
the June Board.
Our comments in the June Board this year 7
i and last year were both preliminary and cnly
- partial, il 8
where last year we made more detailed and substantive jfcommentsontheSeptemberBoard.
That's the approach that 9
9
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we would take this year, assuming we get the Part 2 in 10 11 time to study them well enough for the September Board, we 12 would make our substantive <;omments then." If we don't get them ear,1y enough, then about all we can do is do it in ld 13 14
!j February when the next meeting is scheduled.
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 The work on the action plan is continuing. NRC, t
24 DOE, State and ACDA are the participants in that.
It is 25 l
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actions identified in the work plan are resources.
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work plans and action plans are more completed, that there il 7
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is going to be an awful lot of work to do all of the things 8
1 that has been identified as needed done.
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1 to which the solution has yet to be found.
2 Now, the first subject that both of those 1
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documents addressed is state systems of accountancy and 4
control.
In general, the main problem with respect to i
5 the state systems that the agency has encountered, the most 6
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l need for the current concept of international safeguards 8
ll for fully measured material balances.
This includes not u
9 only measurements of the main flows, but also all of the 10 l,
lesser flows.
The discards and the waste.
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11 requirements for complete inventory measurements rather i
12 than -- not just partial inventory measurements, and often 13 l
enough
.to serve the needs of international safeguards.
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14 involves -- it requires a program for determining the errors 15 j
associated with this spectrum of measurement.
lI 16 j'
I think in general, I can say the U.S.
is far i
17 ahead of other states in the nature of having such a state 18 sys. tem.
With respect to the agency, part of the problem 19 lies with the fact that the original safeguards document 20 simply was not explicit in requiring this kind of a system.
6 21 They required reports.
They weren't very explicit in making l l
22 it clear that those recorts had to be based on comclete 1
23 measurements.
i 24 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
When you say, " safeguards to 25
'l documents," do you mean the agreements?
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The agreement, and there are two d
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referred to as INFCIRC 66, Information Circular 66, and 5
,i that agreement was devised from the statute.
The other is
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8 The statute type agreement pre-dates the NPT by 9
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quite a number of years.
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12 This part of the problem, the sort of legai part---
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COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Let me ask you there, how i!
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many countries are there now that are operating under 15 ll INFCIRC 66?
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MR. HOUCK:
It is in the Annual Report.
I don't 17 know the number.
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MR. BORIGHT:
Something like a dozen or so.
It is 18 19 not 2 and it is not 50.
20 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: Is it possible to have 21 adequate safeguards if all you have are the INFCIRQ/?
4 22 MR. HOUCK:
Well, it depends on what you mean 23 li by adequate.
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I think, in our sense, adeuqate means that i
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everything is under safeguards, and the answer generally undeg l
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INFCIRC 66 type agreements, everything isn' t subject to i'
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inadequate.
Some of the older type agreements ---
of 4
MR. BORIGHT:
I think the answer clearly is "yes".
n 5
You asked if it is possible?
In fact, you might even 6
i claim it as mora probable, because there is one key e
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8 on inspector presence at all, in 66.
Whereas, we went 9
2 through months of excruciating negotiation in INFCIRC 153, na g
getting a balance between the interest of an inspectee and 10 11 the effectiveness of the system.
!i 12 So I think the answer to your question is clearly, 13 "yes".
,It is possible.
Whether it is certain is anc'.aer 14 question.
il 15 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Well, what I meant by i:
16
- i my question was if all you had was the minimum requirements l!
U 17 for INFCIRC 66 ---
MR. BORIGHT: There aren't any. There are no 18 li 19 I
minimum required -- It is a very, very general document.
20 It says very little.
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safeguards isn't even specified, nor are any measures,
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anything.
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Thaie are a large number of activities that are having the effect of having the two systems, intermd 2
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the 153 package was.
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facilities are covered.
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10 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: What does it presuppose 11 l
about surveillance?
12 MR. HOUCK: Well, the modern forms of -- INNCIRC 66 i l 13 has undergone some evolution over the course of the years.
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14 Old existing INFCIRC 66 agreements have no provision for 09e lo.
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are as good as INFCIRC 153.
19 20 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: Of the roughly dozen then, 21 l
that you were referring to, how many of those would you 22 think surveillance was not in use.
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MR. HOUCK:
I think it is actually getting down il 24 to a very small number of countries, or zero, because.most
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containment suveillance by the agency, and the agency 10 ll started using it even before then.
11 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: When that happens they use
.y 12 it in the same way and in the same basis as they would in
.p 13 a country where the agreement provided for it?
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MR. HOUCK: Where the agreement doesn't provide for t-15
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accept subsidiary arrangements, new subsidiary arrangements 16 that are modeled on 153 rather than on 66.
17 18 i
The other -- Well, the actual rate of progress
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20 MR. BORIGHT: Excuse me just a second.
I don't 21 know how we are doing for time.
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We have mentioned a lot of things and we are sort il 23 of on our way through it by facility type, but I assume you il 24
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will let us know if we are not getting to where you want to 25 1
go.
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effective measurement system is that just the practices 10 around the world aren' t up to the U.S.
standards. This is
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one of the things that we are hoping that will help this I,
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situation is when the U.S. offer is implemented we can add i
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other countries where we feel that they really need help h
6 in understanding and improving their own system.
7 MR. PARTLOW:
Is that possible or do we run into 8
clearance of classification?
i 9
MR. HOUCK:
Well, right now, it is really just 10 a proposal that the agencies involved think it is a good i
11 proposal, and number two, I would say it hasn't been i
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I don't know.
I'm not aware that it has'been 1
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substantive part of the SIR and that is, the situation on j
tl li 20 individual facility types.
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safeguards can really be excressed in terms of what the 23 technical situation is with respect to facility types.
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25 relatively well in hand.
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large fast critical facilities.
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material has not been removed at very frequent intervals when 11 12 j
the reactor is operating in an experimental mode.
13 What is likely to be the answer to this is a i
14
-l combination which the U.S.
and other people are working on.
A combination of containment and surveillance together with 15 some sort of random type partial inventory that is or a very 16 17 frequent basis of elements of the critical assembly.
t 18 The second type facility is the lightwater reactors COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Let me see, I can't think 19 20 of his name, Bert Vincent (phonetic) was here he seemed to be a little less sanguine about research reactors in 21 general.
(inaudible) they only visit them once-in a while, 22 j
their own standard calls for 4 visits a year which they 23 I
don't seem to come anywhere near.
In my view, 4 times a year 24 d esn' t seem to me particularly -- Well, a little bit more 25 l
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MR. HOUCK:
Let me give one -- some detail on 4
the approach that we have taken on timeliness. That is, where i
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the quantity involved in a facility is less than what is I:
termed significant quantities, which in the case of highly 6
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timeliness requirements are not )0 days, but one year.
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If the reactor contains more than those quantities, i;
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then what you say is about true.
The agency's practice a
13 1
in achieving timely detection of what you are promoting as i
14 being 10 days for that kind of material would require a level 1
15 of activity that they obviously are not doing at the small i
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plants.
17
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That shifts it into more or less a similar problem i
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area when tasked with a fast critical facility.
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Now, with respect to the light water reactors the 3
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The problems a
tend to relate more to the agency's experience, with the 5
reliability of their surveillance systems, as the agency 6
shifts from some of the older less reliable camera systems to 7
the better camera systems and to their closed-circuit TV 8
systems, at least the expectation is that this reliability i:
9 problem will be reduced.
10 j
The other aspect of safeguards at lightwater n
11 reactors at which work is needed, has to do with the ability 3 4 of the agency to independently determine how much plutonium 13 is actually contained in the fuel.
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there you will find out rather accurately how much plutonium
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is there.
The problem relates to situations where spent fuel 18 is going to be in long-term storage.
There is an argument --
h 19 an argument can be made Ctat if the agency is going to 20 safeguard this stuff, they should be in a position where if 21 suddenly it is missing they can say how much is missing, not i
22 j
only how many assemblies, but how many plutonium.
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Before you do that, I made a few li
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why don't I mention those and then maybe you can come back 15 3
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i 17 CHAIRMM HENDRIE: Before we do that, do you i
t 18 wan,t to cite some specific things, Peter?
19 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Maybe later on.
20 MR. BORIGHT:
I will be very brief.
21 General cooperation in the non-proliferation area, 22 I
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very active one.
Not only with Japan, but with EURATOM i
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and with other major states.
7 We certainly don't perform to that degree, up to 8
o my standards.
I would like to be much more heavily involved 9
with the people in the international system.
Nevertheless, 10 particularly since the Tokai thing, we really have been 11 working very closely, particularly on that subject.
We have 12 had, in the last 8 years, perhaps three what I would call 13 general bilateral reviews of safeguards that have gone on 14 for days.
I went to one in '72 in Tokyo, for example.
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they should be of interest, but just for what it is worth, Il 24 jl just some general points.
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security side?
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1 in Japan?
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MR. BORIGHT:
I suspect it is a physical
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That is a generic world-wide problem l
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l EURATOM hasn't been, until recently, under IAEA inspections.
E 10 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Well, what about the physical 11 security aspects?
Wasn' t that one of the ---
12 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: The terms that I had 13 j
understood, or at least from my reading of the SIR, a
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15 to that, and the implication was that they (inaudible) 16 0
that is one of the problems and also the reference to the 9
17 negotiations are not quite in place yet.
I wondered, maybe 18 l
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of what further information you have on it, and especially 1
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to the extent (inaudible) when we would expect to see 21 (inaudible)
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I was just going to add, though, 23 ll il 24 1
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It is a problem, though because in is the 1
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COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: What about the items that 10 would affect the states where there is a problem with 11 j
surveillance?
j 12 MR. BORIGHT: But that is the agency's surveillance
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14 j
Now, the only question, therefore, related to F
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17 single out -- it seems to me that in that sense it is a 18 l
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COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
So in that case, it is still
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and IAEA problem?
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MR. BORIGHT:
That's right.
11 MR. HOUCK:
Let me just say something about one 12
'j of the problems in understanding the SSIR.
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17 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
But that's a different ---
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14 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
(inaudible) an attempt to i
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It does relate to that, these were il 17 N'
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and it will help a lot.
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Was the use of surveillance 10 in your section reliable?
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11 There are no criteria as to what constitutes J
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You are looking at the SSIR?
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I can't answer the question.
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On the otherhand, when it goes wrong 4
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I don't know what else 18 we,can say about that.
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19 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Why don' t you look on down 20 your list?
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One of the other items Iil 22 j
(inaudible) the progress of the negotiations there 23 N
for the countries that delayed the start of (inaudible)
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More embarrassing to 9
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continued further delays is,-in fact, uncertainty about 20 these detection time goals.
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10 11 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
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What, he has a big tape?
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Magnetic tape.
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Your statement isn't clear.
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SIR, page 19, (inaudible) even though the relevant i
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set of true statements on a given state.
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for the states, and we don't entirely know why they did that.
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MR. SHEA:
Do we have any idea of how the SIR
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primary drafter in this evaluaticn secticn that Frank was 11 g
talking about.
He gets inputs from all over the agency.
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5l 13 MR. BORIGHT:
Parsick (phonetic) 4!
14 MR. HOUCK:
Ray Parsick, have you ever met him?
15 He has been over there ---
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He is an extremely diligent guy.
17 CHAIFDQli HENDRIE:
I have known him for years.
1 18 MR. HOUCK:
So he puts it together, and he puts i
19 it together as consistently as he can, but he is completely 20 dependent upon inputs that he gets from each individual 21 operating section.
As I indicated, one of the problems NoT 22 is that the nature of the inputs are new always on the 23 ll same basis from all the sections.
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element out of the bay and replaced it with a dummy.
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How long will it be before you i
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COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
(Inaudible) 25 MR. BORIGHT:
Oh, excuse me.
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an agenda matters on both holding and closing meetings, which i
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I do want to thank John and Frank.
18
- i Thank you very much for coming, and declare this meeting l'l 19
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