ML19340D386

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Final Deficiency Rept Re Lack of Steam Tunnel Embedment Stiffner Plate Weld,Initially Reported on 800505.Caused by Inadequacy of Manufacturer QA Program.Missing Weld Has Been Added & Inspected.Qa Program Audit Conducted
ML19340D386
Person / Time
Site: Hartsville, Phipps Bend  Tennessee Valley Authority icon.png
Issue date: 12/18/1980
From: Mills L
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To: James O'Reilly
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
References
10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, NCR-10, NCR-HTN-QEB-80, NCR-PBN-QEB-80, NCR-PEN-QEB-80, NUDOCS 8012300484
Download: ML19340D386 (3)


Text

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fb-N TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY CH ATT ANOCG A TE.Ni s3EE 37401 400 Chestnut Street Tower II December 18, 1980 l

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Mr. James P. O'P 11y, Director Office of Insp tion and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear egulatory Commission j

Region II - uite 3100 101 Marie a Street d

Atlanta, eorgia 30303 li

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

HARTSVILLE AND PHIPPS BEND NUCLEAR PLANTS - REPORTABLE DEFICIENCY -

STEAM TUNNEL EMBEDMENT STIFFENER PLATE WELD (NCR'S 10, HTN QEB 80-01, PBN OEB 80-01)

Initial notification of the reportable deficiencies was made to NRC-0IE, Inspector R. W. Wright on May 5 for NCR-10 and May 13, 1980, for deficiencies NCR HTN QEB 80-01, PBN CEB 80-01.

The first interim report was submitted on June 4, 1980, followed by our second interim report on September 19, 1980.

In compliance Nith paragraph 50.55(e) of 10 CFR Part 50, this is the final report.on the subject deficiency.

If you have any questions, please call Jim Domer at FTS 857-2014 Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY L. M. Mills, Manager Nuclear Regulation and Safety i

Enclosure

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cc:

Mr. Victor Stello, Director /

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Office of Inspection and Enforcement t

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555

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s ENCLOSURE HARTSVILLE NUCLEAR PLANTS A AND B AND PHIPPS BEND NUCLEAR PLANT STEAM TUNNEL EMBEDMENT STIFFENER PLATE WELD OA IhPLEMENTATIO'l (ATLAS MACHINE AND IRON WORKS)

NCR'S 10, HTN CEB 80-01, PBN CEB 80-01 10CFR50.55( e)

REPORT NO. 3 (FINAL)

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On May 5,1080, TVA informed NRC-0IE Region II Inspector, R. W.

Wright, of a potentially reportable condition under 10 CFR Part 50.55(e) regarding a steam tunnel embedment stiffener plate weld. This structure was manufactured by Atlas Machine and Iron Works ( Atlas), Gainesville, Virginia. On May 13, 1980, TVA informed R. W. Wright of a potentially reportable condition under 10 CFR Part 50.55(e) regarding a breakdown in the Atlas OA program. This is the final report on these items.

Descriotion of Deficiency When Atlas presented the Hartsville. unit'A1 steam tunnel embedment to TVA for shipment, it was rejected because some joints did not match y

within allowable tolera1ces. To repair this condition, the assembly had to be cut into segments for realignment. When this was done, a TVA inspector noticed a backing bar which was not flush to a stiffener plate. Upon removal of the backing bar, it was observed that this seam had not been welded. The end stiffener plate in upper column 1B was welded on three sides only. This instance of a weld being omitted is documented on NCR-10.

This condition indicates that the Atlas inspection program is deficient.

On April 29 through May 2, 1980, TVA conducted an audit of Atlas.

This audit revealed 16 deficiencies in the implementation of the Atlas OA procram, nine of which are considered significant. These deficiencies involve document control, material and process control, OA records, and training, and are documented on NCR's HTN QEB 80-01 and PBN OEB 80-01.

Safety Imolications Were it not for the fact that some joints were out of tolerance, the,

missing weld may not have been discovered. Consequently, when this l

deficiency was found, TVA had no assurance that other similar deficiencies did not exist. Missing or inadequate welds within the I

structure could degrade the structural integrity of the embedment

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which could adversely affect plant safety.

l Corractive Action l

The weld that was omitted from the stiffener olate (NCR-10) has been i

made and inspected per QA requirements. TVA has two resident inspectors at Atlas to supervise inspection and repair of the steam tunnel embedment and monitor other contracts.

A contract engineer and l

a QA evaluator were also sent to. Atlas to advise and aid in contractual and CA program difficulties.

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Atlas hired a CA consultant to aid in the development of appropriate QA procedures. Atlas also changed QA managers and increased the inspection staff. TVA has accepted the present QA p.rog. tam and has verified that it is being properly implemented in an audit which was conducted on November 3 through 7, 1980. During this audit, all previous deficiencies were evaluated and all except one regarding CA records were closed. No new items were found during this audit.

TVA is satisfied with the level of QA currently being implemented by Atlas. TVA's contract engineer will remain at Atlas until TVA is satisfied that adequate performance is beitig maintained.

Another audit of Atlas is planned in approximately three months.

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