ML19340D322
| ML19340D322 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 12/05/1980 |
| From: | Dieckamp H GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP. |
| To: | Ahearne J NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19340D316 | List: |
| References | |
| 801201-02, 801201-2, NUDOCS 8012300269 | |
| Download: ML19340D322 (11) | |
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L-M 201 263-6500 TELEX 136-:82 Wnter's Direct Cia! Numcer 201-263-6030 December 1, 1980 (Oricinal)
The Hon. John F. Ahearne, Chairman
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Nuclear Regulatory Cc= mission Washington, D.
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20555
Dear Mr. Chairman:
It is the purpose of this letter to request that the Com-mission reconsider and modify its orders of July 2, 1979 and August 9, 1979 dealing with the restart of Three Mile Island Unit No. 1 ("TMI-1").
We believe that an evaluation of developments since the entry of such Orders demonstrates that they have pro-duced consequences which are unjust and inconsistent with the public interest.
The discussions at the commission's public meetings prior to the entry of the August 9, 1979 Order and the terms of that Order manifested a clear expectation by the Ccmmission that the hearings required by that Order would have Rev.
been initiated by February and that a Commission decision on the matter of lifting the suspension of TMI-l's operating authority could be reached by September of this year.
Yet the fact is that the hearings did not even begin until mid-October 1980.
The consequence of those orders, has been to severely penali:e the four million residents of our service areas and our hundreds of thousands of investors. Unless the Commission takes action to expedite matters, authorization for operation of TMI-l will be further delayed for many more months.
We are addressing this request for re-consideration and modification of your July 2 and August 9, 1979 Orders to the Cor:. mis sion, rather than to the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB), since it is the Commission fand not the ASLB) that can determine whether, in the light of all the pertinent considera-tions, such orde'rs should be modified.
803eao0.2(o7 Jersey Central Power & L;ght Company /Metrocohtan Ecison Company /Pennsylvanta Efectnc Company
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BACKGRCC'ID A!!D SASIS FOR SE ORDERS There is no legal require =ent that the Cc==ission e=picy the formal precedures which it has ordered prior to authoricing TMI-l restart.
Section IS9a of the Atc=ic Energy Act does not preclude continued cperation of a nuclear unit while the Cc==is-sien has under censideration the =atter of suspension or a end-l ment of the operating license. The Cc==ission is today proceeding i
l on th'at basis with respect to other nuclear units.
Prior to the adoptien by the Cc==ission of its August 9, 1979 order, we sug-gested that a discretionarv. (nct =andated by the Act).cublic I
hearing could be held before restart is authoriced and that the l
formal proceedings under Section 189a ceuld be initiated and go forward as a wholly separate =atter and be co=pleted after restart.
In a me=orandus dated July 26, 1979, ycur legal staff pointed out the clear fistinction between (1) a hearing en an order to suspend or revoke a license, which is governed by Sec-tion 189a of the Atc=ic Energy Act, and (2) a hearing as an aid to enable the Cc==ission to reach a dec sien as to whether re-start could be per=itted, to which no statutcry require =ents are applicable.
Ycur legal staff pointed out in that =e=crandu=
that, while the first type of hearing requires a full adjudi-catory hearing, "the Atc=ic Energy Act does not require the hear-ing to be held prior to restart" (Z=phasis in original).
That memorandum pointed cut that, with respect to the second type of hearing:
"No statutcrv. recuire=ents are acclicable l
to any such hearing. Since the plants could be restarted in the absence of any hearing l
whatscever, it would appear to follow that if a hearing of this nature were prescribed, no recuire=ents, save those of fairness, would be applicacle."
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o l December 1, 1980 Our efforts in July 1979 to persuade the Cc= mission to '
adopt procedures that would permit the TMI-l issues to be addressed within a reasonable time frame were unsuccessful.
Instead the Co==ission chose to treat TMI-l dif ferently than all other effected plants and ordered a full adjudicatory hearing with a further requirement for specific approval by the Co mis-sion itself prior to restart.
The Co$ mission did not give an adequate explanation of its discriminatory action nor is there any record that it considered the strong public interests to be served by procedures for TMI-l which were less time-centu=ing.
The Cc= mission's Order, dated August 9, 1979, stated (at pages 3-5) that the bases for the conclusion (in the Cc= mission's July 2, 1979 Crder) that "the Commission presently lacks requi-site reasonable assurance that the Licensee's Three Mile Island Unit No. 1 facility can be operated without endangering the health and safety of the public" were:
1.
"The NRC staf f has ascertained that B&W designed reactors appear to be unusually sensitive to certain off-normal transient conditions originat-ing in the secondary system.
This, in turn, places a large burden on the plant opera ors in the even: of off-normal system behavior during such anticipated transients."
The Commission's statement is applicable to all S&W reac-l tors and, notwithstanding this statement, the Commission has l
permitted all S&W units with operating licenses (other than TMI) l l
to operate.
Nu=erous reviews and studies have not resulted in 1
any determination that B&W reactors cannot be operated safely.
TMI-l is not unique in this regard.
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"As a result of a preliminary review of the TMI-2 accident chronology, the NRC staff initially identified several human errors that occurred during the accident and contributed significantly to its severity."
There is no question that, with the benefit of hindsight, some of the actions taken by the TMI-2 operators were proved to have been inappropriate.
But there is no question, also, that the actions taken by them were. responsive to their training which reflected the perception by B&W and NRC of plant behavior during a loss of coolant accident.
Both the Ke=eny and the Rogovin reports clearly identify the critical linkage between presu=ed system behavior and operator action.
Indeed prior experiences revealed that under circumstances such as those which occurred at TMI-2, operators were likely to inappropriately ter=inate high pressure injection when faced with high pressuriser icvel, but this finding by the NRC and B&W was not communicated by the NRC or B&W to the TMI-2 operators.
The Kemeny and Rogovin reports point out that the TMI operators had superior qualifications in in terms of background and experience and above-average secres NRC qualifying examinations.
To the extent that the August 9, 1979 order is predicated on the actions taken by the individual l
l TMI-2 operators, it is not well-grounded since the Kemeny, Rogovin and other reports have since demonstrated that the principal cause of the accident and its severity was the failure I
to integrate and disseminate knowledge gained from the Davis-Besse investigation and other reports.
3.
"In addition to the items identified l
for the other B&W reactors, the unique circumstances at TMI require that additional safety concerns identified by the URC staff be resolved prior to restart.
These concerns result f rom (1) potential interaction between Unit 1 and the c.,
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. December 1, 1980 damaged Unit 2, (2) questions about the management capabilities and tech-nical resources of Metropolitan Edison, including the impact of the Unit 2 accident on these, (3) the potential effec: of operations neces-sary to deconta=inate the Unit 2 fa-cility on Unit 1, and (4) recognized deficiencies in emergency plans and station operating procedures."
Even a year ago, it appeared probable that the Cc= mission had overgenerali=ed its concerns as identified with TMI and that it had expressed such concerns in a way which would inevitably provide occasions for delay.
In the light of the experience gained over the period since the entry of that Order, it is clear that this has been the situation.
For example, in the Safety Evaluation Report (SER), ( NUREG-0680 ), the staff refers to areas in which it regards existing standards as " inadequate" or where
" formal acceptance standards" do not exist, and for which "new acceptance criteria have been cr.are being developed."
What this means in reality is that we are confronted with undefinable schedules which result frc= attempting to comply with non-exis:-
ent or changing criteria.
At the same time, the staff is inter-preting the July 2 and August 9, 1979 Orders as requiring a complete demonstration to the Licensing Board as to just how the requirements will be met, even though the staff admits that some requirements have not been adequately defined and that it expects to impose additional requirements beyond those listed in the Orders, which have not been defined.
Presumably, these require-ments will be imposed on at least all B&W plant licensees when l
ultimately defined and are nos unique to TMI.
The matter is further aggravated by the tendency of the staff to require full compliance with the long ters actions, (NUREGS 660 and 0737), as contrasted with the requirement of the Order for reasonable progress.
These difficulties have been particularly manifested in connection with the issues of management capability for which I
, D ccabor 1, 1980 I
criteria are in a continuing state of development and of emergency planning where the interface with FEMA is still in the process of definition.
As a result, the staff is many months behind schedule in preparation for the hearings before the TMI-1 ASLS.
The issue of finadeial qualifications also lacks clear criteria, however compliance with the staffing and system modification require =ents will constitute the best measure of adequacy of financial _
resources.
RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DELAYS Let us make clear that we are not criticiring the TMI-l ASLB for the delay.
On the contrary, we believe that the Board has struggled valiantly to deal, in a timely manner, with the ill-defined assign =ent given to it by the Commission.
The delays are attributable primarily to the following:
(a)
The Commission's orders defining'the issues to be considered prior to restart, open up to relitiga-tion many of the NRC's licensing criteria applied not only to TMI-l but to all operating pcwer reactors.,As a result, our customers and investors have been made easy prey for those seeking to exploit all opportunities for delay; t
l (b)
The Con =ission's staff has not given the priority to this matter which the orders clearly
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contemplated; indeed the staff has candidly admitted that this is the case.
(c)
Some of the issues involve items for which the Commission either has not yet established criteria or for which it is unwilling to apply existing criteria; the result is that there are items for which there are no established standards against which our performance or that of other licensees can be measured; I
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. December 1, 1980 (d)* Even where there are purported standards, the staff interpretations frequently change and, with changes in staff personnel, these problems have been magnified.
(e)
There is a staff tendency to reach out and require compliance before restart with actions identified for the future.
It may well be that the internal structure within the Com-mission, and the impediments to communications to the Cc= mission from its staff and licensing boards, are such that the C0= mission is not adequately infor=ed that the priority that it assigned to the TMI-l restart proceeding has been altered.
More than two months ago, the Chairman of the ASL3 for the TMI-1 restart proceeding expressed concern on that score and stated (Prehearing Conference page 2436):
"I think that the Commission has to be made aware that the staff has allecated its prior-ities inconsistent with the schedule it first adopted, and inconsisten: with the schedule that we thought we had some understanding on."
The fol10w-up Septe=ber 17 Memorandum and Order of the ASL3 states:
"There have been substantial delays in this proceeding.
In McVember 1979 the NRC staff predicted that its Safety Evaluation Report (SER) would issue in January 1980. Tr. 553.
The SER, served June 16, 1980, remains incom-plete in several large and essential areas:
management capability and resources, financial qualifications, lessons learned Category A Items, and emergency planning.
It is there-fore not possible to schedule an evidentiary hearing on those issues."
"This latest failure by the staff to meet its schedule predictions has once again raised the board's ccncern that the Commission should be informed that the expeditious hearing antici-pated in che August 9, 1979 Order and Notice of Hearing (10 NRC 141, 147) will not be realized."
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l "When it became apparent.from the staff's report i
on August 13 that the staff would not soon be' ready to proceed to hearing on management, finan-cial, and emergency planning issues, the board, in very emphatic ter=s, advised the staff that the Commission is not receiving the information it deserves in this case, and that the Co==is-j sion has a right to be infor=ed that the pro-caeding is threatened with further delay.
As far as the board can determine, the staff has made no such report to the Commission."
e The recent report of the Subcommittee on Nuclear Regulation of the Senate co=mittee on the Environment and Public Works and the Senate action on the Commission's fiscal 1981 authoriration,
bill have urged that the Commission expedite the restart of TMI-1 to the extent consistent with protection of the public health and safety.
In his Report "Three Mile Island:
The Financial Fallout" (EMD-80-89, July 7, 1980), the Comptroller General stated:
"NRC has treated Met-Ed's restart program differently from other utilities with Babcock and Wilcox reactors.
We do not question their judg=ent in setting dif-ferent requirements and procedures, given the situation at TMI.
However, we believe that the uniqueness of the situation that led to the differing requirements should also engender different procedures for expediting the corrective actions needed and the return of the unit to service.
Performance criteria that are lacking either for restarting TMI-l or cleaning up TMI-2 should be expeditiously fur-nished and timely decisions on co=pany compliance with the requirements should be made.
maile full recognition of the public's right to participate in the decision making process should be given, l
7 the hearinc crecess should be conducted so.that it-rs as.ecur:acle to the utilities as.1: is to the public."
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We respectfully suggest that the consission should recog-nize that its actions in delaying the restart of TMI-l adversely impact the cost of electric energy to the four sillion residents of'our service area (and the economy of that area) and conflict with Natiohal policies relating to foreign oil i= ports.
Such delays also increase the cost and reduce the financial resources available to us to deal with the clean-up of TM!-2.
The Orders of the PaPUC and NJ3PU summarized in Section C7 of the SER (NUREG-0680) made clear, as of that date, the interrelationship between authorizatien by the Co==ission of restart of TMI-l and our financial ability to continue with priority items.
The various reports and orders to which we have previcusly referred have de=enstrated that one of the major proble=s in dealing with the aftermath of the TMI-2 accident is what the Co=ptroller General's report, dated July 7, 1980 (EMD-80-89) has characterized (at p.60) as the "present fragmented roles.and rocpensibilities of the various Federal and State regulatory agencies".
It also referred to the need to bring those roles and responsibilities together into a unified approach towards re-solving the problems created by the accident.
Action by the Commission in connection with TMI-l restart is central to achiev-ing that objective and acccunts for the Co=ptroller General's recommendation that (at p.62)
...NRC =ove as quickly as possible, while taking all necessary steps to protect the public health and safety, to consider and act en the question of restarting TMI-1."
RECOM. VENDED ACT CN What we are urging,.in substance, is that the consission re-examine the matter in the light of the developments in the past months since the July 2 and August 9, 1979 Orders were 0
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. D;ccubor 1, 1980 entered and that it recognize that the public interest is not served by prolonging for =any additional months the = ore than 16 months of forced shut-down which have already occurred since the July 2, 1979 order.
Spe'ifically we propose that the Co= mission follow a c
course consistent with its treat =ent of other B&W reactor plants by lifting the i= mediate effectiveness of its July 2 and August 9, 1979 orders upon a deter =ination by the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR), with the approval o# the Cc=missicn,
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that the bases for making the suspension orders i= mediately effective have been satisfactorily resolved.
Such a determination would, of course, include a determi-nation that TMI-1 has taken all of the actions required of other B&W reactors as a condition for resumption of operation following the shut-down orders issued to these reactors in the Spring cf 1979.
The determination would, in addition, enco= pass those con-cerns peculiar to TMI-1 listed in the Co= mission's August 9 Order as bases for the i==ediately ef fective suspension of TMI-l's operating authority.
The determination should be based on those criteria that are now in effect and/or apply to all other operating reactcss.
Further, we would expect the determination by the Director, NRR, to include compliance by TMI-l with those
" lessons learned" actions recuired by the Co= mission to have been imple=ented by other B&W plants at the time of TMI-1 restart.
Determinations by the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation on the above =atters would not remove such matters from the issues to.be considered in the hearing before the ASL3 and would not preclude the ASLB from reco==ending sedification of those determinations based on the hearing record.
The Director's determinations would serve solely as a basis for lifting the immediate effectiveness of the July 2 and August 9, 1979 Orders.
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. December 1, 1980 We do not propose that the TMI-l hearing now in pregress before the ASLB be cancelled.
We anticipate, instead, that the hearing would proceed along its present course with (1) the pre-sentation.of evidence on all of the substantive issues enumerated in the Commission's August 9, 1979 Order, (2) the filing of proposed findings, (3) the issuance of a decision by the ASL3 recommending the continuation, suspension or =cdification of TMI-l's operating license, and (4) the Cc==ission's review and
. final action on the ASL3's reco== ended decision.
We do not suggest that the Consission should compromise public health and safety at TMI-l or ac any other nuclear reac-tor.
However, we believe that National and regional interests
& e being needlessly sacrificed by the continued delay in developing and applying appropriate procedures for expeditious authorisation of TMI-l restart and that the Co= mission has the authority and responsibility to bring that sacrifice to an end.
Respectfully,
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Governor Brendan T. Byrne Governor Richard Thornburgh George H. Barbour, Pres. NJ3?U Susan M.
Shana an, Chan. PaPUC Commissioner Pater A. Bradford Commissioner Viccor Gilinsky Coesissioner Joseph M. Hendrie e
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%, ~ f September 4, 1980 Docket No. 50-289 Mr. R. C. Arnold senior Vice President Metropolitan Edison Company 100 Interpace Pr a c y Parsippany, New 4. ey 07054
Dear Mr. Arnold:
In NUREG-0680 issued in June 1980, we identified open items in our review of your compliance with the NRC Order of August 9,1979.
This review covered your Restart Report through Amendment No. 18, and letters and other documentation through late Pay 1980.
Since that time we have received Amendments Nos.19 and 20 to the Restart Recort, dealing with the revised Emergency Plan and ranagement capability,as well as your current financial plan and some plant procedures. These items are in review.
However, we have received no amendments or other information on the bulk of open items in the SER since issuarce of.NUREG-0680.
Your letter of Iby 28,1980 (TLL 254) identified schedulea intermeciate and cenpletion dates Tor many open items, at least half of whicn have alreacy passeo.
Verbal inferraticn from your staff in July indicated significant sub-mittals were to have been made by August 1, and after this date had passed, this was estimated to be accomplished by the end of August. Present estimates, we understand, are now mid-September.
During our meeting on financial matters on August 14, comitments were made to respond to approximately half of our questions in this area by August 29, and to provide a schedule for the remainder as soon as possible.
ine latter has not been provided, and according to verbal informatirn, the first responses will be at least one week late.
Delayed responses to open items directly affect our ability to prepare a supplement to our evaluation. Availability of staff personnel because of demands of the hearinc may be such that additional delays may result in reviewing amendments received after September 15 covering Order Items 1, 2, 4, 5 and 8.
With regard to financial catters, Order Item 7, our review of the inforration at hand is continuing, but issuance of a supplement and filing of testimony in this area is affected on a day-for-day basis by delays in your retponses.
Your schedules for the submittal of the above information is requested within ten days of receipt of this letter.
Sincerely, O
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lf Robert W. Reid, Chief Operating Reactors Branch #4 Division of Licensing
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DEC 1 1980 Docket No.10-289 Mr. Henry D. a: kill -
Vice President and Director Three Mile Island Nuclear Plant Metropolitan Edisen Cct=any P. O. Scx 480
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Middletam, Pennsyhania 17057
Dear Sir:
k~e have reviead the Pavised Licensed Operater Oualificatien and Requalification Traint.s; Prepa sub:itted by ;cu in respcnse to the March 28, 1950 letter f ce H. R. Centen. Based en ct: reviev, *e fL.d that pregra to be enaccettable for 2C-1 licensed crerations eersc:-.el.
Incorporatien of the ite.s listed L7 the enciesure to chis let' er will be t
necessa:7 for acceptability.
Mr. Joseph Md'illen has been assipad to reviea ycur pregrm. He my be reached en 201-492-7476.
Sincerely, J
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F. Cellins, Chief Operator Licensing 3 ranch Divisien of E=an Facters Safety
Enclosure:
Cecraents en 2C Ccerator Requalificatien'Pregr a ec: See next page-4 oX'peq @d-2 1
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O CTME TIS C*T ~~?REE MII.E ISIr0 CPERA~CR RECCALIFIC.CIC:I PRCGR" (Unit 1 Ad=inistrative ? ccedre 1006)
Open bock q&es ar'-4-istered for pe icdie evaluatien cf an 2.l(q) cperaters knculedge of de subject entter do not appear acerceri-Since these are periedic gaires and are nc= ally aN-Istered ate.
at the conclusica of a short series cf lectres, -e can not accept the cencent of an ccen bock ex 4.ation testing the licensee's knowledgi of a subject. S.is ocrtien cf the regaalificatica This progran shculd be changed to reflect dis regairs=nt.
change shculd also be rade en cage 6.0 d:h reference to de annual writ:en ex.~_..inations.
'Ihe reference to centrcl ennirulaticns st.ich are not cerfc :cd 2.2(c) at the plant shall be =dified to state dat all centrol ranipulatiens shall be perfcIned at ce plan er en de 2.e Mrch 25th letter crovides fer de use of sM ater.
a si.ulater for c= trol eni=laticns as a substi ure for actual plant cpera:icns but dces not alicw de leeway suggested by de strding in ce ::ccedre as ncu writ:cn.
'Ihis sectica ust he recified to clarify de regairenen for centrol enn:.pulatiens.
In additien, de last paragraph cf this secticn states dat,
" licensed persennel, stese jeb assizrnnnes are not diractly related to url: cperatiens will actively partic a:e in centrol Te do roce cperatien a ni W " of cne shift per gaarter.
not believe dis is adecuate to =in:ain de skills and knowledre recuired te crerate ie clan: in a safe en=er.
This secten s'hculd be =dified :o be :er define "jeb assigr nnes cet directly related to =it cceratiens" and then recuire a srecific n=her of shift assizm:s cer conth oi per cuir er decendinz en de c1cseness to the For instance a iicenced day to day coeratices of the plant.
Nuclear Engineer assigned to de facility and xc king at de ter :nnth ny be plant en a day to day basis, cne sbif:
adegaate, but de sann ercineer assigned en a ncn-rcu-i.e basis needs rere ti.e durins a dree anch peried :o retain his skills and knowledze to clearly reflec: de re? airer:ents for these licensed persc=el.
The exe stien #rcci takinz de c= rent annual evaluatien 2.7 exaninat'icn for rerse=ei receivinz -+ Hcense less den six ennths rrior' to de ad cristratien of dis exa=ina-icn is unacceptable. ?!evly licened persc=el shall be recuired to enter de recualifica: ice. pregran u:en receipt of deir license and will be exe:st frca de a.=al evaluatien eurinatica i
only sten this exsninatien is adninistered less than three (3) ronds after de applican: has received his 23C license.
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-, "U:it 2 Ocerater Recualification Prez:n Status" centains 1-.fematien regarding ne2ctiatiens with Pennsylvania State Unim:sitf FN at establishing training sessiens as part cf de recualificaticn c cg m for Unit 2 cperaters. 2.e cperatic6. cf d e Penn state Research Reactor in lieu cf siculator c:eratien for the requalificatien ::cgra:n for de Unit 2 cperater dll net be acceptable. Te do ret believe dat cent:cl mniculatiens of a research reacec, excent ecssibiv for starr@s, is a
. viable substirse for nni:ulahiens c'i a ecwer clant si:nlater.
You shculd derefc e :cdiff dis part of icur nicz: n to assm e that the unit em (2) c eraters cerfe m de recuiied cen::cl Inanipulatiens en a si.ulater so 'dat dey :nindain all their skills and 'ccwledge for cperatien of the plant.
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D:cktt No. 50-289 1 --
s Metropolitan Edison Cc=:any ATIN:
Mr. R. C. Arnald Senior Vice President 100 Interpace Darkway
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Parsippany, New Jersey 07054 Gentlemen:
Subject:
Health Physics Evaluation The NRC has identified a need for licansees to strengthen the health physics programs at nuclear pcwer plants and has undertaicen a significant effer: to assure that actica is taken in this regard.
As a first stao in this effort, l
the Office of Inscectica anc Enforcemen; is conducting special taca a:craisals of the health physics pregrams at all c:arating pcwer reactor sites, wnica include the health physics aspects of radicactive wasta management and onsite emergency pre arecness.
The cbjectives of tnese accraisals are to evaluata the everall acequacy cnd effectiveness of tho Octal health physics crogram a:
each site and to icantify ar2as of waaXness that neec :s ce strengthened.
During the :ericd of July 2S - August 3,1950, the NRC conducted a scecial evaluatica of ::a health pnysics program at Unit 1 of the Three Mile Island (TMI) Nuclear Station.
The major pertion of this evalua:icn was conduc:ac using the same a:praisai tecnnicues anc accactanca critaria for ne scme areas as are ceing usac in :ne ccacuct of na scecial taam a praisals tt operating pcwer reac:crs nrcugncu: the country.
Two accitional areas were included in the TMI evaluatien snich are not acdressed in the special team appraisals at cperating pcwer reactors.
The two additicnal areas reviewed were: 1) ycur actions to correct itams of noneccoifance breu;nt to your c tan: Ton as a result of the investigatica into March 23, 1979 accicent, the findings of which were documented in NUREG 0500, "!nvestigaticn into the Mar:h 23, 1979 Three Mile Island Acciden: Sy Office of Inspec.icn and Enforcament"; and 2) verification of your i:clementation of rec: mendatiens contained in NCREG-0575, "TMI-2 Lessens Learned Task Force Status Re crt and Short-Term Rec =endatiens".
Becausa of these ciffarances, the ter= " evaluation" is used : distinguish it frca the special team a:praisals concucted at ccerating reactors.
Specific areas examined during this scecial evaluation are described in the enclosed re:crt (50-239/50-22).
Within these areas, tne evaluation taam reviewed selected prececures anc representative records, caservad worx: p ractices,
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s' 41 Metropolitan Edison Company 2
NOV 2 8 IS and interviewed personnel.
The evaluation findings are discus. sed in detail in the enclosed report.
Based on the findings, the Evaluation Team reached the overall conclusien that the Unit 1 aspects of the health physics program are adequate to sucport the present level of activities, but.there are a numcer of significant weaknesses which must be corrected to provide reasonacle assurance that the pregram will be adequate during cperation and major.cutages.
The significant weaknesses included the fc11cwing:
1.
There was a lack of effective management oversight in assuring that the radioicgical controls, training and radioactive waste organizations were clearly defined, that cersonnel were precerly selected, cualifiec anc assigned responsibilities for staffing Onese organizations, and tnat assigned responsibilities were being carriec cut.
2.
The excesure centrol program contained discrecancies between Unit 1 and Unit 2 indirect bicassay procedures, exnibitad inadecuacies in several calibration precedures, lackac action levels for issuance of scecial monitoring cevices, e.<nibited shortcc=ings in the maintenance of resciratory protection ecuicment and had an estaclisned cuality assurance program which failed to include all monitoring devices and contractor-supplied bicassay services.
3.
The solid radwaste shipcing program lacked key elements for ensuring the proper use of shipping containers and implementation of the attencant QA requirements.
4.
There were incccolete and conflicting actions in relation to resciutien of NUREG-0573 itaas.
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Within the partion of the evaluation related to imolementation of the Unit I draft preposed NUREG 0554 Emergency Plan, the Evaluatica Team concluced that significant weaknesses included the folicwing:
1.
The lack of clear assignment of individuals to the functional areas of emergency activity; 2.
Failure to have a clearly defined prograr for training individuals wne l
may be assigned emergancy duties; 3.
Procedures wnich imolement the emergency plan were incomclete, overly general, and exnibited caissions of key elements; and i
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APPENDIX A NOTICE OF VIOLATICN 1
Metropolitan Edison Company Oceket No. 50-289 Based upon the results of the NRC evaluation condue:ed on July 28 through August 8,1980, it appears that certain of your activities were not conducted in full. compliance with NRC regulations as indicated below.
Items A thru E are Infractions.
A.
10 CFR 20.103(c), " Exposure of individuals to concentrations of radio-
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active mat.erials in air in restricted areas" recuires in part that:
When respiratory protective equipment is used to limit the inhalation of airborne radioactive material pursuant to paragracn (b)(2) of this section, the licenseo may make allowance for such use in estimating axcosure of individuals to such =atarials providac that such ecuitment is used as stipulated in Regulatory Guide S.15, "Accep acle Programs for Respiratory Protection."
Section C.4 of Regulatory Guide S.15 statas in part, "The iicensee is to maintain and implement a resciratory protaction program that incluces, as a minimum...c.
Writtan precacures for maintenance to ensure full effac-tiveness of respiratory protective ecuipment, inclucing precadures for cleaning and disinfection, decontamination, inspection, repair ano storage..."
l 1.
Contrary to this recuirement as of August 1,1920, allewance was made for the use of res iratory protective ecui:=ent, out writtan procedures for performing periccic maintenance on salf-containec breathing apparatus (SC3A) units and air-line recairator regulators were not acprovec and implemented.
This lack of a:preved, ce: ailed programmatic guicanca contributad directly to a) tne unavaiiacility of records d:cumenting periodic maintenanca recortedly being performed and b) the licensee's failure to recognize ne necessity for performing periodic calibration /caintenance of airline respirator pressure regulators.
2.
Contrary to this recuirement, as of August 1, 1980, allowance was l
made for the use of resciratory protective equipment, but procedures for filling the SC5A air bottles, using either :ne Eagle or Make breathing air ::: ressors cid not exist.
Operating prececures/instruc-tions for these cc=cressors are necessary to assure:
a) the safety of personnel acerating the hign pressure air coceressors, anc b) ic maintenanca of :na compressors to f supplying hign quality brea:ning air.
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DUPLICATE DOCUMENT Entire document previously entered into system under:
ANO b lll ON 9 L No. of pages:
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o Metropolitan Edison Ceepany 3
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- 4. / There were facility and ecuicment shcrtcomings in relation to the E=ergency i
Operations Facility, Environmental Assessment Center, anc reactor building evacuation alarm.
Subsequent to the axit interview on August 8, 1980, various meetings were held with you and memcers of your staff to discuss the preliminary findings of :ne health physics evaluation.
During these meetings, accitional information and-preliminary rescenses were crevided by Me:repelitan Edisen Ceccany in recly to the preliminary findings identifiec by the Health Physics Evaluatien Team.
The additicnal informatien anc creliminary rescenses provided were reviewed and considered by the Evaluatica Team in ec cleting :neir everall evaluation of the Three Mile Island Unit i health physics pregram.
We recognize :nat, as a result of these discussiens, action :c resolve tne significan weaxnesses has been initiatec and, in many cases, may nave caen ce=cletad by nis time.
Our verification of ycur corrective acticn will await ycur formal rescense to the request in the following paragracn.
After receiving ycur rescense, all information sucplied will be reviewed for its implementation during sucsecuent inspections.
The significant weaknesses identified mus ce resolved prior to restart of Unit 1.
Items identified as significant weaknesses whien mus: be resolvec were selectec in a mannor consistant witn that used in selecting significant weaknasses whica rus; ce corrracted at ocerating pcwer reac ces wnere sceclai team appraisals have ceen concuc:ad.
It is recuestec tnat you carefully review the 57 items identifiec as necessitating resciutica crice to restart for censideration in effecting icarevecon s in tne nealth pnysics anc emergency planning programs.
We raccqn1:e inat an exclici: regula: cry recuirement pertaining :c eacn significan weakness identified may not currently exist.
However, to cetermine wnetner acecuate pre:ecticn will be previcec for One health and safety of workers and One puclic, you are recuested :c sucmit a written statament witnin twenty (20) days of your receipt of :nis letter, describing your corrective action for eac cf the items recuiring resolu icn prior to restart wnica are identified in tne enciesec recort including:
(1) steps which have been taken; (2) stens wnich will be taken; and (3) a seneccia for completion of action.
This recuest is mace pursuan: Oc Section 50.54(f)
Lof Part E0, Title 10, Ccce of Feceral Regulations.
We note that a nuccer of the significant weaknesses identified are also acplicacle to Unit 2 because many of the findings for Uni: 1 are based on the direct support whicn elements of the Unit 2 raciclegical controls and racwaste crganications provide to Unit i.
This matter will be the sucject of separata correspencence with respect to Unit 2.
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