Text

Response to Intervenor Public Utils Board of City of Brownsville 801112 Opposition to Proposed Settlement License Conditions.Conditions Are in Public Interest.Imposition Will Not Damage Intervenor.Certificate of Svc Encl
	ML19340D304
Person / Time
Site:	South Texas, Comanche Peak
Issue date:	12/03/1980
From:	Calhoun M, Dopsovic D, Fabrikant R, Mcmillen N, Whitler J; JUSTICE, DEPT. OF
To:	; Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
References
	ISSUANCES-A, NUDOCS 8012300250
	Download: ML19340D304 (24)
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA mt;mt n. se. -

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 0;

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Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board In the Matter of

)

HOUSTON LIGHTING 6 POWER

)

COMPANY, et al.

)

Docket Nos. 50-498A (South Texas Project,

)

50-499A Units 1 and 2)

)

TEXAS UTILITIES GENERATING

)

COMPANY, et al.

)

Docket Nos. 50-445A (Comanche Peak Steam

)

50-446A Electric Station,

)

Units 1 and 2)

)

REPLY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE TO THE COMMENTS OF THE PUBLIC UTILITIES BOARD OF THE CITY OF BROWNSVILLE OPPOSING PROPOSED SETTLEMENT LICENSE CONDITIONS l

Pursuant to the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board's

(" Board") order of November 20, 1980, the Department of Justice

(" Department") hereby submits its rr ly to the Comments of the Public Utilities Board of the City of Brownsville, Texas, Opposing Proposed Settlement License Conditions (" Comments"),

submitted on November 12, 1980.

I.

BACKGROUND On September 15, 1980, Texas Utilities Generating Company

("TU"), Houston Lighting 6 Power Company ("HLP"), Central and South West Corporation ("CSW"), the Staff of the Nuclear r

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submitted to Regulatory Commission ("Staf f") and the Department this Board two proposed sets of license conditions (" settlement license conditions") in the above-captioned proceedings, one relating to the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, anc the other relating to the South Texas Project.

On September 25, 1980, the Public Utilities Board of the City of Brownsville, Texas (" PUB" or "Brownsville") filed a motion for disapproval of the settlement license conditions. 1/

On October 3, 1980, PUB filed a Motion for Revision of Procedural Scheduling requesting indefinite extension of outstanding procedural dates, which an was denied by the Board.

On October 8, 1980, Brownsville filed its Initial Trial Brief. 2/

On October 14, 1980, the Board informed the parties that they need not file responses to PUB's September 25 Motion and its Initial Trial Brief before the holding of a Prehearing Conference. 3/

1/ Motion by the Public Utilities Board of the City of l

Texas for Disapproval of Proposed License Erownsville, Conditions; Comments Opposing Proposed License Conditions; and L

I For Further Proceedings (" Motion").

)

Request l'

2/

On October 16, 1980, PUB filed a First Supplement to Erownsville's Trial Brief.

1980).

Notice of Special Prehearing Conference (October 14, t

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At the October 24, 1980, Prehearing Conference the Board i

1 1

ordered the PUB to file its objections.to the settlement license d

f conditions within two weeks, and to include in its subsequent pleading all of its arguments in opposition to the proposed 1

i license conditions.

See October 24, 1980 Tr. at 1240.

On e'

November 12, 1980, the PUB filed its Comments opposing the 4

settlement license conditions.

l j

The Department believes that the settlement license conditions meet the standard required for their immediate 2

The approval by the Board, despite Brown.Jville's objections.

legal standard governing the immediate effectiveness of license conditions proposed as a settlement is set forth in Duke Power Company (Catawha Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-74-47, 7 I

i A.E.C. 1158, 1159 (1974).

Under Catawba the conditions must be.

"a reasonable settlement of differences [among the settling 6

l parties] within the public interest" 4/ with a focus on whether non-settling intervenors would be " improperly prejudiced or disadvantaged" 5/ by immediate effectiveness of the settlement conditions.

The Department submits that the settlement license i

conditions are in the-public interest and that the PUB has not demonstrated that it would be " improperly prejudiced or disadvantaged" by imcediate effectiveness of the settlement license conditions.

Indeed, immediate effectiveness could not I

prejudice Brownsville because acceptance of the settlement i

j license conditions would not impair, or even 4/

7'A.E.C. at 1159.

5/

Id.

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B affect, Brown sville 's righ t to present evidence at a plenary hearing held af ter die settlement license conditions are attached, 6/ and to seek relief additional to or different from that contained in the settlement license conditions.

Moreover, as the Applicants have agreed to immediate imposition of the settlement license conditions irrespective of the outcome 4

6/

Section 105c of the Atomic Energy Act, and the Commission 's consistent practice thereunder, support a non-settling party's i

ri gh t to an evidentiary hearing where that party demonstrates the existence of genuine, relevant, material factual questions in dispute.

See Siegel v. Atomic Energy Commission, 400 F.2d 778, 785-6 (DTC! Cir. 1968).

Compa re Independent Bankers Assoc.

of Ga. v. Board of Governors, 516 F.2d 1206 (D.C. Cir. 1975) with Connecticut Bankers Ass'n v.

Board of Governors, No.

79-1554 (D.C. Cir., Feb. 7, 1980).

If the Board finds that th ere a re "ma terial f acts" in t

dispute between Applicants and Brownsville, since th e set tlemen t license conditions do not purport to resolve any facts, immediate attachment of the settlement license conditions could not affect PUB 's righ t to present evidence at a plenary hearing Feld a f t er th e set tlemen t licen se condition s a re a ttach ed.

In I

this regard, th e Depa rtmen t calls the Board's attention to pa ra gra ph 4 of the Stipulation accompanying the settlement 1-icen s e con di tion s wh ich s ta te s :

Each of the Applicants denies that its past conduct j

and/or its proposed activities under the license for the South Texas Project without these conditions are inconsistent with th e an titrust laws in any respect, and nothing in this Stipulation or in these conditions constitutes any admission or evidence of inconsistency l

with or violation of any law or reRulation, state or l

federal.

Noth ing in this Stipulation or in these conditions constitutes any evidence against any Applicant or any admission by any Applicant as to any issue in this or any other proceeding. b

t of further hearings, it is clear that Brownsville will benefit from the settlement license conditions since the conditions furnish relief which Brownsville might not be able to obtain after an evidentiary hearing.

THE LICENSE CONDITIONS ARE IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST AND II.

ARE ADEQUATE TO ALLEVIATE THE SITUATION INCONSISTENT hlTH THE ANTITRUST LAh5 AS ALLEGED BY THE DEPARTMENT In 1977 and 1978, the Attorney General advised the Commission that TU and HLP had engaged in a concerted refusal to deal with interstate electric utilities 7/ and that this concerted conduct " raised serious antitrust issues which.

warrant [ed] a hearing." 8/

The apparent purpose of this refusal 7/ ' Letter of January 25, 1977 to Howard K. Shapar, Executive legal Director, Nuclear Regulatory Commission from Donald I. Baker, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice; Letter of February 21, 1978 to l

Howard K. Snapar, Executive Legal Director, Nuclear Regulatory Commission from John H. Shenefield, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice; Letter of August r

1, 1978 to Howard K. Shapar, Executive Legal Director, Nuclear Regulatory Commission from John H. Shenefield, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice; Letter of September 25, 1979 to Howard K. Shapar, Executive Legal Director, Nuclear Regulatory Commission from John H. Shenefield, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice.

8/

Letter of February 21, 1978 to Howard K. Shapar, Executive fegal Director, Nuclear Regulatory Commission from John H.

Shenefield, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, U.S.

I Department of Justice, p. 11.

i

-5

The settlement license to deal was to avoid federal regulation.

conditions expressly prohibit TU and HLP from engaging in or or understanding" with each other or maintaining any " agreement with any other entity "to refuse to deal with another entity (ies) with the purpose of maintaining an exemption from Accordingly, the jurisdiction under the Federal Power Act." 9/

license conditions are adequate to cure the perceived settlement laws which prompted situation inconsistent with the antitrust the Department to recommend that a hearing be conducted.

The situation alleged by Brownsville to be inconsistent with laws is similar to that which prompted the the antitrust to recommend a hearing in these proceedings, viz.,

Department TU, HLP, and other ERCOT utilities have agreed to refuse to deal 10/

Of the three " major with utilities in interstate commerce.

law aspects" of the situation inconsistent with the antitrust alleged by Brownsville, the first two are:

(i) the agreements, combinations and monopolizations creating barriers to interstate power transactions; Iand} (2i) the divisions of the bulk power market of unilateral within ERCOT resulting from the threat disconnection by the major applicants as a means of enforcing this restriction on interstate power transactions. 11/

License Condition I.B.(6)(b),

9/

South Texas SettlementLicense Condition D.(2)(1)(b).

Comanche Peak Settlement 10/

hee, e.g., Comments at 7-8, 31-42, 66-80, The third, which relates to Brownsville's 11/

Comments at 7-8.

is discussed in Section III infra.

relationship with CPL, j

4

Furthermore, Brownsville argues that:

No one utility could have succeeded at excluding interstate commerce without the agreement and cooperation of others.

Each would have been compelled by the need for reliability to interconnect with other utilities.

They could succeed in perpetually excluding all interstate utilities only by agreement and cooperation among themselves.

Absent agreement, they too would have lacked the power to exclude interstate utilities, since the economics of electricity transmission would have required each of them to interconnect with some others. 12/

2 Brownsville's Comments therefore make clear that its overriding concern is with joint action among utilities in Texas 4

to preclude interstate electricity and to avoid federal regulation.

The settlement license conditions explicitly prohibit such concerted refusals to deal and, thereby, remedy the alleged situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws identified by the Attorney General, as well as at least two of the three major aspects of the situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws alleged by Brownsville.

Paragraph D.(2)(1)(b) of the proposed Comanche Peak License Conditions and paragraph I.B.(6)(b) of the proposed South Texas License Conditions state:

[

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l cts at 73-74.

There is an ambiguity in the 12/

Comre term' -

T,/ utilized by Brownsville in explaining the alleged l

sit 1?

n inconsistent with the antitrust laws.

Brownsville i

appeard cc believe that individual action enforcing an agreement is " unilateral" action; in the Department's view, however, is action taken in pursuance of or to enforce an agreement joint, not uniliteral, action.

Interstate Circuit, Inc. v.

United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939),

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[HLP or TU) shall not enter into or maintain any agreement or understanding with any other Entity (ies) to refuse to deal with another Entity (ies) with the purpose of maintaining an exemption from jurisdiction under the Federal Power Act, and in the event that

[HLP or TU] refuses to make an interconnection with or chooses to disconnect from any Entity (ies), such decision and/or action by [HLP or TU) will be undertaken unilaterally, not jointly, and without consultation with any other Entity (ies), provided, however, that after [HLP or TU) decides to undertake such action, it may notify any affected Entity.

Notwithstanding the absolute prohibition of certain joint conduct in the settlement license conditions Brownsville apparently insists that the settlement license conditions would leave intact an anticompetitive agreement or promote a pattern of anticompetitive joint conduct.

For example, the PUB suggests the following agreements would not be prohibited under the settlement license conditions:

or combination between TU and HLP that an cgreement neither will introduce interstate electricity into the Texas intrastate area, beyond that over the DC tie of CSW, proposed DC ties or as may be approved under PURPA and second, (the] effectuation of this agreement by a series of bilateral agreements in which each utility requires that other utilities and wholesale customers with which it interconnects will not carry any interstate electricity. 13/

I The Department disagrees.

The Department would view a contract wherein HLP and TU agree to remain outside the regulatory jurisdiction of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 13/

Comments at 67. -

("FERC") as violating the settlement license conditions, since such an agreement would embody an implied promise by each party to disconnect from third parties should the non-jurisdictional status of HLP or TU be jeopardized.

The license conditions do not prohibit HLP or TU from reserving the option to disconnect unilaterally to preserve their non-jurisdictional status in a bilateral contract with a utility to which they are interconnected, provided that the bilateral contract is not the product of a broader underlying agreement. 14/

However, the settlement license conditions do not authorize or approve such a clause.

Truly unilateral refusals to deal by TU or HLP under such a clause would not necessarily be inconsistent with the antitrust laws.

Thus, it is not necessary for the Board to impose a license condition absolutely prohibiting every unilateral disconnection or refusal to connect by TU or HLP.

It is sufficient to provide, as do the license conditions, that a unilateral refusal to deal settlement by TU or HLP will be subject to an enforcement proceeding and to

(

14/

Such a contract is distinctly different from a bilateral agreement in which each party agrees not to enter interstate l.

commerce.

As discussed above, the Department views such an as a situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws agreement I

and a violation of the proposed license conditions.

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potential Sherman Act liability. 15/

Furthermore, a unilateral disconnection by TU or HLP is not the situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws alleged by in its advice letters, and Brownsville does not 1

the Department appear to allege that such a unilateral disconnection is inconsistent with the antitrust laws.

Indeed, in its Comments, Brownsville notes: 16/

Under [ United States v. Colgate 6 Co., 250 U.S.

300 (1919)), traders may choose with whom they will if their individual, unilateral choice is deal, even

. which would based on a purpose or interest violate Section 1 if embodied in an agreement.

I.B.(6)(a) of the proposed South Texas License 15/

Paragraph Conditions and Paragraph D.(2)(1)(a) of the proposed Comanche in the event of a particular Peak License Conditions provide that(or unilateral refusal to connect) by unilateral disconnection either HLP or TU to avoid federal regulation after the Entity i

requesting an interconnection has been denied such by an order of l

-the FERC under the provisions of the Public Utilities Regulatory Policy Act ("PURPA"), the NRC may conduct an enforcement action with the burden of proof on HLP or TU to show that the particular unilateral refusal to deal would not create or maintain a with the antitrust laws or the policies situation inconsistent thereunder in accordance with Section 105 of the Atomic Energy to utilize the provisions of Should an Entity elect not the Act.

PURPA, and TU or HLP nonetheless unilaterally disconnect, or any other Entity (as defined in the license to bring an antitrust action in federal Department conditions) has the right court.

16/

Comments at 66-67 (citations omitted).

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t Under th e Sh erman Act, a unilateral refusal to deal would be assessed in light of a variety of the factors, including wheth er monopoly power existed and whether the refusal was based upon an in t en t to monopolize or had an anticompetitive effect. 17/

Notwith standing that the settlement license condition s absolutely proscribe concerted refusals to deal and do not th e PUB approve of or authorize unilateral refusal to deal, requests this Board to impose:

a requirement and commitment th a t un d er n o circumstance, other than as required by normal prudent utility practice, will any of the Applicants disconnect from the nuclear plants here to be licensed or from the DC tie-lines, or disconnect facilities so as to prevent any other ERCOT utility from receiving power from either of such sources.

Applicants would be specifically enjoined from such disconnections for the purpose of preventing connected systems from 18/

engaging in interstate energy transactions.

17/

See, e.g., Mid-Texas Communications Systems, Inc. v.

Xmerican Telephone 6 Telegraph, 615 F. 2d 137 2 ( 5 th Ci r. 1980),

I cert, denied sub nom.

Woodland's Telecommunications Corp. v.

South western FeT1 Telephone Co., 49 U.S.L.h. 3270 (Oct. 14, 1980); Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. den i ed, 4 8 U.S. L.W. 3532 (1980).

Byars v.

Bluff City News Co., Inc., 609 F.2d 843 (6th Cir.1979).

j PUB's reliance on the Federal Trade Commission in Tyson s l

Corner Regional Shopping Cen ter, 85 F.T.C. 970, modified, 86 F.T.C. 921 (1975) for the proposition that Section 5 of the F.T.C. Act prohibits a unilateral refusal to deal even by a single firm without monopoly power is misplaced (see Comments at 51, 56-57).

A fair reading of that opinion compels the conclusion that the F.T.C. was concerned with concerted conduct, not a unilateral refusal to deal.

See 85 F.T.C. at 1009-1110.

18/

Comments at 16.

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for However, Brownsville offers no factual or legal support such relief.

Nor does it show any " improper prejudice or disadvantage" to itself from imposition of the settlement license conditions. 19/

Brownsville also suggests that the settlement license conditions are inadequate because they " compel utilities

. resort to FERC seeking to enter interstate commerce to.

under (the] PURPA first [ provision], even though that strtute permits FERC to deny relief for failure to satisfy any of numerous required showings." 20/

However, the settlement license conditions require no entity to use the provisions of PURPA.

Moreover, Brownsville does not argue that use of the PURPA procedure itself rises to the level of an inconsistency with the antitrust laws. 21/

19/

Brownsville apparently desires that TU and HLP be regulated Ei the FERC.

See Comments at 19-20, 23-24, and October 24, 1980, Tr. at 1156.

Yet, Brownsville has not shown any prejudice to itself from failure to obtain such relief.

Brownsville is directly connected with, and has traditionally dealt exclusively with, Central Power 6 Light, a FERC-regula'ed utility.

The did not take the position in its advice letters that Department the lack of regulation by the Federal Power Commission (later with FERC) over TU and HLP constituted a situation inconsistent the antitrust laws.

It was the alleged concerted response by TU, HLP and others to avoid federal regulation that prompted the Department to recommend a hearing in these proceedings.

20/

Comments at 12-13.

21/

While the PUB seemingly took this position in its September 75 Motion (at 9-10) and Brief (at 30), it apparently has abandoned this argument.

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The PURPA procedure constitutes a restraint on the ability Unilateral of TU and HLP to unilaterally disconnect.

e disconnections are prohibited by the license conditions where ar.

entity obtains a PURPA order.

Since not all unilateral laws, it is disconnections are inconsistent with the antitrust to conceive how a procedure which limits unilateral difficult disconnection can create a situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws.

Furthermore, Browns'rille's apparent concern future PURPA proceedings will be long and burdensome is that misplaced.

The difficult and complex issues concerning interconnecting ERCOT and SWPP are likely to be resolved in the current proceeding at FERC. 22/

Finally, the PURPA procedure should decrease the threat of disconnection, since it provides a forum for resolution of disputes that led to the " midnight wiring" and the ensuing 1976 disconnection of ERCOT.

although the PUB raises the spectre of a In conclusion, possible future disconnection, the Department believes that the of a disconnection, particularly one as massive as threat occurred in May 1976, is significantly reduced by the acceptance l

of the settlement license conditions.

The May 1976 these license conditions disconnection exhibits the problem that t

are designed to prevent.

The Department believes that the l

a recurrence

(

proposed license conditions are adequate to prevent ER 78-9.

22/

Central Power 6 Light Company, FERC Docket No.

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c of the May 1976 disconnection and disagrees with th e PUB th a t the proposed conditions make long-term power transactions virtually impossible because of the possibility of a threat to disconnect. 23/

Brownsville does not deny in its comments that the license conditions decrease the risk of a disconnection as th ese settlement compared with the situation existing without license conditions, and states that th e 1976 disconnections th at disrupted ERCOT were the product of a conspiracy or combination because no one entity had sufficient market power to direct a

course of intrastate-only operations. 24/

Consequently, Brownsville cannot be heard to deny that th e th rea t o f a disconnection is greatly reduced by the settlement license conditions, which prohibit the concerted conduct alleged to have occurred up to and including the May 1976 disconnection.

4 THE OTHER PROPOSED LICENSE CONDITIONS ARE ADEQUATE AND III.

BR0hNSVILLE HAS NOT DEMONSTRATED THAT IMPOSITION OF THESE LICENSE CONDITIONS HILL DISADVANTAGE OR PREJUDICE BR0hSSVILLE KITH RESPECT TO CENTRAL POWER 6 LIGHT COMPANY a

The third " major objection" by the PUB to the settlement license conditions relates to "the historic and still unresolved refusal of Central Power 6 Light Company (" CPL") to wheel firm power for Brownsville on a f air and practical basis and CPL 23/

See also, note 28, supra.

i disadvantaged by the settlement license conditions, the Department submits that the PUB's suggested approach of a deferred ruling on the proposed license conditions will not advance the overall public interest but only Brownsville's private interests.

Finally, Brownsville argues that the DC asynchronous interconnections proposed by HLP, TU and CSW before the FERC would create or maintain a situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws. 29/

However, the appropriate standard for approving the settlement license conditions is whether they are in the public interest under Section 105(c)(6) of the Atomic Energy Act and whether they improperly prejudice or disadvantage Brownsville.

Brownsville has not and cannot make this latter showing.

Brownsville seems to argue that the Licensing Board is being asked to approve licenses specifically requiring the building of DC interconnections.

But this is not the case.

As has been noted by both Applicants and the government parties, the license conditions do not dictate the specific type i

settlement I

of interconnection that will be built between ERCOT and l

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l 29/

Comments at 28-30.

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17 -

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SKPP; 30/ they commit HLP, TU at CSK to use their best efforts FERC to secure approval of the DC lines.

This provision at evidences a commitment in the settlement license conditions to the constructions of interconnections between ERCOT and support i

leaving the particulars of that interconnection to be

SKPP, determined at the FERC.

Brownsville is a party to the FERC and can make all appropriate arguments proceeding at concerning the propriety of the DC interconnections in that forum. 31/

Consequently, Brownsville cannot show that it is prejudiced by approval of these license conditions.

1 30/

October 24, 1980, Tr. at 1207-9 (comments of Mr.

Eouknight); 1223 (Comments of Mr. Fabrikant).

31/

In the Matter of Louisiana Power 6 Light Company (Waterford 5 team Electric Generating Station, Unit 3), Docket No. 50-382A (April 12, 1974), 7 AEC 698, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board stated that it does not consider litigation in other forums to be within its jurisdiction and will not meld the issues raised in other litigation into these proceedings.

The Board would have no objection if the parties' should decide to settle all outstanding litigation Conversely, if the parties wish to simultaneously.

separate these proceedings from all other litigation for settlement purpose, that would be satisfactory.

the issues in the present proceedings were

However, forth in the Board's Memorandum and Opinion of set 1973 (RAI-73-4, pp. 312-316).

These issues April 24, and only these issues are before this Board.

7 AEC at 704.

. t

Moreover, Brownsville has not argued that the Applicants commitment to build interconnections would not improve the ability of utilities within Texas to obtain power from outside Construction of such interconnections would clearly of Texas.

create opportunities that do not presently exist for bulk power transactions between ERCOT and SKPP.

Consequently, the license conditions should be approved by the settlement Commission.

IV.

CONCLUSION The settlement license conditions are in the public interest and do not prejudice Brownsville.

Accordingly, the Department requests this Board to approve and make immediately effective

[thesettlement license conditions in their entirety for both the Comanche Peak units and South Texas Project units.

Respectfully submitted, t

f4Il Robert Fabrikant Assistant Chief l

f-V Nancp*H.McMillen 1

dd-M David A. Dopsovic 1 L

I

O t

i kPaadd&abow Mildred L. Calhoun t,

l 4dne4-lWut4+MA9hd ohn D. hhitler

['

l Attorneys Energy Section Antitrust Division U.S. Department of Justice (Phone:

202-724-6653)

Dated:

December 3, 1980 h'a sh i n g t on, D.C.

i i

I i

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r t,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board In the Matter of

)

HOUSTON LIGHTING S POWER

)

COMPANY, et al. (South

)

Docket Nos. 50-498A Texas Project, Un i t s 1 and

)

50-499A 2)

)

~

TEXAS UTILITIES GENERATING

)

COMPANY, et al. (Comanch e

)

Docket Nos. 50-445A Peak Steam Electric

)

50-446A Station, LMits 1 and 2)

)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that service of the foregoing REPLY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE TO THE COMMENTS OF THE PUBLIC UTILITIES BOARD OF THE CITY OF BROWNSVILLE OPPOSING PROPOSED SETTLEMENT LICENSE CONDITIONS has been made on the following parties listed hereto this 3rd day of December 1980, by depositing copies thereof in the United States mail, first class, postage prepaid.

Marshall E. Miller, Esquire Alan S. Rosen th al, Esquire Ch a irman Ch a i rman Atomic Safety S Licensing Michael C. Farrar, Esquire Board Panel Th oma s S. Doore, Esquire U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Atomic Safety and Licensing Commission Appeal Board Panel Wa sh in g ton, D. C.

20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mich ael L.

Glaser, Esquire Wa sh ington, D. C.

20555 1150 17th Street, N.W.

Wa sh in g ton, D. C.

Jerome E. Sharfman, Esquire U.S. Nuclea r Regulatory Sheldon J. Wolfe, Esquire Commission Atomic Safety S Licensing Wa sh ington, D. C.

20555 Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Ch a se R. St eph en s, Secretary Commission Docketing and Service Branch Wa sh ington, D. C.

20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Samuel J. Chilk, Secretary Wa sh ington, D. C.

20555 Office of the Secretary of the Commission Steph en H. Lewis, Esquire Wa sh ington, D. C.

20555 Ann P. Hodgdon U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of the Executive Legal Director i

Wa sh ington, D. C.

20555

. L.~

Jerome Salt: man Mich a el I. Miller, Esquire Ch ief, An titrust and James A-Carney, Esquire Indemnity Group Sarah N. Welling, Esquire U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Ish am, Lincoln S Beale Commission 4200 One First National Plaza Wa sh ington, D. C.

20555 Ch ica go, Illinois 60603 Mr. William C. Price Mich ael Blume, Esquire Central Power S Ligh t Co.

Frederic D. Ch anan ia, Esq.

P. O. Box 2121 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Corpus Ch risti, Texas 78403 Commission Wa sh ington, D. C.

20555 J. K. Spruce, General Manager City Public Service Board Jerry L. Harris, Esquire P. O.

Box 1771 City Attorney, San Antonio, Texas 78203 R ich a rd C.

Ba lough, Esquire Assistant City Attorney Perry G. Brittain City of Austin President P. O. Box 1088 Texas Utilities Generating Austin, Texas 78767 Company 2001 Bryan Tower Robert C. McDiarmid, Esquire Dallas, Texas 75201 Tobert A. Jablon, Esquire Spiegel and McDiarmid R.

L. Hancock, Director 2600 Virginia Avenue, N.W.

City of Austin Electric Wa sh in g ton, D. C.

20037 Utility Department P. O. Box 1088 Dan H. Davidson Austin, Texas 78767 City Manager City of Austin G.

W.

Oprea, Jr.

P. O.

Box 1088 Executive Vice President Austin, Texas 78767 Houston Ligh ting 6 Power Don R. Butler, Esquire Company P. O.

Box 1700 1225 Southwest Tower Hous ton, Texa s 77001 Austin, Texas 78701 Jon C. Wood, Esquire Joseph Irion Worsham, Esq.

W. Roger Wilson, Esquire Merlyn D. Sampels, Esq.

Matthews, Nowlin, Macf a rlan e Spencer C. Relyea, Esq.

Robert A. Wooldridge S Barrett 1500 Alamo National Building Worsham, Forsythe 6 Sampels San Antonio, Texas 78205 2001 Bryan Tower, Suite 2500 Dalla s, Texas 75201 David M. Stahl, Esquire I sh a m, Lincoln 6 Beale Joseph Knotts, Esquire Suite 325 Nich ola s S. Reynolds, Esq.

1120 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.

Leonard W.

Belter, Esq.

Wa sh in gton, D. C.

20036 Debevoise S Liberman 1200 17th Street, N.W.

Wash ington, D. C.

20036 1

i Douglas F. John, Esquire Robert Lowenstein, Esquire McDERMOTT, WILL 6 EMERR J. A. Boukn igh t, Esquire 1850 K Street, N.W.

William J. Franklin, Esquire Wa sh in gton, D. C.

20006 Lowen stein, Newman, Reis, Axelrad 6 Toll 1025 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.

Morgan Hunter, Esquire Wa sh ington, D. C.

20036 McGinnis, Lochridge 6 Kilgore 5th Floor, Texas State Bank E. W.

Ba rn e t t, Esquire building Ch arles G. Th ra sh, Jr., Esq.

900 Congress Avenue J. Gregory Copeland, Esq.

Austin, Texas 78701 Th eodore F. Weiss, Jr., Esq.

Baker 6 Botts Jay M.

Galt, Esquire 3000 One Shell Plaza Looney, Nichols, Johnson Houston, Texas 77002 6 Hayes 219 Couch Drive Kevin B. Pratt, Esquire Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73101 Assistant Attorney General P. O. Box 12548 Knoland J. Plucknett Capital Station Executive Director Austin, Texas 78711 Committee on Power for the South we s t, Inc.

Frederick H. Ritts, Esquire 5541 East Skelly Drive Law Offices of Northcutt Ely Tulsa, Oklahoma 74135 Watergate 600 Building Wa sh ington, D. C.

20037 Joh n W. Davidson, Esquire Sawtelle, Goode, Davidson Donald M. Clements, Esq.

6 Tioilo Gulf States Utilities Company 1106 P.an Antonio Savings P. O. Box 2951 Building Beaumont, Texas 77704 San Antonio, Texas 78205 Mr. G. Holman King I

W. S. Robson West Texas Utilities Co.

General Manager P. O. Box 841 South Texas Electric Abilene, Texas 79604 Cooperative, Inc.

Route 6, Building 102 W. N. Woolsey, Esquire Victoria R 31onal Airport Kleberg, Dyer, Redford 6 Weil j

l Victoria, Texas 77901 1030 Petroleum Tower Robert M. Rader, Esquire Conner, Moore 6 Corber Robert A. O'Neil 1747 Penn sylvania Ave., N.W.

Miller, Balis.S O'Neil, P.C.

Wa sh ington, D. C.

20006 776 Executive Building 1030 Fif teenth Street, N.W.

R. Gordon Gooch, Esquire Wa sh ington, D. C.

20005 John P. Ma th is, Esquire Steven R. Hunsicker Baker 6 Botts 1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

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,a Leon J. Barish

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Assistant Attorney General (for Public Utility Commission of Texas)

P.O. Box 12548 Capital S'tation Austin, Texas 78711 f

David A. Dopsovic, Aftorney Wa sh ington, D. C.

20006 Energy Section Antitrust Division Department of Justice 3

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ML19340D304

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