ML19340C565
| ML19340C565 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 07/03/1979 |
| From: | Scinto J NRC - NRC THREE MILE ISLAND TASK FORCE |
| To: | Bernero R NRC - NRC THREE MILE ISLAND TASK FORCE |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 8012110226 | |
| Download: ML19340C565 (8) | |
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Jul. 3 b79 MEMORANDUM FOR: Robert M. Bernero, Leader Task Group No. 5 NRC/TMI Special Inquiry Group N
FROM:
Joseph F. Scinto NRC/TMI Special Inquiry Grou y
SUBJECT:
TASK 5 BACKGROUND REVIEW Task 5 Al is about 1/2 completed.
Thus far, it appears that the NRC role..in emergencies has not been specifically discussed or defined in an authoritative fashion by the NRC. There are legal bases for various roles (up to and including " recapture" and operation). How-ever, the background information contains predominantly general statements concerning " assistance", in the event of emergencies, by NRC to the licensee and to State and local governments. There is an absence of any specific con-sideration of particular activities by NRC in emergencies.
Although this is the general pattern of the background, Manual Chapter 0502 stands out in vivid contrast.
It touches on a range of roles for NRC up to
" formal intervention" and "on site direction of action". Thus far, I have found no background discussion of this document, nor of its sharp departure from past generalities.
Attached is a first stage write up of the information thus far developed for Task 5 A1.
8012110 j
NRC EllERGENCY RESPONSE ROLE A.
STATUTORY BASIS The statute (with respect to the regulatory activities which were transferred to NRC by the Energy Reorganization Act) is principally cast in regulatory terms:
- It imposes obligations on persons to obtain a license to " possess" facilities and materials and obligations to obey the Act, the Comissions regulations, and the license.
- It authorizes the Commission to issue licenses and to impose standards and regulations governing " possession" of facilities and materials.
The statute deals with emergency-type situations explicitly in two instances (3 sections); but these are principally directed toward Commission " recapture" of facilities to continue operation, rather than to recapture for the purpose of shutdown and placing the facility in a safe condition.
First, under 108 when Congress declares a national emergency, the Commission can suspend licenses, order recapture of SNM, order operation of the facility and order entry to operate.
(Compensation).
It is unclear whether this was intended to apply to an instance in which the operation of the facility (or an emergency at the facility) constituted the " national emergency".
{Jeedtoreviewlegislativehistory-buthighlyunlikely).
Second, in the event of a revokation of a license (188), when the Commission 21 finds that "public convenience and necessity" or the production program requires continued operation of a facility, the Commission may, after consultation with 1/This rebtes to activities carried out, while the emergency is going on, to amelio-rate the emergency or its consequences.
It does not cover the Commissions investiga-tive authority.
2JERDA-00E function.
r
. JJ appropriate State regulatory agencies having jurisdiction, order that possession be taken of the facility and that the facility be oper'ted.
(Compensation).
In revokation cases, found by the Commission to be of extreme importance to the national defense or to healti and safety of the public, the Commission may re-capture and operate the facility before completion of the APA procedures (186).
-(Compensation).
It is unlikely that this was intended to apply to a situation in which the facility was a threat to health and safety and that the only acts of operation by the NRC were those intended to shutdown the facility and render it safe.
In such cases, compensation would not appear to be applicable - basically the exercise of a police power. However, it appears broad enough to encompass a facility - caused condition of extreme importance to public health and safety, permitting an immediately effective order to enter and to operate in order to shutdown the facility and render it safe, while the APA notice and hearings for revokation were subsequently completed.
In this case compensation would be none or nominal. A condition precedent to such action is an immediately effective revokation of.the applicable licenses.
This existance of these 3 sections dealing explicitly with certain circumstanceri, does not detract from the application of the Commission's other regulatory powers to emergency situations; that is, the NRC may use any of the other regulatory authority it may have in an emergency situation, including the power to
" prescribe such... orders as it may deem necessary... to protect health and minimize danger..."
(161i)
J/Need to review legislative history. -If there is any indication of what is meant, it is likely to be limited to economic regulatory agencies, like 182 c - since there are no State radiological health and tafety agencies having jurisdiction.
. B.
Fonnal Interpretive Statements (1) The Regulations.
The Commissions regulations (10 CFR) provide no source of information as to the NRC's' function in the event of an emergency. They impose obligations on appli-cants for licenses to provide, in their applications, plans for energencies.
(2) The Regulatory Decisions.
These deal only rarely with any NRC' action in the event of an emergency. Princi-pally, they discuss State or local plans or capability to evacuate with emphasis on coninunications arrangements (Sqn Onofre 2 & 310). They make very clear, however, that as to regulatory policy of the agency, there need be no, plans for protection of people outside the low population zone (about 2-3 mile zone i
surrounding the reactor, except in congested areas like Iudion Point where 1 PZ is 1000 yards). The cases which first articulate this appear in about 1971. These are contemporaneous with the beginning of the policy statements
.'W that class 9 accidents are of sufficiently low probability that they need not be considered in the licensing process.
There were warnings by the Appeal Board in two Parler cases (ALAB-188, & ALAB-216) that the staff should review Appendix E to ascertain whether.it was-adequate to assure that people would be ready to implement appropriate plans if and when the time came.
1/
The Seabrook argument ALAB-390, rejected by the Appeal Board, specifically argued for interpreting NRC regulatory requirements as requiring plans to protect people
.ulPZ pressure vessel decision; Annex A to Appendix D.
3/ Accidents greater than design basis accidents.
3/ By Scinto for the staff.
t Y-.
9
. down to the applicable PAG's, even if this meant going beyond the LPZ. The Appeal Board rejected this, holding that this was a rule making function. The decision implied, and the concurring opinions specifically expressed, that the present rules implied that 25 Rem (whole body) was " safe".
TMI-2 is one case in which some aspects of the role of the NRC is touched on.
The continued capability of the Pennsylvania Bureau of Radiological Health became a controverted issue. This came up specifically with respect to two points. The first related to the State's post accident monitoring activities.
The Licensing Board concluded that the evidence showed that the licensee could do the job of off-site monitoring until additional resources by NRC inspectors and Brookhaven Lab became available.
The second point related to BRH's role in advising other State agencies on appro-priate protective measures. After stating that the advice of BRH on whether evacuation was needed is probably the most important element in deciding to take the action, the Appeal Board went on to indicate that this advice could instead come from the licensee or from the NRC and that the State and local Civil Defense people were willing to rely on advice provided by the license or by the NRC "in conjunction with" or " independent of" the BRH. The Appeal Board did not discuss the problems of potentially conflicting advice.
From the regulatory decisions, the only NRC emergency response function discussed is that of augmenting off-site radiation monitoring and of assisting in the assessment of the significance of the event.
.o
. (3) The Manual Chapters #-
Under the AEC, the manual chapters dealing with AEC response to emergencies appeared to be principally directed toward the investigative function after the event. This research is not yet complete. Similarly, the initial version of NRC Manual Chapter 0502 was principally directed toward receiving and evaluating information about incidents, informing the Comission and other NRC management of the incident, reviewing reports of incident investi-gations and a rather ambiguous concept of directing, coordinating and develop-ing plans for NRC response to incidents.
However 0502, as amended on 2/6/78 is significantly different.
It is the only HRC document (thus far identified) which identifies NRC response actions ranging from (1) obtaining early factual information; (2) assisting the licensee and others, in the form of advice and expert opinion; up to (3) determing whether the situation warrants formal NRC intervention.
"This direction could take the form of oral and written directives by a responsible office of NRC, or in the extreme, could theoretically involve on site direction of action".
The reference to " directives" has a basis in 161i'. To the extent that the con-cept of "on site direction"'is intended to convey " hands-on" operation by NRC personnel, the statutory bases are limited. The Manual Chapter'does not in-dicate the prerequisite need to revoke the license in order to act,under 186
.s (that, of. course, does not make the statements legally defective)'.
NThese are formal implementation of the Commissions Statement of Organization, see 10 CFR 1.2.
. The source of this concept in revised 0502 needs further inquiry.
It should be noted that within 3 months of the promulgation,in 5/4/76,of the original revision of 0502, a second draft of a plan having concepts similar to revised 0502 had been proposed at the staff level, at least.
It should be noted that the statement by Region I I&E (undated) which appears as part of Met Ed'sEmergency Plan for TMI-2, reflects the investigation and assistance role indicated in the initial version of 0502 and not the more activist role indicated in the rev' ed 0502).
"The primary role of the NRC during a radiation emergency is that of conducting investigative activities associated with the incident and verifying that emergency plans have been implemented and proper agencies notified.
In addition, however, if NRC personnel are dispat:hed to the scene, they will, as needed, assist in coordination with the Energy Research and Development Administration Radiological Asssitance Team and provide to state and local agencies advisory assistance associated with investigating and assessing hazards to the public."
This appears to be a fairly sJccinct summary of the NRC role as understood l
fairly widely in the agency at that time (see also current Regional Response Plan; compare with current 0502.
C.
INFORMAL STATEMENTS (1) NUREG-0396 (NRC Guidance to States on Emergency Planning) and the various documents referred to therein, except for the Federal Response Plan (GSA 4/77) discussed below, discusses federal and NRC roles in terms of emergency response planning and providing guidance to states.
Emphasis is on describing emergency response as primarily a matter for state and local personnel with the federal function i. hat of assisting the state and local officials.
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t i The NRC response to the GA0 report (3/30/79) stresses the lack of NRC authority over states and local governments to require emergency plans.
The Federal Respcnse Plan again stresses that emergency response is primarily a matter for state and local governments. Annex I starts out with an ipse dixit statement that "under our Constitutional form of government, those emergencies, unless they occur in federally controlled areas or involve federally owned material or equipment, all in the first instance a matter of concern to State and local authority". However, in describing a Category II event (potential for nuclear emergency resulting in casualties) it indicates that " Presidential involvement is, at least, possible". The report, particularly Annex II in-dicates that for NRC "there appears to be no iack of legal auttcrity to respond to "... Emergencies and, to the contrary there is a legal obligation imposed upon the NRC and ERDA to take prcmpt and effective corrective measures..."
(p.4, P.9, P 24)
However, OELD (Voegli) commenting on these statements in the draft (10/24/75) indicates that the cited authority does not have a direct bearing on the issue involved - authority of the NRC to respond to an emergency during the time the emergency exists. Voegli mentions 108, and concludes that there should be "a legal analysis relevant to the matters under consideration".
BlasthisforwardedtoGSA? What action was taken by GSA?]
8)ther relevant information documents are to be identified and evaluated.
Legislative history including statements to legislative Coninittees needs toberesearched).
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