ML19340B689

Responds to Item 1a of 800630 Memo Discussing SECY-80-153, Re Proposed Rulemaking on Reactor Siting.Requested Site Evaluations Will Be Included in SERs for Applicable CP & OL Applications.Related Matl Encl

ML19340B689
Person / Time
Issue date:	09/05/1980
From:	Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Dircks W NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO)
References
FRN-45FR50350, RULE-PR-100, RULE-PR-50, RULE-PR-51 NUDOCS 8011110640
Download: ML19340B689 (15)

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September 5,1980 MEMORANDUM FOR: William J. Dircks, Acting Executive Director for Operations FROM:

Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

SUBJECT:

SECY-80-153 ADVANCE NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING ON REACTOR SITING This is in response to item la of the memorandum from S. J. Chilk to W. J. Dircks, dated June 50, 1980. As directed by the Commission, the Staff will include the requested site evaluations in the safety evaluation reports for the applicable CP and ML applications.

/

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Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 8011110 0

p y DISTIRE'JTION:

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DESCRIPDON 6 Muse Se uacianebeel E D TO DATE RECElvtD BY DATE bM Nb SECY 80-153 - ADVANCE NOTICE OF Eisenh */Vollmer 7/8 S S?90S9 03t9 PROPOSED RULEMAKING ON REACTOR v

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9 ENCLOSURE 10 SITE ASSESSMENTS INTRODUCTION:

One of the aspects to be considered in the decision of whether or not to go forward with the construction permit process for specific plants is the b

projected acceptability of the sites. Although the sites have benn judged by the NRC staff to be acceptable according to present regulations and practices, except for some remaining questions about the geologic suitauility of,the Skagit site, it is prudent to consider these site in terms of the kilure siting policy and subsequent rulemaking.

1 The present schedule for rulemaking on siting policy calls for proposed rule to be published by the end of lo10, and for afinal rule to be set forth in July 1982. The precise changes in criteria, which could change a presently Ite into an unacceptable site, can only be identified after acceptab'. :

4 completion of rulemaking.

It is, however, possible to make some predictions on the outcome of the rulemaking, and use these predictions to test the likely future acceptability of the sites. This approach permits the decision process to go forward now with good assurance that a present decision on site acceptability will stand the test of time.

One of the aids available for making predictions of future site requirements is the " Report of the Siting Policy Task Force", NUREG-0625, plus coments of the Connission, the ACRS, and others on that report.

Based on the task force report, and coments thereon, it is reasonable to use compliance with the site characteristic parts of recomendations 1, 3 and 6 as a test for future acceptability. These recomendations involve population density s

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and distribution (recommendation 1), groundwater interdiction, and the avoidance of unproven design features required to compensate for site characteristics. The sites being considered do not have any obvious problem when compared to recomendation 2 (minimum standoff distances from external hazards), and the other recomendations are not site characteristic matters.

P0pulATION DISTRIBUTION AND DENSITY All of the sites being considered meet the present NRC regulations.

In addition, all of the sites meet the population density and distribution criteria suggssted by the Siting Policy Task Force. Pouplation density and distribution characteristics based on the 1970 cer. sus are given in Table 1.

Similar information with projected growth to the year 2000, is given in Table 2.

These tables indicate that the population densities are within the Regulatory Guide 4.7 guideline of 500 persons per square mile at distances out to 30 miles at initial operation, and are probably within 1000 persons per square mile guideline during the life of the plant.

As already noted, all the sites meet the suggested guidelines in population distribution and density set forth by the Siting Policy. Task Force,

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TABLE 1 POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS OF SITES BASED ON 1970 CENSUS EXCLUSION CUMULATIVE POPULATION AND POPULATION DENSITY RADIUS (PERSONS /SQ. MILE) WITHIN:

SITE (Miles) 5 Miles 10 Miles 30 Miles Allens Creek 0.82 1800 8000 94,000 (23)

(25)

(33)

Black Fox 0.53 3500 10,000 460,000 (44)

(33)

(160)

Pebble Springs 0.49 380 880 4,800 (4)

(2)

(2)

Perkins 0.37 4,500 34,000 620,000 (58)

(110)

(220)

Pilgrim 0.27 9.600 51,000 880,000 (120)

(160)

(310)

Skagit 0.38 3,800 16,000 150,000 (49)

(51)

(54)

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TABLE 2 POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS OF SITES BASED ON PROJECTION TO 2000 EXCLUSION CUMULATIVE POPULATION AND POPULATION DENSITY RADIUS (PERSONS /SQ. MILE) WITHIN SITE (MILES) 5 MILES 10 MILES 30 MILES I

Allens Creek 0.82 3,600 16,000 190,000 (46)

(50)

(66)

Black Fox 0.53 5,400 16,000 720,000 (69)

(52)

(250)

Pebble Springs 0.49 450 1,100 5,700 (5)

(3)

(2)

Perkins 0.37 7,300 55,000 1,000,000 (93)

(180)

(350)

Pilgrim 0.27 13,000 71,000 1,200,000 (170)

(230)

(430)

Skagit 0.38 7,300 31,000 290,000 (93)

(98)

(100) 1

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6 POPULATION RISK The relative risk for the population out to thirty miles has been calculated and compared to the presently operating reactor sites. This information is shown in Table 3.

The Population Risk Factor is the product of reactor power and the Site Population Factor out to 30 miles. Coarse groupings of the plants according to population risk can be constructed. The Indian Point and Zion plants are four reactors which represent about 35 percent of the total population risk; none of the proposed CP plants fall in this group on the basis of Population Risk Factor. The next 14 reactors of Table 3 (Beaver Valley 3 through Davis-Besse 1) represent about 33 percent of the total population risk; the Pilgrim 2 and Perkins units fall in this group on the basis of Population Risk Factor. The Population Risk Factors for Pilgrim 2 and Perkins are a factor of about 6 less than that for Indian Point 3.

The next 34 reactors of Table 3 (Ginna through Arkansas 1) represent about 28 percent of the total population risk; the Black Fox and Skagit units fall in this group on the basis of Population Risk Factor. The Population Risk Factor for Black Fox is a factor of about 10 less than that for Indian Point 3, and the Population Risk Factor for Skagit is a factor of about 18 less than that for Indian Point 3.

The next 15 reactors of Table 3 (Dresden Ithrough Big Rock Point) represent about 4 percent of the total population risk, the Allens Creek and Pebble l

Springs units fall in this group on the basis of Population Risk Factor.

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The Allens Creek and Pebble Springs Population Risk Factors are factors

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of about 35 to 400, respectively, less than the Population Risk Factor for Indian Point 3.

F I.

TABLE 3 SITE POPULATION RISK FACTOR

• TO 30 MILES FOR OPERATING PLANTS AND CP SITES PLANT POWER (MWT)

POPULATION RISK FACTOR Indian Point 3 3025 2916 Indian Point 2 2575 2482 Zion 1/2 3250 1635 Beaver Valley 1 2652 1183 Millstone 2 2560 763 Haddam Neck 1825 704 Salem 1 3338 628 Millstone 1 2011 599

, Peach Bottom 2/3 3293 543 D. C. Cook 2 3391 502

0. C. Cook 1 3250 481 Turkey Point 3/4 2200 433 Pilgrim i 1998 424 Rancho Seco 2770 41 5 Davis Besse 1 2770 402 R. E. Ginna 1520 374 Dresden 2/3 1527 346 Surry 1/2 2440 334 Trojan 3411 310 Quad-Cities 1/2 2511 299 y

Oyster Creek 1930 255 Browns Ferry 1/2/3 3293 221 g

Oconee 1/2/3 2568 21 8 Q

Ft. Calhoun 1420 199 Palisades

' 30 195 H. B. Roginson 2 2200 180 Duane Arnold 1658 166 Calvert Cliffs 1/2 2700 162 J. A. Fitzpatrick 2436 161 Maine Yankee 2630 160 St. Lucie 1 2560 141

TABLE 3 (Continued)

PLANT POWER (MWT)

POPULATION RISK FACTOR Vennont Yankee 1593 132 San Onofre 1 1347 128 Brunswick 1/2 2436 124 Nine Mile Point 1850 122 Arkansas 2 2815 113 Prarie Island 1/2 1650 109 Monticello 1670 105 Arkansas 1 2568 103 Dresden 1 700 96 Kewaunee 1650 94 North Anna 1 2775 94 Farley 1 2652 93 Point Beach 1/2 1518 79 Ft. St. Vrain 842 75 Hatch 1/2 2435 54 Yankee-Rowe 600 43 Cooper 2381 40 Crystal River 3 2452 32 Humboldt Bay 220-27 La Crosse 165 7

Big Rock Point 240 6

CP SITES Allens Creek 3579 87 Black Fox 1/2 3579 325 Pebble Springs 1/2 3600 7

Perkins 1/2/3 3800 547 j

Pilgrim 2 3456 555 Skagit 1/2 3800 167

• Assumes. equal probability of core melt accidents for each plant.

[.

SITE HYDROLOGY The Siting Policy Task Force reconnended that 10 CFR 100 be revised to require that there be reasonable assurance that interdictive measures be possible to limit groundwater contamination from Class 9 accidents within the immediate vicinity of the site. A review of each site has been made to gain some perspective on how well this recommendation could be implemented; a detailed review and engineering analysis of groundwater behavior, nuclide sorption, pathway interdiction, and other details such as contemplated under Task Action i

Plan III.D.2 would require much more study. The present evaluations are summarized below.

The Allens Creek site in Austin County, Texas, is located on a bluff west of the Brazos River. Groundwater in the site area occurs at about elevation 100 feet mean sea level (msi). The reactor building mat is five feet higher at about elevation 105 feet msl. Liquid releases from a Class 9 accident would migrate to the groundwater table and eventually into the Brazos River. The town of Wallis, which is located about four miles down-gradient, we, ~d be the first to be affected by a liquid release from a Class 9 accident. Using extremely conservative assumptions, the staff estimates that it would take about 24 years for groundwater to effect the Wallis water supply.

The Black Fox site is in northeastern Oklahoma about 22 miles east-southeast of Tulsa. Groundwater levels in the site area range from about 540 feet, mean sea level (msl), in the Verdigris River floodplain to about 555 feet msl in the terrace deposits south of the plant, and up to 560 to 575 feet msl in various units of bedrock under the plant. The gradient is about 80 feet per mile in j

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the bedrock and 15 feet per mile in the terrace deposits. Groundwater, under the plant buildings, moves in a southerly direction. The foundation elevation is planned at about 540 feet msl.

In the event of a Class 9 accident with release through the foundation, the groundwater in the station area would be affected first. The station dewatering system could intercept the spill and carry contaminated water to the waste-water holding pond. However, since the dewatering system is an active one, sump pumps could also be turned off to prevent water from being pumped to the surface. This would allow the groundwater level to rise to its natural level and, if not interdicted, flow in a southerly direction towards the Verdigris River, Inola Creek and the nearest water well. These are located 6200, 2200 and 500 feet, respectively from the reactor buildings. Using extremely conservative assumptions, the staff estimates that it would take tens of years for groundwater to migrate to any of these influent points.

I The Pebble Springssite is in a semiarid area of north-central Oregon, about 150 miles east of Portland and approximately 3 miles southeast of the Columbia River. It is on a plateau separating Alkali and Eightmile Canyons, both of which drain into the Columbia River; Alkali directly and Eightmile via Willow Creek. The groundwater and foundation are both at about 700 feet ms1.

The proposed Pebble Springs Reservoir would create a perched groundwater mound in the'imediate vicinity of the plant. A Class 9 accident could introduce radionuclides into this groundwater. The nearest point at which this ground-water can emerge is a tributary of Alkali Canyon about 1000 feet west of the plant. The estimated transit time to the tributary is about 200 days.

f.

s The Perkins site is on the right bank of the Yadkin River approximately 12 miles

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north of Salisbury, North Carolina. Liquid releases from a Class 9 accident could affect the groundwater regime. Dutchmans Creek and the Yadkin River, which are fed by groundwater, could also be affected by releases to groundwater.

The planned foundation elevation is about 600 feet msl. The groundwater table in the site area is generally a depressed reflection of the surface topography being at or near the surface in the valleys and 50-55 feet below the surface on ridges and steep hills; it is at about 665-710 feet msl under the units. 3rounawater does not move to great depths, but is directed almost laterally by nearly impermeable rocks, to discharge near the level of perential streams. Groundwa ter movement is toward the south and southwest of the plant.

In the event of a Class 9 accident with release through the foundation, the radioactive spill would enter the under-drain-dewatering system and would be removed by sump pumps to the auxiliary holding pond where it would be diluted with the volume of the pond.

The diluted radioactive liquid would then seep under the dam, which forms the pond, and would enter Dutchmans Creek and eventually the Yadkin River.

The nearest downstream water user is located about 8 miles downstream.

It would take more than 3 months for the contaminated liquid to migrate to this user.

The Pilgrim 2 site is about 38 miles southeast of Boston on the shoreline of Cape Cod Bay. Cape Cod Bay is the dominant water body in the region; no flowing streams cross plant grade. Groundwater deviation varies from 0 to 12 feet msi; the foundation elevation is minus 12 feet msl. Unconfined groundwater is present 3 the glacial till and outwash which underlies the site. The groundwater basin is relatively small, with piezometric levels generally a modified expression of surface topography. The hydraulic gradient

[

is directly away from the plant toward Cape Cod Bay. Based on a preliminary analysis of groundwater movement in the site area, liquid releases from a Class 9 accident would require about 50 days to reach Cape Cod Bay.

The Skagit site is on a hillside about 300 feet above the floodplain of the Skagit River, which is the dominant hydrologic feature of the region. Ground-water is at an elevation of about 415 feet msl, and foundation elevations vary 300 to 440 feet msl. Several small creeks cross the site. The stream closest to the reactor buildings is Wiseman Creek, which passes withir, about 2,000 feet and discharges to the Skagit River about three miles south of the site. Radioactivity entering the groundwater on the site would most likely migrate to Wiseman Creek about 2000 feet from the reactor building, but may first surface at a developed spring approxirnately 1100 feet away. The staff has estimated that the minimum travel time to the spring would be about 3 years. This analysis neglects the sorption of certain radionuclides, which should be appreciable and would lead to much longer travel times.

The conservatively estimated travel times from the release point to the first user or unconfined point varies from 50 days (Pilgrim) to more than 20 years (Allens Creek and Black Fox). Even for the shortest times, it is considered feasible to take effective interdictive and mitigative actions in case of ground water contamination from a Class 9 accident. Several methods, including pumping, pressure groutings and construction of slurry walls, are available, but the best approach for each site requires more detailed study.

A reconnaissance level survey of the sites does not reveal any flaw regarding hydrology.

i i

1

The implementation of mitigation and interdictive measures to be used need not awatt the occurrence of an accident, nor do they need to be decided before construction is initiated.

For example, a bentonite slurry wall to intercept contaminated groundwater could be constructed at any time; likewise, pumped wells to depress the water table could be drilled at any time.

OTHER SITE FACTORS The Siting Policy Task Force reconmended that selected sites have no un-favorable characteristics requiring unproven design features to compensate for site inadequacies. A survey of foundation conditions, seismic design, and meteorology indicates that the proposed sites meet this recomendation.

The survey infonnation is tabulated below:

SITE CHARACTERISTICS FOUNDATION SEISMIC METEOROLOGICAL SITE CONDITIONS DESIGN DISPERSION NOTATIONS Allens Creek Soil 0.10g Fair to good near urban center Black Fox Rock 0.13g Fair to good high-tornado frequency Pebble Springs Soil 0.20g Poor to fair desert climate Perkins Rock 0.15g Poor to fair low wind speeds Pilgrim Soil 0.20g Good coastal zone Skagit Rock 0.35g*

Poor to fair recirculation potentia ~

• This is estimated, but has not been resolved

r l

SUMMARY

AND PECOMMENDATION When compared to the Siting Policy Task Force recommendations, as modified by the Commission and ACRS comments, the sites conform to the recommendations. Some sites are better than others in the sense that they have characteristics that are more favorable than the recommendations, but all the sites should be acceptable when compared to criteria likely to envolve from the rulemaking proceedings.

Based on the review conducted thus far, it is recommended that the Commission instruct the Atomic Safety and Licensing Boards having jurisdiction in these cases that they should not impose additional siting considerations, beyond those of the present regulations, the proposed rule on siting, and the new rule on emergency planning in determining whether a construction permit should be issued It is also recommended that the rulemaking proceedings proceed expeditiously so that any presently unforeseen factors which could render any of the sites unacceptable are identified at the earliest possible time.

j

F

.S ACTION:

Denton

" [**k D

UNITED STATES Cys: DirCks L

Cornell 8

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION n

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I WASHINGTON,0.C. 20555 f

Minogue n'%, *****/

Mr Grill l

June i 1980 Besaw l

Felton OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY Wagman Shapar NMS3 l

MEMORANDUM FOR:

William J. Dircks, Acting R

l Executive Director for 0p rations 3{ae lo FROM:

Samuel J. Chilk, Secreta P de

SUBJECT:

SECY-80-153 - ALVANCE NOTMEi 0F PROPOSED RULEMAKING ON REACTOR SITING (CONSENVCALENDARITEM)

In association with the advance notice of proposed rulemaking on reactor siting, and in recognition of the action of the Congress in the FY 80 Authorization Conference, it is necessary for the NRC to develop a transition policy to move from the old to the new siting criteria and a method of focusing on existing sites. Therefore, the staff is requested to do the following:W(

h t ' ' gh (1)(a) For plants with applications for CP filed before October 1, j

1979, but that do not have an LWA or a CP or for LWA plants with little construction co.npleted, the staff is directed to determine for the purpose of this transitionary effort which of these would not be expected to meet the recommendations of the

iting Polic.y Task Force, NUREG-0625, as modified by OPE and ACRS comments as discussed with the Commission. This comparison, together with the other aspects of the safety evaluation, will be j;/

used to determine if any additional measures in plant design or

(

i-operation should be recommended.

(b) The staff discussion of siting matters should be placed in the s staff Safety Evaluation Report or should be in the form of an NY' e

addendum to the SER.

Tha Commission will then review these matters when the LWA or CP cases reach us.

(2)(a) For plants with CP applications filed before October 1,1979 and:

1.

with an OL, or; ii.

without c.n OL but with a CP, or; 4

7

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iii.

without a CP but with an LWA and more than a little

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construction completed; the staff is requested to continue to develop a priority list of those plants in the highest population areas for additional safety evaluation.

As the proposed siting criteria are developed, the staff should determine how far to extend the list based on those plants which might fail some significant aspect of the new criteria.

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(b) Following ;ompletion of those analyses currently underway, i.e.,

gh Indian Point, Zion, etc., the staff should continue safety reviews i) for the next plants on the list and recommend what if any additional measures are indicated.

(c) These staff reviews should be in the form of SECY papers that are presented first to the ACRS and then, after appropriate revision, to the Commission.

Based on the early reviews,

[

the Commission may either truncate or require extension of the

'g original candidate list.

cc:

Chairman Ahearne Commissioner Gilinsky Commissioner Kennedy Commissioner Hendrie Commissioner Bradford Commission Staff Offices