ML19340A566

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
IE Insp Repts 50-010/77-23,50-237/77-21 & 50-249/77-21 on 770811,12,15,16 & 23-26.Noncompliance Noted:Failure to Follow Procedures & Test Equipment Upon Completion of Maint
ML19340A566
Person / Time
Site: Dresden  Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 09/02/1977
From: Fiorelli G, Knop R, Shafer W
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML19340A564 List:
References
50-010-77-23, 50-10-77-23, 50-237-77-21, 50-249-77-21, NUDOCS 8008270822
Download: ML19340A566 (5)


See also: IR 05000010/1977023

Text

..

. - . .

. - . .

. - .- . .

.. -- - - -

-. -

- ~. . - . . - -

- -~ - . ,

.

.

~-

. . - . . . . . . . , . - - -

1 -

'Di

'

.

~

.

i

..

('

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

-

J

REGION III

Report No. 50-010/77-23; 50-237/77-21; 50-249/77-21

i

l

Docket Na.50-010, 50-237, 50-249

License No. DPR-02, 19, 25

'

Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company

Post Office Box 767

Chicago, IL 60690

.

Facility Name: Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 1, 2, and 3

Inspection at: Dresden Site, Morris, IL

Inspection conducted: August 11, 12, 15, 16, and 23-26, 1977

[MD 6-

M

p

_y - ! ~ ) m __

,

j

Inspectors:

W. D. Sha'fer

-/

$C"

2

Y- /"I [

-

R. C. Knop

'

v{ c I k

?-/ _.77

'

Approved by:

Caston Fiorel , Chief

Reactor Operations and

Nuclear Support Branch

4

]

Inspection Summary

,

Inspection on August 11, 12, 15, 16, and 23-26, 1977 (Report No.

1

50-010/77-23; 50-237/77-21; 50-249/77-21)

1i

Areas Inspected: - Routine, unannoun.:ed inspection of plant maintenance

on Units 1, 2, and 3;. licensee event reports for Unit 2 and 3; quality

control department review functions; and a tour of plant areas.

In

. addition,' an announced security meeting was attended by the inspector

on August 23-26, 1977. The inspection involved 72 inspector-hours

onsite by two NRC inspectors.

Results: Of the four areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or

deviations were found in three areas; two apparent items of noncom-

pliance were found in one area (Infraction - failure to' follow proce-

,

i

dures; Infraction - failure.to test equipment upon completion of

maintenance - Paragraph 3) .

.

-- -

.

.

2

,8008270

.

,

t

.

.

~~

.

.-. .

.

-

. .

- .

. . . ~ - - - . - . . . - . -

- - - . - - ~ - . - - . .

-,,_

k.

.

4

-

.

'

DETAILS

_

l.

Persons Contacted

  • B. Stephensan Station Superintendent
  • B.

Shelton, Administrative Assistant

  • C.

Sargent, Technical Staf f Supervisor

  • J. Eenigenburg, Dresden Maintenance Engineer
  • G.

Abrell, QA - General Of fice

  • R. Kyrouac, Quality Control Engince"
  • J.

Reardanz, Quality Assurance

  • R.

Rowland, Quality Assurance

  • J.

Bell, Dresden Maintenance

  • D.

Schildgen, Quality Assurance

  • J.

Plese, Storekeeper

The inspector also talked and interviewed with other licensee

employees, including members of the technical and engineering

staff, and reactor operator personnel.

  • denotes those attending the exit interview.

2.

Licensees ( ality Contr?1 Review

While reviewing the Quality Control Department's esults of routine

investigations, the inspector noted that the licensee had identified

and corrected two items with respect to Technical Specifications.

The inspector noted that many of the problems identified by the

-

Quality Control Department are primarily related to the storeroom

and the handling of safety related equipment. Resolution of these

storeroon problems is being accomplished, however, the inspector

noted that the 1.ength of time taken for final resolution is

exceedingly long. The problem of prompt response by the scoreroom

to Quality Control concerns will be followed further durin'g normal

routine inspections.

Upon completion of reviewing the Quality Control Department's

deficiency reports relating to the storeroom, the inspector

toured the warehouse storeroom and found that several safety

related components (a target rock safety relief valve and a

control rod blade), were receiving inadequate storage with

respect to proper wrapping, desiccant and covers.

In discussing

.

-2-

i

p,

.

-.

_ _ _

___m._-

.. _.

___

_

_ - - _ _ . . _.

..

t

'

.

.

J

,.

!

,

~

..

.

,

i ~

this concern at the exit interview, the inspector noted that the

inadequate storage' of this safety related components would normally

,

,

be an item of noncompliance, however a previous inspector report

l

(50-237/77-18; 50-249/77-18); the licensee received an item of

noncompliance with respect to receipt storage and handling of

{

safety related items. The licensce's response to this noncompliance

J

is not due until late August, 1977, therefore these findings were

i

forwarded to management as additional examples of the previously

identified noncompliance.

1

!

3.

Review of Plant Maintenance (Units 1, 2, and 3)

!

l

The inspector reviewed 50-safety related work requests and approx-

'

imately 200 non-safety related work requests to verify that,

j

safet" related work was being properly identified, approved pro-

!

cedures were being used where applicable, maintenance activities

!

vere being properly inspected, functional testing and calibration

prior to returning components or systems to an operating status

was being accomplished, quality control records were adequate,

pctsonnel assigned maintenance work were properly qualified, and

that all safety related maintenance work requiring reporting to

q

!

the NRC was reported as identified in the Technical Specifications.

The following concerns were identified:

-

-

j

Work request 5500, Solenoid Valve Replacement for CRD H-9, required

-

the issuance of a safety related solenoid valve from the storeroom.

'[

The solenoid . valve that was issued from the storeroom was later

identified as non-safety related by the Quality Control Department.

The resolution of this problem appeared to be the "Grandfathering

!

In" of this suspect solenoid valve in order to justify its use

in a safety related system. However, the inspector determined

that the licensee failed to follow their quality control proce-

dures (QP 15-52) with respect to nonconforming materials. The

"grandfathering in" of equipment used in safety related systems

is an acceptable practice, however, a proper engineering review

must be conducted to make this determination. Quality procedure

15.52 would have provided this review. .This example of noncom-

pliance wat discussed at the exit interview.

i

While reviewing several work requests relating to testing cf

safety valves, the inspector noted that the instruments used

{

to set these safety valves are not always properly calibrated.

l'

In discussions with licensee representatives, the inspector

,

i.

determined that the calibration of these instrun.ents is generally

accomplished prior to testing of any safety valves. However,

l

.

4

-3-

f?

.

, . - . -

.

-

-_. . - -

-_,

.

-

.

. . .

,

-

-

- - -

- - . . . _ - - _ .

.

. - - -

,

f

,

A

.

.

.

-

.

,

.

,

while reviewing a work rcquest accomplished in February, 1977,

_

and relating to safety valve testing, the inspector noted that

instruments used for setting the safety valve setpoints were

calibrated in Sepr. ember, 1976, and in January of 19.75.

Much confusion appeared to exist between departments as to which

department was responsible to assure proper calibration.

In

reviewing the licensee's procedures, the inspector determined that

QP 12-52, Control of Measuring and Test- Equipment for Operations -

Station Instrumentation, requires the instrument engineer to control

the calibration of this instrumentation. Failure to follow this

procedure was discussed at the exit interview.

In reviewing several non-safety related work requests, the inspector

found that the licensee treats the repacking and/or tightening of

packing on containment isolation system valves as non-safety

related. The inspector informed the licensee that any work per-

formed on a safety related component must be followed by a test

of that component if the work performed in any way affects that

components operability. In this case, containment isolation

system valves require timing and testing prior to returning to oper-

ation. This item of noncompliance was discussed at the exit inter-

'

view.

,

In general, it appears that the maintenance department is doing a

good job on most safety related work requests. The above described

concerns appear primarily as a result of inadequate management

contr

A.

No further concerns were identified.

.

4.

Review of Licensee Event Reports (Units 2 & 3)

Through direct observation, discussions with licensee personnel,

and a review of the records, the following licensee event reports

were reviewed to determine that reporting requirements were ful-

filled, immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective

action to prevent reoccurrence has been accomplished by the Tech-

nical Specifications.

Unit 2

Report No. 77 21, LPCI Valve 2-1501-3A failed to open.

Report No. 77 .10, LPCI Heat Exchanger Leak.

.

l

-4-

l

l

.. .

'

L_

.

.

. , .

.'

'

-

.

.

(

Unit 3

Report No. 77-25, 26, 27, Failure of Relief Valve Pilot Stems after

-

Maintenance.

Report No. 77-28, Low level in diesel generator day tank.

Report No. 77-29 Failure of Unit 3 diesel generator cooling water

pump.

5.

Plant Tour

The inspectors walked through various areas of the plant to observe

operations and activities in progress, to inspect the general state

of cleanliness, housekeeping and adherence to fire protection rules.

The inspectors noted that housekeeping in general, apper. red ade-

quate, however, the Unit 2 reactor building was in signi.ficant

need of housekeeping attention. The inspectors also noted that

raterial to be used in the forthcoming refueling outage was

scattered throughout the building with no apparent attempt for

control. This was discussed at the exit interview.

During the plant tour the inspectors noted that a hole had been

cut through the concrete wall from the outside of the turbine

building. The location of rebar in the opening appeared to pre-

vent unauthorized access by persons outside the turbine building,

_

however, the licensee was cautioned to secure the penetration in

order to prevent unauthorized access.

No items of noncompliance or deslatiens were identified.

6.

Security Meeting

On August 23-26, 1977, the inspector attended a safe;,uards meeting

at the Dresden site.

Information discussed at this meeting is

exempt from public disclosure as provided by 10 CFR 2.790(d).

7.

Exit Interview

The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in para-

graph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on August 16, 1977.

The inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection.

The licensee representatives made the following remark in response

to certain items discussed by the inspector.

Acknowledge the statement by the inspector with respect to the

items of noncompliance (Paragraph 3).

.

-5-

.