ML19340A327
| ML19340A327 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse, Perry  |
| Issue date: | 11/05/1976 |
| From: | Goodhope A, Head D, Lazo R Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| To: | |
| References | |
| ALAB-332, NUDOCS 8003060983 | |
| Download: ML19340A327 (25) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:. __ ) ' ' + ' " ~ b ~ ) $Oq -C -4 ~~ c*'$-{$\\ b UNITED STATES OF AMERICA g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION g N T BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING SPECIAL BOA Robert M. Lazo, Chairman Andrew C. Goodhope Daniel M. Head In the Matter of ) Docket 50-346A THE TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY and THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING COMPANY ) 50-500A ) 50-501A (Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Units 1, 2 and 3) Docket 50-440A THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING 50-441A COMPANY, et al. ) (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2) DECISION OF SPECIAL BOARD ESTABLISHED FOR 10 C.F.R.62.713 PROCEEDING November 5, 1976 Opinion of the Board by Mr. Goodhope and Mr. Lazo: This Special Atomic Safety and Licensing Board was constituted to rule upon a motion to disqualify a law firm from representing a party in a proceeding before a Commission Licensing Board because of its prior representation of another party tc that proceeding in allegedly related matters. il?, 1 08060 n
. The underlying proceeding involves antitrust issues arising under Section 10Sc of the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. 92135(c). The City of Cleveland (" City"), a party adverse to the Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company ("CEI") moved pursuant to the provisions of Section 2.713 of the Commission's Rules of Practice (10 C.F.R. 62.713)1! o t disqualify the Cleveland law firm of Squire, Sanders, & Dempsey ("SS&D"), along with its Washington affiliate, from acting as attorneys for CEI or any other applicant in this proceeding. The grounds were that SS&D had represented the City for many years as bond counsel, sometimes in matters 1/ In pertinent part, 10 C.F.R. 92.713 provides: (b) Standards of conduct. An attorney shall conform to the standards of conduct required in the courts of the United States. (c) Suspension of attorneys. A presiding officer may, by order, suspend or bar any person from participation as an attorney in a proceeding if the presiding officer finds that such' person: (2) Has failed to conform to the standards of conduct required in the courts of the United States; Any such order shall state the grounds on which it is based. Before any person is suspended or barred from participation as an attorney in a proceeding, charges shall be preferred by the presiding officer against such person and he shall be afforded an opportunity to be heard thereon before another presiding. officer. l 1
, affecting the City's Municipal Electric Light I; ant ("MELP") which is a competitior of.CEI; that the firm had also represented CEI on past occasions and in this proceeding and, in so doing, advanced interests adverse to the interests of MELP; that SSkD never made full disclosure to the City of the conflicts of interest inherent in its representation of CEI i in matters adverse to MELP; and that the City never consented to SS&D's representation of CEI in such matters. The City also argued that a partner in SS&D, had been an important official of the City's Law Department before coming to SS&D and, in that capacity, might have obtained information which would be useful to CEI in the present antitrust proceeding or 4 had responsibility for matters substantially related to this proceeding. The City therefore argued that the representation of CEI by SS&D in the antitrust proceeding is in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and should be proscribed. SS&D took the position that there is no substantial relation-ship between the matters handled by SS&D as bond counsel for the. City and its representation of CEI in the antitrust proceeding before the Commission. It also raised the defense that'the. City had consented to the dual representation and had therefore waived its-right to object to it. s ..r__,
f . This matter h as been before two previous Atomic Safety and Licensing Boards 1 and the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board. On June 11, 1976, the Appeal Board remanded this matter for further hearings consistent with the lppeal Board decision !and this Special Board was established. Thereafter a-prehearing conference was held and discovery was commenced in preparation for a hearing as ordered by the Appeal. Board. ~ On August 26, 1976 counsel for SS&D filed a motion to dismiss the disqualification proceeding before this Special Board on the grounds that the same disqualification issue had been decided by the United States District' Court for the Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division.and that the doctrine of collateral estoppel precluded this 3 card from relitigation of the issue. The plaintiff in the District Court case was the City of Cleveland and the defendants Tere CEI and four other utility companies, who had together f ;rr.e G -the Central Area Power Coordinating Group. On December--15, 1975 the City of Cleveland filed it. motion in the District Court to disqualify SSSD. Icgal ecunsel L or defendent CEI. This motion charged a conflict *cf int?ces: ~ f 2,/ The Toledo Edison Company and The Cleveland Elec tric Illuminating Company (Davis Besse Nuclear Power Statior Units 1, 2-& 3), ALAB-332, NRCI-76/6, 785-803 (June 11, 107 0 =, W g kt --e-T- y y +' 'N-f*eT
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-s , arising as a result of earlier legal retainers between SS&D and the City and sought to foreclose SS&D from further participation in the District Court antitrust proceedings. On August 3, 1976, after a three-day evidentiary hearing the District Court issued a comprehensive Order denying the motion of the City of Cleveland. This decision has been appealed to Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, but has been suspended pending settlement negotiations by the parties of the underlying antitrust case. Since the District Court found that there was no conflict of interest in the dual representation by SS&D of the City of Cleveland and its long-time client CEI in the District Court proceeding, that determination is dispositive of the disquali-fication proceeding at hand, provided the issues before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's antitrust Board are the same as those before the District Court in its antitrust proceeding. A study of the complaint in District Court proceeding (see attachment to Motion of Squire, Sanders & Dempsey to Quash or Modify pursuant to CFR Section 2.720 or for a Protective Order Pursuant to CFR Section 2.740) and the statement of issues before the Commission's antitrust Board (Prehearing Conference Order No. 2, dated July 25, 1974), establishes that t'.. untitrust proceedings before the District Court are l' i
T , in all essential elements identical to the proceedings before the Commission's antitrust Board. (See also attachment to the Motion of Squire, Sanders and Dempsey to stay temporarily Further Discovery for a copy of the District Judge's Order and opinion p. 30-31). Since the antitrust issues before the District Court and the issues before the Commission's antitrust Soard ace essentially identical, it is clear that the District Court reviewed the conduct of SS&D in its role as counsel for the City and for CEI in the same context that this Boart has been called upon to examine the same conduct; namely me ther SS&D acquired any information or knowledge as counsel for the City in its municipal bond work which could be in conflict ' with SS&D's present representation of C2I in the antitrust proceeding before the Commission.3/ -ter 3/~ The Appeal Board in its decision remanding thic ( ALAB 332, p. 24) specifically adopted the decisicn in T.C. Theatre Corp v. Warner Bros. pictures 110 ? Supp 265 (S.D. N.Y. 1953) as controlling this matter. I? a decision held that it was only necessary that a substantial relationship between the previous representation and the subsequent one be shown to establish a conflict of iniarest requiring. disqualification. The Appeal Board rejectr_ the proposition that evidence of injury or specific cc:_:.dences n Oc -10 Occe being breached was necessary to find a violar' of Professional Responsibility, Cancns 4, 5c 9, tls o rejected was an argument that disclosure of a reccficencial information could be permitted by the Canons. (ALA3 330 p. 25)
s 7-The District Court specifically found that there was no substantial relationship between SS&D's municipal Bond work for the City and the antitrust suit pending before it. (See appendix to Motion of Squire, Sanders and Dempsey to Stay Temporarily Further discovery for the District Court's opinion). At page 32 of its opinion the Court stated: i "The Court necessarily con'ludes that the City has failed i to meet its burden of proving a substantial relationship l ~ between the instant representations." l Contrary to the position espoused by the Appeal Board the District Court appears to reject the proposition that the disclosure of confidential information to one attorney in a law firm presumes disclosure to all attorneys in the l firm. The Court st ated that modern legal practice makes l this rule too harsh and that this. presumption should be rebuttable. This is merely dicta since the court had already found no substantial relationship, and further found that in fact no confidential information was obtained by SS&D as a result of the municipal bond work for the City. l l-
li: _8-In addition the Court found that the City was astoppr:: to assert'a conflict of interest and had even waived any such rignt as a result of seeking.the aid of SS&D as 5:.. counsel _with the fall knowledge that SS&D had represented CEI. continuously for many years. The. majority of this Board concludes that the a c c t:c _ne of collateral estoppel forbids the retrial bef:ra Ocari of the issues decided by the District Court in ita dismissal of the City's motion.to disqualify SS&D. The applicable principles for the applic:;; ; ' doctrine are fourfold: 1. that there was pre'rious it.;r^.- tion between1the parties or their: privies; 2. i n ?. - :r-,: competent jurisdiction; 3. which resulted i n 9.
- 4 m' 1-ment; 4. of the particular issues involved in the =~ ns : --
litigation. l At the outset the question arises as to "$n. - judicial ~ determination should operate as a ecliatar. estoppell in an administrative agency proceeding. Tt' majority conclude that it should. apply to the spert'_ issue 'before this Board. li' I l A ,a ,e.,-,
9 The broad doctrine of res judicata has been held to be applicable to an administrative agency proceeding.d! Kenneth Culp Davis in'$18.11 of his Administrative Law Treatise (1958) states: " Ordinarily a court decision will be res judicata in a later administrative proceeding _.1 the same circumstances in which it would be binding in a later judical proceeding." As pointed out by the Staff attorney 7.t oral argument, Mr. Davis also discusses a substantial number of exceptions to this rule. None of these exceptions i appear applicable to this quite narrow proceeding. The cases { generally hold that rec judicata or collateral estoppel do not apply to administrative proceedings where their applica-tion would frustrate the regulatory function as prescribed by the agencies' congressional mandate. These doctrines, for example, should not_be applied so as to interfere with the Commission's function of providing appropriate safeguards for the public health and safety as regards nuclear reactors. f The issue before this Board does not present such a situation 4/ Ree judicata is the broad principle applicable to an entire cause of action, while collateral estoppel bars the reliti-4 gation of the same issues or f acts. Carr v. U.S. 507 f2D'191 (5th Cir. 1975) p. 1259, FN1, Mas trachio v. Ricci 498 F 2d'1257 (1st Cir. 1974) p. 1259 FN1.
(. 6 n u c' u and the adjudication by the District Court is. binding u;':r. --the Board. The argument by the' City and.the_ Staff t.:at 1._;.;;.t; n ~ . before the District Court did not involve the sa;m parties. or-their privies is. rejected. The argument.'is thar ct:aer ' the Staff attorneys nor the Departnent of Justics 3.;: r'r.nys appeared in the District Court. ass and censa p n: -
- 1;c a they are both parties = to the. Commission's anti:r's: -pr^.c4 ad-ing, there was not an-identity of parties in tae : o
---'c c e e d-ings. The Staff attorne -asserts that the P ;..- to participate in any decision as to the qualu ;ca disqualif'. cation of attorneys to practice 2eJ0ra .x m. ar Regulatory Commission since they a: e :cund t o a e: u. -the Commission *s' Rules 'are_ereceri.. in:ar.ere; d . :u.. - so as to protect the public in:2r237. Ecria/5c, :- parties in interes: to this disqnclificaricr ;rr -... c.. .r
- i the. City and SS&D as was true in tha Eiscr.c C c u.c" Board is--at a loss in finding tha; either th.e Staf
. Department of Justice has any interest.in "hc r?;r t-T~ - in thef antitrust proceeding, 'other than thi; :. 7 - withithe Commission's rules of practice in :hei/ 't-tion'of=their client. D**]D *]D W Vg .c o lu - aN l j L
. Staff counsel, however, also urges that this Board adopt some'of the lindings of the District Court, grant the motion of SS&D to dismiss the disqualification proceed-ings and enter a decision and order' consonant with the opinion of-the Appeal Board. Staff counsel requests that this be done on some vague theory of comity between the Commission and the District Court, but that the Board decision not be a final decision until the appeal to the Sixth Circuit-Court of Appeals is decided, or else without prejudice to the City of Cleveland to move to reopen this proceeding in the event of a reversal of the District Court decision The Board rejects this approach. The decision of this Board-to grant the motion to dismiss is based primarily on the District Court finding that there was no substantial relationship between SS&D's prior bond work for the City and its present representation of CEI. The District Court also found the City estopped to make the conflict of interest charge and that the City had waived any objection' to SS&D's present. representation of CEI. These are the bases for this Board's application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel in.this instance. The Court's findings that there in fact had been no passing of confidential information by i i l
. the City to SS&D and that no information was exchanged among the members of SS&D or that the presumption that such was true should be rebuttable, was merely incidental .to that decision once the direct findi gs of estoppel, waiver, and lack of substantial relationship had been made. This is in harmony with the Appeal Board's remand decision (ALAB 332). Not to grant SS&D's motion at this time and enthr a final order based upon the doctrine of collateral estoppel would be to ignore the numerous cases cited below holding that the District Court decision is a final decision. It is also urged that since the remedy sought by the City before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is not identical to the remedy sought in the District Court proceeding, that the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not apply. This argument is rejected. It is true that the City is seeking appropriate conditions in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission license to CEI which would eliminate any situation'which might be found to be inconsistent with the antitrust laws, waile in the District Court it is seeking treble damages as well as injunctive relief as a result of any finding of violation of the Sherman Act. Nevertheless, the information needed in both proceedings is substantially identical and-does not change the basic issue as to whether there was any substantial relationship between the prior employment of SSkD by the City and its present representation of CEI in either the District Court or before the Commission. As to the seco..u.lement necessary for the application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel there is no dispute that the District Court was a court of competent jurisdiction to decide the issue before it. Nor is there any question as to whether the decision of the District Court was a final judgment. The cases are uniformly clear that a decision of the type here involved is a final judgment even though an appeal to a higher court is pending. 1 B Moore's Federal Practice 90.416(3) and cases cited therein. Nor can there be any serious argument whether the decision of the District Court determined the issue as to whether SS&D could continue to represent CEI in that court. This is the identical issue before this Board in this proceeding. i i
=_ _ CONCLUSION The doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes relitiga-tion before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission of issues determined in the disqualification proceeding held in the Jnited States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. The findings of the District Court are binding upon the parties in all subsequent litigations, including the Nu: lear Regulatory Commission proceeding. Analysis of the District Court s determinations discloses
- n u r ;e.1 proceeding at hand have been rejected by the Distric Court.
some of them on multiple grounds. The standard of conduct-required.of counsel before the Nuclear Regulatory Commissic: 4 is identical to the standard required by the courts of the United States, and in the light of the District Court :s findings, there can be no disqualifica' ion of SSLD in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission proceeding. According:y, 331D is. entitled to_a dismissal of the disqualification charges filed against it as a matter of law. l
. WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, in accordance with the Atomic Energy Act, as amended, and the Rules of Prm.tice of the Commission, particularly Section 2.713 (10 C.F.R.), the Motion to Dismiss filed by Squi.re, Sanders & Dempsey is hereby granted and the disqualification proceeding pending before this Special Board is dismissed. This disqualification matter is returned to the antitrust b! or entry of an appropriate order denying the Motion Board f filed on November 20, 1975 by the City of Cleveland to disqualify the law firm of Squire, Sanders & Dempsey together with its Washington affiliate, Cox, Langford and Brown. (The dissenting opinion of Mr. Head is attached) THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD ESTABLISHED FOR A SPECIAL PROCEEDING CONCERNING 10 C. .R.62.713 ./x Andrew C. Goodhope, Memdbr YW s RobeYt M. Lazo. Chalfgph Issued at Bethesda, Maryland this 5th day of November, 1976. 5/In its decision of June 11, 1976, the Appeal Board held that af ter the Special Board rendered a decision disposing of the disqualification matter in its entirety, the antitrust Board's function thereaf ter is limited to carryling out the ministerial duty of promptly entering an order giving effect to the Special Board's decision. ALAB-332, NRCl-76/6, 794 (June 11, 1976) 4
DISSENTING OPINION The subject of this special proceeding is whether the law firm of Squires, Sanders and Dempsey (SS&D) should be disqualified from participation as counsel for the appli-cants in the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission-(Commission) antitrust proceeding involving the Davis-Bessie and Perry nuclear facilities. The background of this action is well set out in the majority opinion, and need not ha repeated here. Basically, despite the intricate factual circumstances involved in the court and administrative litigation, the present issue before this Board is a clearly defined one. SS&D has moved that the disqualification proceeding be dismissed on that basis of the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Their ground is that the issue of disqualification has been decided by the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio by Order issued August 3, 1976. The-briefs filed by the parties on this issue and the majority opinion adequately discuss and analyze the law relating to the doctrine of collateral estoppel, rendering it unnecessary to set out a lengthy dissertation on the doctrine in this opinion. It is sufficient to say that the doctrine does apply to administrative prcceedings, United States v. Utah Construction & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394,
4 421-22 (1966),1#and that collat'ral estoppel has been o recognized as applicable in Commission proceedings, Alabama Power Company (Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2). CL1-74-12, 7 AEC 203 (March 27, 1974). Collateral estoppel does require that' certain unities be present for it to be effective. There must be an identity of parties and an identity of issues, and the first decision must be a final one by a tribunal of competent jurisdiction. In the instant cause, a strong case can be presented that the doctrine of collateral estoppel should be applied. It is, however, an area of law which is suscep-tible to a wide variety of interpretations ~and a numerous amount of exceptions. In my opinion, a different result than that arrived at by the majority is warranted. 1/The Supreme Court in United States v. Utah Construction & Mining Co., discusses the doctrine in terms of res judicata. The distinction between res judicata and collateral estoppel is that in res judicata.the cause of action is the same in the two proceedings, whereas in collateral estoppel the cause of action in the two suits is different but the particular issue in controversy sought to be barred is the same. Commission v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 501, 597-98 (1948). This distinction is not ' of significance for the purposes of deciding the present motion. 0 .y, e mp
% Professor Davis in his Administrative Law Treatise (1968) mentions in Section 18.12 that the doctrine of collateral estoppel is fully applicable to some administrative proceed-ings, partially applicable to some, and not at all applicable to others. He notes that the doctrine may be relaxed or qualified in any desired degree without destroying its essential service. The reasons for relaxing the doctrine include the public interest aspects of avoiding undesirable policy in some concrete contexts. Similarly, the Commission in Alabama Power Co., (Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), supra, p. 203, held that collateral estoppel should be applied with a sensitive regard for the possible existence of some special public interest factor in a particular case. In my view, the present disqualification proceeding and its subject matter is a case where a particular public interest factor requirer that this Board not apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel. My analysis is that the responsibility and authority of the licensing boards of the Commission to control their proceedings to ensure uniformity and regularity therein necessitates that there be an independent decision on whether a particular [
_ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. attorney is qualified to practice before the licensing boards. To foreclose an independent decision by the operation of a legal doctrine would appear to run counter to public policy and constitutes an unwarranted intrusion into the ability of the Commission to control its internal proceedings. The power to disqualify an attorney from an NRC proceeding is a power unique to the Commission and it should not be relinquished to a foreign tribunal. While the decisions of the U.S. District Courts are entitled to great respect by.the Commission, certain inherent powers cannot be abridged by Court actions. I would, therefore, deny the motion on the basis that the public interest considerations vitiate against use of the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Also, a persuasive practical argument underlies my concept of the public policy consideration in this matter. Had the decision in the U.S. District Court in Ohio been opposite, it would be difficult to justify an automatic disqualification of SS&D before the Commission because of the serious ramifications to SS&D's professional reputation. Under these circumstances, it seems inequitable to apply collateral estoppel because the result in the District Court j l 1
. in Ohio was favorable to SS&D. Further, as an alternate reason for denying the motion, I consider that a. valid argument can be made that there is not a true identity of issues between the matter before the District Court and the matter before this Special Licensing Board. This, admittedly, is a matter upon which reasonable men can disagree. While no doubt there is substantial identity in the factual pattern that gives rise to both disqualification matters, the ultimate issue before the District Court is different from the ultimate issue before this Board. In the court litigation, the issue was whether SSkD should be disqualified from participation in that action before the District Court. In our case, the issue is whether SS&D should be disqualified from participa-tion in the NRC antitrust licensing proceeding. While this - particular position is technical, it buttresses use of the public policy exception to the collateral estoppel doctrine under the circumstances of this case. Accordingly, I must dissent from the resolution of the SS&D motion made by the majority. In my view, the motion to
i f dismiss the disqualification proceeding should be denied and we should proceed to an evidentiary hearing on disquali-fication as required by the Appeal Board in.its decision on remand, ALAB-332, NRCI 76/6, 785 (June 11, 1976). l Daniel M. Head, Member j Atomic Safety and Licensing Special Board i I i l l 4 l 4 i. / l l ,. 1
t l-i UNITED STATES OF A ERICA . NUCl. EAR REGULATORY COM'-11SSIO" in the Matter of ) ) Tile TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY, ET AL.) Docket No.(s) 50-346A CLEVEIA:~D ELECTRIC ILLt :I :ATING ) ' 50-440A COMPANY ) 50-441A ) 50-500A (Davis-Besse Nucicar Power ) 50-501A -Station, Unit No. 1; Perry ) Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1&2)) 'CERTTFTCATE OF SER'?TCE I hereby certify that I have this day served the foregoing document (c) upon each p'crson designated on_the official service *11st compiled by the Of fice of the Secretary of the Cosmaission in this proceeding in accordance uith the requirements of Section 2.712 of 10.CPR Part 2-Rules of Practice,-of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Rules and -Regulations. i Dated at; Washington, D.C. this day of v 197 h. K )d li h. ~, Ol b W 0h Officc/of the Secretary of the Commigsion 4 r.* D"*D ~*D ~T .S.. I oo o .::2 O O F s
i, 's - g-UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY' COFD1ISSION In the Matter of ) } TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY, ET AL. ) Docket Nos. 50-346A -(Davis-Besse, Units 1,'2 and 3)) 50-440A .) 50-441A i-CLEVEIAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING). 50-500t. CO., ET AL.. ) 50-501A (Perry, Units 1 and 2) ) ) SERVICE LIST. Robert M. Lazo,-Esq., Chairman Donald H.Hauser, Esq. Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Victor F. Greenslade, Jr., Esq. U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Cleveland Electric Illuminating Washington, D. C. 20555-Company P.10. Box 5000 Cleveland, Ohio 44101 Andrew C. Goodhope, Esq. 3320 Estelle Terrace Joseph J. Saunders,- Esq., Chief-Wheaton, Maryland 20906 Public Counsel and Legislative Section i Daniel' M. Head, Esq. Antitrust Division Atomic Safety and' Licensing. Board U..S. Department of Justice-U.:S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20530 WashinIton, D. C. 20555 1 Gerald Charnoff, Esq. Joseph Rutberg, Esq. Shaw, ~ Pittman,- Potts, Trowbridge-Antitrust-Counsel and Madden ) Counsel for NRC Staff-910 - 17th Street,.N. W. j i U.'S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20006 Washington, D. C. -20555 Lee C. Howley, Esq., Vice. President j Chief and General Counsel Office of Antitrust'& Indemnity = Cleveland-Electric Illuminating Office 'of-Nuclear Reactor Commission. Company Washington, ~ D. C. 20555 P.13. Box 5000 Cleveland, Ohio 44101 Benjamin. H. Vogler, Esq. Roy.P. Lessy, Jr., Esq. David C. Hjelmfelt,' Esq. Antitruat Counsel Michael 01dak, Esq. Counsel. for NRC Staff 1700 Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W. 'U.'S.' Nuclear, Regulatory. Commission . Washington, D.' C. 20006 LWashington, D. C. 20555 L f .l l -o .2.-. ..,.... ~ _.,--..,a.
50-346A, -440A ~ 41A, et al. Page 2 Reuben Goldberg, Esq. Leslie Henry, Esq. Arnold Fieldman, Esq. W. Snyder, Esq. j 1700 Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W. Fuller, Henry, Hodge & Snyder Washington, D. C. 20006 300 Madison Avenue Toledo, Ohio 43604-Steven M. Charno, Esq. Melvin G. Berger, Esq. Mr. George B. Crosby Antitrust Division Director of Utilities U. S. Department of Justice Piqua, Ohio 45350 Washington, D. C. 20530 William M. Lewis, Jr. Honorable Thomas E. Kauper W.M. Lewis & Associates Assistant Attorney General P. O. Box 1383 4 Antitrust Division Portsmouth, Ohio 45662 U. S. Department of Justice Washington, D. C. 20530 Robert D. Hart, Esq. First Assistant Law Director Mr. John C. Engle, President 213 City Hall AMP-0, Inc. Cleveland, Ohio 44114 Municipal Building 20 High Street Anthony G. Aiuvalasit, Jr., Esq. Hamilton, Ohio 45012 Antitrust Division Department of Justice Honorable Richard M. Firestone P. O. Box 7513 Honorable Edward A. Matto Washington, D. C. 20044 j Assistant Attorneys General Antitrust Section Susan B. Cyphert, Esq. r 30 East Broad Street, 15th F1. Antitrust Division Columbus, Ohio 43215 Department of Justice 2140 East Ninth Street Honorable William J. Brown Cleveland, Ohio 44199 Attorney General State of Ohio David M. Olds, Esq. Columbus, Ohio 43215 William S. Lerach, Esq. Reed, Smith, Shaw and McClay Honorable Deborah P. Highsmith P. O. Box 2009 Assistant. Attorney General Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15230 Antitrust Section 30 East Broad Street, 15th F1. Thomas A. Kayuha, Esq. Columbus, Ohio 43215 47 North Main Street Akron,' Ohio 44308 Duncan, Brown, Weinberg & Palmer 1700 Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W.~ Joseph A. Rieser, Jr., Esq. Suite 777 Lee A. Rau, Esq. Washington, D. C. 20006' Reed, Smith, Shaw and McClay Madison Building, Suite 404. John Lansdale, Jr., Esq. Washington, D. C. 20005 Cox, Langford & Brown 21~Dupong Circle, N. W. Terence H. Benbow, Esq. Washington, D. C. 20036 A. Edward Grashof, Esq. Winthrop, Stimson, Putnam and Roberts 40' Wall Street New York, New York 10005
[ t ~' 50- 346A, _ -440A, '" 41A, et a l. Page 3 l (- . Jar.;'a R. Urban, Esq. l Anticru.0 Division Department of. Justice -Washington, D. C. 20530 _ Michael R.- Gallagher, Esq. Gallagher, ~ Sharp, Fulton, Norman and Mollison l
- 630 Bulkley Building
' Cleveland, Ohio 44115 l f_ Perry Public Library 3753 Main Street Perry, Ohio 44081 Director Ida Rupp Public Library 301 Madison Street Port Clinton, Ohio 43452 9 l 1 (. l. .-}}