ML19339C727
| ML19339C727 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Peach Bottom  |
| Issue date: | 10/06/1980 |
| From: | Daltroff S PECO ENERGY CO., (FORMERLY PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC |
| To: | Brunner E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19339C723 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8011190203 | |
| Download: ML19339C727 (2) | |
Text
O PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY 2301 M ARKET STREET P.O. BOX 8699 PHILADELPHIA. PA.19101 am so m swirtes t. oactne,,
suc se o crion October 6, 1980 Re: Docket Nos. 50-277 50-278 Inspection No. 50-277/80-16 50-278/80-14 Mr. Eldon J.
Brunner, Chief Reactor Operations & Nuclear Support Branch US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406
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Dear Mr. Brunner:
Your letter of September 15, 1980 forwarded combined Inspection Reports 50-277/80-16 and 50-278/80-14.
Appendix A addresses one item which did not appear to be in full compliance with Nuclear Regulatory Commission requirements.
This item is categorized as a deficiency and is rescated below with our response.
Technical Specification 4.7.D.2 states in part..."Whenever an isolation valve listed in Table 3.7.1 is inoperable, the position of at least one other valve in each line having an inoperable valve shall be recorded daily."
Technical Specification Table 3.7.1 lists drywell purge inlet isolation valves as applicable valves.
Surveillance Test 5.3 " Inoperable Isolation Valve Position Daily Log," Revision 3, dated August 14, 1979 references Technical Specification 4.7.D.2 and states in part, "The purpose of this log is to record the position of at least one other valve in each line having an inoperable isolation valve."
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8011190
Mr.
E. J. Brunnor, Chiof Pego 2 Contrary to the above, fron May 24 to June 19, 1980, there was no valve position logged for three parallel lines, each'of which was in-line with inoperable isolation valve A0-3520.
The parallel lines for which no valve position was logged contained valves A0-3519, A0-3521A, and A0-3521B, respectively.
Response
i When it was discovered that valves A0-3519, A0-3521A, and AO-3521B were not being logged in Surveillance Test 5.3, Inoperable Isolation Valve Position Duty Log, they were expeditiously added to the surveillance test as noted in the details of the inspection report.
The incident was caused by individual operator error.
The operator made an incorrect determination of which isolation valves were required to be closed according to ST 5.3 during the period when A0-3520 was inoperable.
This failure to log all required valve positions did not present the potential for an abnormal occurrence because each of the three valves of concern were included in the closed panel checks conducted by the operator each shift as noted in the details of the inspection report.
The checks would have revealed any abnormal positioning of these valves and administrative controls were in effect restricting the opening of containment ventilation valve's during operation.
The responsible operator was counseled and the importance of correctly implementing the surveillance test was reemphasized.
A review of the circumstances leading to this incident indicates that this was an isolated occurrence and requires no further action to prevent recurrence.
Very truly yours, f
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