ML19339C680

Notifies That IE Bulletin 80-19 Has Been Sent to Listed Licensees

ML19339C680
Person / Time
Site:	Fort Saint Vrain
Issue date:	09/02/1980
From:	Madsen G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
References
NUDOCS 8011180861
Download: ML19339C680 (1)

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AR LINGTON, TEXAS 76012 su 2 nu MEMORANDUM FOR: Those Listed Below FROM:

G. L. Madsen, Chief, Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch, RIV

SUBJECT:

IE BULLETIN NO. 80-19 Subject IE Bulletin has been sent to the following licensees. A copy is attached for your information.

Arkansas Power & Light Company ANO-1 & 2 (50-313, 50-368)

Nebraska Public Power District Cooper Nuclear Station (50-298)

Omaha Public Power District Ft.CalhounNuclearStation(50-285)

Public Service Company of Colorado Fort St. Vrain (50-267)

)f $ 9?faW G. L. Madsen, Chief, Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch

Attachment:

As stated 8011180861

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SSINS No.: 6820 UNITED STATES Accession No.:

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 8006190022 0FFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

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20555 July 31, 1980

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IE Bulletin No. 80-19 FAILURES OF MERCURY-WETTED MATRIX RELAYS IN REACTOR PROTECTIVE SYSTEMS OF OPERATING NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS DESIGNED BY COMBUSTION ENGINEERING BACKGROUND:

This bulletin a'ddresses the failures of mercury-wetted relays used in the logic matrix of the reactor protective system (RPS) of nuclear power plants designed by Combustion Engineering (C-E).

Except for Arkansas Nuclear One Unit 2 and Palisades, both of which use dry-contact matrix relays, the NRC understands that all other operating C-E plants use C.P. Clare Model HG2X-1011-mercury-wetted matrix relays in the RPS.

Mercury-wetted matrix relays mrnufactured by the Adams and Westlake Company were initially used in the Palisades plant; however, because of repeated failures of these relays, they were subsequently replaced with relays having dry-contacts. GTE, *.he manufacturer of these dry-contact relays, however, has since discontinued taeir production. Thus, although the dry-contact relays used at Palisades have performed without a failure since they were installed, they are not available for 'he other operating nuclear power plants designed by C-E.

OPERATING EXPERIENCES AND EVALUATION:

To date, operating nuclear power plants designed by C-E have reported, thirty-one (31) failures of mercury-wetted relays used in the logic matrix of the RPS.

Most of the reported failures were " failed-closed" type (i.e., the type that could inhibit a reactor trip), and four of the reported events involved multi-ple failures (i.e., three relay failures were 6 tected during two tests; two other failures were detected during two different tests).

Because of the re-dundancy within the RPS, no reported event would have prevented a reactor trip; however, the build-up of coincident " failed-closed" failures of certain sets of relays could result in trip failures for off-normal events.

The number of single and multiple relay failures reported gives rise to two concerns: (1) the total number of fr. lures yields a much higher random failure rate than that used in other relay failure estimates *, and (2) the number of

• Other relay failure estimates include (1) WASH-1400, " Reactor Safety Study",

NRC, October 1975; (2) IEEE Std 500-1977,"IEEE Guide to the Collection and Presentation of Electrical, Electronic, and Sensing Component Reliability Data for Nuclear Power Generating Stations", IEEE, New York; and (3) NUREG/

CR-0942, " Nuclear Plant Reliability Data System, 1978 Annual Reports of Cumulative System and Corponent Reliability", NRC.

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IE Bulle~ tin No. 80-19 July 31, 1980 Page 2 of 2 multiple failures detected suggests the presence of a common-mode failure mechanism. Such a common-mode failure mechanism could result in the build-up of specific " failed-closed" faijires which,'in turn, could result in antici-pated transients without scram (ATWS). Thus, the relatively high random failure rate and the suggested common-mode failure mechanism, indicate that plants using wrcury-wetted mat.ix relays in the RPS are more. susceptible to scram failures than predicted in other studies.

ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN BY HOLDERS OF CONSTRUCTION PERMITS OR OPERATING LICENSES FOR NUCLEAR POWER FACILITIES:

1.

Review your facility to determine whether or not mercury-wetted relays are used in the RPS. If no such relays are used, you should submit a negative declaration to this effect and you need not respond to the remaining items in.this bulletin. Your negative declaration shall be submitted to the appropriate NRC Regional Office within thirty (30) days of the date Of this bulletin and a copy forwarded to the Director, Division of Reactor _ Operations Inspection, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, NRC, Washington, D. C. 20555.

2.

Licensees of operating nuclear power plants using mercury-wetted relays in the RPS should increase the frequency of their surveillance tests.

Until further notice, or until the mercury-wetted relays have been re-placed with qualified relays of a different design, surveillance testing of the relays shall be initiated within ten (10) days of the date of this bulletin and repeated at intervals not exceeding ten (10) days thereafter.

Upon detecting a failed relay, the failed unit shall be replaced with a qualified dry-contact relay or a new mercury-wetted relay.

(The removed relay shall not be reused in the RPS.)

3.

Nuclear power facilities which-are using or whose design includes the use of mercury-wetted matrix relays in the RPS shall submit either their plans and schedules for replacing the mercury-wetted relays with qualified relays of a different design, or-justification for using the mercury-wetted relays. Responses to this item shall be submitted to the offices listed in Item 1, above, within ninety (90) days of the date of this bulletin.

Approved by GAO, 3180225 (R0072); clearance expires July 31, 1980. Approval was given under a blanket clearance specifically for identified generic problems.

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IE Bulletin No. 80-19 July 31, 1980 REC'INTLY ISSUED IE BULLETINS Bulletin Subject Date Issued Issued To No.

80-14 Degradation of Scram 6/12/80 All BWRs with an Discharge Volume Operating License (OL)

Capability or Construction Permit (CP) 80-15 Possible Loss of Emergency 6/18/80 All nuclear facilities Notification System (ENS) holding Operating Licenses with Loss of Offsite Power (OLs) 80-16 Potential Misapplicacion 6/27/80 All Power Reactor of Rosemount Inc., Models Facilities with an 1151 and 1152 Pressure Operating License (OL)

Transmitters with Either or a Construction Permit "A" or "D" Output Codes (CP) 80-17 Failure of 76 of 185 7/3/80 All BWR power reactor Control Rods to Fully facilities holding Insert During a Scram Operating Licenses (Ots) at a BWR or Construction Permit (CP)

Sup. 1 Failure of Control Rods 7/18/80 All BWR power reactor to 80-17 to Insert During a Scram facilities holding Operating at a BWR Licenses (0Ls) or Con-struction Permits (cps)

Sup. 2 Failures Revealed by 7/22/80 All BWR power reactor to 80-17 Testing Subsequent to facilities holding Failure of Control Rods Operating Licenses (OLs) to Insert During a Scram or Construction Permits at a BWR (cps) 80-18 Maintenance of Adequate 7/24/80 All PWR power reactor Minimum Flow Thru Centrifugal facilities holding OLs C5arging Pumps Following and to those PWRs Secondary Side High Energy nearing licensing Line Rupture Enclosure i

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