ML19338C322
| ML19338C322 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Peach Bottom  |
| Issue date: | 07/25/1980 |
| From: | Gallagher J PECO ENERGY CO., (FORMERLY PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC |
| To: | Grier B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| References | |
| IEB-80-14, NUDOCS 8008150109 | |
| Download: ML19338C322 (3) | |
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PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY 2301 MARKET STREET P.O. BOX 8699 PHILADELPHIA. PA.19101 JOSEPH W. G ALLAGHER e6scfmc raoOuct oN DEPA=TMENT (2151 841-5oO3 July 25, 1980 Re:
Docket Nos. 50-277 50-278 IE Bulletin 80-14 Mr. Boyce H. Grier Office of Inspection & Enforcement Region 1 U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406
Dear Mr. Grier:
This letter is in response to I.E.Bulletin 80-14 forwarded to us on June 12, 1980, concerning the " Degradation of Scram Discharge Volume Capability (SDV)".
Additional information relative to SDV capability has been submitted in response to IE Bulletin 80-17.
Approximately 170 manhours were expended in conducting a review of.IE Bulletin 80-14 and in preparing this response.
No corrective action associated with this Bulletin was required.
The actions requested and our responses are listed sequentially below.
ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN BY LICENSEES 1.
Review plant records for instances of degradation of any SDV level switch which was or may have been caused by a damaged or bent float assembly.
Identify the cause and corrective action for each instance.
RESPONSE
Our review of plant records has identified several instances when the level switches themselves did not function properly, however, no instance of degradation of any SDV level switch which was or 800815o toc \\
Mr. Boyce H. Grior, Director Page 2 may have been caused by a damaged or bent float assembly was identifed.
2.
Review plant records for instances of degradation of SDV vent and drain valve operability.
Provide the closure times required and typically observed for these valves and the
-basis for the required closing times.
Identify the cause and corrective action for each instance of degradation.
RESPONSE
Our review has not determined the design criteria for closure time of these valves, however, our Engineering Department has bean requested to review this matter.
Closing times for the SDV vents and drain valves from a scram signal will be tested on Unit 3 as part of the testing required for I.E.
Our review has identified only one instance of SDV valve degradation which was reported in LER 2-80-12/IP dated 7/22/80.
The LER concerns the inoperability of scram backup valves in the air supply to the CRD scram valves and the vent and drain valves on Unit 2.
3.
By procedures, require that the SDV vent and drain valves be normally operable, open and periodically tested.
If these valves are not operable or are closed for more than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> in any 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period during operation, the. reason shall be logged and the NRC notified within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> (Prompt Notification).
RESPONSE
A surveillance test has been initiated which strokes the SDV vent and drain valves daily to verify proper operation (ST 9.22).
Also, valve position is verified and logged daily in the surveillance log (ST 9.1).
This procedure (ST 9.1) ensures prompt reporting to NRC and determination of cause of failure.
4.
Review i n s t r.c c e s in which water hammer or damage which may have been caused by water hammer has occurred in SDV related piping.
Identify the cause and corrective action for each instance.
/
Mr. Boyce H. Grier, Diroctor Page 3
RESPONSE
Our records indicate that no instances of water hammer or damage caused by water hammer have occurred in the SDV or its related piping.
5.
Review surveillance procedures to ensure that degradation of any SDV level switch due to a damaged float or other cause would be detected and that inoperability from any cause would be reported to the NRC.
RESPONSE
Surveillance procedures have been reviewed to ensure that degradation of the SDV level switches from any cause would be detected.
Our surveillance test procedures required that any inoperability be verified by Shift Supervision and that the Station Superintendent be informed immediately.
A report would then be submitted to the NRC as required by the Technical Specifications.
6.
If no functional test or inspection which would detect degradation of each SDV level switch has been performed during the past 3 months, make provisions to perform an inspection and functional test of all SDV level switch assemblies at the next reactor shutdown of greater than 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> duration.
RESP 03SE Each unit has 6 SDV level switches.
Unit 2 is currently in a refueling outage and all six Unit 2 SDV level switches will be functionally tested prior to start-up as required by Item 2.d of Bulletin 80-17.
The four Unit 3, 50 gallon (RPS) level switches were last functionally tested on July 2, 1980 (A and C logic) and July 22, 1980 (B and D logic).
The Unit 3 three gallon (alarm) level switch is functionally tested as part of a daily surveillance test.
The 25 gallon (rod block) level switch has not been functionally tested in the past three months, however, an inspection and functional test will be performed during the next reactor shutdown of greater than 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> duration.
Very truly yours, cc:
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection & Enforcement Division of Reactor Operations Inspection Washington, DC 20555
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