ML19338B868

Deposition of Tm Novak (NRC) on 790730 in Bethesda,Md.Pp 1-84

ML19338B868
Person / Time
Site:	Crane
Issue date:	07/30/1979
From:	Helfman S, Novak T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE
To:
References
TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 8001280633
Download: ML19338B868 (87)

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-L -~ .-...~ 0 s jaa "8%c5 y ,o,, UNITED STATES g g. ,( NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ,.g,q j wAsumorou. o. c. :osss s%w% y< f, s[ g To: Fromt Richard S. Mallory, OGC b Enclosed is a copy of the transcript of your deposition before the President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island. Please read through the transcript carefully and correct any errors (other than unimportant punctuation errors) in black pen on this copy. Correct any errors you can identify in the questions, as well as in your answers. This copy will not be retyped, but will be reproduced as you have marked it, so your corrections should be dark and legible. After you have corrected the transcript, please sign and date the certificate at the end, and type your narca under your signature. You may wish to make a copy of the transcri at for yourself before returning the original to me. When you return the transcript, please indicate if you object to making your transcript available to the Commission or to the Commission's investigation of Three Mile Island. Because of Commissioner interest, we would appreci-ate receiving your corrected copy by c.o.b. Monday, August 13, if possible. Unless you have an objection, I wil1 send a copy of your signed, 4 corrected transcript to the President's commission with the request that they substitute it for any uncorrected copies they miy have. If you have any questions or problems, do not hesitate to call me or the attorney who represented you at the deposition.

Enclosure:

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.~. s -~ CERTIFICATE I certify that I have read this transcript and corrected any errors in the transcription that I have been able to identify, except for unimportant punctuation errors. Date: ,) /3/9f9 [ Thomas M. Novak I ( l l

4- \\ Acm'3 UNITED STATIS OF AMERICA ~ m PRESIDENT'S COMMISSICN ON THE ACCIDENT AT 2 THRIZ MILE ISLAND 3 C 4 5 6 7 DEPOSITION OF: . THOMAS M. NOVAK 8 9 10 11 Rocm 1132 New Phillips Building 12 7920 Norfolk Aw nue Sethesda, Maryland t( 13 ~ July 30, 19 79 14 10 :55 o ' clock a.m. 15' 16 APPEA hNCES: 17 on Behalf of the Ccmmission: IS STAN M. EILFMAN, Atterney Associate Chief Counsel tg 2100 M Street, N.W. 29 Washington, D.C. 20037 Cn Behalf of the NRC: l 31 MARK CHCPKO, ESQ. 23 1717 E Street, N.W. Washingten, D.C. 20037 23 I 04 t L I l 3 I, \\ 1 Acme Reporting Compcny L u t u.....

c 3 -1 2 O t _ 7. D ?_ '.{ ,3 g.a.m. mss. s _ _ _'. C".' CTCSS ..T'._-'"".' .._ -..C S C s. 3 Thc=as M. Novak 4 -{ 4 5 E _X E _I 3..I. _T.S 6 NUMBER: TOR IDEN"'!?! CATION Novak No. 1 4 3 Novak No. 2 82 9 Novak No. 3 33 to 11 la 13 i 14 15 16 17 IS I 19 .,y 1 21 ! i 1 .,, i 30 m i .,4 l . i i 25. Acme Reporting Compony

r ~ ~ 3 1 _R _O.C =7 3 -' _D _,=.. = T. G S s 2 MR. e -' MAN: 'Tculd vou please state fer che t, 3 record ycur full name? THE WISTISS: "'hemas Michael Ncvak. (~ 4 5 MR. HII.JMAN: Have you ever had your descsition taken before? g THI WISE.55 : No. MR. 3" % N: Perhaps I should explain a few of the S 4 characteristics of the deposition. 9 Your testimenv that you are giving today is swc n, 10 -and-as a result will" receive the same fc:ce'~and VffE'et as - 11 if you had given yeu: testimenv in a court of law. 13 At the conclusion of the deposition, the testimenv will be ret'.uced te ranscript form hv the court reporter, 14 and you will he crevided with a ccev and affc:ded an 15 99 rtunity to make any changes which you deem necessary. 16 Ecwever, vou should be awa:e that we would have 1 13l the ec.certuniev. to ec==ent on any. changes that v.cu take and I I i if the changes are substantial, it could reflect adversely i 19 i en vcur credibill:y. 20 i i u! "'here fo re, it is impc::an: c he as ac~ -=-= =s .veu can, and if you need clarificacica ci a Taestica hefers i t _ t l yet answer, please feel free := ask fc: clarifica:icn. .a t n

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3 = .,, j necessary that ycu cive audible :sspc e,1s si.ca i: :.s D' fD $f lff il(P "> N ~ D D l' 3d [J6 J t l Acme R ep orting Company

4 1 difficult to take down neds of..de head c: gestures. You ~. 2 should try to allcw =e to complete a questien even if ycu 3 anticipate where it is going, and I will try to alicw you ' f, 4 to complete an answer before I ask my next questien because 5 it is difficult for her to take down twc people tal*<ing at 6 the same time. 7 It is our practice at the conclusion of a depcsition 3 to continue it rather tha:..:o terminate it in the event 9 there are further questions that we have to ask. We will 10 simply reconvene the degesition. 11 Oc you have any qcestions about any of that? 12 THE WITNESS: Nc. 13 Whereupon, ~ 14 THCMAS M. NOVAK 15 having been duly swc n, was cal".ed as a witness herein and 16 testified as folicws: 17 DIRECT EXAMINATION 13 3Y'MR..F M1AN: 19 Q Ycu were asked to bring a resume with ycu. Did i l 20 ycu de so? ,q fi 01 A Yes, I have ene. u2 t 22, MR. EI' MAN: ~~4e would like :c have this marxed as J t 23 ' the firsu exhibit. to -he descsition. 24 (Nevak Ixhibi: ::c. I was 1 25 i =arked der identifica:1:n.; Acme Reporting Company

t 3Y MR. 2-*M!AN: Q !s this resume an accurate representacten of your o-1, educational and crofessional and employment bachereund? 3 A Yes, it is. g 4 0 I suppose de best place to begin is could you give 5 us your title with the NRC and describe very briefly what .O your obliga.icns and responsibilities are? A Mv =csition is Chief of the Reacec: Systems 3 ranch 3 in the Division of Systems Safety. g Isthat ecsition, I am respcasible for the review 10 ccustruc ten pe:. nit appli atiens anc op'eratins 1T6kase -~ ~ e c 11 applications for light water reacecrs. g h area of our responsibility fccuses on the review 13 of transients and accidents, and for a variety of systems g des 5ed to cope with these events-the emergency ccoling 15 system, the residual heat removal systems are just examples. 6 Presently I have also been assigned en an interin task force related to bulletins and crders which was formed 13l fcilowing the Three Mile Island 2 Accident, g i

c you continue tc.perf :n vcur functions as chief Q

'O. r I l cf the Reacter Svstems 3 ranch, Iivision of Systems safe:v? n1 I i l A No, I don't.

• Te have, as a consecuence Of the interim!

l I Organi:ati:n, = ' -=-= e branch chief :.s presently

== i l l i cc: forming '= duty. His name is Atemis S.=eis. i I t C When ycu were =erformine the 'cb cf chief O' the . U J. b Acme Recorting Compcny

6 1 Reactor Systams 3 ranch, what was the organiza:ica of your 2 depar =ent? i. 3 A The organization consisted of two sections, one whose supervisor was Mr. Sandy Israel, and the other section 4 5 whose supervisor was Mr. Gerry Masetis. Their positions tiere as sectica leaders. There was 5 no specific differences in specific responsibility differences between sections. They are ecmparable sections 3 and they are capable of dcing tasks without specialty in a 9 10 sense. F:ad:h sicuion das eHher~ 6'15r '7 ~ engineers assigned tt l to the section so in total we have about 15 professional 12 13 people and two secretaries and myself. 0 Could you describe for the record what cccurs, 14 for example, with a construction license application? Where 15 16 does it go? Cces i: go to you, the team leaders, de ~ engineers? A The application is first, it is directed to =e for I j 19l assignmant; depending on the a=ount of work in either sectien!, I will make'an assign =ent where I feel that the work can .,9 i he nes: easilr acccmmlished. 1 3, i i I i 3l It is den assigned te, I : cte i: to a sectic: I i l l 3; leader with perhaps a suggestien as needec to :ne eng:.neer i l .,. i who I chink night he most suitable :Or i 1 The secti:n leader and nyse'f wil'. discuss tha: 23 I, Acme Reporting Com cyI L

7 6 .t assign =ent. The for=ality of :he construction review, of 2 course, takes several steps. Are you interested in going s. 3 through those? Q Right now I am just:.1aterested in the ficw. f 4 A The materia ~. then, once it is assigned to a section, 5 the distribution would include then the section leader and 6 cyself and a responsible engineer assigned :: tha: review. 3 Q Then the enginee: dcas the actual review? A Yes. What will typically happen is the sect'on 9 to leader and the engineer will sit down and the secti- -leader will-highlight those aspects of the review t. c. he-13 thinks and expects the engineer to focus on. 13 We have a standard review plan which is our general way of doiag the review. We will utili::e previous reviews 14 f similar plants to perhaps highlight a specific area where 15 we want te spend more ti=e learning about a particula is aspect of the design so they generally will sit dcwn and 1 outline the review for themselves. i 19l The engineer himself will have sete ideas of where l he thinks he should be spending his time. .,,0 l We have as a par. of our review process identified 3, the perieds of time that is available to che engineer, so i .m-l .3 l in effect he is trying to identify those pc : ices cf the l review that both he and the section leader feel shcul'd he 3 i covered. Cn cccasions, I will inser wha: : hi:2 are areas 3 Acme Reporting Ce nj i. 2! e

~ 8 that shculd be covered. We =ay ge: cgether and discuss t the review. 2 s. 3 Q The three of you? A The three of us; it depends specifically on the plant 4 5 and any peculiarities of it. 6 Q When the engineer has ccmpleted his review, does 7 it go back to the team leader? 3 A Yes. Of course, there is several cpper: unities for discussion. His first work p:cducu is a draf: set of 9 10 questiens that he works up. There will be a let of discussion i 11 before those have been~ prepared Sut' i:he~ section leader then' l concentrates. on the review of the first set of questions. 12 13 He generally turns them back to the reviewer to reflect the review and thev will discuss them. There is 13 l usually on cccasien a question or t'ao that '4111 come up to 15 16

De where they can get earlier guidance if they feel I wculd have some opinion en it.

It may help direct it and she: ten t the review p ccess, but generally I do no: see the original 1g L %c "'heaep s sc=ething between the l firsu eet of quesniens. ,9 l l engineer doing he review and the sectica leader. i l ,0 1 i i ,, j Q When the secnien leader is sacisfied, dces it -~, i l ., i ccme back to you? l A Then thev are forwarded to ne. The concurrence is a 3l a lie:*.e differen depending en ::e stage ce questiens. t This is a preegative cf the divisien,.he asciser.: direc::: f L i Acme Recorting Comheny

t 9 1 cf reactor safety. The firs =cund of questions en a plan 2 can he sent cut through the branch chief's signature. i. 3-Q Your signature? A Yes, my signature: in effect, I concur. I am the p 4 3 highest level of cencurrence, so the section leader then 6 would prepare the for=al set of questions let's say, and then I would concur on them and thav. would be then directed te 3 us, the Division of P:cject, Management. That is not the first time I see them. 3 to What I see for the first -ime is generally a -- ~ cl~eanad up frts~t draft af the qtiestrens and" then I~wiIl~ - 11 tg review them, nake =y ecmments ec the section leader, and the 13 engineer at the sa=etine.

• 4e go ever them, and we iron cut any differences that I have.

3 15

• dhen we agree on them, then they are put back into

,6 the fc: mal p ccess of creparing dem in final form. Thev. are signed out then bv. the section leader d:cugh me. I u l 3 concur in them, and then they are directed to cur Civision I cf ?:ciect Management. 19 l '.sg ! Q Are. these questiens which are posed to de Civ:.sion i t of P 0 ject Management? I f i A They are actually-directed de:r b de applican:. ,a i 3 The Civision of ':cject Management acts as a funnel, sc 00 ., 4 j s=eak. Thev =cceive all de questiens frem all of the .,5 l

schnical areas en the staff and they are che contact wichin O fnl@ D h.),h'hN Acme Reporting Ce peny.s n.,

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10 t the staff he ween the applicant and the staff. 2 O Then the applicant I assu=e has a certain period S. 3 of time within which to respond? 4 A Yes. Generally he may take six to eight weeks to 5 respond to the questions. 6 0 Where do those responses go? 7 A

• hey are directed back to the project.

In other 3 words, the fc==al chain is f:c= a branch chief in ? cjects 9 to a licensing manager let's say representing the utility to of applicant. t1 Th= 23spenre, the-fc al respcnse-then is bac.Cto ~ r 12 the branch chief, and then a distribution of.he responses ,3 are made to all of the technical divisions so we wculd den 14 receive our response in terms of a=end=ents to the 15 applications c: responses to questions. 16 Q In the. event you discover a transient c an accident 17 which warrants review by other depart =ents wi~"' '"a

NRC, is in addition te v. cur cwn, is there se=e p ccedure fe. referring l

19 ' those concerns to other depar-ents? ~4culd vet. de cha thrcugh the Division of ?:cject Management? 3 i t 21; A ~4e say. Thera are cccasions wh'en in rans=icting l cur questions to the Divisicn of ?:0jec: Management, they .m. e 3l =ay note sc=e questions and note -he relaticaship ches.e questions have :c ether branches. 1 D 3 Sie p;chablv. inic:: ally. hava -=ad

= the branches 3,

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p-t involved and =entioned ec them that we ars =a. king this o Comment. 3 We also discuss questions directly with other f-- 4 branches where the technical disciplines require that we 3 better understand the commonality of the concern. 6 e may agree then that a questien which has a n s=.ecific flaver which may reflect two different disciplines 3 would be generated, but it sculd ccme cut of just one of the 9 technical disciplines, so there is ne specific c ccedure that is followed. to _.The standard' review prans ident:ifv the inter ~ ~ 11 1, relationships between branches, but there is no specific 13 form let's say that I would fill out which directs an inquiry t4 or requests an inquiry by ancther branch, another technical branch. ,5 Q Sut you can tap C s knowledge of de technical is ex=ertise of earticular branches? 1 i That's right. As the questien develops where i: A ,g is recogni:ed that it c: sses into areas outside of cc: cvn i tg ~ sc. acific expertise-and for. which. we. dc act have,. we =av .m have the pr'-= y responsibility, they may have secondary l review ss:cnsibili.ies in the sense of suppc::ing cur effert,i .m i ) i e i 3l we will identify cur needs. j l ., ; I

'n sete cases, they =ay have the primarf respcnsi-l j

biliev and we .av. nere fer deir inic..anien wha: ve knew t .J, l l Acme Reporting Coryh i y _y =

12 1 about.he particular issue. - 2 It is basically done en an informal basis, but ther,e 3 is generally documentation involved with it--not in every ( 4 case, but in the cases of substances both branches generally 5 will use a meme to identify and to formalize the wc king 6 relationship, what se have agreed to do en a specific 7 problem. 3 0 You indicated ir._ycur resume in the first paragraph 9 cn the first page that your responsibilities include the to performance of safety reviews and evaluations of 11 applications for nuclear power plant construction per=its 12 and operating licenses. 13 Cnce a plan obtains an operating license, does i ~ ' fall witheut the jurisdictica of ycur branch? 14 15 A No. There will be exceptiens. When an cperating 16 License is issu~d at present, there =ay be a number of e 17 residual issues that will be resolved perhaps pricr ec the 13 first reviewing of the Lant. nis may be 13 non hs af:e 1 19 the plant has received, an cperating license, i I 00 In this case, the" Division of Project. Management 1 I 21l in its efficia' -* sferal of a project, of a cc=pleted i i ' ' ~ 22 I cperating licensed p:cject : the Oivision cf Operating I I 23l Reac:crs will in its :::ansmi :a1 '.e::er identify :hese piggifgg[lh)b WSjlh f m3 24 residual items. I i j, 25 It w:.11 aise identify the respcnsib'.e branches in the! I f Acme Recerting Compcny

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Division of Systems Safety whc.will fc11cw through en o these issues. Generally this will restic in a supplement 3 a safety evaluation : hat was written as part of the-cperating I' 4 license reviews. 5 Q And your branch then could be involved in the 6 review of an open item in an operating license application I even after the operating license had been granted? 3 A That is correct. - 9 Q There is another possibility that cccurs to ny 10 mind where you would become aware, ycur branch would l 11 beccze aware of.a transient er an.accidan which warrants t t 12 additional attention, and yet you have-the expertise within 13 your branch to analyce it and sc you wouldn' t he seeking ~ 14 expertise from another branch within the NRC, but =ight wish 15 to call the matter to the attention of. ancther branch which is would have the ability to de sc=ething about it. 17 Eave you had the experience of referring a safety 18 concern to another branch or another decar :en in order 19 to aler: them to the safety concern rather than to chtain l 2 their technical exper-ise?" ^ rm fF\\Q 4 ~ i sl Oca s .,1 A Yes. New ycu have used two"te-s. .cu nave used ~, safety concern, anc tn.en you saan transients, so te speak. r I 33 ! I vculd censider safety concern := he the brcader.

wculd l

i i l 'i j include perhaps a new understanding cf the ::ansient. 3 Cn cccasien where under the cencep cf a safety Acme Reporting Compcny

_1. 14 t cence=, we have in de review of an operating license identified some test info =ation dat we have required and.,. 3 frem it we cenclude eat that infc=ation is of general concern, for example, to operating reactors. e 4 3 We would transmit that information to the app cgriate 6 people in the Division of Operating Reacters. We would communicate with them orally. We would send them a nemo a if we thought it was nec_es_s_ary.. We would talk to them, and 9 we would make sure that they had that understanding. 10 You.have to reccgnize that we do that whr.2 we feel { ~~"tF. eta Ts a clear relationship between the issue that we are...... _. presently working on and a si'ilarity of design in an 13 operating plant. 13 Q 31sically a generic concern? A Yes. D U Q W. y ur branch would he responsible for na. king 16-the decision concerning whether er not such a concern is to g be routed to operatine reac ors? Wculd that he you or is I sonsone like Gerre Ma:eti c: Sandy Israel or one of the 1 tg l engineers ender dem, or is that your responsiMey? 'o t A It is not anyone's respcnsibility. is everyone's.! 3 I .,,, t think if a :sec=endatica is =ade, we would e:gect an ,'~ l i engineer := naka it, a section leader, if he reccgni:ss it, 3 .,. i c nyself, sc : don't have any final say whe:her this permit i l 0 i is c.oine. there c: ac t. 3, Acme Reporting Company

15 t If scmeone -" nks it has =arit, and generally ~ 2 people go alene with them, we veuld forward it, so there is 's. 3 no for=al decision process as to exactly where in the 4 organization that information, to whom it should be p cvided. 5 There is generally no. hesitation to provide this 6 information to the parties that we thin'< have an interest in it 7 3 Q So an engineer could make a recommendation to handle a =atter in this manner? 9 A Yes, he could; if he felt it should go to another to 11 ' divisionT as part cf generating the" concern; he also decides--' en the distributien. This is paru of the formality of tg 13 preparing the memo is to make up an 1:.itial distributien list. 0 Would he he responsible for the distribution of 14 the document or the concern or the me=orandu=, er dcas that 15 is ccme back to you, or dces it ecme to the team leader? A .There is really no for..ality to who is responsible 17 for the distribution. It is a collegial dccu=ent in a 13 sense. If it was originated by an engineer, he may sugges: tg 31 some people that he thinks.--shoul:1 he pu en -le distiihution lisu. Semeene else =ay add to it. D 21, Generally as vec go un. hie.ne- - -be review c. recess i i I i i 23l the suggestica to broaden i:--in other wer:is, ; =igh: 1 i I 24 suggest semacne in research =ight have an interes in i: .,. l hecause Of sc=a c hsr. infer:atien ' = ~ - Save, so genera *.ly Acme Reporting Company

16 9 what generally happens is the distributien increases as it is considered by higher and highe: levels of =anagement. i, 3 It is very rare that we would decide ec take sececne off of 4 distributicn. That wouldn' t he a pechlem. We don't have a 5 guide necessarily to keep the distribution list to a minimum, 6 al dcugh ebvicusly everyone in the building is not interested I in it, but we generally try to suggest that it be made 3 available to.the pecple whe-have an interest, have some 3 backg cund in the subject. 10 Q Would you have the authority to decline to 11 distribute a concern like this if an engineer had recommended la it? Cees the decision reside in your hands? 13 A No. The organization per.:iits that engineer to send 14 that ecpy to anyene he deems app cpriate. He can sign it 13 himseld in a sense. He can send a memo, attaching ancther is meme so to speak, and say I thought you would he interested in this. n No one else in my branch did, if that is an example l 18 i you wish to use. I 1 i I 20l Q Would that also hE true of the team leaders? 4 l fhk f u6 i 3., Q Such as Mr. Israel and M.:. :4a::stis ? 23 i A Tes. "' hey cculd if they wish send a r.sro := scmeone, I i l . i else. Generally, che distributica is intended :0 cc/e ccher ., s l readers an idea of who has i: so :.f there is scme discussion, ~ i Acme Reporting Cemocny

L7 I if two people on our distribution list find seme:hing cha: M. 4 they wish to talk about, they knew that the c hor person has, 3 the =ame and it is a fra=e of reference. 4 Q Would there be any advantage to an engineer or to 3 one of the team leaders to obtain your signature on a memo 6 expressing such a concern? A . :s. There would be an advantage because it 8 represents a higher level-of management view on it. Ic: 9 exammle, if a =emo in written by an engineer and it is 10 provided for general distribution as opposed to the same 11 being sent either by a section leader or even a branch memn L2 chief, I think it just naturally suggests a higher level of 13 importance being attached to that mese. It is given a little 14 bit =op fe, =ality. 15 It is not normally a practice for an engineer to is write =emos en 'his cwn because there is an opportunity, of 17 course, that there =ay be disagreement. If he just decides 13 to wri:e a =emo, he dcasn': discuss it with anyone, there is I 19 a chance that his views would not represent those views of l 20 the branch, and so we would then have to write a me=c which 21 is sent to the same distrihutien list offering a differen: 22! viewecin:. I: = a v. be a.cosizion of the staff. hat is i 23: different, se generally an engineer, f he has a point, he i e i l i 28 will di'scuss it first vich his evn management. l i i 05 I: =ay he suggested by the secti:n leads: : hat he l Q

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gg i go ahead and prepara a =ame for his own signat=e, =aking o* these facts known. It sav. be that, I don't knew if the i. 3 secticn leader would concur. It would nou necessarily be i 4 obvious f cm the transmitta-1 cf the memo itself that there 5 is concurrence by a secti,cn leader. Jg can send it out 8 without it. He may wish to have the concurrence of the I section leader, but that wouldn't be obvicus then to the 1 1 8 reader of the memo, but i; would be on file within the branch 8 whether er not there was concurrence. This is at the option 10 of the engi$eer and the section leader. 11 Q Let me show you a co9v. of what has beccme known. La as the Novak memorandum which for the record shculd be 1** l noted as an exhibit to the deposition of Sandy Israel. Cown at the bottcm in the lefthand cc ner there is 15 a contact reference. ge h t.would that indicata t hreaercfthis 16 17 =emorandum in view of de fact that it bears your signature? 1 18 A Generally the contac: persen is the criginator. 13 He authored it, and anycne who has questions rela:ed :c the =amewculdbeexpechadtocentacthim. .,0 O.at is generally l i 1, 31 the way we use the con =act in our branch. A persen who I- ,f drafts the =emo is identified as the centac: persen. i 4 Ul Q Cou'd 'e assu=ed f:cm the

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--=- v. Israel I i 'i l is indica:ed as the centact, and the maccra.du= bears ycur 3j signatura, tha: :hore was a +-..-- once be: ween the two i i l l Acme Reporting Compcny

19 1 cf you as to this =e=crandus? .~. 2 A Yes. In this case, I received the =e:c first in ai, 3 draft, and if I recall right, I noted sc=ething to the 4 extent okay for final, which in effect at least at that level 5 at that time suggested that I supported issuing the memo as 6 Ls. 7 I don't recall if.' =ade any changes. If any, it 3 would have been en the editorial. It was then routed back 9 to the secretary for final typi::g. It was a handwritten 10 first draft, and I think this =eme then went to final ver!

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h .f ... ecc t erea t_e.r. it wa. s t.yped--cencur:sence or original, It initial concurrence by Israel, and then myself. 13 Sere is a file copy of the =eme which would 14 'da " y the originator er what you want to call the criginal 15 contact, and then any higher levels of concurrence. In 16 this case, I think mine was the highes level of concurrence 17 to the =emc. 13 Q "'here would be a ecpy of this in the file which 19 wculd indicate =cre infor=ation han is contained en this i e rr 6KYAf. yt 'u, i di emu 00 copy? g!g h

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i l al A Yes, to the extent tha the file ccpy has en the l i 0 ! Icwer portion of the page hiccks which are basically initial l. 23 ! biccks, the date Of the final typing, er le:'s say when I. 24 Mr. Israel initialed it, and then I wculd ini ial i: and 25. .sien 1: a: the sa=etime sc I wculd have initiated i: en wha: 1 i Acme Reporting Company

20 t we refer to as the yellow copy of the =emerandus, and there 4 should be a coev cf chat in cur file. 3 Q Would it be pessible te obtain a ccpy of that 4 copy? 3 A When we have an opportunity for a break, I will 6 1CCat* it-Q In addition to reviewing the me=crandum, prior 3

o initialing your cencurrence, did ycu discuss it with 3

Mr. Israel? A I dcn't recall any technical discussiens. It may 10 .scuss:.cc =ay.. ave en y ceen to :ne extent. - --- - _ _ .___._._-..y__...._.,__...__... y a. _... ve,-een, .e d:.. 11 12 that I read your =epc and I initiated it for final typing, but I can' t swear to that. ,3 14 I~=ay have =entioned it just te let his kncv where 15 the =eme was in the review process that I had read it, that i 16 I saw no, I had no ecmment en it other than to go ahead and issue it, and let it becc=e what is new suggested as a review 1; reminder. p7 "l 9 (Il R} ) pS is d' f L l As I recall I did add Mr. enn ?.cs J *e f ,9 3 t distributicn. He was =v i= mediate superviscr, and in the l ,0 I l n: criginal draft, I dc act knew if, I cannc: recall if I l i ~, i Mr. Israel identified Ecss. I think I added ".r. Ecss en the t 1 3l distributien, se this was a case where the distribution was i i I .,4 in large based en =y review of the =e=c. t i t .,5 Ihers was never any cc= ent abcc: whether -he l Acme Raccrting Compcny

4 .i 2 t distributien as finaily came, cut was all that was necessary. ~ We added Mr. Ross and that's ali I recall f cm the i. discussion. 3 Q Who is Mr. Ross? 4 A At the time, Mr. Ross was my immediate superviscr. 5 ,3 Ee was the Assistant Director for Reactor Safety, and the purgest of =y adding him to the distributien was to let his 3 . know of the area that we, intended to investigate as part of g this review remi-der so that he wcuid have some cppc--" d y to ecmment en it if ha saw fit. to Someta.._ _ h. -.=es t ere is a quest:.cn that perhaps the - - -. - 11 12 area that you are going into is perhaps not specifically 13 ur area of res;cnsibility. Perhaps it should he reviewed bv ancther-branch. It is an opportunity for manage =ent to 14 15 n te whether the information is going perhaps, the request fc is informatien let's say if the review reminder would suggest that is going cutside of what we wculd consider 1 ,s our standard review plan, so he is effered an cppertu.ity gg =cre f cm a manage =ent point of view--I didn't expect any l technical comment f:cm hi:r.- I didn't really expect any .y .,t [! cc= ment, and I didn':-receive any cce=en: frem him, but i j 3l vas an oppc : unity fc him to put 53 self into the p ccess i i if he saw fit. .,3 l j I l We weren': going to wai en any cencurrence f cm him. - r e g\\r i l O d!b d i Acne Reporting Cornpany

.. ~.. ..~ 22 1 Q Is it normal p ccedura to CC li=. Ross with me=cs 2 such as this? s' 3 A well, I =a'<a 1: a.p:ccedure. I =a'<a 1: a poin to 4 put his en the distributica of anything that I am signing 5 out where I have not perhaps discussed it with his c: he has 6 not seen any draft, so he has an cpportunity to see i: very 7 early in the process. 3 My raccliectien_is.I did not discuss this review 3 reminder wi d his prior to my signing it, but only p cvided to him a copy of it when it was issued to everycne wi'Mn the 11 branch. 12 Q What is a review rami. der? 13 A A review reminder is intended to p cvide 14 information to all of the engineers in the branch of an is area that we wished te follow through en as par: cf either is a CP review c an OL review, so i: p cvides =cre detail in 17 an area perhaps than what de standard review plan would 13 suggest. j t9 I It also nay pick up an area that is s=ecificallv i 00l not detailed in the standard rev_ew plan, so.he standard I t 21 i rev aw plan =ay have been a b: cad dedinitica of that area I i l cf review and a review reminder veuld sugges: in :cre de: ail 1 0:: 1 I i i 23, the area that shculd be. zursued bv. -J.e reviewer in -J.e l 24 ! review, se he is in efdece directed, al:hcugh no: forcibly l 05 directed, bu. certainly enccuraged and expectad c fcilew A CNie Recorting Cc r? Jh

~ 23 1 threugh en that review reminder in the sense that questions 2 dealing with that specific schjecu would be an cutgrowth ef t, 3 his review. 4 He wculd leek at the review reminder. He would 5 review the design of the plant, and he would generate 6 questions c other inquiries as suggested by the reviev 7 reminder. 3 Q The reviewers that. ycu are referring to are the 9 engineers on Mr. Israel's c: Mr. Ma:etis' staff? 10 A That is cc: rect. 11 Q -..Therefore, the cencerns of the =amorandum would C ccme into play in the review of construction licanse 13 applications and operating license applica:icas? 14 A Th.atiscc:: set. 13 Q As far as you knew, was this =emorandum =cuted to 16 the branch cr. department that wculd he concerned with 17 cperating reacters that already have their construction '3 permits and : heir operating license? 19 A As far as I knew, it was nce :cuted ec them. M l. Q Let ne read ec veuI and then show you a pc tien l t i 21 cf Chairman Hendrie's identification of what he censifered l + l 22 ' six =ain factc:s tha: caused and incisased the severi:v i i 23l cf the acciden at Three Mile Island, and this was part of I l I I 24 i a sea emen: he cave en April Loth, 1979, and : En referring i 25l Oc Inhihi: lic. 2 Oc the Sandy Israel depcsition. Acme Reporting Ce

.- - ~i s 24 t on page 10, the ecr.clu.-im reads, ""'he staf f has I ~ ' identified six ma-in facecrs that caused and increased the 4 't. 3 severity of the acciden: as follows." 4 Paragraph 2 reads, "The pressurizer elect:cmatic 5 relief valve which opened during the initial pressure surge failed ec clcse when the crassure decreased helcw the -O = actuation level. "This failure was not recognized and the relief line closed for somet -a." i 3 3 Paragraph 3: "?clicwing rapid depressurization of to the pressuri:ar, the pressuri:e: level indication may have-tt - Ted' to erroneous infeitinesiis 6f~Efgh Iever in~he reactor l t; ecolant system. The pressurizer level indication apparently 13 led the operaters to crematurely terminate high pressure inject w., flow, even thcugh substantial voids existed in the g 15

Sactor ccolant system" A

Do you have a question? is Q When you are done lecking at it t-A I would like to read it. ,,i i i (The witness read the referenced dccument.) 19 p] D [d@bh l 32 WITNISS: I have read 4: l '9 O g O 'u u Q 3Y MR. ~s~.':.FMAN : i 4.., I Q Nculd you agree that *=cse twc parag aphs describe l 3. I I 3l

we of the =ain factors in the Three Mi'.e Island ::ansient i

,I I cf March cf this year? i 3 ,,1 A .e: ne say : hat these are 20: necessarily :he wc:ds " i i i i l A c..s e Raporting Compcny m

4 25 1 that I would cheese to describe the event. In,other wc ds, 2 I don'. wish to say that--I have a different way I would ( 3 express it. 4 In general, I wculd agree that the failure to 5 recognize that the valve was cpen was a serious considera:icn 8 in the overall accident. I I would also agree that the operator, as I 3 understand it, p cvided makeup sufficient to maintain level 9 that he thcught was sufficient to maintain level in the to pressurizar, so I would agree with those two statements that 11 they are. two i=portant statements. 12 There are seme points in here that I wculd diragree 13 with in the sense of very technical sense. I am sure that the Chair.dn was speaking crally. I don't think this was 14 15 necessarily a prepared statement. '"he rr3 are sc=e technical 16 weaknesses.- ~ l~ For example, the failure was act reccgnized and 13 the relief line closed for sc=etime--chvicusly not closed i 19 for scmetime is what should have been stated in the record. f ~ Q ?at is a gra:mtat[ cal confusion? 20 21 A Yes. Also there is a statsment in here that l j 22l fel10 wing :spid depressurization of the pressurizer--I fon' l i 23 i knew _ hat, I have ne: studied the elets Of nha ::essuri:er ' I 24, pressure := agree tha: :here may have been a.ery es.:'.y l 05 ' spid depressuri:ation, but to say that fel'.: wing rapid i Acme Reporting Compony

26 1 depressuri:atica of de pressuri ar, I =igh: quibble with the to::t rapid, but that's about it. g 3 j Q Sut generally speakingk you would agree that the 4 failure of the PORV to close and the misleading information 5 p cvided to the operator as to core ecolant level by 8 pressurizar level indication were main facters that caused I c increased che severity of the accident?- 3 A Yes, I would agree that they are impc tant. I 9 dcn't knew that they are dat separate because as I recall to f:cm the accident, once the relief valve was closed, the 11 lavel d cpped very quickly, se in a sense, one led to the 12 other, given the relief valve would have been closed, de 13 cperater would have p cvided for more ma'<sup, but keeping 14 the two separate, in general I would agree that the relief 15 valve being open and the cperator, as I understand it f cm 16 reading sc=a of the material prepared describing the event, t* =aistained makeup primarily as I understand it based en F 18 l pressuri:er wats: level. i 1 19 Q In fact, to: d ated E2I based en pressuri:e l l t 00 ; level.indicatien? ? i h 21 A Yes, I thicli chat is cc rect. O o l' 22 Q Allow =e to refer you firs: :: paragraph I cf the 23! Nevak =e=crandum wherein it is sta:ed, t;nder upse: ,I 24 l condi icns, such as p clenged re'.ief valve Opening and l i t l 25 1 accidents where significant voids are f : ed 4- ~- a primary i 0 Acme Reporting Company

27 l t system, it may be possibis to end up with a twc-phase 3 mixture in the pressurize: that is not at the highest 3 temperature in the primary system. Under these circumstances, additiona.L less of primary system inventory c shrinkage in 4 3 the pruary system may not he indicated by pressuri:e level. "'his situation ha.s already occured at Davis-Besse 1 when a 6 relief valve stuck cpen." 3 then paragraph 3 ,"Although the safety analyses 9 do not require termination of the makeup system, cperators to would cont:ct makeup flow based on the pressurize: level 1g as' Fa:ff df EeC:7c: mal pFecedWiii. As" a ife~iufE, Tiiider 12 certain conditions where the pressurizer could behave as a =ancmeter, the operator could errenecusiv shut off makeup .a flow when significant void cccurs elsewhere in the system 14

. loss of inventory is continuing."

15 men the last sc 2ce in the final paragraph: is ?c: OL reviews, p ccedures should be reviewed to ensure t. adequate infermation before the cperater terminates =akeu:, f j b ficw." I l l My questice to you is first what are the negative og t i l .,, I consequences which you envisien f:cm an cperater turning off I despite the presenca ' ~" ds in the systsm, c- --a-= --l t is a centinuing less of inven: cry ' ased on =isleading c l infermatien btained f:cm pressuri:e level indica icn? .,4 A Ixcuse ne. Can ycu read back the questf.:n? 3 I 2 Acme Reporting Company

29 1 (The record was read bv. the reporter.) 2 T5Z WIT.iE55: "'he negative censequences I will 3 judge to =ean the pctential for core uncovery and ccre 4 damage. 5 If you just had voids in the core, voids in the 6 reacter coolant system, excuse me, and no leak from the reacter coolant system, I can't define any specific p chlem 3 with cutting back on makeup ficw in that situation. l 3 In other words, - the fact that you have voids in I l the reacter ecolant system would not by themselves lead to to tt cere-damag. ~ 12 If, however, you did ce=bine acw voids present ,3 in the cc.:e and a centinuing loss of inventcry where new the i i 14 inventory being lost is greater than the a= cunt of =aket.; 15 being added to the system, the potential there is for them, i .s the voids to increase to a point where there would be t 1 insufficient water re=aining in the reacter cooling system to centinue to ecci the core in an acceptable wav.. l I B I ? is could lead to a ec s unceverv as referred to ,9 ! l l 3 in core damage. g g'f d}dpN4 ,bi g tr j 3Y MR. e. FET : I Q ~4culd this be =cre likelv whe-= '-* c=erater l ._3,, I 3 cc==letely turns off nakeup ficw as cpposed 00 inter =ittently' i reducing ficw, increasing flew, reducing d'cw? l ., t i 4 I A Wel', _he answer is basic 2'.'.y f us:- what we ca_1 a i Acme Reporting Company

i i 29 I = ass inventory balance. If you have a certain a= cunt of = ass that you are icosing f cm de reacec: cociant system, and i 3 then you decide to turn it off, chvicusly the deficiency is 4 maximized. You are losing.the maximum amount. The net amcunt 5 is maximized. Let me say, hewever, if you have pericdic adding I and cutting back of makeup ficw, you would still do the 8 same calculatien in effect over se=e time peried, take an i inventory so to speak of the a= cunt of mass in the reacecr 10 coolant system, se depending en how frequently ycu restored 11 - " low, if ycu had no ficw,,,it is just a mass balance, but U in general it would he better to keep ficw on than to take U it off. 14 g 3ut in any event, this scenario presents the 13 hovious possibility of core uncovery as a censequence, 16 wculd ycu agree'With that D } t b II A Yes.. I would agree that if an cpe:2::: fc sc=e ,a reasen did nc p cvide the same a cune of = ass :o the U system as was being ics: through the system, that the i 20 system is capable then of =aintaining pressure at sc=e value j i 21! and wha you effectively have :.s scre steam haing fc vard .m in the reac cr ecolant system occupying volumes tha: i I vculd nc:= ally he occupied by licuid va er. i .,4 l i Q Wculd ycu agree :ha: the concern in -his re=crand = t 25 that was signed by you and drafted by Sandy Israel concarning Acme Reporting Compcny

~ 30 1 te==ination of makeup ficw cn the basis of misleading 2 information f:cm pressuri:er level indication is a concern, s. 3 for potential core uncevery? Is that the danger addressed? 4 A Well, I can say Iceking back at the zamo teday, that ,3 certainly 1s the case. 6 I wculd point out, though, that I think it is fair, 7 that the remarks shouldn't reflect the thought p ccesses a that I went through at the,ime I initiated the me c. I 9 think that is important. to I did not focus at the ti=e I concurred in the memo . __.cn issues such ~ as-~c~cYe EncBvery, ~sc~at thaii tis.e shat I 12 signed the same, I was act in ::ry own mind follcwing through 13 en any of the specific scenaries. I basically read the meme 14 for the basic substance of the meme. I found nothing in is there which ' suggested.to =e a reason that we shouldn't go 16 ahead. I thought we should, and en that basis, I did. 17 New to go back and lock at the =emo and study it is today, yes, in iceking at it ecday,the concern that you wculd l 19 have is that if an operator did act maintain p cper makeup, 20 and if he did secure makeup, the possibility of core 21 uncevery is a reality t t' 2: C When you reviewed the =e=crandu=, chen you i 23 confined yourself :c a scenaric that is described in -he 24 =e=crandum and did net e:c rapciate f:cm that? i 25l A I canne even say that I -heugh a scenario. I I i i i Acme Reporting Compcny

31 1 read it for the purycses cf underssanding it. I did no: 2 studv it in the sense to construct the scenaric to either s. 3 agree to disagree that such a scenario was possible. 4 The purpose of what I did by reading the memo was 3 just to know in effect the thrust of what the memo was trying 6 to pursue. It seemed like an area that =erited to me seme 7 investigation. As I recall, there was, the investigatierr 3 was to center en the need for a icep seal which was just a 9 particular hand in the pipe. 10 I did not see any reasen why we shouldn't pursue 11 the need to better understand why these were there, so I i 12 wculd say at this trno if that was basically the point, 13 that was all I can recall that I got out of the =e=o. 14 I did not particularly spend any time reading the 15 memo at all. I think I may have glanced at it for ten 16 minutes. l 1" Q Would you censider the concerns raised in the 15 l ne=crandus regarding misleading inic:=atien f:cs the i 19l pressuri:e level upon which the operate ceuld te:sinate 20 nakeup flew to raise a safety concern? i ^ 21 A At the time I signed it,.no. T.a me expl=4* 3 i I l 23 is part of our review p ccess, our branch dces no: review i i 1 03 ' emergency precedures. I dcn't recall =ak:.ng any menta-i 24, acts of the fac: dat we were discussing emergency precedures 25 i and operator acti:ns, sc I guess a: the -1:e I signed the i l i Acme Reporting Company

32 msm I did not see, I did no: recognice what the =emo was l 1 2 suggesting to the sa=a degree that I see it today. i t. l 3 I wender if I could have the eustica re-read and 4 my answer because I think I lost it scmewheres along the 1D* 5 (The record was read by the repertar.) THE WI*NISS:

Okay, 3Y MR. EZIE ER:

y ,Q Had the fidal paragraph of Mr. Israel's memorandum 9 to caught your attention where he suggests that p:ccedures he 11 _eviewed to ensure deqdate ' info:miti5n hef' ore t.Se operator 12 terminates makeup flew, would there have been a way fe you to call this to the attention of the ceccle who would be to., able to review the p ccedures to ensure that the coerator 14 15 had adequate information before he terminates makeup ficw? A I'm sorry. I am going to have to ask her o 16 read 11 again. ,3 (The pending question was read by the reporter.) TEI WISESS: Yes. Iet me sav chat if a need l ,9 i 'o to point this cut in the precedure had ccee to my attentica 1 i to the point that I wanted :: =ake c.her pecple aware of :.:, 3., i i I i I at -ha: time I would have discussed it with p chably pec='i-i who reviev,Oper: ing license persennel. ~.e : me enplain. f .,a,, I A: the time : hat I w ene the .eme, si ned the t I namo, it was mv unders-=- ' ; that the On'.v cec.=le within the .,3 Acme Recorting Cor

33 I staff who reviewed, who had the p:ccedures, were ne=hers o of the Operating License Branch. It was my understanding i, 3 that as part of develcpment of their examinations, they 1 4 would have access to these p ccedures. l l 5 I was not aware, to my '<nowledge, that Inspection 6 and Inforcement also had reviewed the peccedures, but perhaps ~ ] reviewed them at the site, so my point of contact as best I 8 could recollect of people who would have at least had 9 access to de precedure wculd have been the Cperating to License Branch. 11 It p Obably would non have ended there since they_ L2 do nou review the technical acceptability of the p ccedure, 13 but caly review it f:cm the point of view of deter =ining 14 what porticr. cf that p:ccedura do they with to chcose to 13 examine the operator en. 3Y MR. EI!JMA.N: 16 Q For de cperator's exa*.ation? i-A 2.a is cc :act, so the answer to your questien is 13 it would have been pcssible to follow through, although : i do not now knew exactly what chain of actions would have had l 19 t 00 to have been ta'<en. i i [l I ev_?.Na I f\\ i --i My assccia:icn w:..th people dd .pl..g krev. 3, 3 l i 1 22 p ccedures was not, I was no: familiar with -hat at da ,t ti:.8. l l 24 : C

scends :. ke to ne dat dere were ac fc mal i

1 25l p ccedures. Nould :ha: he an accurate assessmen, and :ha: Acme Reporting Compcny

~ 34 1 you would have had to have found a path? A I wculd say that that is generally true. I can i, 3 recall only one instance where we had an opportuni:f to 4 discuss even generic precedures. In one case, in reviewird 3 an emergency core coolant system for a class of plants, we 8 were concerned wich the operater actions, so we used the p ccedurea as the document f cm which we could understand 8 exactly what actions he would have te perform. i 9 We were interested then in the nu=ber of actions to and whether he would have sufficient time to perform those 11 actions. That. review culminated in our decision that the-- t operator should have scre, should have an automatic backup 13 in the sense that if he failed to perform the action, the 14 action would be done automatically for him, but in general, 13 we did not review p ccedures, and I wculd agree with the 18 way ycu phrased the question. Q Co you recall if that prior experience involved 13 a 3&W plant? 19 A It did not. It was a Westinghouse standard pla.:, l i. 20 i .and as I recall it had the title cf 32SAR-3. l 1 i 79 I There was one other occasien that I sight add when i l ~, -l there was a concern in the last several years ahcut a l 1 3 nu=her of events where the reacec s were ever-pressurized 2' '. during staruups. Feeple who wc:kad fc: me infc:mally i '23 chtained a ecpy of a p ccedure c p ccadures en hcw cla,:s Acme Reporting -Ce u

l. j 35 e i t were star ad up, so we did, and I think again we =ay have 2 gene through the !icensing 3 ranch where we asked if they s. 3 could cbtain for us a cecy of the procedure, and I think that is the way the engineers chtained it. 4 Q What was the ccncern at that **"e? 5 A The concern at that time, there was a technical 6 concern that during startups because sicher of operator 3 inattention er failures of certain equipments, the plant was 9 pressuri:ed--water :sactor plants were particularly sensitue 10 to ever-pressuri:ation because when the plants were being 11 7 tarted up/ they wei:IC be" ccmpletely' fill'ersith s~aser IGM g unless you were very careful en how you added water and 13 removed water, it was possible there for you te add more 14 water than*you were removing, and the plant would very qu ekly pressuri:e. 15 Q Is that the condition cf going solid or being 16 solid? 1 A That is correct. 3 t i Q What was the concern,that the pipes could be broken? 19 A Ihe cencern was that if you had a verf i :adiated 3 i 3, j vessel, and if it should have a crack c: a flaw in it, that I l 7, } there-was a suggestion. hat v4~" -"a vessel being ccid, i: i 3l vas of britela character, and with high pressures there t i ,,4 l was a chance tha: that. flaw wculd g w and rupture the vessel. a i .Q =c vcu recall wha: :lant this c ncern was discus @t 9 \\ Acme Reporting Ccmp ny +

U s 36 1 in the centext of? 4-A We discussed,the concern was brcadened to include . 3 all operating PWR's. As I recall, we may have had'55e 1 4 procedure for the Canald C. Ccek. Plant, and the Indian Point 5 2 or 3 operating plant. Q Were any =e cranda issued by your branch concerning the danger of going solid when the plant was in this state? ~ A Yes. Memoranda ~tc the point that Mr. Flugge, who is not now an employee of the staff, noted the concern. to Ee was reviewing licensing event reports which identi.fied 11

• "ese. kind of events.

He wrot's a =amo which summarised la these events and initiated the actions that follcwed. 13 Q Was he an engineer? '4 A Yes, he was. 15 Q Cn whose team was he? 16 A Ee worked for Mr. Ma:etis. Would it be possible to obtain a ecpy cf Ron Flugge'sl U Q t .*. I i semorandum? l i 19! l l A Yes. .,9 l ~ Q Co you reca da -"at ecisede who decor-d.ed the l

• • l' 3,

dis aihution of the =ecorandu=? ~4as it Mr. Flugce cr @p' \\g u ~ Mr. Masetis er yourself? u i A No. I can' recall who dete_ ined it. Nc. I i I i i 241 don' t recall whc =ade that, distribution.- i 3 i Q ~4culd there also be a yelicv copy of -his re=crandum 1 Acme Reporting Comocny i

37 1 in your file? 2. A Yes. 1, 3 Q Could we obtain a copy of chan as well? 4 A Yes. 5 Q Getting back to the Novak memorandum of January 6 loth, 1973, with respect to the final paragraph where there 7 is. this discussion concerning a concern that p ccedures he 3 reviewed to ensure adequate infor=ation ec the operator, ? is what you are saying that that simply didn': catch your to eye? 11 -= . It didn'.t catch my eye, and if I were to p chably A 12 suggest d.c.b we might have done with it, at most it would 13 have been part of an operating license review. We would ~ 14 have pursued whether the p:ccad"-= "c: that specific plan, 15 what it would specidically say. 16 I guess new locking at it, it would enly have 17 suggested when we finally got tb..the poi.it where the review was nearly ec=p'. eta because it is only at cha: cime when I t 19 the p ccedures have been prepared, that we would have had l l 20l as cpperunnity to review t.ie p ccedures and Oc make sure i I l 21l than that there was censistency between the design and the i i 22 p ccedures, but that is speculating because we, as : nust i 03 point cut, we don't as a ac mal paru of cur review, we have I 1 l 24, acu cc=hined the review cf p ccedures and the design. i, i i 25l When we have ch nnec p ccecures, i: has only been On j k p) l Acme Reporh.ng pagpcny

38 in. backg cund to help us have a-hetter understanding cf 2 what an cperator =ay er may no: de c: what he is required tb. 3 do. It.gives us better backg cund to understand potentially 4 a weakness in the design. 3 Q Sc is what you are saying that ocerating p ccedures 6 and design review were separately reviews basically? I A That is ccr:ect. 3 Q IIad such a ecurse of action cecurred and had 9 this paragraph caught your eye, would the peccedure 10 that you have outlined have confined this cencarn to 11 avaluatien of cperate: License permits, applications c 1* construction permits? 13 A If the peccedure aspect had really caught my eye, 14 it would have suggested to me a concern ec make this note, M this informatien kncwn to the Division of Cperating 18 Reacters. 17 I would have lecked p cbably fc some generic way is! to disseminate this infer =atien. I nay have tried to talk strictly then to the Operating Ticense 3 ranch pecple te see 19 20 if they cculd have disseminated that indc:=atien to all l t I 3, ceera" g plants--p:cEably act, bu: : prehably still wculd 1 m have discussed i: first wi_h _he tr.eratine..icensa '-=- *- hI,pe,g}jl[if3bh l w r 1 O I 3l pec9 8. We p chably then vculd have cencluded tha we wcu '_ d i 25;! nave nad := discuss it with the Civisien of Cperating l I Acme Reporting Commeny i

39 Reactors. 2 Q Let =e call your attention :o the first sentence s. 3 in the camerandum where the secc:and = :sfers to -Ms i 4 pechlen as being one noted.in 3&W plants that Icep seals 5 in.the pressurizar surge lines are used in sema plan: s designs noted in 3&W. Is that a generic reference to the 3&W plant design? A Yes. g Q Did that generic reference catch your eye when you to were icoking cver this memorandum? it A

Yes,

=... - - - ... -... - - - -.... -.....it p chably did. In other words, it at least 12 suggested to me that B&W designs were the only pressuri:sd x 13 water reacter designs that had a Ices seal. 14 I' probably didn't ma'<e much cf it because dhe 15 3&W plant, design has a different configuration with regard 16 to, in terms of elevation. It has what we call icwer lecp t-designs and raised loop designs, sc it wculd net have t.o, surprised me that a ec=ent li'<a a Ice; sea'. oni.r cecurs en i tg ' 3&W, and I =ay have associated that with just due to de fac i 29l that they have a di'faren: elevation a :angement, differen: 21 than de Westinghouse-and cc tustien plant designs. 1 22l Q Cf ccurse, at the time cf the issuance of this i =accrandum there were a nurier of 3&W pla.:s tha: a. ready 22l t 2; ' had their cperatcrs license and perhaps had gene cc=ercia'.. Wculd cu ae.ree with tha ? rj nm i c, {nbj huk 0 q, ~ s Acme Reporting Compcny

) 40 l i t A Yes. 2 Q The precedura dat wa-411cwed, that is, providing 3 this memorandu=t to the engineers en the staffs of your two 4 team leaders, would not have brought this memorandum to 5 bear en EsW plants that were'aiready operating reactors and 6 already perhaps operating ecmmercially, is that ec :ect? A That is cc ect. The distribution did not account g fer it. I think I did not, recognize it as scmething that 9 should be discussed at this time with the Divisica cf to Cperating Reactors. 12 It p cbably was b_e__ca_use__I thought there was semer... - 12 work yet that we had to do. In other words, we would 13 pursue the rep _ew en an operating license review and if l 1 14 informatiod ::mo out of.that review which we thought added 15 to our concern let us say, then I think we p cbably would 16 have brought the Division of Cperating Reacters into it, t; I would imagine that my thcught p ccess was one of ,3, wull, we still have to de the work. We still have to perfe:r, that part of the review that was a reminder :c the reviewers 19 20 to learn w:s about de pur;cse of having pressurized locp 1 2 seals, and if f:cm cur. review we dete= tined sece:hing da: 23 1 we felt had a safety censideration, den we would bring i: l e i I 3l cc to, 0; infor= - de Civisien cf Cperating Reacecrs, sc : L 24 l would have to say i: =ust have been my deugh at d z time i 5 6 23 when : signed de re=c da: i: was sc=eding chat shcu'.d be i Acme. Reparting Compdny* ~

t 41 I kept within the branch because we wara just going out, trying n to now learn =cre abcut the specific design peculiarity, i, 3 and if something would ccme up out of it, then we would 4 have another point in the enview process where other people 5 could be b cught in to share our intermation. 6 Q With respect to the concerns raised regarding 7 inaccurate information concerning core level on the basis 8 of pressurizer level, and-the possibility that the operate: 9 would terminate makeup flow based en the inaccurate 10 information, what further review did you feel was necessary 11 before this matter was called to the attention of other t 12 depart =ents? 13 A Well, I did not focus on that point, so I don't 14 think that is a fair characteri:ation. 15 What I would say is as I recall my point was that 16 we were going to investigate why.there was reactor ecolant U Icop seals. 'When we understecd why they were there, we 18 would p cbably then disseminate that infor=a.cio n. j 1 19 We would, if we felt it was certainly a safety conce:. Ml I that was =cre firm in cur minds. i l 21 I did not a the time we issued : hat re=c recogni:e l 22 all of the ingredients of the me=c to the same Level tha: 23 we can today but it was in my sind seme:hing -ha we were i 24 ! going to rev ew to be :er understand the basis fer a specific i L I 25 design configuration. 'D I Acme Reporting Compcny

42 t Q Would ycu agree that the safety concern is rather. ac.c. arent en t:he face' cf this memorandum? s. 3 A In today's light, yes, but I de not believe that i 4 it would be that apparent at the time that the memo was 3 prepared. ,3 Fc: example,'there are 15 engineers in the branch. To my knowledge, no one ever sat down and discussed it 3 with =e. Nchody asked me whether c not we should discuss 9 this issue with the Division of Cperating Reacters. I assume to and I am fairly positive that each of the engineers read the memo. re"at-reast T#furd haefe 'ie~ad 'it te make sure"h'e' ~ tt at least understeed it. g 13 He may have not done anything with it at that time becau~se he was no: reviewing a B&W plant. As.I recall, 14 15 there was only ene c tac B&W plants at that time being 16 reviewsd, so the memo did not ring the halls at the time it t-was issued that it certainly is suggesting it can ring today. 13 Q 3etween January 10th, 1978 and March 23th, 1979, t I 19 was any such review conducted c: further exploracica of the j 3 p chlem conducted in your branch? D l b l g A It was my undersuanding--le: se say it this way. l l t l ~, i I would have expected that that fu_.her review wculd have t 1 taken lace as part of the review a' v= cperat:.ne --a a l license review. Midland is a 3&W plan: ci similar design := i 34 : the Thre= va Island plan design, se it would have been 3 i Acme Reporting Company

43 logical for the reviewer of that plant to engage in j . questions dealing with that subject. ~ 1 Q Do you know who was assigned Oc review chat plant? A Mr. Scott Newberry was the assigned reviewer, and he was assigned to Mr. Jerry Mazetis' section. 5. ~ 6 A The review has been in process for probably two years. Cnly recently did I have an opportunity to talk to 8 Mr. Newberry, and he noted for me that when we reviewed, started the review of the Midland application, it was one - of -the plants that we selected-for assistance' in review ~f cm- ~~ 11 theIGEGpersonneloperatingtheIdahoNatio$alhasu Laboratory, so they assisted us in preparing some of the la, questions,* in fact preparing :nost of the questions fc our initial round of questions with the applicant. Q Could you please give me the name again of the lahcratory? A It was the Idaho National Test Laboratory--INIL--

daho National Engineering Laboratory.

l U [ Q Co you know if they dault specifically with concerns ; 00 i I raised in the Nova.k recorandum of Januarf loth, 19~3? j 21 A 'I did ask that cuestion =cre recentiv, and I Mr. Newber:f infor=ed ne that he icoked at their questions 23 i and it was nou there. It is possible tha: their questiens 1 i pra-dated the issuanca ' - e review reminder. i U UA Acme Recortina Commenv

s o m- _e es -w-44 1 When we p cvided inic.~ation to the people who o would be assisting us in cur ' reviews, it is my understandintr., ~ 3 although I did not specifically verify it myself, that we 4 gave them copies of all of the standard review plans for 5 which we have primary responsibility, those that we have 8 secondary responsibility. I We wculd have also.given him, them ccpies of all 8 of the existing review rem ders, so if it was in existence 8 at the time they initiated the review, they would have had to de heefi of de review edader. .~. U Q_ Would it be possible to obtain a copy of the la questiens they posed se as to ascertain 9.e date that they 13 posed them? 14 g 7,3, 15 Q Could you provide that to us? 16 A Yes. MR. CHCPKO: Off the record. 1~4 (A discussion was held off the recc d. gp 19 SY MR. EZI,IMAN: M' Q Ic you know if the concerns of the Nevak i memcrandum were addressed in the c.estiens finally sub d--=d i i ^4-! to the a=elicant in the Midland CL review? I I 3 Vewcer y acdress those In c her wc:ds, d'd V-l 1 i l i 3' cencarns that the Idahc Nati:nal Test '.aborate:/ did ac ? l l 4 i ~, A

cnLr recen:Lr aska'. Mr. Newber:~r and Mr. Ma:e:Ls c

I s t Acme Reporting Company

45 l i i if they had, if there was a question asked dealing with this [ M. As T recall f:Om cur conversation, thei s first impression was yes, thev had cicked it uc.

Ecwever, 3

they had act been able to 1ccate the question. In d.scussing it between themselves, they believe 3 what they new recall is that while it wasn't asked en de ,o firs round, they had intended to ask fc in during che second round of the questions, se it may have been when they thcught they had asked it, that might have been really what g the recollection was coming up with. ut_t hadn't been_ asked.*et,_but.what they._,,. _.... _. gt No 4 - ] p cbably were going to de was ask it en the second round cf / questions. Q Eas the second round of questions been cccc,leted 14 c is that ecming CD? 15 A There have been second =cunds of questiens ,6 comm. leted. I don't knew if we specifica11v. issued cur final second round questiens. i 1 i My thought is that when we were p cbably in the 19 i preparation of the second round of ques-dens is when che 20 ! l I l l Three Mile incident cccurred, se new chere is a ques.ica i 4 in sv mind whether all of our c.uestion.s. get cc: befcre de 3 Three Mile incident. .,. j Subsequen: Oc the Three Mile incident, we have had i 3, .,..i ether ceccie assisting us en the stadd in perfc:.ing chis 3 %,h\\ &y rp'U Q ' sd Acme Recerting.C or t q o j \\

46 review, so I am not up to data as to exactiv wha: stage 2 of review the Midland a=.=.11catica is at this time. s. 3 Q Would it he possible to obtain frem vou a cepv cf 4 the second round of questions if they exist er the draft 5 second round questions if they exist? A Yes. .o E Q Co you believe that had :he significance of the 3 safety eencerns been raised. in the Novat camerandum cd Januarf g 10th, 1978 invclving nisleading infer =atien frem pressuricar to level as to cera ecolant level and potential operator error ..b... d-.-- =enereen, that. _ -. -this memorandum would have plaved a ase 13 significant part in preventing the accident at Three Mile T Island in January of this vear? .w A I my own epinion, no; I think the =e=cranda u 15 would have been. judged probably still hypothetical. It was not clearlv in av m4 d a :nemorandum which had sufficien: 16 t-technical detail c.cerhaps suc.c.est a change in the desi:.. 3 I am speculating, but I would guess that it would l I i i not have been a clear basis for saying had that inferma:icn { 19 I been disseminated, withcut a deuht it wculd have ::aciuded, the Three Mile Island accident. i I dcn't knew the answer. My guess is -J.a: the .o. l =eme cculd have been reviewed and " deed :c he still .,.,a: 1 1 i i 3l nygctnetical. There was basis :: sugges that the cpera:crs .nad.nad events s

._a: ::

his. .cceptanle acticn.nac ceen l Acme Recortina Commenv

s 47 1 taken, and it may have been argued that the operaters are 1 2 alar. incugh ec respend p cperly and that there wculd be no, l s. 3 need fer a design change. Q Your first point was that a memorandum such as this 4 5 would need a technical workup to sally have been useful, e is that correct? A Yes. I think that we would have had to develep 3 a technical basis to suppo.rt the need for changes in cperating 9 plants. We would have done it by the accu =ulatien of to additional operating data f cm which a technical argu=ent would h.. d.-e ma e to support the need for a change. l ~ 11 1, For examc.le, when we talked about the pressurized 13 water reactor transient, it was through tha kind cf an t4 argument etiat changes in the design of the plant, as well 15 as seme of the precedures, cccurred. The staff was 16 convinced that these changes were necessa f,and en a tim.a t. basis app cgriate for making these changes required that they he made. t3 19 I think enly after we ceuld have accu =ulated a i 20 technical argument, which wculd he made ef the data f:cm i n operating plants and a. technical evaluatica cf its significance, 23 would changes he suggested. D @3 b 3 Q Ead such technical wc:kup heen d ne :n.his i 3l =e..terandum de ycu feel that this ne=crandert in conjunc:icn I i with such :achnical verku: could have been a sienifican l i 6 l l 1 Acme Reporting Company i

1 48 1 facter in the preventien of ""C 2? 2 A I would say that'what we would have certainly s. 3 changed would have been operating p ccedures, so the pro- [ 4 cadures would have been =cdified to reflect the concern. 5 To the degree that the mcdified operating procedures would 6 have prevented the accident, yes, but that mill would be a certain degree of speculation on my part. 3 Q At the and of the_firsu paragraph of the memorandum 9 there is a reference to the Davis-Besse 1 incident wher's a to relief valve stuck open. \\ _. - Were you familiar with that transient at the ti=e- -.. - l 11 12 that you reviewed this =amorandum? 13 A I was aware of the transient, yes. We had studied ~ 14 it several months earlier. I did not specifically recall 15 any of the review of that incident when I signed this 16 =emorandum. 1 I knew it c:cisted, and I was satisfied that it ts was an appropriate reference. i 19 Q At the time that you reviewed this =e=crand=, t 20; were s u familiar wf '- -" .v.ichelson =ecorandu= grcduced by i i 21 Carl.v.ichelson? D IU g\\ - uuu u 20l A No, I was ..o0. did not. w c:: its e:cistence. 23! Q At the time you reviewed the =emerandum, were you l t

s l aware that this =eccrandum was inspired by a centact between 25 '

Sa dy !srael and Jesse Ibersele? l Acme Reporting Comocny

49 1 A No, I was not. 2 Q Were vcu aware that that centact arcse cut of a s. 3 discussien'by the AC35 concerning the Pebble Springs plant? 4 A No, but let me point cut that I was aware that Sandy 5 Israel and Mr. F.hersole had had some discussions. It was 6 my understanding that these discussiens er as I recall now, 7 my i:inression was that these discussicas related to perhaps 8 over-ficcding of the stea=.generaters. 9 Q Ycu weren't aware that their discussiens concerned to the cencerns raised in this =emerandum of January 10, '78? 11 A That is correct. 12 Q Were you aware of the sequence of events of the' 13 Cavis-Besse September 24th, 1977 incident when you reviewed 14 the =e=cra$du=? 15 A I was familiar with the Davis-Besse event following 16 the time that events cccurred. I did not specifically, 17 again as I said earlier, refresh my memory as to specifically 'S what was the : avis-Besse even: when : si ned the nemorandum. 19 Q Cc ycu think that voc were aware that the Cavis-20 3 esse event involved an unex lained closure c#

1. =adwa*=-

= l l l 2' ' valve which cu: cff water :c de stea= genera::: wh'-" 22 ' turn resulted in a rise in reac c: core p essure and i 23 emperature and as a result the ?CT7 cpened and stuck cpen, i l 24 da: cec'=-- ascaped 2 :cgh -he Open PCrr, flowed in: 25 ; the quench tank to such an exten: da: the ruptured disc en - ne r n P s $D }AL o - -{

g '

l -cme Reporting C pnipeny o

50 the quer.ch tank ruptured and that nevertheless the L c.rassuri:er level increased to its =axi=um? Were v.ou aware cf those details? A I was probably aware of those details shortly after the event. The branch had an opcortunity to send people to 5 es e an we , study e.e event. 6 When I ne.ed the memo, I probably had a recollection of the Davis-Besse event as an event which had a transient which ended up with a relief valve opening, but = cst importantly, that the quench tank ruptured and that there - was.-a--blowdown-into-containmener 11 O cc veu recall the names of the cecple who were sent 12 to investigate that ever.: f cm your branch? A At least Mr. Gerald Mazetis. 14 Q Ead those details slipped from your sind by the time you had sviewed the Januarv loth, 1973 me=crandum? 16 A Yes, thev had. 17 O Wculd it he fair to sav that the reference in the ,a i Januarv 10th, ' 73 =emerandum of opera :: arrer based en ,9 I 1 6 misleading infor=ation as to ccre ccclant level based on l 1 m l pressurizer level didn't catch your eye? i 21 l l A 2.at is correct. When I say dids't catch my eye, w i i i 23 ; let =e say that if I read i:, technically 2: = ace sense :: l l .,4 l me so I wasn' a uine with bhe cal centen: ci :he f' g ',,shN hd(OMOO(uten o 'i ' y 25 I Acme Racortine Comocnv

1 51 t .When I say it didn' t catch my eye, it didn't i 2 suggest to me anything of the significance of the statement, s. 3 as we can now icok at. 4 Going back to the Davis-3 esse incident, we 5 concentrated our reviews on,certainly we were interested in 6 what the cower operated relief valve, how it performed. 1 7 We had an intrest because we were gena: ally 1 coking for i a systems response. 3 We were interested in the centain=ent behavior, to specifically the amo n t of debris that was for=ed in the tt sump, so there were areas of our review that we concentrated I _.__...m_._. 1., on. 13 .?/ =ecc11ecticn was ve in the Systams 3:anch did 14 not specifically icok at the operator actions. It may now 15 in hindsight he a weakness or a specialization by which the is I Branch did its work that it was not able :: really o. n the t7 operate: in the systems review p ccess, t3 Q Nccid it he acenrate to say that as a result of the review of the Cavis-Sesse incident, you were not aware of the; tg 39 operator acnien in that incident? f l l l 3, A No. We ::cbab1v. were aware of it. It vas difficulti f I for us 00 ince ora-= 3-4- a sense in:0 cc: review p cesss. t i 3; Q I see.

• hat efers to the operate: having ter=ina ad, I

n. 3 7 i i l A Ihat is cc rec.. p Q[ ^;'1' p T(g'1g3 3 i dI I(bob'}q l J i-....,~.;-., c---- L

a 52 Q In the structure of things, is.ir. Centen your superior? ~ A Mr. Centon is the Cirector of che Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. Under bi, he has a number of d. visions, one of which is the Division of Systems safety, whose director is Mr. Roger Mattsen. Under Mr. Rcger Mattsen is a n"~her of assistant directorships--one, reacuor safety. At the time of the *hree Mile incident, Mr. Rchert g Tedesco was the assistant director. I recorted to Mr. Robert 10 '- Tedesco at the time. - - - - ~ ' - ~- 11 Q Mr. Tedesco I assume was not provided with a ccpy of the January 10th, 1978 memcrandum as a part cf distribution? 14 A That is cc rect. He may have had it in the file that Mr. Ross turned over to his when Mr. Tedesco r.ssumed 16 res=onsibility. I have no idea whether c not that indeed

1. s i

occurred. is ' I Q When, did Mr. Rcss turn ever rese.c=sibility :: Mr. Tedesco, if you can recall? Is that shortly after the I 00 3 i =emerandum was issued' 21, i i .,., i, A No. I don'c recall the specific date. t ~ i Q ~4c ul d :.: have been semecise-inr1A71? o a va ? 23 i u li, i J j iu i 6 i a ,,, s. J 6b b l l " L2 24 ; i Q What cime wculd this have been? i l i l Acme Recorting Compcny

n 53 I i A Well, if.v2. Ross maintained any files, it =ight i o have been filed under information related to the Reacter i, - 3 Systems 3 ranch. 4 Q But not applicable ~ to a specific OL review? 3 A No. I would have guessed he would have had it under 6 a file which would have been a file to show the areas cf I review of varicus branches. 8 Q Did the Pebble Springs plant ecme before your branch 8 fo: review? 10 A Yes, as a construction permit application. 11 Q When was that app cximately, if you can recall? ta A 1977; it had a delayed review because of the s 13 potential-cff the recc d. I4 (A discussion was held off the record, and che 13 witness' response was read back.) '6 T WIDr5SS: Fc: velcanic erupticas in the l~ vicinity of the plant site. 18 3Y MR. ET' Md.AN : l i 18 i Q Eas that plant received an cperating license oc ~ .,0 date? i .,, i A Nc, it has net. I Q Oid it go th cugh an cperating licensing review .I O ! stage through ycc: \\f branch? ,' 53 dr D L ., l A Nc, io has not. ,. i ~i Q Are ycu familiar wich te.p;esticas -ha: are l I I Acme Recortina Comceny

54 1 p:cpounded by the ACRS regarding pianu applications? 2 A I am familiar with those questions -lat the AC3S i. 3 develops in the area that I have technical ecgnicance over, 4 yes. 3 Q Ce those questions get =cuted through your branch 6 either to c en the way back, with answers, f cm the licensee? ~ A Well, ACRS questiens can take a variety of paths. 3 Usually the questions ceme-to us f cm the staff members. 9 "ney say be questicas that a specific cccmittee man has to wished to be asked, and we then endeaver to answer it, or - i i 11 we will let it be kncwn to the applicant that this is.a question .i. that we have been asked to answer and suggest that he 12 13 prepara an answer either as an amend =ent or perhaps an a 14 =eeting. 15 Yes, we generally. I wculd say we always :sceive 18 the responses to any ques-J.cns by the applicant. If they ~ 1~ are fc maliced and if they are at a meeting tcday, it is

g. c T

0h 4 13 part of the record, se it is available 00 u.1 i . 19 Q Cid your branch receive the questions that were +, 00 p:cycunded by the ACRS regarding the pebble Springs applica:icn? 01 A These questiens are a little, -hey were a li::le 22, unique. They vers verf detailed, as I :scall, and my I 03

scellection is that thrcugh phe Div sion ci ?:c ect 24 Management c sc=eching chase questicns were p cvided cc the i

i i l 25i applicant, seme:hing in che sensa of can you have chase l i Acme Raccrtine Comeany

55 1 answers to dese questions in time fc de next subec=mittee 2 =eeting c scmething. s 3 As I recall, the staff was just =cre c less a 4 middleman in getting the questions to the applicant. They 3 were prepared by somehedy on the staff of the ACRS, and they 6 were given to us p cbably through the Division of Project 7 Management-seme of the pecple on our staff, in fact. I a think I recall that we had se=e very limited discussions 9 with regard to the secpe of de questions. to It is my racc11ection that these questions went well ._._'~ _ _..i:eyend wl3tle Iduldlfaditionally cail *he be52s of cur ~~ ~ ~~~ ~ ~~ tt ~ e review either in suggesting =cre failures than what we would t3

aditionally icek at, and asking for consequences, but it was of that nature.

14 13 Q Cc you recall who discussed the secpe of the 16 questions? Was that.veu and sc=e other people on vcur staff? A As I recall it, I did have discussions either with t; '3l Mr. Israel c: Mr. Ma:ecis. I don't recall which persen I I had that with. l 19 I o i Q Was it ene er the other rather than hcth? l 29 t i A It could have been both. I' These questions were rcuted fr = de ACRS eventually. Q l t .,3 =c vcur 5:anch and den ycur branch simply passed dem Oc l 1 i 24 l the acclican: wi dcut further analysis c: review of che I I .s, questions? ,79 n e'."p.w., ~ r . m. n i w 1 a u i C .s e m a cann +;,n t= : ~..

5G t -A No. Let =e see if I can help. It is =y 2 racc11ection that the questions were given := the app cgria,te s. 3 brancb. in the Division of Project Management. They 4 probably gave us a ecpy of the questions at the sametime 3 that they gave a copy of the questicas to the applicant, 3 so that was the way I think we beca=e aware of the qcestiens. We p cbably got them thecugh the Divisicn of 3 Project Management, but they were responsible for seeing 3 that these questions were provided to the applicant. 10 Q Then your branch did not act as a conduit? 11 -A S.at'is Mr reccIlectfen.- No ; we"dii 'not.- '-" t2 Q What if anything was done by your branch with respect 13 to the questions? A We ca.m. inly read the respenses. We were interested 14 15 in the responses to the questiens. We did not, as a fo- '.al review, review the adequacy, so the questions were basically is developed by the AC25. We reviewe.d the respenses basically for infor=ation and to st:cngthen our cwn review of the gl tgl particular conce: s suggested by the questions. l l 3 Q Co you.have any raccliection of the centent of i i I questien No. 5, which.was p cycsed by Mr. Ibersole? 3, i i i A No, I do noe. t O Co you recall if any of the questiens raised 3 .,4 l specifically che concerns which are addressed in the..anuary 1 i l 'O 10th, 1973 =ecerandum signed by yeu? D qh'va ~ /1WT T' 6 * -y L i-t -[1 ' dd . b U i Acme Reporting Compony = r

57 A No, I do not. Q Is there scme documentatica concerning your s branch's censideration of the Pebble Springs questions 3 that we might be able to see--memoranda, evaluations? A Ist me see if I understand. What you are asking me is after we had received the responses f cm the applicant, did we writa anything which described any ce==enes ' rela ed to those rescenses? 3 My recollectica is we did not, but I will icek and if there is anyuhing available, I will make it available to you 11 Q Is it normal precedure for vec to receive the 12 questicus propcunded by the ACRS and the responses p cpeunded br'the applicant? i A Yes. We generally work a little more in the line-- I would suggest that this was a little different. Genesi.ly what happens is we are a stronger, we =ay play a stronger t- =cle in the questiens. In this case--by that let me clarify what I mean by strenger. We would get,a certain questien f:cm ACRS. We =ay read it, discuss it, and then prepare questiens and then 21, i ask them of the acclicant, so we may dc that kind of wc:k en .m f behalf cf the staff. 23 1 Then the questien ec=es back. We review it. We 24 ' l vculd discuss the res=cnse with he ACRS-~and,.he acclican.. - j.! .a Acme Reporting Ccmpcny l l-

58 In this case, the questiens had, c my nature were already, you might say had been prepared. "' hey were i. areas, as I recall, that we wculd not ac:= ally ask because 3 in the sense they wculd he, you might suggest a viciation 4 f what we wculd censider to be cur standard review practices. 5 ey w u d be cutside of what we dg.ht can design basis 6 events. Q Your area of specialication? 3 A Not se much the area of specialization--as scmething 9 ey nd what we :s W re fc Econsing; for e m % e, H we to }~ ~" equira that an ac=1 dent'he reviewed assuming a single" " failure, we would act necessarily then ask for accidents that 12 would require two c: three single failures to track that g scenaric, so in that sense the questions were dealing with perhaps scenarios less likely than what the staff would g 'I

• 16 Q

So in that. circumstance, your staff really did nothing with these questiens? .a. A. "' hat is cc rect, in the sense tha: we neither g i included them in our own safety evaluation--we were kacwledged ._y able that the questions were asked. We were kncwledgeable Ul that I den't know if ali cf the questions oculd be answered \\ l i i l i l in encugh de ail to say that all you wanted ec knew, the ,,, l a l I i applicant was able to p cvide you with. i ,5l It was my understanding and recollection.ha: the 'T l ii) ' '\\[ O fl ! j D O Jj) D Acme Reporting Comp Eb 'N ( l \\

f9 applicant p cvided a surprisingly ec==rehensiva answer; g tiiat might have been because of his need to try to be as .t. responsive as he could c the cecmittee such that thev 3 could complete thei: review and the c ccess of the 4 cens c en pe. t cou ce r ught to a close, j 3 Q Was your branch responsible for ::ansmitting the g respenses to the ACRS? A Not te my kncwledge. 3 Q Co you recall or de v.eu knew if the a=c.licant 9 responded to each of the questions that was p cpounded? g _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _.A As I said, he may not have answered all of the j g m questions completely. Scme of his answers nay hays been I we -have sotr studied. that specific scenario, but he answered the questiens, Als it was my rec llecti n in is ussings with u

• E 16 which he was able to respend to these questions in a rela.tivelv short period of time, ts >

l 9l Q Were v.ou aware cf an.y ::ansients cccurring at .'o ! plants cutside of the United States that might have invclved l I

t a PCE7 failure.

21 i A was

at the time, le 's say cp until. the time c f.he '"' ~= = v d ' = :sland accident.

03 [ Recentiv we have been =ade aware ci a clan: 3, 1

1:siant s' - 41a: in scme respects cc

--a --=a v= =cciden: = =as ' f Q {V-u g h l . O@c@h Acme x a p ortm.g an o

~ 60 t in dat there was a system transien which resulted in the 2 PORY valve re=aining cpen, one of two valves remaining i, 3 cr-and say have been cpen for a period of 20 minutes 4 after which the operator secured the valve. 5 Q Was that a Westinghouse plant? 6 A It was my understanding that this is a Westinghouse 7 designed plant. S Q. Located in Europe? 9 A Yes. to Q Co you recall i' you personally did any wc k on the - - \\ 11._.. - -. _ - - -.':'hree Mile Island 2 construction pe it c: cperato: license 12 application? ( 13 Q, At the time that Three Mile Island 2 application 14 was submitted for a construction per=it, I was wc hing 15 in what is new called the Division of ?:cject Management, to Mr. F. css was what we at that time called the, he was the 17 p cject sanager for dat branch. 13 I dcn't rec = = y specific portiens Of the review i 19 -Jiat I underteck myself, but ! de think that we had t i 20 discussions in de area cf ' thermal hydraulics with regard 21li te Three Mile Island. - l 22 I say be recalling ' tree Mile Island tinit 1. "here [ i 23 l is that possibility, but I don't recall any specific reviews i i 24 tha: ccnducted myse'.f cf either Three Mile Island 1 c: 2. 25 0

• iculd it surprise you ec learn da; you are la.sted i

Acme Reporting C c l

61 on the decket fe Three Mile Island 2 for a'pp cximately 4 400 hours, if I recall cc: ectly, of time? i. 3 A This is prior to the Three Mile Island incident? Q I am trying to find out the dates. 5 A Your question is with regard to the operating license 6 or the construction permit? I Q I' m no t sure. I can represent to you that your a name appears on the Three Mile Island 2 decket. 9 A That could be the case because if you go back in 10 time to the Three Mile Island decket, it includes the 11 ccnstruction permit for Three Mile Island.1., operating. 1* license fc Three Mile Island 1, cens.truction pe../t for Three Mile Island 2, and the operating license for *hree 14 Mile Island 2. 15 As I recall, I did not perfcrm any engineering 16 reviews of Three Mile island 2. I had already takan en =y I present position. There were periods of time during which I i did perform engineering reviews and it is very possible i l U that one of the c.lants I cocid have rev.iewed in le 's sav.- deretriewoftheemergenchcoreecolant systems c: cor. 3 i i I i -le:ma'. hydraulics could have been either Of de Three. Mile l, -i Island enes. .s. i Q Could ycu previde us vi d any decu=ents which ~' ,. i l wculd indicace what daces ycu wc ked en Thraa 'de Island I 25 i I and what ycu did in da: recard? }\\ \\ \\ u l Acme Recort,nc <cmceny i

62 1 A I don't knew how I could do that. I could see 2 if that informatien is available. I am very skeptical I 3 that I could obtain it without a very :edicus review. 4 Q Can you suggest where we might find such information? 5 A I would suggest that the Accounting Depa *mant may s be of some hele.. Q Okay. You mentioned earlier that due to 3 specialization c: compartmentali:atien, certain types of 9 review fell outside of your function, and I think we were 10 discussing this in the context of the rcute that you migh: tt fo110w to bri:.7 the concerns of the Janca:7 10th,. 7_3._. _ _. _ _. _ memorandus to the attentien of ather detaraents within the ,o DEC

• 13 14 fs it your feeling that such ccmpar'"antalization 15 or specialization in the NRC was an organi:ational defect of 16 sema sort prior to TMI 2?

A Certain1v I think a certain a= cunt of compartmentali i 1. 13l =acion'cr speciali:ation is necessarf. Nuclear pcwer plan: j tg design envelopes a wide range of speciali:ation, so I would { +

o supc. ort sc.eciali:ation as a necessarv. c. ar cf a we

1. ~~ctionq i

.n ing regulatcry c:gani:ation as far as nuclear pcwer plan: reviews are cencerned. 4 i

3. l

.ity scist is tha if there was an err r, it was i I l .i the failure te reccgni:e the relationships between che i p;ccedures, he emergency cperacing p :cadures tha wculi l 3 MUN$h ) C(gmgcJy6 ~i Acme Report.ing

\\ 63 a fc110wed as a censecuence cf an accident. t We were aware of the procedures, but we did no: N i as part of our review of a system design 0: a systa= 3 1 l 4 evaluation ecmbine the ceerator's activity with what he would do following p ccedures, not to say that we didn't 3 know that he had p ccedures.* Cu$ reviews did censider how g soon an ocerator =ight have to take an actic;:, and we wculd certainly consider that. 3 We were careful not to accept designs and scenari:s 9 fer which operator actions were suggested to be recuired 10 - verr earirafter an accident c~c'duffed',"sd "f:cm' th'e" point of u our review, we would icek at the design to see that the cperator had sufficient ti=e ec take an action. 1, What I nean new--but we did not scrutini:e the 4 peccedure to see that,all of the implications of what the 3 c=erater could or could not do as cart of the accident is scenario, so f:Om that peint of view, I would sense a need to tie those together. I Q "No cuestions occur.as a result".cf-icur ce==ent. t 19 l First is would you agree that the B&W CTSG design pu f ar, ,9 l greater demand en the.cperator in a time sense':han ei:her .. i i r { the ~4estinghcuse design c the cc=hustion eng'-=a 'ag design? ' f i A Well, if I take awar

• "-==

'd 4 1 a sland 2 accident; -~a 23, 1 and everv. hine we have nes recently reviewed in erns cf 1 24 i i I i short times Oc d:fing cc: steam generators and se f:::h, i h Comp) Acme Reporting e

i 4 J 64 g the answer to your question would be nc because cc: rules 2 that we have adopted in terms of required cperater actions in i. the even: Of an accident are the same for Westinghouse 3 4 plants er ccmbustion plants or a General 2:lectric Plant or 5 a B&W plant, that being no cperator action is required 6 let's say any scener than 10 minutes, regardless of the-accident, se the cperate: response ti=e is ac shorter :c 7 these classical accidents tae..t we have reviewed. 3 Q When you indicate that the operate has ne required 9 to procedure to follow for 10 minutes, is that post-DC cr _g A this is pre-nc. This says if there is an accident 12 13 that cccurs, any action that is required t: =itigate that t 14 system, that accident cust be performed automatically, that the operator does not have to take an action before 10 15 16 minutes, se there was no action requir' d by an e=ergency e precedure as.far as I know. 17 We wculd net have a:creved the design had we kncvn that there was an action required c:her than verifica ica, l gg which means you leck but you don't have to perfor= an action. i .,9 You dcn't have to turn en a pu=p

secure a va'.ve c: start 3

l a diesel er senething cf ta: nature, so ncne of these .,,,--l i acti:ns are required any scener than 10 ninntes, and this 3 is pre-SC. 1 34 I t Q

n the

~".C 2 scenario, the Opera:Or, is i: accurate 3 6 4 SmO '4 09 0Iiill9 CO' gs }I .3L

i 63 l t Oc state that the opera c en the basis of indica:::s :cok action? i. i I I '3 A

.et me point cut one thing and le: me first clarify an earlier statement.

4 5 Generally, there is never a requirement for an operator to take an action before 10 ::iinutes. On certain O a clasts for an interim period of time we have given credit a 3 for an operator taking an action let's say in 5 minutes. 9 Under those conditions,we call him a dedicathd operator 10 in the sense that given there is a response, his first and caly action is to perform that function, se for a period . 11 t, of time until,well, obviously until the plant is =cdified, we have me..sittsd an acticn bv an c=ersec: in less than 13 g 10 minutes; but traditionally our design requirements are 15 that there is no cperator action before 10 minutes. 16 What sight suggest sc=ething earlier is that after g the plant has been built and the plant is operating, scmething is learned of the plan that wasn't criginally kncwn and .5 l i until certain changes can be made to the clan:, as in tha 19 1 sense instead of shutting dcwn the clant until the chances .M. i l i i 1 can be made, the staff has en cccasien dets:- ' ed that a 3,. ~{ dedicated cperater is an acceptable interim :sspense to the I f i i ^CenCs:n. c 3 I i 3l New saybe we cugh: :c ge back :c your second j questien. vanced :c clarifv ha: ceine. c m '\\ rn q so h' s .x ~ 9 h... g 3 Mu i ~ Acme Reporting Compcny

Su-t Q Lac me fc11cw that for a nc=ent. This type of a o. change and the use of an interim ceerance would result f:cm. s. 3 the recognition of a generick problem, would chat he accurate? I 4 A It could be generic, or it nay be plant specific. 5 Q MY second question concerned what you have described 6 as a lack of integrating operator p ccedures in design review. 8 What do you-feel that is the result of? Is there 9 seme lack of cverview in the c:ganization, sene st nctural to or organizational p chlem that keeps these concerns and reviews unti:IEdms51Teis? } ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~-- ~ [ it 12 A Yes, there must he that. The c gani:ation t3 certainly has to set certain charters for itself, and there 14 is in the 1:!avelopment of a structure of an c gani:ation is certain responsibilities that are identified. I would say certainly a very udictantional oversight 16 t; was the need to give the p:ccedures a closer technical t3 review. I l 9 They were reviewed. "' hey have been reviewed bu: 6 centinue to be rev'iewed by"the Office of Ins =ection and I, .,o I 4. Infe:cenent, and I would act want to put nyself as a persen ~ _s._,' who understands to what dep.h the Cffice cf Inspection and i i l Infe: cement reviews them. .a i 24

do knew -hat, and ce:Sainly it can vary depending i

25 ' en the pecple doing the reviews, bu: it :.s av underscandinv i l Acme Reporting C h

67 that the Office of $nspecticn per'ferms a review in the I 2 sense that it ensures that.all of de necessary procedures s. 3 are-indeed in existence and i =ay perform a review which 4 checks to see that, for example, the designations given to 5 certain equipment are indeed correct, for example, dat valve 6 designations are proper, but it is my understandine. dat the 7 suitability of that procedure in the terms of is it the right 3 kind of a precedure to respend to that accident was not 9 specifically under the charter of de Inspection and to Enforcement. a Similarly, it was not unde = the charter of.the 12 Office of Operator Licensing Branch. They were f ='-tihr 13 with the precedures only to the poin:.that they knew that ~ 14 the procedure was one that could be physically carried out is by an operator,cr.d also whether it served as a base f cm which 16 they could censtruct various tests to determine if de 17 cperator was indeed fa= ilia: with de precedure. 13j Q Are there sc=e changes prepcsed in the crgani::ation f i 6 i 19 cf the NRC to ensure that issues such as ycu have menticned i 00j concer.ing cperato: precedures den' fall between the cracks? i I i 21 A It :.s =v. e.nde'rstandine. that as cart of the icne-j 22 j term recc==endations of de lessens learned task force, dat j 23l dey will be lecking at dose areas where de staf f should i 04 provide higher, put higher emphasis in deir reviews and j 25 certainly ~ -4' 4 's relatively kncvledgeable te many j Acme Reporting Com m

t 68 4 t people dat I as fairly confident hat this will be one i al l of thei: recommendatiens. i. 3 0 But they will recemmend that certain issues be 4 emphasized or that there will be structural changes in the 5 organization in c:dar to ensure that certain issues are s covered? A I th ik I would expect them to identify the need to 8 ensure that enese kind of reviews take place. 9 Whether our management decides that eksy, we agree to with the need for those changes and we must =ake the necessary 11 changes within-de-present structure cf de c ganizatien t'- or whether sc=e changes to this structure would have : he U made would have to be decided at a later time. '4 O Your description of the opera c: procedures leads 15 me to de conclusion that they don' t alicw for much discretion 16 on the pa. of the operater, that an event occurs and he fc11cws de steps of a fairly rigid precedure, i~t Would that be accurate? I 1 i 9 i A I am not familiar vid all da: an opera:cr dces $o t in the sense that de precedure just defines what de Opera c= it has :: do. It dcasn': suggest what he can't do or what he -.n. l = sight also be able :: do, so if there is a wea'<.nass da: we 4 U have beceme =cre aware of f=110 wing he '" -=a '" ' = :sland ' 4' accident, i: :.s da: :he Opera::: perhaps respcnded and did l =cre.than wha he specifica11r was recuired :: do for de ~~ s Acme Reporting Corb D D

9 69 l event. t 2 It is my understanding the operator is not restric ed s. 3 to only these actions required by the e=ergency cperating 4 proce.. dure, my point being that we only give him credit for 5 perfombg only those actions dictated by the emergency 6 ocerating crecedure, and in that sentse we review it to see that it is well c dared and that the operator has enough a informatien to perform those actions when req"d ad. MR. u m AN: Let's go off the record for a minute. 9 (A brief recess was taken.) 10 BY MR. HILFMAN: tt Q With respect to the precedures which the operaters 12 are recuired to follcw in the event of a transient, is t-o 14 the intentien to eliminate the need for the cperator to en:cise discretion c make analysis of the transient at is 16 the time he is supposed to be cerforming his =aniculations? A In general, ves; it is sv understanding that an t, 73 cperater is trained to rec:gnise es_ :ain cbse-.able symp:::s. i t In other words, if voc have an event, dere is inicrmatien i 19 i disclaved in the centrol recm which he is ::sined := .m l 1 recogni:e, so this is ce==i::ed :: memery.

f dese lignts 3

i I 1 l - l' gc en in a sense, he recognizes dis. t r i Ee den is ::ained te take ce. tain :. =ediate M i l I l i actions which nay only be verifica:icn, and :.f indeed we had l 3 i a react:: trip, he verifies da: the :cds have all bc :: ed, 3 c e -[l) M )[Pd) u u h o@ ~} jL ?i 10 ~ m n,e e,+ =

70 for exa=cle, and then he is required then to fellcw a

ccedure in terms of perfc.. ning any subsequent actions, i

so he doesn' t really de any diagncsis other than what he t l is trained to diagnose and se he is enly expected to diagnose a certain variety of events f cm which he can determine what specific p ccedure he should fc11cw. o Q Such as a p ccedure which would require him =c check his pressurizer level in c dar te determine ccre cociant: g level? 9 A That I don' t know that that wculd be the case. -- -- would say that' if he 'has a p ccedure, 'if.he ha...d..iagno se d...-- -... s 11 that he has had a loss of ecolant accident, he than fc11cws the s=ecific c ccedure for a icss of ccclant accident, and 13 he fellcws* all aspects of that p ccedure. That is what he 14 is trained to de, and if the precedure itself wculd say maintain makeuc water or EPI water to that determined 16 for the cressuri:er water level, then he would fellcw it only ~ t~ hecause he has been ::ained te de it and that is the 15 accepted respense, se he is nor =aking a decisien in that sense. 00 Q Leu =a give vcu a hv.=.cche:ical. e t ' s as su=e tha: . he c= era:c: 11 1 had been trained that =ressuri er level l indica icn and ::sssure indica icn rese end fell in tandem, B, 1 i. and he Observes that pressuri:er level indication is t 3 i j increasing whereas pressurs~is decreasing, and he has 20: hhlW IAi I i Acme R a c e rh.na C o nte anwt t ff d i ia

4 71 t been prW_ fed with a specific precedure to cover such an 2 event, what then dcas the operater de in ligh: of the s. 3 phiicsephy that the precedures are set cut,he is ne: 4 required to analyte, the transient, he iceks for indications 5 and, reacts? 6 A The operator, and here we may be. using the ter:t plurai because it is nes: likely that there would be two 3 operaters in the recm, a,senic: reacter cpera:cr and a reacted g cperater, the senic: reactor operater would then have to 10 make a decisien if he sees an event that is different than an it event that he has been trained te respend to, to take 12 what he considers to be a safe course of action. 13 0 Is this contingency provided fer, c is this just 14 a necessar observation? A I would censider it te be, it is an observation. 15 16 What I am saying is we don't, 4s far as I knew, expect hi:t 1; te have to analyze and respond to events dat he has not 13, been previcusly trained to. We don' t ter,c them in that sense 19 by saying we are enly going to teach you as nuch, only a 29 certain level of accidents, and new we are gcing te spring I l i j 2 scme new enes en you and expect you to decipher these new l i e c:Ws"Ecr:actly and taka prcper action, so the answer tc your 23 ruestien wculd be no. i ,4 i It wculd 4ust cccur becaus4 we "d '- -acegni:e in to be an event :har cec'd cccu differen: chan eha: he i 3 Acme Racerting Com i

72 1 has been ::sined t respond Oc. 2 O

• he operators den are no: ::sined to handle i,

3 situaticas dat are nec specifically dealt wi.h in their 4 procedures? 8 A That is my understanding. 6 Q Are you aware of what the educational level is I of operators? 8 A It is my understanding that they generally all have 9 a high school, at least a high scheci education. They will to take a certain nu=her of courses that =ay be censidered ec l 11 he ecliege level courses to give dem a better understanding t l 12 of basic nuclear engineering principles. i 13 Q Did your branch have any respcnsibility for cent:ci 14 =ccm desigE in reviewing operato license applica:icas? 15 Not a major design; as I noted earlier in our is discussien, there was one time when we did icok at tha 17 ner.ber of actions that would have to be taken a.d the ability I '8l cf the cperator Oc move frem one 1 canica to anc:her to see i 19 that he could do it in the timeframe necessary, but that I i I I i i 3 would have : he ir. =y =ind a very secondary review. i i l f i. i l is' not pri ary :O cur re'7ieV. I

• • 3 22,

C '4culd ycu have reviewed such -hings as the i 23f loca icns of indica ::s? I l 2' l A No. i 3 Q . or e:cample, :he 1ccasion of de cuench :ank Acme Reporting Camp )l

i 73 1 indicaters en de bank of the cent ci panel a: Od.' 27 2 A No, we wculd act have dcne dat as par: cf cur j 3 review. 4 Q Is there any branch.within tha NRC that reviews 3 control reem design? 6 A 'le s. That branch is the Inst =entation and I Cent ci Systems 3:anch, and it would be my judgment that they 3 perform the najority cf the review cf cent:01 =ccm layout. 9 Well, of the review that is perfer=ed by the staf f, I would to suggest that they are the primary reviewer. 11 .. - _ Q, _But you. don' t knew the extant of the review that 12 is performed? 13 A That is correct. ~ 14 Q Wculd yet: branch ba responsible for reviewing the 15 adequacy of indirect indicatiens of plant ccedition such as 18 the ind"act position indicate: en the ?cRV? 17 A No. 13l Q Is the review that vour branch performs a: the ^ '9 construction pe:nnit stage or at the cperator license j ~ l 20 i applica:icn stage confined :0 safa:7-related ite=s? I i "l A' ?:imarily, yes, but in the review of certain i 22l

ansients, we de consider what we censider c he de nen-23 safsty c: con :01 sys:sm i= pac: =igh: he en _ hat specific t

24 ' transient, sc we primarily review the ::ansient f:cm -he l l 23 point of view that if there :.s an effac da; ce cent:01 @ @ fb Ml Acme Report.ing Ce can, ]s 3 y a .,e a

74 1 system may have to further degrade the system to =ake the 2 transient =cre limiting, then we censider it in the sense i 3 that if the cont:ci system, if that was the normal 4 function, we wculd consider it. 5 We don't review the centrol systems or non-safety a grade systems in terms of determining whether any credit 7 can be given to these systems. In general, any mitigation 3 is only permitted by safety-related equipment. 9 Q When you refer to mitigation, you are cencarned with 10 riitigati=n of what? 11 A. A transient,.an,, expected event er even a serious __._ 12 accident would only be mitigated by equipment designed 13 for mitigatica of those sgecific kinds of events. 14 Q Als you indicated at the outset, the focus of your is review was on transients and accidents and the systems is designed to ecpe with such events. 17 A That is cc :ect. 13 ; Q So pri=arily ycu are cencerned wi:h safety-related l 1 I 19 i items? l 00, A That is cc : set. 21 l j 0 Co you knew 'if there is a branch wi d in de }iRC l l 22; dat is concerned primarily wid reviewing acn-safety related, t 23 i

i. ems?

I -i 24 : A lie. 2.e basic pein cf cur review :.s hat we ::y i 05,

= ge a: the review where you pcstulace an even: which includes i

Acme R ep orting C o % f'ib.G: la o c U

I 75 t in a sense the failure of non-safety related equip =ent. 2 Therefore, the event is not :sduced in severity because s 3 you have given credit for non-safety grade equip =ent 4 continuing to perform a functien. 5 In. terms of developing a sericus event, we assume a that non-safety grade ac.ui=. cent dees not functica o minimize the sericusness of the vent, and then en de recoveri 3 side we de not give credie _for non-safety grade equipment, 9 helping to mitigate the equipment. 10 Q Is there a performance in the transient review, i how.ever? 11 A Well, we have thought that it was because we 1,. 13 generally don't give credit for ncn-safety grade equipment, t4 We have in cur :sview of certain boiling water reacters 15 recently, we have deter: tined dat certain credit has been is given to ncn-safety grade equipment to perform a funcuien that-at least the designer feels is a normal function, and then these transients are not serious accidents. hey are 13, i tg transients for which the criteria is there being no fuel .,,9 damage as a censequence of that event. l .,s. I wculd have-.:o sav. da de staff has been learnine i =cre and scre in de last two years ahcut the 1 =c::ance of .m -i .nen-safety ::ade equipment in de censequence of ransients .L. I and accidents. 24 i I l C et's =cve en :c de suhd.ec: cat we were :al%ing i f h l Acme Report.ing Comp,c-

n t about earlier abcut compar =entalization in de Ev^. .nd i l ycu -indicated that thera may he sc=e chanc.es cr:. csed to

4. -

3 eliminate scme of the drawbacks of such an organizational 4 structure. 3 What types of changes organizationally could be made 6 to sitigate the ce=partmentali:atien that you have noted? 7 A Let me say this. The term compartmentali:ation 3 assu=es that we all work is, boxes and we don't talt to each other. g to That is not true. What I as suggesting is that frem CEe rev:.aw of3e Threi Mile Island accident adid eveF tsing- ~ 11 f 12 else that we are learning, it would suggest to se de need 13 to, for example, integrate the review of the precedures along l 14 with the design of the plant. to recognize that the 15 cperater is going to play an important role in hcw a specific 16 scenario evolves, and so f cm dat point of view, I am saying 1 17 that probably what recc=mendations would ceme, or at least ,3 it is mv cpinien that there is a need te consider putting i 19 together in a closer wav than it presentiv exists de 1 3 need to study the operator respense to events and the I i aculpment that is designed to sicigate dese events, and cc: -i i i i understanding of how dese events would. Occur. .,a-I e i 3 You wculd prehably still have speciali:ations 24l in the sense dat you vculd have, 20: exam =le, a se: cf 4, pecpie who are cencentra ine. 'e:'s sav. en understanding all I e o Acme Recorting Com og g ny P

a.e. 77 _t about less of ecciant accidents which incindes how cperat::s ~ are trained to :sspend te less of ecolant accidents, hew 2 i' l' 3 the peccedures are develeped, what equipment is neesssary, but that does not mean that you neec. the sa=e pecple review-4 3 ing seme other transient. 6 It could be another g cup of pecpla reviewing =1 ancther transient, but haviewing it-in the sa e breath, 3 so there would still be specializations, but it may be 9 specializations of the kind you talked about. to We may have a g up that speciali:es in reviewing 11 - aII" aspects-'of a J. css of clolaht ace:.deni, ahd ~another 12 g cup that maybe speciali:es in accidents which perhaps are 13 all secondary side induced transients in pressurized wats: reac c s. .:' hat is an exa=ple. a 15 Q Sese overviews,would they be envisioned as 16 cec dinating the efforts of more speciali:ed or more t; ccmpartmentalized g cups, c do they p:cvide an everview :: what? 13 i 19 A It would be my opinion that this g: cup would have f 20 the crimarv. :ss=ensibility for the completa review. It i 21, wculd :sduce the necessity te go cc: side of a branch, sc :: I l e.a sc.eak, so ' -/ ' d, a branch tha: has :ssponsm y f0: i 23 the completa review of 'a icss of coolant accident wculd i 2; L include understanding the training that the cperater is given,'. unds: stand the precedures that are devel= ped, understand .,5 i D 9 "O ~T]m A 6 Aa 2 Acme Reporting tempcny i ~--

78 t the de sign and that wecid be in the sense of an inclusive c.ertir:n of hew an accident =av. develce.. e s. 3 Q Are there pecple on the staff that already have 4 t.his scre general er broader view of ints::elationship he: ween 5 design and precedures and so fc th? 6 A

• dell, I would have to admit since de T:C 2 accident, and I think a let of tecple have h cadened their 3

understanding of the relationship between p ccedures and 9 the design, the importance I think has becc=e clearly go obviously. tt Q Dc you envision al.y-s...-.....tructural changes in the tg crganization to ensure that this review cn a broader basis 13 is conducted as a matter of =cutine? A If the crganizatica as it is presently constructed 14 is can' t p cvide that function, then it would he obvious that is it would he sedified. 1. I W"*c if it is a cuestica of giving a specific - 3 branch a new charter, assigning a different set cf pecple tg scw to that branch to perfor= that charter, den indeed i l 3 has been acccmplished within the same basic structure se vec ! 1 4.1 =cve pecple around and veu.=cdifv. de charter. Tha: :.s one I wav cf achieving it. .m i .i 23{ It nay he necessarf : restructure de c pani:acien i I because it is jus: =cre effician: te dc i: that way. Tha: 24 1 1 l

.s also a pessibility.

23 I ~Ji Acme Recorting Ce nueny

,,_.a 4 .~ 79 1 Q I have two final questiens, and one is do you see 2 any safety related cencarns about locating two reacters at i, 3 the sane site? 4 A No. Let me point cut that has always been part of 5 cur review when we de leek at dual sites where necessary. 6 We see complete separation, so the fact that there are two i 7 units on the same site and the rela.icnship between them 3 has been part of the normal. review process, basically that 9 an event to one unit shouldn't have a feedback effect from to another unit, and/c call upcn c seed systems f:cm anc her =.. 11 unit. They basically are reviewed as two separate units in 12 the areas'that I am responsible for. 13 Q Were CC 1 and CC 2 connected in such a way that ~ 14 tC 1.was..eeded te help bring OC 2 te a ccid shutdewn c ta maintain it in thatf ondition? 15 16 A It is ::ry understanding that there was seme use cf 17 Three Mile Island l's chemistry lab and so forth because of

3 the activity-level lat's say in the 'Jni

2 lab, buc as far I

19 as the systems that were used, to ny kncwledge there was ne l i 20! CC 1 systems. ~ f i l t

• e v. n a v. have, fc ex 7 1e, used scme of the i

i 20 l, secrage facilities at CC 1. These are areas tha: I am nc: t l I . 23 ! specifically a specialist in. i + 24 ' C Lac ne ask ycc f.f ycu recall receiving fr : '3 l 3:. Earley. silver, p c ject nanage- = 2, a decu=ega n g go @@@J apDo Acme Reporting Co l

30 t cencarning an April 23rd, 1978 transient at T.!I 2, une 2 details of which invcive'd five safety grade va2:es failing S. 3 to close with a less of pressuri:e 'evel indicatica en the. 1cw side? 4 5 A May I see the document? Yes, I recall this document. 6 It is my racc11setien that Mr. Silver and I had a discussion ahcut the event, and I asked him if he cculdn' p:cvide =e with a document. 3 g As I recall, I thought the dccument I was going to to

get, expecting to see was something prepared by the Office

- - - tt 7 f-Inspecti~en and"Inforcement;- - ~ - - ' - ' ~ ~ ~ 12 Ihe dcct=ent you shew =e is one that was prepared 13 by the Met cpolitan Idison Company. It doesn't =ake any 14 difference 3 but we had a discussion. He did send =e the 15 document that you new have shown =e. and I see en the cover 16 of it a notation that I did make to Mr. Israel, t. I fc: warded it'to him fer infer =atien, and having, g time pe-nitting semeene in his section icek into this l g dcct=ent for what we could learn about the event. I 20 Q Co you knew if there were any such fc110wup and i i. this was dene? I 21 = A I do not knew. I de nc: :scall ever specifica11r ~ l 23 having any discussions with Mr. Israel about a.y hing we { \\ i i 34 l =ay have learned f:cm the review of che decu=ent. 3l Q

o you :scall whether ycu saw the *I2 chat was cogfif8 h[D me m e.c o.,

e

~. ~. ~ 81 1 prepared on this transione? A I de not recall. i, 3 Q Co you recall whether this decu=ent which ceces 4 f cm Met Ed suggestad a review of plant cperating p ccedures? 5 A I de not recall. I dc recall not spending much 6 time iceking at the docu=ent. Ihe substance of my 7 raccliection deals with the conversation I had with X. Silver 8 and his description of the event suggested an interest to me 9 and I asked him if he could obtain a copy for me. He did that, 10 and when I,had an opporuunity to leek at the =agnitude of 11.. the report, the size of the repc :, I did not want to take 12 any ti=e to icok at it myself, and I assigned it to X:. Sandy 13 Israel. I gave it to him, routed it to him, and suggestad 14 that he mighu want to have semeene leck at it for inficw. 15 This to me then suggested that if he could assign 16 someone to it, we cught to at scmetime review it Oc see what 17 we could learn f cm the event. 13 O As far as you knew, ncthing subsequen to your l 19 assigning this to er sending it to Mr. Israel for his i 20 information was done by way cf review? i 21i A As f ar as I know, I have had ac discussiens related ~ -i to him, wi-h his en it until very recently when this 23i docu=en: was shcwn to me earlie '-= '=s: day c: twc. i 24 ' I did ask him if he had seen it c recalled it, q 25 and he had nc kncwledge of recclisc icn, but cutside of -ta: o g 3 y h' MI 0) J Acme Reporting

82 1 i t few minute discussion, dare was nothing da: I ca. recall l in terms of discussion related to dat document. 4 i s l Q That was post-OC 2? 3 l A That was post-CC 2. 4 5 MR, HI JMAN: h t's go off the record fer a mement. 9 (A discussien was held off de reccrd.) MR. EIIJMAN: Tat's mark this package of material 3 which consists of a me=c route slip en de top frem Harley 9 Silver, refers to a conversation.cf, it locks like 7/5/78, to as the notation frem Mr. Novak to Sandy, and this is tt ---Sandy-Israel?- 2 THI WIOTESS: Yes. 13 MR. m % N: "? lease have sc=eene glance at for 14 info," and. it is fc110wed by 33 pages of material rela'i.g 15 to a trip, ES incident.sf 4/23/78 at the OC 2. 16 (Novak Exhibit Nc. 2 was marked t-for identification.) l tS MR. HIISMAN: With rescect to de documents that I i 19 have been requested during de ocurse of the depcsition, j i l .,39 i ccunsel have agreed that the dccu=enns will be provided i l ccvered bv a le::er frem the'NRC and tha: the cover lecter 3, l l .,._, i and de dccuments =av..cintly he referred te as I:@.ibit 3 d I -3 to this depositien. i l. j i 4 34.l MR. CECPKC: We se stipulace. -sy s-b ~ 9 Acme Reporting Com 2:n y 6

o 83 1 (Novak Ixhibit Nc. 3 was marked 2 for identificatier..) 3 MR. EZIntAN: As we stated at :he beginning of 4 the deposition, it is cur practice to adjourn.he deposition 5 rather than terminate it in the event we have ~urther 6 questions for you, and so at this cine, unless Mr. Chepko 7 has further questicas-- 3 MR. CHCPKO: No-questions. 9 MR. EZIJMAN: "'he depesition will be adjourned. 10 Thank ycu. -= 11 (Whereupen at 1: E p.s the. descsition, c f n n 12 Mr. Nevak was adjourned.) 13 s e 14 15 16 17 IS l t .l l 19 8 l 1{ l I i n; \\ '6 ul p \\ s u.:. i + 1 it j [ i i e 1 l Acme Recertina Comceny i

S4 i 3' l 2.._mes. e-e...__....- r. s ) [ 4 l e CCCII" NC/.3IR: Cagr Tv: DEPOSITION OF THCMAS M. NOVAK 3 ZIA. CTG CATI: July 30, 1979 I TCCAOCCN: Sethesda, Maryla:d 3 I herah'r ce-tifr hat the ; :ceedings and evide==a he: sir. 91 a:s cc tained full'r a:d ac===staly L: the =ctas taks: by se ,o s n. at._the %= d g:_is. tha. aheva case hefera the -- .._.._g. 3RESIDEN*' S CC.W.ISSICN CN n' ACCIDCIT AT THREZ.V.I2 ISI.AND I a:d that '* *s is a t: :,e and c===sc-transcrip cf the sa=e. ..,a t,. UAt#: July 31, 1979 15 ( C / 5,.l -Dw - -.. / c-i 7 Official Repc ts: ,3 Ac=e Rac.e:-ine. C:::an r i t p..t. ~.%..w.... 3..7 w_ l ,3 i Vas*d e ::, C.C. 20C05 I ~.] gl. "M f e. l %n f

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