ML19338B824

Deposition of Levine (NRC) on 790915 in Cambridge,Ma. Pp 1-75

ML19338B824
Person / Time
Site:	Crane
Issue date:	09/15/1979
From:	Burns R, Jensch S, Levine S NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY RESEARCH (RES), PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE
To:
References
TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 7910310269
Download: ML19338B824 (75)

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F.oc= 24-102, Ca= bridge,:4assachuze::, en Saturday, Septe=ber 15, 19'79, Cc==encing at 10: 30 a.=.

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SAUL LEVINE, having been duly swcrn, i

1 3

testified in answer to direct interrogatcries by MR. JINSCH:

4 Q

Dr. Levine, you have previously been deposed, and I 3

7 have read ycur deposition.

I also read the 3

deposition cf your associate, Mr. Budnite.

I think I have in mind some of the considerations of ycur 9

to h division, which is entitled Regulatory Research, is I

11 that correct?

1:

A The Office cf Nuclear Regulatory Research.

13 Q

You are the director of that office?

y A

Yes, I a=.

b 15 il Q

You have previcusly in your other depcsitions set d,

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forth your bicgraphical sketch of your academic and 16 t

g enperience bac': ground, have you not ?

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A Yes, I have.

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19 Q

Have ycu been in this business a icng ti=e with the i

3 AOC21C Energy CCnmisien and the Nuclear RegulatCry 20 3

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t Cc- 'ssion?

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Yes, I recall sc=e of our prev 1cus meetings, I

3 y Mr. Jensch.

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Ycu also a; pear as witnesses in some.cf the cases?

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Yes, 1 have.

2 Q

I don't know whether you have had an opportunity in 3

the last say ten years to follcw so=e of the 4 l procedures that we have had, but let me ask you this.

Have you ever heard of subjects being examined in 5

6 j the course of a hearing and the suggestien was made, I

well, that's a generic issue, whereupen silence

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8 prevailed in the hearings, as if the subj ect beca=e 9

sacrosanct, and shouldn't be covered further at the 10 hearing, have you heard about that?

11 A

Yes,1 have heard about that.

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Q Does your department develop or research generic 13 issues?

I4 A

Yes and no.

The generic ---

l Q

That scunds like the general approach we've had in II e,

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che hearings abcut generic hearings.

'till you 16 17 proceed, please?

i A

Yes.

The generic issues arise out of a process, the 38 t

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i licensing process.

Now the history of where t' hey I9 s w.wn:1 s

,0 ca=e frcm is very si=ple.

There were starting 15 A,

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years agojthere were reactors being licensed, given construction permits cr-cperating licenses,

'3 with sese issues not being fully resolved, and i

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these began to cc11ect.

The basd* '-" 'a--ing l

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I pr.rticular issues slide en a particular case was i

li m ui that it ;;ill-be caught cm--.e "- = up and taken l

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3 i care of in a succeeding reacecr; and that really m

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nevdr happened very effectively, so there was this 4

collection which ca=e

) be called unresclved safety 5

issues, and then I thin: Sc=ething else, and finally 6

generic issues.

7 Q

Other descriptiens that we won't nention here, but 8

9 go ahead.

A There =ay be others.

10 s. e. '.)

11 I know that they are net generated per--ee, h.

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but-sene defir.itien; if there is sc=e definitien, I 13-haven't heard ene.

I think I have given ny-

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t intellectual dsO nition is the test definition I know.

14 Iiow there was at one time a list published is i

I 16 by the A. C. R. S. cf several hundred, 350 cr maybe I.

17 400, T_nd in these days chere Yas a " strong effert s

a is i

going en to try to catch up with these, snd fina'.ly s.

i 19 !!

after sc=e years they were reduced to 133 a

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8 20 !!

Q Sy what process, if you know?

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Yes.

There were in fact letters written, reper s 21 I

l issued by the Regulater-/ ctaff cf the A. C. R.

S.,

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which sr.id here is what we have gene C.rcush - Take f

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:i ccre cf this issue.

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i Now I reviewed at one point briefly each i

of a long list of ceveral hundred items.

It was

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shortly after I became the director of research; and 4

I wanted to see if there were issues there that 5

required research, so that I could start programs Pr ac to to help resolve, issues; and what became apparent 6

7 me, almost i==ediately, was that those issues were 8

not real issues in terms of being important to 9

safety, that having worked with Norman, done NASH-1400, I had a perception already of their to 11 relative importance to risk, just by reading a brief 12 description of the=, and that I felt that we could, 13 by the use of WASH-1400 techniques, demonstrate that 14 about half of those issues were not significant 15 contributors to reactor accident risk.

I 16 I I approached sone people in N. R. R.

j 17 Q

Which is what?

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Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research.

With a i

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l 19 proposition I would put up two of my best people, J

j 20 if they would put up two people, which,we would put s 55 9 1

together, getting irformation, and getting our WMH l ~, '

• techniques to hand?.e these issues.

That proposal 23 was never accep*,ed.

l 24 jj a the =eantime, by work of others, this

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'*st got reduced to 133 I,

Then about, well, sc=eti=e last year, the

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-- chair =anf4ma.-,,+ran-7 weww.

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.:. j N. R. C. and Harcld Denten asked =e to werk en i

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-. generic issues; could I take the ccaplete list of

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133 issues, and could I, not me personally, but could 6

=y office, by the use of

• DASH-1400 techniques g

characterize the as to relative i=portance 'a( to

- S afe t y, cm c hy--and'. u tn did that work in about 9

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- two month:, and we found out of 133 items, seee+

11 N1 7 C -- - ". had nothing to do with sa'ety,.

1:

They had to do with environ = ental matters, and that is fine, but they didn't belong cn a safety list, and 13 14 there were procedural =atters on this list also.

I is There were ite=s like update chapter so and so cf the rJf..1-L

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16 s.ta* M review plan.

'~nst didn't have any safety y'

j 1-cignifi nce especially; i.was not an issue.

Y.ayte l

l 1s it needed an update, but it was not an issue.

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19 was a crocedure.

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'ist, and we fcuid about either, I can't rene=ber l

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the exact nu=ter, either *7 c: 59, stood ou0 as

3 h issues that could centribute sienificantly to ilp I

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4 o reacter accident risk, and we found there was a n,

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l sharp.:leavage at that point, the rest were rather c ;,

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and9. W havh -) ". 3. R. accepte. that"wcrk after d

3 so=e review and cinor codifications, and there is i

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now a progra= in place to work on those issues.

--They are called task acticn plan items, and we a.%

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' " m in the Office of Research have assumed 7

8 responsibility for several cf those because of the 9

shortage cf resources in N. R.

R., so we are 10 assisting the: in working out these.

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11 They also have a te=porary organization 1

that Harold Denton established after "hra-

'e 13 Islan..

There is one special task force, called the d

14 Generic Issues Task Force, which Dr. Hanauer is the i

15 head of, so there is a unified effort to get this I

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-reing.

g 17 'i Q

Let me just go back if I may.

You said sc=e of the h

a II 18 y generic issues developed cut of proceeding 1 and I a

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j 19 suppose enperience at varicus pla.ts, even J

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suppcse throughout the world.

It is in that matter s

that generally the generic issues are identified, 1

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is that ccrrect?

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A Tes, yes.

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those may vary frc= ctse to case, fer instance, is I

i that ccrrect?

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A Generally we have not participated at all in the 3

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resolutien of these issues.

Now occasicnally ny 4

5 pecple get consulted on, without my even being aware, on =any technical natters, and we may have given 6

advice here and there, but the ba:ic issues are 7

settled in N. R. R. with the A. C. R 3.

s 9

Q Are ycu a statutory efficer under this energy to reorganication plan?

11 A

Yes, I En.

1:

Q That led to the creation of the Nuclear Regulatory l

13 Cc==ission January of 1975?

14 A

'75 15 i Q

Is the N. R. R. a statutory organization?

s 15 A

Yes, it is.

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Q And the statute would define the function of each a

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of the two cffices?

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Yes, it does.

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Q Perhaps.you could tell us in a practical way why h

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1 there isn't a close-da a--alationship between the 1

two cffices as the status has develcped, for 1

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instan09.

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A Well, it is hard to be precise about it.

I can h'I 24

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l give you sc=e speculation and feelings on =y parc, 1

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and there are a nu=ber cf facters thac are different,'

3 but let =e go through the facter:.

There.is not a 4

coherent picture.-

s Y W-Cne factor is befer,e the N. R. C. was 5

/

6 establishel, what was the basic core organization in 1

7 the A. E. C. was on the general Canager's side of the s

house, net en the regulatory side of the house, the 9

div1Sicn of reacter safety -ond r3 search, which is 10 now part of =y effice.

11 7nen the N. R. C. was created, we were the 1:

only pcrtien of the general =anager, side of the house 13 that was transferred to the regulatory progrs=, to 14 the N. R. C.

' here ars =any pecple in the N. R. C.

d> 4 15 who S.r not want us to come.

Now I know that f

yanning 7.untcing, who s the di.'ector cf regulations' 16 17 ij under the 1. E.

C., had talked to Herb Ecuts, who wa:

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my ;redecesscr, and asked him explicitly to ec=e wit.k q

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19 this rescurce to the !!. R. C. as cpposed to staying e

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en the general =a-.ager's side of the hcuse wich 4

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Erda, sr.d I thcught that was very wise.

Ecuts and i

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I had long discussiens abcut'th5.s, and wh_'e it t

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wacn't cenplete;7 cle:r where we should go, we endedI n,

up in brlance the best place to go was in the j

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i N. R. C.

However, in spite of cur views, and in spite cf Manning's view, there were =any pecple en 2

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3 the staff who did not want us to ec=e.

Oney wanted I

4 research responsibility, all right, but they didn't 5

want an organication to cene in to perform that 6

function.

They wanted to perform it thenselves, and 7

so thert was a source of difficulty.

8 There is another source of difficulty,

-,.hich pertains to the general attitude in N. _ R. R. !

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I';-f_i.;p -- it's wrong, but I am fairly l

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sy= pathetic to it, because I understand it.

In all 12 the years in which the people in N.R.

R. have been i'

13 licensing reactors, even when they were in the 14 A. E.

C., they'were given very little help frc=

anyone.

In general, until Kouts's divisien was 15 s

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y established in the A. I. C., the A. E. C. 's research f

l organica: ion was not responsive to the needs of the 17 i

a 18 licensing peep;e, and so they had nowhere to turn I

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for technical ing.t.

They had no resourcec, they i

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had no =cney frc= Congress to spend on hiring people, s

. :1 j eensulcants or laboratcries to do work fer them, I

l and they had to do the bes: th'ey could.

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They became i!

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I not Outward locking, and they treated everyone who d

was outside their organization with equal cente=p:,

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ll althcugh conte =pt isthewrongwordj h.atisused 3

1 faceticusly, end-h=e of this attitude persi:ts.

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S.ey have a m*-

' ire attitude;

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we can do nMs-better than anyonej you n~*

never helped us before and probably aren't going to s

help us now.

No =atter how goed ycur intentions are 9

to help the=, they're probably nct going to accept to

't.

S.at is a big part of it.

I guess another 11 part of it I have to say is partly our fault.

We 1

3 were created, at least the reactor safety portion l

13 cf our werk, was created with the idea that you 14 know Appendin K of Part 50, the energency ccre cooling criteria, was conservative, and we're scing is e l

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16 to research to prove where reality wre, which m a s

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q noble etjecti e.

' e're scing to :tudy reality, and h;

show that Appendiz K =edel was overly conservative, 13 l

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b So this creates a naturt.1 tension between the two 19 a

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groups, and we have done that by the way, a lot of a

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21 cur research is shewing just that, and this nay be

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resented by 50:e people.

I don't know, but there is

3 sone cf that.

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Well, the reason --

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Now I should add one other thing.

Since Harold 1

Denten has becene the director of that office, I

3 l things have become very =uch better.

They're still i

f a long way frc where they ought to be, but Harold 4

i Denten has come in with a different attitude.

His 5

6 attitudo is, see, let's set together and let's 7

solve Oh problems, I need all the help I can get, s

and certainly research is a great thing and I as 9

going to use it, so certainly things are starting to I

go change in a better directicn.

11 Q

The reason for ny asking all this -- it doesn't have 12 any relevancy to the Three Mile Island -- and let me 13 start with a specific incident of Davis-Besse.

14 Would that have cene, the incident at Davis-Besse, 15 1,

Ocme to you for your review by your office or by what is now Denton's office?

g 16 I

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It would se to ewo places principally.

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Denton's office and to I & E, Inspection and a

I-Enfcreement.

It would cene to us thrcugh the 19

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.e licensee event repcrts and our probabilistic staff, j

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,1 where we would, tame net 1cck at safety significance; i,

bue w==== ~~ying to collect data en plant failures i

i 23 y and system failures so that we can do better risk Il

4 I; assess =ents in the future.

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i Now I proposed three years ago that we set l

tl up a better syctes.

I preposed this to N. R.

R.,

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and it was rejected.

I then wa: talking to Mcdonald, 3

i vrw who is head of cur management and program analysis 4

office, which cellects data.

It does the L. E. R.

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cc11ection, and I said L. E. R. collection is fine, but so=eone has to analyze it to see what it =eans, l

l and I have pecple in =y probabilistic group who have 3

the capability to write co=puter models that will 9

to take the L. E. R. data, and give you analyzed data, i

I digested data, which can then be used.

Q You're talking about sc=e newer developments, are 3

F 13 you now?

A I a= talking about three years ago, something I g4 l

wanted to do, and I'll update that as I go along, 15 j

l and : suggested that we talk to all the people in the 16 j'

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N. R. R. and and he and all the other offices, and '

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l find out what their needs were, and then we could 2

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i forth.

This was rej ected, and so nothing came of it.

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Mere recently since 7. M. I. I recc== ended 21 I.

to the Cc==issien we establish an operation-

3 t; evaluaticn functicn.

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In your effice?

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I didn't say where it chould be established.

I just 1

l said the agency needs it desperately, and ainost k-A i

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i==ediately a task force was m.r:rted, and a terr l

-fcr e report was written, that reco== ended it be 4

_5 established, and it has now been approved by the 6

Con =1ssion, and they are new seeking a director for that office.

s The way it's going to be set up is that 9

there Will be a central effice of abcut 15 pecple 10

'that will repert to the executive director for 11 cperations, which I think is a nistake, and there i

1: -

would then be satellite offices in all the najor 13 offices of a few people, and they would work together.

14 I think it's wonderful that this function 15 is finally being established.

It's charter will be

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l 16 to do all kinds of data analysis, including studies t.

j 17 y of the :afety significan:e c' "v '"~as, which =ust s

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be done, is t

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Well, as I understand, there has been sc=e suggestion i

20 we caly need one person to =ake an evaluation of 1.*

21 failures.

It has been charged that if you had a

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can in each utility operating a' plant, that he would' l

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be able to assess, for instance, the significance Of

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6 cperating plant, but I think one of the proble=3 hat =a.y pecple have about '"hree Mile Island is you e

i S I had th'- Michaelsen report, and the Davis-Besse 9

incident, and something at Ocone, and it might have 10

'been put in the round file as far as any rea::1cn 11 i

that we have been able or I have been able to l

i 12 1 discover from the N. R. C. abcut those three things, 13 so that either these, whatever they call these, 14 licens ee ---

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" cite a few years ago.

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Q Can you put a date en 107 i

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' hree years ago, =ayce cere.,

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I read the L. E. E. cn Davis-Eesse, and you could 1

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= "--- that L. E. E. that it was a matter of

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'l great significance.

Just a minute.

I lf That =ay be the real ccr.e of the problem.

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I 5

A Just a =inute.

The way it was written, you couldn't tell, but the Davis-Besse people made an analysis of 6

7 that in great depth with their vendor and so forth, S

and issued a reper about a half inch thick, which 9

spelled the whole thing out, the whole sequence, and 10 frc= that you could see the safety significahce, 11 and that was sut:itted to the N. R. C.

1:

Q Where did that go?

Was that filed with the 13 Michaelson report?

i 14 A

There was sc=e 40 copies filed with the Office of 15 Inspection and Enforce =ent I knc.r.

I don't know g

16 where they all went.

I never heard of it until l

l:l af t er Tnree !".13 !sland.

i 17 h

l IS Q

Well ---

s I

t j

19 A

So the industry, at least the utility and its

- j 20 l

contracters in =y view did an encellent job cf

.i 01 analy ing that.

Now where that infor:ation was propagated, how far, apparently' no one tried to

~

13 deter =ine very well the safety significance.

!f 24 il Q

Well, I think the Ocone.situaticn may be ia that d.

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ss=e categcry.

As ! understand it, the utility I

+

I there, and its designer, sc: together and werked 3

that problem out, and they nade a report t'o the t

4 l N. R. C. _I guess that, either the A.- E. C. or-5 N. R. C.

Eur, what happened to those data I guess they're still searching?

6 7

A I would like to cC==ent en that, if I may.

s Q

Please proceed.

9 A

One, I am not fn ' liar with the Ocone situation that I

10 you're talking about, but that's nct the point.

l 11 The point I would like to =ake is that we had a 12 situation in the N. R. R. where there was no one 13 group directly responsible fer reviewing L. E. R. 's 1

14 fer their safety significance.

15 Q

Why shouldn't your depart =ent do that?

l l

16 g A

I'll answer that in a =cnent, if I =17 It was 3

I 1;

l scattered diversely through N. R. R. and I & E.

c 18 i It was just a scattered thing where individual i

l 19 viewers did whatever they wanted about it, and this i.

a 20

=atter has been shcun in nany places, many different

- 21 kinds cf technology, is the kind of thing, an 22 cperations evaluation func icn' is a kind of thing g

i 6

23 I that has to be separated fr:n and ap art frc= the it i

$o licensing offices, the line offices.

New when I.

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n

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recentended the evaluations function, and the 1

i

!j discuscions with I. D. O. and so forch, I recc== ended i

4 it to be located in ene of two places, the Office of 3

i Standards or the Office of Research.

I felt it' 4

i I

8 i could not be in an office that was either licensing cr inspecting reactors, whereas chey have a vested 6

I felt interest, whereas the other two do not.

especially strongly it should not be under the 8

I. D.

O., because the I. D. O. has so many o'her 9

to things to do it could not give ---

i i

II i

Q E. D. O, is?

I r

Executive Director cf Operations, for Operations, g,- '

A could not give appropriate technical guidance to 13 whoever is the directer of that effice, and I don't 14 i

care what office ycu are in, you always need sc=ecne 15 i s

i ab c. e y ou, t c c alk at cut your ' a a'-

' a ' ' difficulties, 16

I e

and to exchange ideas, and set direccions, so I I

~

P I8 N think the I. D. O. is the wrong place for this.

i 1

19 cffice to report.

3 1

Have you observed, cr can ycu tell us the extent te l l'i J-l 0,

40 Q

3 1

which the divisions in N. R. C..have utiliied the

- ~

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analytical process reflected by *iASH-1400?

l l

They produced for the Cc==ission, after the lewis 3 'j-A' ll 4 ;!

~came cut, and at the request of the 6

repcrt I

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1 Cc~ *ssicn, a lis cf all the enanples of where they lI had used the tech'.ique, and it's a long list, and I

.I it's -- they nade the ;cint clearly every. tine they

)ji 3

[

said they used it, but they really didn't rely on it.

4 5

They juct locked at it to see what it would do.

6 That's beside the pcint.

7 Q

It's a fun activity.

s A

The point is nost people didn't know how to use it.

9 It appears sinple on the surface.

10 Q

Icur office did not appear or participate --

1 I

11 i

A Taey didn't ask us what we did.

1:

Q Well, you or your office ---

t 13 A

They wanted to know how it was used in the licensing 14 process.

15 !

Q 7ney didn't ask you to review to see the extent to j

i z

16 g; which the licensing groups used the WASH-1000 17

,J analysis?-

i.

t i

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A

!!c..

Ito, they did not.

J t

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19 Q

lid any of the people say in lI. R. R. participace i

Ik

D k in the devclopnent of WASE-14007

!.i 1

li 21 A

Yes, sone of then did, t

f Q

Were those persons invcived in i;he utill:ation of 6

3 jj

he WASE-1400 process in !T. R.

R., do you know?

e.1 24 A

I don't 1:now.

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Q Well, continue.

You were saying it 's a subtle and 3

ccaplan analytical process.

3 A

Yes, and you have to.kscw a lo of different t

disciplines to do it well.

You have to be a very 4

5 Sood reactor engineer, who understands system 6

reliability well) >_...e al;; har

, you also have to understand the relationship that occurs between 7

i 8

physical processes and system failures.

When a 9

system fails, what physical process occurs, and how 10 does that physical process affect the cperability of 11 other syste=s, and that's a very sophisticated kind 12 of mind already.

You have to understand statistics 13 pretty well to be sure you don't go astray en 14 si=ple assumptions that turn out wrong answers, and 15 we have seen iets of exa=ples of people using these 16 i

techniques incorrectly, s

i il; 1 have =aintained, fer several years now 17 I

l at least, that we shculd have a strong training i

is i

l 19 pr0grar, tourses fc11cwed by en-the-job trainir.5, s

J.

and develop an even enlarged grcup of people 20 a

21 that can do this werk, and it has been so far cpposed in N. R.

R.,

even though the Cc =ission I

23 supported it.

'-teresting situ :1cn.

Fcr whc= is i

24 Q

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,t-I the N. R. R. workine, the Cc- ':sion er sc=e other 1

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organication?

A hey're working fcr the Cc==ission, obviously.

3 f

Q Obvicusly.

And the Cc==1ssion can't get the N. R. R 4

m t

I' to do their requests, is that 3

A Chat is essentially what happened, in my view.

Now 6

I must say I have just raised this issue again with o

Harcld Denton, and I am sure he will consider it 3

i 9 l carefully and with an open mind.

i 10 l Q

Well, I have heard thct in cany of these cases, too, i

11 i

You also look to see

.at they're soing to accc=plish, I

g, what they -- how icng has Harold Denton been at that 13 !

Job?

A Somewhat less than a year, I believe.

Maybe a year.

g4 Q

Well, frc= all I have reviewed and read, the 15 :

16 WASH-1400 analysis is, I don't knew if this is a 1.

17 ll correct ter=, been screly neglected in the N. R. C.,

h a

I' gg and to hear a report that they have analyzed, but a

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,caid no attention to it, and didn't rely en it'or g9 a

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some such, wculd indicate it wasn't really analyzed I

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as carefully as 1400 de= ands.

I 21 A

wculd like to ec==ent on that".

r 4

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?20ceed.

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A Eut I would alse like to go back.

I think ycu cade l i

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a rather disparaging cc==ent abcut Harcid Centen,

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and I would like to at leas present 27 view.

1 4

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What respect?

3 d

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A You said how icng has he been en tne job, i= plying r.

5

=aybe he was just a part of the cid gang.

6 I Q

What I mean, he hasn't had an opportunity to do ---

7 A

He hasn. had an opportunity, but I must say even 8 l before he got the jcb he was one of the few people 9

in N. R.

R., who exhibited great interest in the to b, application of these techniques, and has cons'istently l

11 suppcrted it.

I I

1: l Q

I think that is gccd to get en the reccrd.

11 i

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A I just wanted to ---

14 Q

What I =eant he hai.:'t had an opportunity to apply I

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sc=e of these directions to the N. R. R. group, and i

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perhaps as time permits, he will be able to do that.

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3ecause I think really, if I sense sc=e of the

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. 22 situatiens of neglect, and I think there is also a

3 ll feeling, frem all I have read, that the WASH-1400 "d

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i licensing process, and it's a fairly long story about, how I ca=e to this, but it has cc=e to =e since t

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T. ". 2. ac a result of the accident and as a result 4

of the auxiiiary feed water study that we did, which 5

has been discussed earlier here, that there are 6

cutliers to the risk perception that we had, that we 7

had a certain perceptien of reacter accident risks s

for the engineering studies we did in WASH-lh00, and 9

we now fcund in T..'I.

I. there is an accident to 5equence that was much higher in probability than 11 anything we saw in WASE-1400, and we see in the 1:

study of auxiliary feed water systems acrcss plants

~

13 that there is a wide variation in their probability 14 c * *e' ' ure, and that the Surry plant that we happen 15 to have picked and studied in WASE-1400 was among s

16 the =cs: reliable auxiliary feed water syste=s, but 17

,1 there are c:her syste=s that are a facter of cne j

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hundred =cre likely to fail than that systen, and x-1.

ei 19 they have to be fixed.

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So it occurred to =e:

now how can we sit j 0

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l'i lj here as an agency, kncwing that there are outliers 21 fres our perception in WASE-1400, and not do a.- thing l

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about it.

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accc=plish a number of things at once.

We will draw f'

j event trees en all operating reactors, except where i

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th*7 are very si=11ar, and we will draw si=plified 3

N k&f l

'tr:no-trees, not the very large enes frcs WAS?.-1400, 4

v 3

but simpler enes ts-seew, to identify these systens and failure possibilities that appear obviously not to 6

be in the ensemble of WASH-1400 risks and find out 7

what to do about those.

I would also use this 3

9 progra= Es a way of training people en how to draw to event trees, which is the biggest single thing you I

I have to de to understand risk.

And I told Harcld 11 g,

he wculd have to put up sc=ewhere between eight and 13 twalve people.cf his very best people, and have to bleed over it.

I tcld the chairman this, and he is 14 i

I 15 l backing it.

Harold is backing it.

And we are h

planning new to pick one plant tc do it as an 16 a.

37 exercise, and then get organized to go through the s

2 la whole rignarole with plants.

i 19 O

let =e go back to thu generic situaticn.

Ycu said a

i e

si II 7ou r solved it down to abcut 17 cr 19 issues.

Who 20 3

is ecine to rescive all tho'se?

2 1

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1 A

N. R. R. has the pri=ary respchsibility, and they

3 have programs crganized to work on them, because cf 1

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24 ll their lack of resources at the ncnen we have taken I

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ever sc=e of that work.

Sc=e of those task act'on i

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j plans have been assigned to research, and we have pecple and contracters working en those.,

3

)

Q Can you give us an enu=eration, some degree of what h

those ---

5 l A

There is one called station blackout, which means 6

what happens if you lose all AC power.

There is one on the e ergency sump in the containment.

When you 3

9 ;

have to use emergency core cooling system in a Tecirculation more.

There is questions abou't the 10 v rtering of water and so forth and so forth.

I 11 l

think we have the one en water ha-er, and two or 1,.

l u

i 13 i three others.

I think we have about five or six.

Q That is in your department?

i t

j A

My department.

33 Q

What are those cver in N. R. R.?

8 16 1

I 3l A

don't recall, I cculd =ake a list available to you.'

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Q Would you do that?

18 4

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A Yes, I would be happy to.

g9 s

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And I guess send it in to Chair:an K=eny at the

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i President's Co==ission.

,1 A

Yes.

I 23 Q

Rec: 714, 2100 M Stree: Ncrthwest, 20037, I think.

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A Rocs 714 d

f Q

Right.

In your Opinion, hcw sericus tre thes e 3

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cutstanding generic iscues?

4,

A 1 think there are one or two that we cught to work 5

6 l right away.

That is =y recollections.

Q-Could you tell ---

A I don't recall what they are.

j S

9 Q

WCuld 70u put asterisks on the ones you are going i

10 to send in?

i I

11 A

Yes, yes.

i 12 l Q

As you know, as you have indicated, this questien of l

13 generic issues has been pending a 1cng, long time.

A. C. R.

S., the Advisory Cc==1ttee on Reactor y,

I 15 Safeguards, enunerated this 1cng list to which you Il r ferred, and then there have been some adju:::ents, 16 t

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4 p

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and to f ::h.

Perhaps your analysis cf Ontse i: sues 1

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Is has aided in the reduction of the number, either l

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19 that they weren't significant safety issues er they a

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o if were enviren= ental issues cr procedural issue: cr 9b

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peCple are still lc0 king fCr'& resolution nade Cn i

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these issues.

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Yes.

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brotherhcod, everybody is for getcing these things 3

solved, but ncbcdy does anything about them, and it 4

doesn't see= to affect the licensing proceeding.

5 Are those issues cf such substance that the licensing 6

provisien should be altered in sc=e way to get a 7

resoluticn?

S A

I haven't thought about it, but I don't thi.k sc.

I I

9 haven't thcught about it care'ully.

j Q

• • hy not?

If they're serious enough to have tieen 10 f

11 pending for sc=e:hing like ten years and nothing i

i 12 d0ne, isn't it about tine to get sc=e finality in

3 here sc eplace?

14 A

I'm not sure they have been pen.ing for ten years.

d il 15 p Don't ferget there was once a list cf 350 to 400 i

d I

16 ite=s.

Many o* these have been resolved.

Sc=e have i

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Tnere has been a process wor'cing on them.

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l 400, and there are new 20, that's been a large mark, i.

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2 a "'"k of large prcgress ever the years.

4 1

Q

'The quection really is hcw =any were actually 3

l resolved er just re=oved frem the list under the 4

1 3

analysis you =ade.

A Oh, no, no.

Many of them are resolved.

I have 6

read reports.

There are lists of, there are reports 7

I I

8 on this icsue and that issue, and wi.a; was done to resolve it.

Yes.

9 i

Q

• I think as say it is interesting to know licw =any 10 I

11 were resolved in the process, the last of which you I

1, just ---

A That could be provided.

14 Q

-- and how cany are really ---

15 l A

Would you like =e to furnish that?

1 16 j.

Q If you can without a ict of research.

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A I dcn't %ncw how ruch werk it is fcr me.

t I

Q Ocn't belabor the subject.

{

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can tell you there were a significant nunber-that a

?

20

,l Were solved.

They weren't just eli=inated.

t i

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Q Take ene you can renenber.

i A

can't reme=ber one.

I just,recember that : have

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- j read reports where they have received issues.

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la; ne see if I can recall one.

' dell, I can 't I,

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l offh nd, but at the time of its listing, there was enough, 2: I recall it, to have everybody in tho l

3 nuclear indu:try quite encrcised about it, 1

I 4

A Yes.

5 Q

And that character 1:atien is correct, it would seem 6

of such substance to n*,rrantsc=e scr of adjust =ent 7

in the licensing prevision other than saying. don't l

sentic-the subject again in this proceeding.

It's s ;

I i

9 i in the hands of the gods, or eneuse =e, it 's in the i

l hands of sc=cbcdy who is going to be dcing scmething 10 11 about it.

And I think that has led to a crest deal 12 cf criticism about the proceedings, if I =ay say a lack of credibility in the results, and I think in 13 n 14 aid of trying to assist the, if not the establish =ent, 15 i the enhance =ent of credibility, that sc=e f1=er 16 pres:~~-'ng of generic issues =ight well be in order.

i

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1; :.

Lo ycu not as: ee?

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A I agree with you cc=pletely.

i.

t 19 Q

Well, lot's get over to ':'hree :',ile Island a bit.

{

20 Do you knew cf any generic 1: sues e

1 develcptng frc= that incident?

i

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l A

Yes.

l}

3 ll Q

What are they?

l i

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p frc: T. M. I. that are generic.

one is cur t

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understanding of accidents.

It's clear to ce, and j

l one was described, I'll state it in my own words, 3

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that there are accidents that can lead to severe 4

3 l ccre da= age but net to fuel melting that have never been looked at with the care that is needed.

It's 6 !

more difficult even to look at those than the 7

accide-as we locked at that involved core =elting.

8 There are issues that have been raised of l

• 1 cas that happen and don't happen.

That is' you 10 l

11 l

have an inter =ittent loca.

When the relief and l

I block valves were open, you had loca, and then they closed it, you don't have a loca, and then they opened 13 y

it, you had loca, you had accidents appearing and 15 disappe aring.

Ycu had emergency core cooling

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18 system being curned en and off, and this makes a i

We're very cc= plex menagshi$ cf things to examine.

19 a

f 3

30103 00 hE7* t0 d3 thai

• 20 3

8 i

8 Now how are we going to do chat?

We're

g 1

going to have te study the machines, the reactor I

3

=achine in much greater detail than we ever have j

i I

I l

4 j before.

The reaccer rafecy philecophy has been scrci i

1 i:

i

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16 m

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22 l-s 1

i of to establish an envelcre of design basis i

l accidents, that everything that was within that would I.

3 be all right, becauce this envelope prctected you, l

and certainly that has not been violated.

The 4

5 C. M. I. accident in fac:, as regrettable as it was, 6 l showed the wisdom of that, and that with these I

7 encrnous a=ounts of radioactivity released to the 3

contair ent, very little got outside the contain=ent 4 9

30 that safety design philosophy is intact, but a little crinkly around the edges.

We shculd certaini/

to I

I 11 not have accidents like happened at T. M. I, happen i

12 very frequently, as frequently as this is predicted 13 to happen.

14 We have already issued bulletins and f

g5 orders which have =ade the likelihood of such a i

1 l!

specific accident =uch less likely.

What are we 16 f

I 17 going to do?

We're going to write co=puter codes.

a 18 ll We're going to do e:Periments, and we're gcing to 1

i 19 i

study the cachine, we have to develop fast running a

J l

j 20 ccdes that can analyce an accident in ten =inutes I

21 to an hour.

l Il We now have ec=putar codes where the f

s t

3 !!

emphasis has been en precision, and the'/ run in very!

i i

24 long tires, 10 to 20 to 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br />.

We still have tc ;

n N

4 i

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^

34 e

i O,

o i

4:

I centinue develcp'ng those codes for the precision I

i il jj that is needed -- by precisicn I don't mean in the

-il answer, I =can in the handling cf the physicfl l

3 t

processes.

We can develop fas't running codes that 4

treat the physical processes with less precisien, 3

and use these =cre precision ecdes as bench marks to

=ake sure that the shortcuts we will take in the a

fast running codes will be adequate, and then we have g

to stucy the machine very carefully and frcm that 9

vill cete the greater enhancement cf understanding to and perhaps core changes in reactors.

11 Q

Well, I think one of the quest $0ns that people 1,

would like to see answered is why should not some of 33 these matters be resolved before they go forward g4 with further cperations.

Can you help in that?

15 I

.I 16 l

A 7es, I can.

I think the = cst

• --ad' ate things that ld,,

a h ve hai to be done hsve been d:ns.

Cne, the j

2 t

)

l s

e ll accident sequence that we knew was, new knew is a 2

18 5

1 19 bad ene,'has been fixed.

It has been made nuch l

d, 10wer 'n probability.

i 20 2

4 F

Twc, the lessen we learned about where

1 i

the ccaraters were deficient in dealing with that, 1I bas'cally in under::anding the stes= tables, if 7:n 3

i,

(

ll will, the relationship between pressure and I

r e

P 6

ii l

11 39 I

4 I

i, lI t

i 1

te=perature, has been fixed because all the cperators I

have been trained new to get a bet:cr understanding i

1 cf that.

And what we're talking about frcm new in 3

t 4

is making further i:provements to make things even 5

= ore less likely.

'a'e want cperators to have better 6

instrumentation, better displays of the instru=entatien, better diagnostics, va want better 7 ;

g ci=ulaters to train them better, and we're going to 9 [

do all this.

It will take tire, but what it will do t

b 10 9

.is achieve a better level cf safety, er at l' east in 1

I 11 y view.

That is our obj ective.

I:

Now the overall risk to the society frc=

13 reacters changes as the nc=ber cf reactors are 14 l operating, so there is a real reason to say if you I

I I 15 li are at a particular level of risk with 100 reactors, 0

3 16,i and ycu go to 200, you would like a better level of

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h not to change. ~,le're working on how to improve the j

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19 t-safety of reactors, we have a progra: called a

u

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{f j

o j I= proved ?.eacter Safety.

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Q That is a new one.

ll h

A 20 wts spenscred by Ocngress in'their 1978

- 22 1li 3 )

Authcrizatien AO: for cur budget.

it cl!

Q Just in ;ine.

ha:n't had a chance to get in 24 h

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• Te didn't get any =cney until the very end of

/

CN

' 9, fiscal ar M '79.

3 v

4 j Q

Are you planning, as cne cf the changes, to limit s

the number cf people in the control roc = when you 6

have an incident like you had at 'Three Mile Island?

7 I understand you almost had to have tickets, you S

couldn't get in it was so crowded.

9 A

One of the lessons learne0 is to establish an I

i 10 esergency center on site but away frc the c'entrol 11 rocm, and that 's where the people can go to try to 1:

help.

13 Q

My understanding that industry at the ti=e cf Three i

14 :

Mile island, particularly Willia = Lee of ?cwer, very j

l 15 l effective in assistance in the analytical work that l

was being done en Three Mile Island.

Are you 16

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18 With industry co==ittees in case of incidents of

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'" hat is a question that I can't answer.

Teu would 1

=

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1 have to talk to Denten or sc=eone.

I l

i b

Q Icu recognize the value of indascry?

23 y A

Of course.

'2he in.ustry knows a great deal about d

e 22 N the*r :schines, and have very ec=petent designers, n

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of the things we are thinking about is what I call a 3

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data link, where just as the opera cr nee s this d

i; f

better display and better diagncstic equip =ent to 4

i I

help hi=, a data link can be established to send i

g that infor=ation to the reactor vendor and to the 6

N. R.

C..

And we're explcring how to do that new, or 7

s l

we have =cney in our fiscal 'oO supplement budget i

request to start plans *n that regard.

9 ;

i.

to i Q

At the time of Three Mile Island, I understand there i

was so=e infernatien cr advice even ec=ing frc=

I 12 lynchburg?

13 A

Yes, on the telephone, I believe, er sc=ething.

Q Is there any way of connecting cc=puters of the type y

i!

0 to which Dr. Ras =ussen referred to sc=e sort of 35 l

16 [

instru=entation new at the =anufacturer so that he

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h ther. was sc=ething that that ec=puter could prcvide.

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Whatever the operator .s, will be trans=itted by 2

3 j.

radio, cr a teleph0ne line, '- ediat ely, in real l

ti=e as it is happening.

4 I

Q You say telephone line, that means ---

5 A

Ey trans=it, I do not =ean = ail.

I =ean ---

6 Q

Cr horseback?

o A

Cr horn 2back.

I =ean in real time.

g Q

Well, sc=e of this I think would have been probably 9

l-go ::

=cre accurate if it had gone by horseback, as I

.i 11 understand it, but hcw can you get useful 'inf.r ation.

1:

if they don't have the accurate infor=1 tion, and 13 i==ediately transmit it -- now ycu say we're going 14 te work out a data link to trans=it information.

t l

15 i My question is how can the c0=puter in the control Fl rco be so=ehcw connected with sc=e reccrding 16 i,

3' device at the =anufacturer?

a 3

I is Sy a data link.

It's a routine procedure done all A

I.

i g9 the ti=e.

s I

f.

o j Q

I a= trying to el' 'nate telephone wires new.

1 A

I a= talking about wires, pecple speaking, that the 21 I

i actual data that sces into 'the ccL,. uter and cut of I

b

3 D the cc=puter could be trans=itted by a

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radiotele=e:ry data link directly to the =anufacturer, 4

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19 4

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Q

'4 ell, I wouldn't want to denigrate the effort by 3

i N

3abccc% i Wilccn in any respect, because I don't o'

now try hing about their capabilities or their 3

programs and so ferth, but at the smae ti=e I don't 4

want tc advertise any other reactor. manufacturer, 5

f but I have had the impression that let us say two 6

other reactor steas =anufacturers have very large 7

staffs and labcratcries and the equipment which in 3

totality per=it them to not only actually receive 9

2

,l infer aticn but ccrrectly analyse it, and I didn't to know whether Babcock & Wilcox had the capability frcm such facilities and personnel as that to 3,

receive and analyce data as let =e say these two 13 other manufacturers.

Do you know anything about that?

34 A

I'm not able to co=nent.

15 -

I ll Q

Is this, by the way, just let me ack, is this 16 1

ll' accepctn=e of the Clanc 9 acciden; for licencing

i 13 l

proceeding considerations going to involve cultiple i

failures, do 70u believe, analyses?

j 19 l!

=

I

! have to give ycu a icng answer, and it goes like o d A

I W

/

l chis.

'de have an establishae=; design basis, s

i accident 2nfety envelcpe, which has worked very well

~ --

to date, and even werked well in Three Mile Island.

'3 d

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Q As to which there may be sc=e dispute, but go ahead.

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We now, ac have said,4w.t Oc study acci;ient that !

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I t.re 1ers severe chan design basis accidenes and nore 4

l severe than decign bas's accidents better than we 5

t l

have so "ar.

With thr.

will cc=e a lot of knowledge 6

It's not clear that design b:: sis accident envelcpe g

has tc be changed, although it nay be or could be.

t 9

It's not clear to se that Class 9 a001 dents have to ho 10 l beccne a part of the licensing process.

The 11 l

A. C. R. S. in a very recent letter addressed this 1

12 i subject, and they called for accident analyses of i

ll the kind I described, and they specifically said it 13 i

14 1

is not necessary that the design basis accident i

I is should be changed and prota'bly it wculd be better

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19 necessarily the design basis accidents, er certainly{

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1 in ter=s of how you run large precess involving thcusands and thousands of pecple and cc==unicating !

i, 3 I to one another.

Yea can't simply say to the:

I i

4 I thfow cut the design basis accident, and review

hat do ycu dc?

How do people 5

reactor; for safety.

6 come to work te=crrew and do their jobs?

They 7

wouldn't knew how to.

s Q

It wculd take then a day er two perhaps?

9 A

No.

It would take them icnger than that.

You have

'o have sc=e intellectual basis in which they work.

t 10 11 And I as not defending the design basis accident as 12 not changeable, but I a= just saying you have to d&cw 13 evolve &mte a process, a requisite analysis and t

14 what ene has to do about it.

First you have to have i

15 !

understanding, and then the process will even e

16 accc=nedste whatever enhancements in safety are 5

tt

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'i needed with this greater underrts= ding.

I wecid te a

18 very cautious abcut saying throw cut the design i

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19 basis acc* dent, and bring en Class 9 you would have J

20 j

cass ccnfusion.

No one would know what to do.

.I t,

21 i

Q

'ihat do you think about not Three Mile I: land but i

= ass ccnfusion?

'l m(7( have been in

~

23 A

That's a different nateer.

i 24 h submarines tha nearly have disastan?jand sc e ll P

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'iow do you think you ceu'd handle the perscnnel g,

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A The same codes I talked about.

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8 A

It's a long way off to ---

9 Q

I have learned enough data fr0: these years of 10 operations -- Dr. F.as=ussen ra' sed kind of a, if i

11 I use the situation, the Russian Pavlov response,

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IS or persennel eenpeteney?

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I think ycu nisunderstocd ne.

I understand l

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NO.

,0 what you're saying new, and let ne address what you

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II just said.

Yhat kind of things-ycu're talking abou

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5 i Q

It's 20 years er so?

6 A

Yes.

Q You're still working on it?

A We ran two large tests this year, and predicted in g

advance *ierywellkntnewayinwhichthefuel 9

es j

$'culd behave.

10 11 Q

The predicticns as the experi=ent went on, so finall'jt 12 l when it was cc=pleted it =et the pred.ictions?

I lI A

No, sir.

13 I

14 n,

a see.

15 !

A Tnese were pre-predictions, and came out very close.

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Q Yes.

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Well, we did use twc ccf.es, the rela; code, under

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I develop ent for many years, has had many adjustmentc.

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t 3 !

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4 !

Q Good.

That sounds pretty good.

5 A

Let =e c,cntinue.

6 Q

Yes.

7 A

This is a fairly complen subject, and I would like S

to get the record f airly clear en it.

You can do a 9

lot of things quickly, but not co=pletely, you could 10 set display hardware quickly, and put it in 11 reactors, to enhance the Operator's capability to 1:

see more infor=ation.

You could get a better data 13 logging ec=puter quickly.

The diagnostic capability.,

14 that is to build a ec=puter that would take the i'

15 varicus pieces of data, and diagnose for the I

g 16 cperater what is scing on in the accident is much n

l i g

17 ji scre cerclicated, and will take a while, take a a

i f

18 couple of years.

Okay.

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19 p

That 's why I am recen=ending the need for v

20 l a supericr kind of person, we call him a safety

{l

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21 engineer, but as f ar as I as ccncerned, he.dcean't 22 i

have to be an engineer.

Ee has to meet the'

,li i-23 jl requirenencs that IIor an spcke about a**a".

i 24 "cu need a person Of that type in the l'a 6

li 1

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.M-I centrol roc = to aid the operator for situations he

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have better diagnestics. tihen you have better i

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y diagnostics, you =ay not even need this cther persen.i

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l But certainly y:u have time to wait for the better 5

i 6

diagnostics, F.nd it's going to take ti=e.

"or. also n0w have a Oertain kind of 7

8 sinulater capability.

Those si=ulators could be 1

h easily fixed to handle a large nu=ber of accident 9

4 q

sequences that we now understand, that go beyond 10 i

11 design basis accidents, they 're all in WASH-1400, il they could be easily progra==ed into a ec=puter, 12 i

t 0

13 y and the operater could be trained on a simulater to I

li 14 do,these.

What 1 was saying would take a lens ti=e a

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approxination.

10 takes time to get that cicse to a

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19 reality in ec=puter prcgre- 'ng, so that final' b

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the pilots new have after how =any 1

!j ctjective that j

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21 2

years?

30 years cf aviatien, 40 years Of aviation?

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You have 300 30 years Of nuclear Operati:n frc= the y

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'4 E*.anhattan proj e0 and s0 forth.

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Q I have never heard of a nuclear research project ii 9 j that wasn't ac0c=panied with a descripti0n of we i

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accident?

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' Jell,1 have not designed boards.

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l understand you haven't.

3 l

A Sut 1 can speculate.

Every day the reacter has, 4,

i i '

3 the operater has to run the reacter, and every day it's not having an accident, so he needs before hin 6

the displays of the process parameters that he 7

s l needs to run the reactor.

l 00 9 l Now they're not j ust a., _ri, by the way.

go They record data with a pen and ink and so ycu can 11 have a backward look as well a now look.

You can't li get all those dials en the panel.

Scme cf the= are 1:

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behind the panel.

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Just a rinute.

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lf he didn't have the dials and reccrders he needed 17 i

a is to run the plant every dar, he wculd have nore 19 accidents.

"e really wecid.

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Giva "'- ' koard to lcok at this side, and then a l

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il 01 beard en this side.

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23 i Up Whatever he wants to, jus like that, and he u

a 24 Would have it.

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Q That would take care of the d?.ily operacions?

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.Take care cf ever; thing.

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A Sc=e of these he has before hi= cover accidents, too.

6 Q

Eave you ever heard of a descript'en of such chacs as to what =ust have been at the Ch"ee Mile Island S

in the Three Mile Island control roc = with lights 9

1. lashing, bells ringing, sc=ething sounding, you 10 would want to escape to maintain sanity, let alene 11 cperate anything?

12 A

I have felt for 15 cr 20 years that sc=e day we ll 1

13 il would have that situation, and it would be impossible l'il 14 ij for the operater ---

t 15 Q

Sc your prediction has cc=e true?

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--- for che operacer to know what te do when 150 c.-

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Oid you ever write a recen=endation to change that?

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have fele for a icng ti=e we needed diagncstic f..

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3 li (A chcrt recess was then taken.)

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If we may resune.

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4 i question involves.

Uhy sh:uld there be the I

5 I appearance at lec t of a di*ference in the quality I

l of the level of the safety work dcne at N. R. C.

6 I

and that done by your group.and that done by the 7 '

3 N. R. E. group?

Why shculd the licensing proceedings s.

9 affect the chara0:er cf the research?

That is benerally ny thought.

Can you address that subject?

to 11 A

Well, it is a very diffidult question.

I can just it start to talk ab.ut it.

I wouldn't say that their 13 work is of 10w r quality.

When you're doing, they're g4 doing licensing reviews in an established franework i

15 against established regulations where nodels enist

=

l 16 to cover what they do.

let ne take a specifie l

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They evaluate the effectiveness of s

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energency ccling systens in acccriance with 1-19 a

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Appendin " Of Part 50.

They use an evaluati:n n: del;

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3 physical processes.

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4 "ow cur jcb in research is to get the data-5 and =ake the =odels that predict that reality very 6 I much better.

That's hard to do.

You need highly.

l cc=petent people to do that.

And we talk, in general, 3

of a =cre scientific view than the regulaters, but l

9 l

we'r not more competent than they are, if that's a

10 w' hat you're trying to --

11 Q

I a= not talking about cc=petency, I at talking 1:

about result.

Tneir result is in the regulatory l

• ra=ework.

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A Our results are in a scientific fra=eucrk, and 14 l,.

4 15 y science is a very exacting thing, and regulati0n a i

!.j less exactinE; thing.

16 3.

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Q Chat' exactly why pecple are cencerned.

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A Yes, but it has to be.

Science is unforgiving.

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Science is the reality of's-ci:nc:, and you have to go 19 A

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very careful atcut it.

A regula: cry process ca.

=ake censervatis=s to overec=e. lack cf k.cwledge, 4

3

'l and you can try :: ask questiens about uny aren't 4

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are dcing this and that, and che answer is I don't j

1 2 i have tc, because I have accc==cdated it with a 3

conservative bound.

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Q Uell, assu=ing his asst =ptions are valid of course it is a conserva'tive bound.

5 I

A There was an A. E. C. hearing for two years, there 6

l 7

was a review.

The Co==1ssion approved it, and i

s I that's what he has to So cn.

9 Q

Many of these reactors have not been able to =eet i

i 10.

the heat levels, or exceeded t' e heat levels, so we h

i set special exceptions?

11 i,

4 12 l!

A They drop the power level, and sc=etimes =ake an i;

i 13 l exception to the rule.

In the cases where we =ay j,

have sc=e data to show that, say, you have been too 14 lll l

conservative in this area, if you =ake a little 15 f

16 ;

excepticn it's all right.

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4 Cr if you dcn't have data, chey =sy do it en their 2

18 cwn, where the research depart =ent I

19 A

hcpe not.

I don't knew what they do.

4 Q

I don't thi=k nany people knew abcut 10.

And I think l

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i 21 [

there was sc=e scurce of confusion as to whether i

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your research may be the r:re precise and shculd te l

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generally applied.

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Maybe there is an encuce for it er explanaticn er 1

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sc=ething.

Q That there was screthin; you were going to give us.

p.

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-_3 generic issues, which are being worked on by M. R. R.,

4 I

5 and being worked en by N. R. C.

Maybe there is i

6 sc=e other assigned to another list, and then you I

said maybe I could list what are the high priority s l ite=s.

9 Q

You said you had senathing abcut Rogivin.

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A Yes.

I can give that to ycu now.

Rogivin to i c

1, 11 circulated a questionnaire ---

I 1:

Q This is, if I may just while he is searching fcr G

c 13 his paper, Rog' vin, R-c-s-S-y-1-n, is an at:crney 14 appointed by the Regulatcry Cen=ission, I believe, 15 cf the Three Mile Island situaticn, so is one going Il

-j 16 l

cn by Congress En Udall, the President's Cen=1ssion a

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19 people say that the fc: is going to examine the a

l' 20 safety cf the chickens in the coep, the Regivin 4

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1 23 is the response by Cr. Levine to Mr. Ecgivin's

'l 24 y endeavor.

Which ---

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! an embarrassed.

I had that en 27 kitchen table

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If you cculd just generally tell us, are you in favcr

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4 ;

5 c' the general actions taken at Three F.ile Island, 6

er what do you think shculd be dene?

A h* ell, I talked about a number of issues.

One issue S

I talked about was the need to change the perceptions 9

in N. R. R.

They have to be = ore open-minded.

I.

10 i Q

How do ycu do that?

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' dell, there are ways to do that.

First of all they 11 i

i 12 can be encouraged by a large number of people, such T

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changes made.

For instance, when Rusche, 14 d

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15 R-u-s-c-h-+, who was the directcr prior to Denton, a

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i 18 would take a broad lock at the reactor safety issues

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A and reactor situations.

He saw fit not to do that.

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e=ployees are required as part Of doing their

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i day-to-day work to develop such a._ata, and th_t

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4 I know Denton shares =y concern, because we have 5

talked about it, and if he.can ever get the Tnree 6

Mile Island over with, he'll get back to 7

reorganizing his organization on that.

8 I think the Cc= mission in fact Operates at l

9 too detailed a level.

I think the Co==ission doesn't 10 !

quite understand that it's a policy bcdy, and n0t an 11 operating bcdy, and it's operating at such a detail 1

1:

level that it interfe"es with the management of the 13 agency.

14 I have suggested that they have a 15

=anagement study =ade to tell the= how to do their 9

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actually daciding the cases?

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Ycu wenidn't have them ccepuce the hydrogen level at 11j Three Mile I;_and during che accidenc up there?

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l-Q "cu would let that be done by people more fa=iliar 4

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A I a= thinking not of the emergency.

I have cther 6

views about the emergency.

7 I

S Q

Uell, deal with the e=ergency.

I think that is going to be a great concern with us.

9 l

10 A

I'll say a few words.

I a= talking about the F

day-to-day operatiens of the Co--dssion.

11 1,.

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A They're cperacing at too detailed a level, and nakes t

13 the policy suffer and keeps the staff frcs doin5 its 14 t

15 0 job better.

0 16 As far as the emergen:7 is concerned, I s

s.

i

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l,i o,

should have designated one of their nu=ber to be in 2

is a

charge of it, and to keep them infor=ed.

They.

j 19

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h. b. J.'s e. h.._q. w3s a ___Js.gLa.

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s 37 the sane ccken, if they didn't have aq i

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24 h screwhere in the agency sc=e one persen who is puc i

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l, of cc=petence te deal with it and make the deci icns.

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That can be established in the Cc==ission 4

crganization or in an ar'-* nistrator.

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way, I have thcusht abcut whether we need an 6

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Cc==ission.

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at least this day and age and this stage of the l

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develcpsent of nuclear, you need a spectru= cf l

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View;cints, and you can't count en one administratcr I

10 l o give you the right balance.

l 13 I also have serious reservations abcut the 14 way cur E. D. G. office perfor=s, and the way we 15

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=anage the agency as a general rule.

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been a =eeting cf the E. D. O. and the five : ajor 16 i

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I-cf* ice direc:crs to discuss a whcie series of a

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19 g recc== ended that he hava such meetings.

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=anage=ent proble=s.

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4 conpletely candid. and open way, which you cannet do in public meetings. I have been a =anager for 34 5

years in the Submarine Service and Polaris and under 6

RickcVer, and I don't see how I could ever have done S

anything I have done in =y lifeti=e under the Sunshine A0t.

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to "to be strong.

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and how you convey infor=ation to the public.

13 Q

Excuse =e if I can interrupt just a sc=ent, and not l

14 to take issue with what you have said ---

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4 about research which nay be one aspect c' it.

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have cantge=ent discussions tcgether, cnly the 1

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'de would have to get legislacien, I expect.

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cr wha ever, but I think it is needed desperately.

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11 service crganization can devel:p and naintain the 1:

required kind of scientific obj ectivity an' cc. petence 13 fer 1cng periods of time that are needed to regulate i

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nuclear power, and I a= naking a reconnendation that s,

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we change the way we do business.

'ie cut the staff 15 a

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safety reviews.

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t; There a.re a lot of people that will object to that, H

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but I think it's a way we can do a very much better 4

job.

5 Q

Well, I think tnat all those things would be very i

4 6

helpful to the Presidential Cc==1ssion in its considerations of what they =ay prepare.

Do ycu have erything other than that?

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Those are the major issues, there may be one er two t

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10 other things, but I don't remember what they are.

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• Jell, I think that's the kind of thing that the t

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Co mdssion is icoking fer.

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i 13

't about one statement you made about you thought the i

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shculd be = ore open-minded.

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=ean by that?

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18 i suspicien, and not with an open-cinded way.

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idea comes in to them that is not originated tF.ere, I l

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it's not a good idea.

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[l Michaelson report.

It didn't.come fr0n the=, and it:

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23 'i Orchably was subcerged.

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A h* ell, I suggested a way to do thac.

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h that would have that function.

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To correct sc=ething, to add sc=ething?

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you correct the situation that is creating 'he need 6

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7 A

I woulf be glad to ccrrect it in sc=e other way if S

you could give me a suggestion.

In fact, =y note to 9

10 T.=eny says be careful about any suggestion that 11 a=ycne makes, and be very careful to make a 1:

correction.

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To Rog' vin, which I will give to you.

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Well, if either of you gentle =en have anything 1

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i the proble=s in research =17 be historical in i

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where :nay have jus becc=e en=eshed in ritual and I

cha s.

I think it's too bad.

I think it is too 5

bad, and sc=e changes have to be =ade, but I think this perhaps to be a good time to see what could be devised.

3

2. JE!SCH:

Bob, do you have anything l

further you think we haven't covered?

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Could I say a word er two about the executive sen=ary?

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"es, please do.

13 A

I agree with everything Nor=an said about the 34 gg executive su==ary, encept I would like to say a few i

things a little =cre precise, that I think he'll

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't cc==anicated too effectively with lay =en.

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,4 Well, =17 I interrupt there?

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cf the nu:: lear power is scall cc pared tc the risks i.

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that we accept in society today, and is totally i

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DR. IEVI!E:

In fact is in the =ain report 6

DR. RAS: CSS".~:I:

And is in the main repert, 7

but what is a criticism that I accept as correct is 8

that cur display of certain of the risks is = ore 9

dramatic, and hence fccused people's attention en it, 10 I*amely the early risks, the early fatalities.

And 11

. although we included in the executive s"-ary a l

discus:1cn of the latent risks as well they weren't 12 i

I 13 equally well portrayed because there weren't nice 14 figures to show them, and they weren't as effectively 15 cc==unicated, so =any pecple didn't understand or didn't ec prehend the delayed ccnseq'ences as well 16 l

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17

'ls as perhaps they shculd have.

I do not believe there

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2 18 1 is any inaccuracies in the exect:ive su==ary abcut E.

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h lG. JE:ISCE:

Oh, no.

I dcn't mean the hi

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MR. JENSCH:

But it didn't emphasize what 1

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really was the main body report, tha*. nuclear pcWer I

k. a a. n. u ~d e. s *

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all ---

l DR. RA3MUSSEN:

Greater safety or Sreater 6

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MR. JENS0E:

Greater scfety to nuclear s

9 90Wer than had general *y understood to be.

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swa=ary by the descripticn you have just given, 13 Dr...asmussen, you didn't equally deal with the 14 i 15 latent situatien as well as you e=phasized the I

a I t, i

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d, 21 ii

• AS E-140 0.

Fcr instance, as recall, Lewis said a

i sc=ething like this.

To scy *h.at because there are r

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an interesting ene, but what pecple are really v

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wanting to know is nuclear power in and of itself at i

l a lower risk than had generally been understood by 4

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the audience to who. you were directing your 5

6 executive s"--ary.

DR. RASMUSSEN:

Well, I think -- it depends 7

S what audience you're talking about.

Our esti= ate 9

came out at a 1cwer risk than sc=e of the critics to had said, but substantially higher than the industry 11 j had thcusht.

The Irdustry generally claimed that the 1:

chance of core =elt was one in a million er less.

13 We found it to be one in 20,000.

That was a factor I

14 cf 50 higher than cuch of the industry had thcusht.

15 It depends which audience you're talking about, 16 l

whether it is scre safe er less safe than they had i.

4 i:2sined.

3 1-DR. LZ"!NE:

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6 MR. JENSCH:

Well, I think this unequal 7

treatment is giving a lot of people a problem.

s D.S. LEVINE:

Well, for those o' us who i

9 have read the main report carefully and those of us 10 who have read the executive su==a y carefully, I 11 find it hard to say in my o'a"1 =ind that there is it very much difference in treatment.

13 MR. JENSCH:

'a' ell, you =ay not feel so,

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Cr. Rasmussen, do you have sc=ething that you Cou'.d add?

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situation ca=e up where they wanted to de sc=ething, 8

and sc=ebody said no, you can't do that.

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viclation of technical specs.

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!i that point the guy in ec==and ought to be able to 10 I

11 say technical specs don't apply today.

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=ergency situation, and my duds-.ent it is better tc 13 ignore that technical spec because this is = ore for 14 today.

'4hether or not that cccurred in T. ". I., it 33 could surely have, and I suspect it may well have,

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e 23 !i govern =ent agency recpensible, they should have l

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is set up with five men in charge, I.

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and that's why it is a particular problen.for the 3

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4

!!cw who should be in charge at the s1*e, 5

I thinl: takes seme thought.

I wouldn't effhand say, 6

but generally the can who has been running the =2 chine 7

8 day in, day out, is the man that cught to be in I

9 l charge, and if he requires !!. R. C. approval, then i

I 10 there ought tc be one can at the !i. F..

C, who has 11 the authority to say yes, go ahead, we decided that's 12 all right.

I 13 FR. JI:iSCR:

Yes.

I think there has been 14 greater support fer the idea that sc=ebody from the II, cperation of the nuclear facility be the one man who 15 I

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16 would really be the t' man, and his werd would s

j c:ntr:1.

As : underst..nd i:, f r instance en this a

2 18 [

hydresen calculation, indu:try =ade a calculation ac i

19 abcut the time that subject came up which indi:iated a

_ 20 i that there was not enough cnygen to get a detonation.

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j DR. F.AS:CSCI:I:

Absciutely correct.

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1 that a hydrogen er.plosien was a real possibility, and i

j En evacuatien should be taken.

Then case the report, 2

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3 as I understand it, that they were considering l

calling cut the National Guard because of the likely 4

I 5

evacuation situation, and the directer cf the 6

National Guard said, ladies and gentlecen of 7

Pennsylvania, you may be sure that your husbands and 8

brothers and relatives and friends will never be i

9 sent into the area where there is lethal levels of 10 radioactivity, which some pecple thcusht was where 11 they could do the most 50cd, so with the hydrogen 12 i calculaticas being inaccurate, as I understand it, l

13 it would seem to support the desirability of one man 14 being in charge, so I think that = cst of the co==ents i,

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have heard is that somebody frcm the cperatien s

16 should be, because he knows his own =achine.

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IS DR. LI7IMI:

Yes, it should be.

i 19 MR. JINSCH:

I do think there is another 8

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problem in this whcie thing, aside frem what happened i

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21 ji at C. M. I., but think Harold Den:c: said,sc=ethinh i

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2 like this.

Industry has -cme to rely upon the 23,l M,, R. C. so nuch fcr analysis cf cafety th-t they del il, very little cf their own, and wen't initiate 24 i

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i j'l endeavors er adopt designs and develep cenpenents i

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'. R. C. d0ecn't suggest it, why nothing is i

ferthconing.

If that is the situation, naybe that 4

5 is why EFEI, E-?-R-!, E?E!, has been developed to l

ccunter that situatien, and it nay be that industry 6

7 will be nore responsive to the need fer greater safety than they have exhibited.

I don't know.

5 9

Well, is there anything further?

I night j

go say, Miss Reporter, that for the record, both 11 gentlenen nedded their heads.

It looks like 1: :

exhaustion.

It locks like a negative response.

13 If there is nothing further, the 14 I depositions of these two gentlenen is concluded.

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15 Thank you very nuch.

o!

(Whereu;cn, at 12:25 p.m., the Deposition Is adjour 3d.)

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3 l the forescing trar. scrip; cf my testineny taken,on 4

Septecber 15, 1973, and further certify that said 5

transcript is a true and accurate reccrd cf my testi=cny.

6 In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand this 7

day cf 1979 S

9 Saul Levine 10 11 Swcen and subscribed to before ce this day of 12 1979 13 14 I

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.iotary :-ublic s

6 16 i

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'l My Cc ::issien enpires:

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I, Judith McGovern Willia =3, a :*c:ary 1

4 i

.ublic duly cc==issioned and c"=d within and 5 l fcr the Cct=onwealth of Massachusetts, do hereby 6

certify that there came before =e en the 15th day of September, 1979, at 10: 30 a.m., the persen hereinbefore l

named, uho was sworn by =a to testify to the truth 8

1 9 l and nothing but the truth of his knowledge touching 1

i to j and ccncerning the matters in controversy in this 1

11 l cause: that he was thereupon carefully examined upon I

12 his cath and his ena=ination reduced to typewriting 13 under cy direction; and that the deposi:1cn is a 14 taue reccrd of the testimony given by the witness.

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depcsition is taken, and further that I a not 2 l

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j 19 relative or employee of any at:crney ca counsel N.

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empicyed by the parties hereto er financially f

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My c:==ission expires u

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Maren *';, 1901.

F.egisterec ?rcrescicna_.:.eper:er tso.

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