ML19338B815
| ML19338B815 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 08/16/1979 |
| From: | Keimig R, Pearson E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I), PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 7909060505 | |
| Download: ML19338B815 (75) | |
Text
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- ---------------------------------------x PRESIDENT ' S COMMI SS ION ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND L-------------------------x DEPOSITION of U.
S.
NUCLEAR REOULATO?Y COMMISSION, REGION No.
I, by RICHARD P.. KEIMIG, held at the offices of U.
S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region I,
631 Park Avenue, King of Prussia, P e nn s y l v.anga, on the 16th day of A u g u s 't,
1979,' commencing at 3:20 6.m.,
be fo re Acher
- Ierkin, Notary Public of the State o f ::ew York.
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1 2
2 A P P E A RA NC E S :
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - _ S I O_ N :
REGULATORY COMMIS NUC_ LEAR 3
4 MARIAN E.
MOE, ESQ.
Attorney, Office of General Counsel s
5 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1717 H Street, N.
W.
6 washington, D.
C.
20055 7
0 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THREE MILE ISLAND:
9 ERIC
'. R S C N, ESQ.,
10 Deputy chief Counsel 11 S'e!9 EBE!!NI:
10 DAN SHERMAN 13 ooo 14 15 16 R I CH A R D
,R.
KE I M I G,
having been first.du y sworn by Eric Pearson, Esq.,
18 took the stand and tes ti fie d as fo llow s :
10 DIRECT EXAMINATION "O
~
3Y MR. PEARSON:
ol I,
Q Would you state your name, please.
\\-
,o A
Richard R.
Keinig.
o3 Q
Mr. Kei=ig, have you ever had a depositic~n
'l
'taken be f 0re ?
4 c:
A Of this nature, no.
S ENJ AMIN R EFC ATING E ERVIC E l
o 1
Keimig 3
2 Q
I then simply will highlight that the 3
testimony you give here will have the same force and 4
effect as if it were given in a court of law, and (2
5 consequently, please make every ef fort to answer as 6
precisely as possible.
7 If a question that I ask is unclear for 8
any reason, just stop me and ask for clarification, 9
and I will be more than happy to give it.
10 Let us begin now with just a brief recita-11 tion on your part of your educational background.
12 A
I have a Bachelor of Marine Science-Engineering 13 degree from the Maine Maritime Academy which I 14 received La 1962.
I also attended Nuclear Power 15 Technology training at the united states Merchant 16 Marine Academy i.g 1963, and also completed courses in technology," health physics 17 reactor and experimenta' 18 reactor operations, Texas AsM, in 1964, and a course 19 in water chemistry for nuclear power plants-treatment 20 and analysis at the Calgon Laboratory in 1964.
21 Q
Could you give us a brief reccunt of your
('
22 professional e xp e rie n c e.
23 A
Yes.
From June of 1962 thrcugh September of 24 1966, I was a United States Coast Guard licensed n-O second and third assistant engineer for American SENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G S E RVIC E
~
e.
L Keimig 4
0 Export-Isbrandtson Lines.
I served as a watch super-3 visor aboard the N.
S. SAVANNAH and had responsibilit I
for the operation, maintenance, testing and other
(<
5 related activities concerned with the reactor and 6
conventional power plant.
7 In October of 1966 through January 1971, I was 0
a senior operations analyst for the F' irs t Atomic Ship 9
Transport, Inc., who were the operators of the 10 N.
S.
SAVANNAH:
In this position I was responsible 11 for the preparation and auditing of reactor and l
conventional plant procedures and for the analysis of 13 reactor plant operations.
I also served as nhift 14 superintendent during the SAVANNAH's first refueling, 15 and acted as liaison with regulatory agencies and 16 contractors.
14 From February of 1971 18 through June of 1972 I was a senior operations engineer for Burns and-ace, Inc.
19 In this position I was responsible for the supervision 90
~
of a project group engaged in the preparation of "1
system design descriptions, pre-operational test and
('
o,
~~
operating procedures for nuclear and conventional o#
~
plant s ys tems for a uti'ity nudiear power facility.
'l
~
I was also responsible for planning and directing the 25 acceptance, pe rfo rmance, pre-operational and startup S ENJ A MIN R E;:C RTIN G S ERVICE
t 1
Keimig 5
o testing prior to commercial operation.
3 In June of 1972 th ro ugh present, I have had 4
various positions with the AEC-NRC, and I can go 5
through those if you wish.
6 Q
Please.
7 A
From June of 1972 through April of 1973, and O
again from December 1973 through June of 1976 I was J
9 a reactor inspector in the Reactor Construction 10 Project section and Construction and Engineering 11 support Branch.
In this position, I was responsible 19 for the inspection of nuclear reactor facilities 13 under construction.
14 Q
Is this in Region I?
15 A
Yes.
From April of 1973 through December of 16 1973, I was assigned as a reactor inspector in the Reactor Test and.Startup Branch.
In this position, l
IS I was responsible for the inspection of nuclear 19 reactor facilities during pre-operational and startup 00 testing activities.
01 From October 1976 through February of 1977, I L
was acting chie f of the Reactor Construction Projects
'3 Section.
In this posit'.cn, I'was tenporarily assigned
't to supervise the activities of a section that provides o
project management for nuclear power facilities unde.-
~
S ENJ AMIN REPORENG S ERvlC E
.. ~
t 1
Keimig 6
2 construction.
3 For the period, June 1976 through October 1976, 4
and again for the period from January of 1978 through 5
April of 1978, I served in the position of chief, 6
Nuclear Support Section No.
2, and in that position 7
I was responsible for the supervision of a section 8
that provides specialized support in the areas of' 9
quality assurance, plant procedures and operator 10 requalification training.
11 In May of 1977.through January of 1978, I was lo assigned the acting position of chief, Nuclear Material 13 control support Section.
In,this position, I was 14 temporarily detailed to supervise the activities of a 15 section that provides specialized support in the area 16 of nuclear materia 1 control and accountability.
17 In April of.1978 through the present, I hold IS the position of chief, Reactor Projects Section.
In 19 this position, I am responsible for the project 40 management of the Office of Inspection and En fo rcement al inspection program for reactors in pre-operational L
nn testing, startup testing, and cper ational phases at 03 resident and non-resident inspector sites.
't Q
How many persons do you have working for o-O you7 i
S ENJAMIN R EPO R TIN G S ERVIC E l
n6 I
Keimig 7
2 A
Let me count them up now.
It just changed.
3 App roximately six.
4 Q
May see the resume you are referring to.
~
~
5 A
Yes.
(Manding.)
6 MR. PEARSON:
For purposes of the record, 7
Mr. Keimig has been referring to a document as 8
he testifies wh.ich bears as a title, his name.
9 Q
Mr. Keimig, is this document, which 10 appears to be a resume of your experience and of your 11 educational background, accurate up to the present?
12 3
y33, te is, 13 Ma. PEAasoN:
With that, I would like to 14 have this entered as Deposition Exhibit No.
1.
15 (Above-described document herein marked 16 Keinig Deposition Exhibit 1 for identification, 17 this date.). _.
IO Q
Could you give me a bit more detailed 19 description as to the exact type of work that you and
^0 your staff do on a day-to-day b as is.
"1 A
on a day-to-day basis we carry out the inspec-L oo
~~
tien program which has been established by the Office
^3 of Inspection and In fo rcement 'fo r' reacto r facilities '
94 in the pre-operational, startup testing, and cpera-tional phases.
S ENJAMLN R EPC RT!N G SERVICE
1 Keimig a
2 Q
Does that mean for all the reactors that 3
are located within Region I,
you and your staff are 4
responsible for making sure that there are no violations O
5 of Nac requirements during the entire life of the 6
reactor from the point of construction through the 7
operating stage?
8 A
No.
As I said',. we start in the pre-operational 9
testing phase.
10 Q
What is the pre-operational testing phase?
11 I am not clear on that.
12 A
That phase is the phase in which for most part 13 the systems have been completed to the utility's 14 satisfaction, and the utility or a contractor for the 15
- tili.ty conducts the testing program of those systems 16 to insure that they function, as designed.
17 Q
Is M r.. H,av e rc a =p in your division, or 18 one of your staff?
19 A
Mr. Havercamp is one of my staff: I am the
^0 supervisor.
- 1 Q
Is he the engineer assigned the respon-nn sibility to inspect Three Mile Island?
"3 A
He is the project inspedtor for Three Mile oI Island, Units 1 and 2,
that is correct.
l n5 j
g can you tell me when you first became
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S ENJAMIN R EPC RTI N G S ERV!C E
1 Keinig 9
2 aware that there might be a problem at Three Mile 3
Island in March of this year?
4 A
Are you re ferring to the March 28 date?
(
5 Q
Yes.
6 A
Approximately to or five minutes of 8:00, when 7
I came to work that morning.
8 Q
Who told you?
9 A
I was met by a secretary as I ascended the 2
10 stairwell to the uppe r le vel, who told me that there 11 was an emergency at Three Mile Island, and the tele-12 phone conversation was going on in Mr. George Smith's 13 office.
14 Q
What did you do upon receipt of that 15 information?
16 A
I grabbed a pad, and proceeded to Mr. smith's 17 office.
18 Q
What va going on there?
19 A
A telephone conversation with, I believe it was, 20 a control room supervisor which was ongoing.
21 Q
Who was the control roo= supervisor at 22 that time, do you know?
23 A
I don't remember the name.
2%
Q Can you recount any of the conversation 25 that was ongeing?
E ENJAMIN R EFC R 7!N G S ERVIC E
O I
Keimig 10 2
A Not specifically.
If you have specific ques-3 tions as to what was discussed, I will gladly tax my 4
memory.
(~
.a Q
How long did that conversation last?
6 A
To the best of my recollection, approximately 7
15 minutes, at which point we attempted to transfer 8
the call to our Incident Response Center.
9 Q
Do you mean the Incident Response Center
~-
10 here in Region I?
11 A
Yes, here in Region I in the upper level, and 12 Mr. Smith's office is down below.
The transfer was 13 unsuccessful.
14 Q
How did you know that there was an 15 Incident aesponse center here that had been activated?
16 A
well, the I..yeident Respense center was activated 17 when we attempted to transfer the telephone call up 18 there.
19 Q
Prior to that, there was an action ongoing 4
1 20 at this Incident aesponse center?
I o
A Not that I as aware of because I was in oo Mr. Smith's office, o3 Q
subsequent to Mr. smit.h's telephone conver- '
2I sation, did you and he haee a conversation?
n5 A
Myself and Mr. smith?
E ENJAMIN R EPC RTIN G S ERVIC E
~
1 Keimig 11 2
Q Yes, righ t.
3 A
off the record?
4 Q
Yes.
C-5 (Discussion. held off the record.)
6 A
We were trying to transfer the call, and the 7
transfer failed.
We then reinitiated the call from 8
the Incident Response Center phone.
9 Q
'Do you have any concept of what transpired -
10 in that conversation; what type of information was 11 being relayed to Mr. Smith?
12 A
At that point, we were attempting to get plant 13 etatu: information as well as radiological in fo rma tion 14 from the plant personnel.
15 Q
Do you remembe r any of the details of 16 the information received?
1
(
A No, sir, I do not.
13 Q
Af te r the conversations on the telephone 19 terminated, what did you do?
20 A
The conversation never really terminated.
The 21 phone line was kept open from that point on once we 22 established the telephone contact from our Incident i
23 aesponse center, to the best of my knowledge,
~
except o4 for sone short periods during the day when additional v3 transfers were attempted; the telephone contact was S ENJAMIN R EPC RTIN G SERVICE l
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s i
Keimig 12 9
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never broken.
3 Q
But that conversation finished at some 4
~
point?
5 A
If you are asking me when that particular conver-6 sation ended, I don't know.
7 Q
, Af te r that conversation ended, what did 8
you do?
9 A
Well, the conversation never really ended 10 because we continued to talk to these people from 11 that point on.
12 Q
Did you stay in Mr. Smith's office for the 13 balance of Wednesday?
14 A
No, we went up to the Incident Response Center 15 by this time.
16 Q
So you did leave Mr. Smith's office and 17 went up to the Incident Response Center?
18 A
Yes.
After we lost telephone contact at 19 Mr. Smith's office, we reinitiated that communication "O
channel from the Incident Response Center, not 21 Mr. Smith's office, nn
~~
Q Did you at any time go into Mr. Grier's 23 4
oflice that morning?
24 A
I don't recall.
I may have.
n3 Q
After you were at the Inciden: Response SENJAMIN R E;:C RT!N G S E RVIC E
=
1 Keimig 13 2
Center here in Region I on Wednesday morning, I 3
understand that you did keep in contact with unit 1.
4 Did you maintain contact with any other person?
~
~.
5 A
We were in contact with unit 2 initially.
6 Q
Did you maintain contact with unit 17 7
A Yes.
8 Q
Wh e n wa s.th a t established?
9 A
I don't know.
I wasn't the person who made th e-10 contact, but at some point, I believe within the first 11 couple of hours.
12 Q
Did you make contact with the NRC offices 13 in sethesda?
14 A
Yes.
15 Q
when was that contact established?
16 A
I don't recollect the exact time.
17 Q
What.was your role in the Incident I8 Response Center early that morning?
19 A
My role in the Incident Response center was
^0 basically to determine who of our inspectors who were in 21 the office that morning were best qualified -- this
.v is the reactor operations inspectors -- who were best 23 qualified for us tc dispatch to the site.
94 Q
why did you determine that somebody should
.,5 de dispatched to the site?
SENJAM" R E P O R T!N G SERVICE
e I
I 1
Keinig 14 2
A Because of the apparent magnitude of the 3
problem which they were having.
4 Q
Would this be routine procedure?
~
5 A
To dispate,h and inspector to the site, yes, it 6
is a routine procedure.
7 Q
I gathe r you did decide to dispatch 8
someone to the site?
9 A
Yes.
10 Q
Who did go to'the site?
11 A
From the Reactor Operations Branch, we sent 12 James Higgins, Walte r Saunack and William Raymond.
13 Q
When did they leave?
14 A
I believe, Mr. Higgins and Mr. 3aunack left at 15 about 3: 30-a quarte r of 9 :00, and Mr. Raymond some-16 where around 10:00 a.m.
17 Q
How d.id they' travel to the site?
l 18 A
Mr. Higgins and Mr. Sadnack, I believe, went in 19 the emergency vehicle with several health phsyics 20 personnel Mr. Raymond, I believe, had to hire a ol rental car.
ks 22 Q
Why did you stay here in King of Prussia 23 rather than go to the site pourse~lf at the time?
2%
A It was not clear at that time frca the informa-n5 tion that we had been able to obtain exactly how E ENJ AMIN R EPC RTIN G SERVICE
1 Keimig 15 2
serious the accident was.
We had 'available to us here 3
many reference materials from which we could attempt
~
4 to determine what in fact was going on.
5 Q
How serious did you think the accident 6
was at this early time?
7 A
I had not made an assessment at that time.
8 Q
Was information coming into the Incident 9
Response center at that time?
10 A
Yes, it was.
Il Q
How would you characterize the information?
12 A
I characterize the information as being relatively 13 good information except that it would take some time, 14 from the information, and the various information that i
15 we had, to determine exactly what was going on 16 what exactly was occurring.
17 Q
After,you dispatched this group of 18 persons to the site, what did you do next?
19 A
- believe I initiated a preliminary notification 20
'to alert our headquarters in writing as to what was 01 occurring, and provide the details that we had at th time to the headquarters staff.
23 Q
- s a preliminary notification, a form on ~
94 which you fill out some information?
o5 A
Yes, it is.
S ENJ AMIN REPCRTtNG 3 E RVIC E
1 Keimig 16 2
Q Why is it called a preliminary no t i fi.c a-3 tion?
4 A
Because it is information of a preliminary 5
natures that is, it is not wholly supportable.
It may 6
not be completely factual at the time.
7 g
Are preliminary notifications a form of 8
information transmission that you would use 9
especially d'uring times of emergency or stress situa-10 tions?
11 A
Preliminary notifications are used whenever we 12 learn of something which we feel the NRC should be 13 made aware o f in a prompt fashion.
14 (Continued on following page.)
15 16 17
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18 19
'20 21 22 23 24 25 EENJAMIN REFCRT NG S E RVIC E
.t.
}
Keimig 17 ft 2.4 LC 2
Q To whom and when did you send that pre-3
'liminary notification?
4 A
The preliminary notification goes to I&E 5
headquarters, particularly the executive officer for 6
Opera tions Support.
It is then dispatched by those 7
people from headquarters to the various other offices 8
in NRC, as well as the Commissioners.
9 Q
By what means do you transmit a preliminary, -
10 notification?
11 A
A preliminary notification is transmitted by a 12 mag card.
13 Q
I am not clear on what that is.
14 A
It is a magnetic card which, from as much as I 15 know about it, transmits the electronic impulses over 16 the telephone wires to a receiver down at the other end.
17 Q
So it is an instantaneous transmission?
18 A
Essentially.
19 Q
cid you get any response from NRC head-20 quarters?
21 A
3y this time, NRC headquarters was aware of what k-
~
going on.
20 was 23 Q
aow do you know that?
24 A
My recollection is that Mr. Grier informed then 25 sometime shortly after e:Io or so.
S ENJ AMIN R E PO R TIN G S ERVIC E
o.
I Kelmig 18 LC-2.L 2
Q so you heard this information from Region I 3
persons rather than directly from Bethesda?
4 A
Which information?
(
5 Q
The information that they already knew 6
that something was already going on at the site?
7 A
(No response.)
8 Q
Shall I rephrase the question?
9 A
Yes, please.
2 10 Q
Where did you hear that NRC headquarters 11 in Bethesda already had information concerning a 12 problem at Three Mile Island at the point you sent this 13 preliminary notification?
14 A
Here in Region I.
15 Q
After sending the preliminary notification, 16 what did you do th,e n ?
II A
Well, I wasn,'t totally responsible for sending it.
18 I had somebody start to prepare it, and I believe it 19 was Don Havercamp, and the reason he prepared it was 20 because he was the project inspe tor and most familiar "1
with the plant of anybody that was here.
o, I was doing other things while the preliminary 23 notification was being prepared, such as chtaining
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44 reference materials and bringing them into the Incident o.5 Response Center and answering telephones from various E ENJAMIN R E,CC R TI N G S ERVIC E
1 Keimig 19 2.3 2
people who were calling the Incident Response Center, 3
and again, another way I knew that the headquarters had 4
been advised of what was going on was because the phones 5
were ringing.
6 Q
Why didn't Mr. Havercamp go to the site 7
with the persons-who first left?
8 A
I considered it best to have Mr. Havercamp where 9
he could better assess from the information that we 10 were getting what was going on, and to inform us of 11 what he thought the problem might be.
12 Q
Can you characterize for us any events that 13 occurred on Wednesday morning here at the Incident 14 Response Center that would be worthy of your mention?
15 A
Can you rephrase that.
16 Q
I am just interested in knowing if there are 17 any events that coge o your mind which would be useful 18 for you to explain to us now regarding the events on 19 wednesday morning here at the Incident Response center.
20 Did anything occur that comes to your mind?
El A
of what kind or nature?
22 Q
Apparently nothing is coming to your mind.
23 A
we were responding to an e'me rge ncy.
~
24 Q
Can you further define what your role 25 was on wedne sday morning o the r than bringing reference SENJAMIN R EF:C R TIN G S ERvicC
20 I
Keimig 2.4 2
material into the Incident Response Center?
3 A
Trying to assess what the problem was and the 4
actions being taken by the licensee, whether or not C. -
5 they were appr.opriate actions.
6 g
what kind of information were you getting 7
from the licensee?
8 A
we were getting..very good information from the 9
iicensee.
10 g
For example?
11 A
we were ge t ting. in fo rma tion on radiation 12 monitoring, or rather, the readouts from radiation 13 monitoring instruments, getting plant status informa-14 tion, temperature.
15 g
what was the information you were getting 16 with respect to radiation?
17 A
Precise numbers?
18 Q
As precise as you can answer.
19 A
I wouldn't even venture to recoilect.
20 g
old they indicate to you that there was a
'l major problem with respect to radiation?
A Yes.
23 g
now bad a problem was there, to your o4 t h i n k'i n g, with respect to radiation releases at the l
site?
S ENJAMIN R EPC ATIN G S ERVIC E
1 Keinig 21 2.5 2
A when you say " radiation releases" -- I am talking 3
about in-plant radiation monitoring, not release infor-4 mation.
~
(
5 Q
Let me defer to that, in-plant monitoring 6
of radiation levels.
7 A
The magnitudes were sufficient to indica *e that 8
a severe problem did exist.
I would characterize it 9
in that fashion for you.
10 Q
what o the r kind's of information were you 11 getting?
12 A
Plant status information.
13 Q
what was that information?
14 A
That the primary system temperature, primary 15 sys tem pressure later on in the day, I believe we 16 got some thermocouple -- in-core thermocouple readings 17 and equipment status.
18 Q
What conclusions were you reaching with 19 respect to the status of the plant from the information 20 you were getting?
21 A
From the infer =ation that we were getting, I would 22 say that I assessed the plant as not being in a stable 23 condition.
2%
Q Would you give us some more infor=ation on 25 that point.
S ENJAMIN R EFC R TIN G SERVICE
1 Keinig 22 A
Yes.
It was obvious that the plant could not 2
be cooled down sufficiently to initiate low-pressure 3
4 safety injection, nor could the plant be pressurized let me rephrase that.
5 sufficiently t MS. MOE:
Would you like the court reporter 6
7 to read back the part you just started with?
g THE WITNESS:
Yes.
9 would you do that.
10 (Record read.)
11 A
(Continuing. )
Let me start over.
12 It was bbvious that the plant should not be
[3 cooled down sufficiently to initiate low pressure 14 injection, nor could the core flood accumulators be 15 utilized to function as they are meant to, and this 16 led to the condition of having the plant be unstable.
17 Q
was it yo'ur view that the status of the
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13 plant created any risk that there might be radiation 19 releases from the plant, or any ocher problems that the 20 plant might cause persons nearby?
21 A
I take it from that,you mean to the environment 22 and to the general public?
23 Q
Yes.
24 A
At that point, no.
25 Q
Is it fair to say you did not' consider it S ENJ AMIN R EFC RTIN G SERVICE
1 Keinig 23 2
to be an imminent threa; to health and property?
3 A
chat is correct.
4 Q
Did your understanding of the situation C.
5 in the piant change at any time?
6 A
Yes.
sometime during the day, the radiation 7
levels in the auxiliary building were noted to be in-8 creasing.
There was water spilled in the auxiliary 9
building, which apparently caused these increases in 10 radioactivity levels.
The ' auxiliary building does 11 vent to the environment through a filtering system, 12 and at that point it became obvious that some releases 13 of radiation might occur.
14 Q
How did you find this information out?
15 A
This type of information was being communicated 16 to us by this time f r6m our people in-plant, in both
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17 Units 1 and 2.
18 Q
What time on Wednesday was this information 19 arriving?
20 A
- t started arriving with the telephone call in 21 Mr. Smith's office at ten minutes of eight in the morning.
23 g
- hat was the initial information?
24 A
Yes.
25 g
Then you said the quality of informataan I
SENJAMtN RE CRTING SERVICE
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1 Keimig 24 I
2 changed.
3 A
Excuse me?
4 Q
You said the information you had with
~
Cs 5
respect to the site began to change later when you learned 6
of these problems that you mentioned.
I am internsted 7
in knowing when that new information came in.
8 A
My recollection as to the exact times is very 9
poor.
You must realize that this is some time ago, 10 and I don't review notes ev'ery day.
11 g
If you do not remember something, you can 12 simply indicate that; that is certainly acceptable.
13 A
It was sometime either in late morning or early 14 afternoon.
15 Q
what did yeu do in response to that 16 information?
17 A
Well, we w e r e. carefully monitoring changes in 18 radiation levels in-plant, and also any reports of 19 the radiation levels outside the plant that we were 20
,cetying, 21 Q
Is it fair to say that you received this nn information and continued your standby status?
o.3
~
A well, I wouldn't characterize or status as standby.
94 We were continually assessing the information as it o-0 came in.
S E NJ,A MI N R E.:C RTIN G S ERVlC E
1 Keimig 25
-2 Q
What happened next?
3 A
Well, this type of activity was continued 4
throughout the afternoon, and at approximately 4 : 0 0 p. m.,-
C.
5 I was directed by Mr. Grier, regional director, to 6
proceed to the site.
7 Q
Why did he give you that direction, to the 8
best of your knowledge?
9 A
To coordinate the activities of the In spe c tion 10 and Enforcement personnel who had been previously 11 dispatched to the site.
1 12 Q
Was it Mr. Grier's view that the coordina-13 tion ongoing at the site was insdequate?
14 A
No, it was not.
I believe he wanted a section 15 chief on the site to ensure that somebody with authority 16 was present.
17 Q
Did you hen leave for the site?
18 A
I left for the site at approximately 5:00 p.m.
19 Q
What did you do between 4:00 and 6:00?
20 A
I gathered some notes that I had and made prepa-21 rations to proceed to the site.
22 Q
Did you leave with anyone else?
23 a
no,
^t Q
Did you go by car?
25 A
Yes, I did.
E ENJ AMIN R EPC RTIN G SERV!CE
-m
?
1 Keimig 76 2
Q When did you arrive?
3 A
I arrived at approximately 9:00 p.m.,
aft 4
stopping home for a suitcase and things like that.
~
5 Q
Did you go directly to the site?
6 A
No, I stopped at home.
7 Q
I mean after you left here, and after 8
stopping at home.
9 A
Yes.
My home is on the way to the site, so I 10 dropped off there.
11 Q
When you went to the site, where did you 12 go at the site?
13 A
I went to the observation center, which was 14 Metropolitan Edison's command post for activities that 15 were ongoing at the site.
16 Q
What was going on at the observation Center 17 when you arrived?,,,
18 A
Primarily, they were assessing plant status, 19 getting reports from environmental survey teams which 20 they had dispatched, and assessing the information 21 that was coming in.
L 22 Q
Did you learn anything new about the status 23 of the plant after arriving?
24 A
I got an update of the plant status from 25 Mr. Herbein, the Met Ed vice-president, and also S ENJ AMIN R EPC RTIN G SERVICE
l 1
Keinig 27 2
talked to our Phil Stohr, who had arrived sometime 3
earlier with the environmental monitoring -- the NRC and asked him what type 4
environmental monitoring van C4 5
of environmental monitoring we had initiated.
6 Q
Were Messrs. Higgins and Baunack and 7
Raymond there?
8 A
No.
All three,.I believe, at that point were 9
still in the esntrol room.
10 Q
Which unit?
11 A
Well, Baunack and Raymond were in the Unit 2 12 control room, and Higgins, I believe, had gone to a 13 briefing at the covernor's office.
14 Q
What information about the status of the 15 plant did Mr. Herbein give you?
16 A
Merely an update of the plant status, as far as II from when I left the Region I office until I got up n
18 there.
Essentially nothing much had changed, as I 19 recall.
20 Q
In the observation center, was there any
'l of urgency or serious concern with respect to sense no the situation of the plant?
3 A
ch, yes.
2%
Q Can you give us more information about o5 why that was.
S ENJ AMIN R EPC RTIN G SERVICE l
I Keimig 28 2
A Well, there was a great amount of activity with 3
people plotting wind direction and radiation levels in 4
various areas, on maps and charts, and other people C
5 try'.ng to dete rmine wha t should be done next in order 6
to get the plant into a safe condition, or what is a 7
manageable condition.
8 Q
dare people very concerned at that point 9
that the plant may deteriorate?
10 A
Yes.
11 Q
What did you do while at the center?
12 A
Essentially just what I have described.
I then 13 proceeded to the site.
14 Q
When did you leave the center to proceed 15 to the sie 7 16 A
That was approximately 10:00 p.m.
-- maybe II 10:15 p.m.
18 g
Did you speak with anyone over the telephone 19 while at the center?
20 A
Yes, I talked to the regional of fice here.
21 Q
With whom did you speak?
p
\\"
oo A
Mr. Grier and Mr. 3 runner, I believe.
o3 Q
Cid you place th 'e c a ll'?
I A
Yes, I did.
o.5 Q
What information did you relay.
EENJA. VIN 9 E.:C RTI N G 3 ERVICE
1 Keimig 29 2
A I don't recall.
3 Q
When you went to the site itself, where t
4 did you go?
C. -
I am sorry, the 5
A I went to the south entrance and had considerable difficulty 6
north entrance date 7
in gaining access to the site.
This was because I 8
do not have a photo identification badge for that 9
unit or that site, and I needed an escort in order to 10 get into the plant.
While the guard was attempting 11 to make arrangements for ne to 7t an escort, one of 12 our health physics technicians was entering the plant.
13 He had a photo identification badge, and I entered the 14 plant with him.
15 Q
He identified you, and that made it okay 16 for you to enter?
17 A
There was no question about my identification,
~
18 but I needed an escort in order to get on the site 19
- itself, 20 Q
once you were on the site, to what location 21 did you proceed?
22 A'
I proceeded to the Unit 1 control room.
23 Q
Why did you go there?
A The Unit 1 control room was providing us with 24 25 the readings fron the radiation monitoring equipment.
SENJAMIN R EPC RTIN G SERVICE
1 Keimig 30 2
Q oid you go there to speak to a particular 3
person?
4 I went there to speak to many peoples also to view the
. ~.
5 radiation monitoring equipment and the levels of radia-6 tion in and around the plant.
7 Q
What was going on at that location when 8
you arrived?
9 A
The Unit 1 operators were maintaining the Unit 1 10 plant in, I believe it was,' hot shutdown condition; as 11 the plant was proceeding to start up earlier that day, 12 startup was halted, and the plant was in a stabilized 13 hot shutdown condition.
other people were, as I say, 14 monitoring the radiation instrumentation for the site 15 from that location.
16 Q
what information were you getting concerning II radiation levels?
18 A
Exact figures, I can't recall.
I wouldn't even 19 attempt 20 Q
Can you characterise whether they were high 21 or low, or a source of concern or not.
22 A
At that point. other than in the auxiliary 23 building, the radiation le v e l's did'not appear to be 24 any great cause for alarm.
25 g
Did that represent an improvement over the 1
t S ENJAMIN R EPC RTIN G SERV!CE l
1-Keinig 31 2
earlier information you had with respect to the on-site 3
radiation levels?
4 A
It represented the status as being as it was 5
before.
6 Q
so'it was essentially the same as it was 7
before?
8 A
It didn't get any worse.
9 Q
And it did not get any better?
10 A
It didn't get an-; better.
11 Q
How about.with respect to the off-site 12 radiation levels?
13 A
off-site radiation levels were, as I recall, 14 not of any great concern at that point.
15 Q
Was there any other information coming 16 into the Unit 1 control room at that time that was 17 considered significant by those there, or which 18 was a change from what they had known before?
19 A
At that particular time that I was there?
3)
Q Right.
21 A
I don't recall whe ther there was or wasn't.
-L 22 Q
What did you do while you were there?
23 A
I spoke briefly to the Unit 1 superintendent, 2%
whom I saw.briefly because he was on his way over to 25 Unit 2 to lend assistance to people over there.
SENJAMIN R EPO R TIN G S ERVIC E
I Keinig 32 2
Q Wha t did he tell you?
3 A
Generally what I was told when I arrived at the 4
Observation Center, the plant status -- re-verified C. ~
5 the plant status.
I talked to several people in the 6
control room as to their assessment of what was going 7
on.
Since they were operators at the sister unit, we 8
could get some informa. tion from them.
I also spoke 9
with Mr. Kunder, who was the technical superintendent 10 of Unit 2, concerning the sequence of events.
Now this 11 was already Thursday morning at this point.
12 Q
How long were you in the Unit 1 control room?
13 A
Until approximately 3:30-4:00 a.m.
14 Q
After arriving about 9:30 or 10:00, some-15 thing in that time frame?
16 A
About 10:00,20:35; that is when I got to the 17 guardhouse, and it,was probably 11: 00 or maybe a little 18 after 11:00 before I gained access to the site.
19 Q
While you were there, did you hear any 20 information concerning an explosion within the con-21 tainment or within the
.2 actor vessel?
s 22
-A Mo, I did not.
23 (conrinued on Page ~33. )
24 25 S ENJ AMlN R EPC RTIN G 3ERVICE J
1 Keinig 33 3.1 2
Q Did any events occur during the time you ow/rz 3
were in the Unit 1 control room which you would like 4
to mention, or was there any change of information
~
C- +
5 since the time of your arrival that you would like to 6
mention?
7 A
I can't think of anything significant.
8 Q
what did-you do when you left the control 9
room?
2 10 A
I att mpted to find my hotel room.
11 Q
Successfully, I trust?
12 A
Yes.
13 Q
when you retired for the evening, were you 14 very anxious or concerned or unconcerned with respect 15 to the status o f the plant, and what might develop 1
16 the following day?
17 A
No, I was d,e fini tely concerned about the current 18 status of the plant.
19 Q
what did you do Thursday?
^0 A
Thursday morning, I discussed over breakfast
'l with Mr. Higgins and Mr. Gallina and one or two other i
k_
people from the Region I office, the events of the
'3
~ what their assess-~
preceding day, what was occurring,
't ment of the incident was, n.5 Q
About what time was that?
S ENJ AMIN R EPC R TIN G SERVICE
1 Keimig 34 3.2 2
A Probably somewhere between 7:30 and 8:00 a.m.
3 Q
Getting back to Wednesday just for a 4
second, did you have any knowledge of or participation 5
in any press conferences held that evening?
6 A
I had knowledge of the press conference that 7
Mr. Higgins and Mr. Gallina attended.
8 Q
Did you have any firsthand participation?
9 A
No, I had not.
They had already left for the 10 press conference or brie fing, or whatever it was, 11 prior to my arrival.
12 Q
So you had no participation in the briefing 13 for that press conference?
14 A
That is correct.
15 Q
Af ter breakf ast on Thursday morning, what 16 did yoc do?
17 A
Proceeded back to the observation center.
18 Q
What did you do there?
19 A
sasically, I guess, we attempted to establish a 20 mo re routine environmental survey program and sampling 21 program for NP.C at that point.
22 Q
Did you stay at th e observation center for 23 all o f Thursday?
24 A
Yes, I did.
25 Q
Did you make any telephone calls while E ENJ AMIN R EPC RTIN G S ERVIC E
I Keimig 35 3.3 2
you were there on Thursday?
3
'A ch, many.
4 Q
Can you characterize for us, as your
~
{* :.
5 memory permits, whom you called and what you said.
6 A
I guess, on numerous occasions I spoke with 7
many people in the Region I office; exactly who they 8
were and when it was_that I spoke with them or what 9
the subject of the conversation was, I don't recall.
10 Q
over the course of Thursday, what was your 11 understanding as to the state of the system?
12 A
My assessment was that the system was still 13 somewhat unstable; that is, the reactor plant was 14 still somewhat unstable.
10 Q
Did you feel it was deteriorating or not?
16 A
tio, I f e l t. th a t it was maintaining the same 17 status as previousif.
IO Q
Did you feel that if the plant deteriorated 19 there would have been time to take whatever necessary
- 0 emergency steps could have been called for?
r "1
A Yes.
Q Did you feel th a t there was any deteriora-
~~
1
^3 tion which could have occurred t h'a t wculd have been
'l more or less instantaneous and would not have provided n
any warning ti=e for perscas in the vicinity?
SENJAMIN R E;:C RTIN G SERVICE L
j 1
l
[
Keimig 36 3.4 2
A No.
3 Q
on Thursday at any time were you aware of 4
the question concerning the dumping of waste water
(
5 from the site?
6 A
off the record?
7 Q
Yes.
8 (Discussion held off the record.)
9 Q
During Thursday, did you hear from anyone 10 that the utility migh t determine to dump into the 11 river waste water, radioactive or otherwise, which 12 had been collected at the site?
13 A
I don't recall any such information.
14 Let me clarify that.
I believe sometime on 15 Thursday there was information regarding the trans fer 16 of water within the piant.
17 Q
I am no't' 're fe rring to that.
18 A
No.
19 Q
At no time on Thursday were you aware of
'20 that?
21 A
No.
C 22 Q
Did you have any involvement on Thursday 23 with the tour that the Lieutenant Governor took of 2%
the site?
l 25 A
No.
i i
SENJAMIN R EFC RTIN G S E RVIC E
I Keimig 37 3.5 2
Q Did you have any involvement in the deci-3 sion on Thursday to take a sample of the primary 4
coolant?
C.
5 A
No.
6 Q
Did you have any involvement with 'ither e
7 the briofing or the actual occurrence of the Governor 8
at his press conference on Thursday evening?
9 A
Yes, I did.
When I was told by the Region I n
10 of fice that there would be a brie fing o f the Governor 11 that evening, I then made arrangements for several of 12 the people who were in the control room and who had 13 participated in the previous nigh t 's b rie fing to 14 participate in that briefing.
15 Q
was that the sum total of your involvement 16 with that?
~.
17 A
Generally, y e's'.
18 Q
On Thursday, did you become aware that the 19 damage to the core and the effect on the state of the
'20 system might be more extensive than was earlier 21 believed?
C 22 A
would have to ask you what the earlier assess-23 ment of core damage is that-you are referring to.
2%
Q Let me ask you.
Early on Wednesday, did 23 you have an assessment in your ow.s mind as to the B ENJAM,N R EPC RTIN G S E RVI C E
1 Kolmig 38 3.6 2
extent of core damage?
3 A
zarly on wednesday?
4 Q
Yes.
C' 5
A Yes, I did, and I did not believe that there was 6
any extensive core damage.
7 Q
Did your belief change at any time?
8 A
Later on during, the day.
9 Q
Wednesday?
10 A
Yes, it did change.
11 Q
Why?
12 A
Because some of the in core thermocouple readings 13 that we were getting, and also the fact that the 14 primary coolant temperature and pressure was not such 15 that boiling would have occurred in the reactor 16 vessel in the co re region.
17 Q
What co.k c'l us io n did this new information
~
13 generate in your mind?
19 A
only that there was some degree of core damage.
'00 Q
could you be more specific as to "some 21 degree of core damage."
C 22 A-No, I can't.
23 Q
would you characterize the degree of cora.
2?
damage as being exiensive?
25 A
At which point?
Cn Wednesday?
SENJAMIN REPCRTING S ERVIC E
I Keimig 39 3.7 2
Q Yes.
3 A
No, I wouldn't.
I hadn't assessed the core 4
damage as being extensive on Wednesday.
5 Q
on Thursday, did you receive any informa-6 tion to encourage you to again reassess your thinking 7
as to the extent of damage to che core?
0 3
A on Thursday, after some more deliberation, yes, 9
I did conclude that the core damage was probably more 10 extensive than I had assessed it to be on Wednesday.
11 Q
Did you ge t any more informa*. ion that led 12 you to that conclusion, or was it simply a delibera-13 tion process?
14 A
I may have gotten other tidbits of information 15 which assisted me in my deliberations.
16 Q
What, kind of tidbits?
17 A
More information with regard to the length of 18 time th at tha hoiling may have occurred in the core, 19 the length of time that the safety injection system "O
~
was not providing water to the core.
'l
~
Q Did you get any informatian with respect oo to the amount of radioactivity within the primary
'3
~
coolant system?
'l
~
A Cn Thursday?
25 Q
Yes.
\\
S ENJ AMIN R EPC RTIN G SERVICE
~
1 Keimig 40 3.8 2
A I don't believe so.
3 Q
old you get that information at some 4
subsequent time?
5 A
Yes, I believe that information came on Friday.
6 Q
When on Friday, do you recall?
7 A
I don't recall.
8 Q
How did that new information alter your 9
preexisting judgment concerning the core?
10 A
It didn't change it any, 11 Q
It did not ch an ge it any?
12 A
No.
13 Q
How long were you at the observation 14 center on Thursday?
You can answer that by telling us 15 when you left.
16 A
That is what I was trying to think of.
17 Q
I th o u gf.t you sere computing the number of 18 hours2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br />.
19 A
No.
Probably until about midnight or 2:00 a.m.
TO Friday morning.
21 Q
What did you do then?
C 22 A
At about 11:00 o' clock on Thursday evening, 23 another section chie f had arri.ved-on-site to back me up.
2%
Q Who was that?
25 A
It was Mr. s. a. Mecabe.
S ENw' AMIN R E;:C RTI N G SERV!CE
I Keimig 41 3.9 2
Q Is he from this office?
3 A
Yes.
4 Q
He is not within your branch, is he?
~
C-5 A
y'e s, he is.
That is the time that he arrived, 6
as I recali, at the environmental monitoring van which 7
we were t' a !. n g as our command post.
He had arrived 8
on-site earlier, and.had visited the Unit 2 control 9
room.
10 Q
Then he came t'o the observation center?
11 A
Yes, right.
12 Q
Did he tell'you anything?
I3 A
Well, we discussed what was the plant status at 14 the moment.
15 Q
You indicated that he arrived at the 16 observation cente.r at 11:00?
1' A
Somewhere around that time.
18 Q
What did you do then?
19 A
We discussed the events up to that point, the 20 status of the plant, our own assessment of what was
'l going on, and I believe I left shortly thereafter.
no Q
I assume that he was coming to relieve you?
^3 A
Yes.
'4 Q
When you left, where did you go?
ob A
! went back to my motel.
3ENJAMIN R E. CRTING S ERVIC E
1 Keimig 42 3.10 2
Q Did that conclude your participation in 3
this whole affair for the day?
4 A~
My active participation, yes.
~
(
.3 Q
Did you have any other kind of participa-6 tion?
7 A
The thinking process never stops.
8 Q
But you did not place any telephone calls 9
or things of'that sort after arriving at your motel?
10 A
Yes, I did.
I belisve I did, 11 Q
Did you place any calls to discuss matters 12 relating to Three Mile Island?
13 A
I believe I called our -- the Region I public 14 affairs officer, and also Congressman Robert Walker, 15 who I was dirseted to call so that I could confirm 16 that he was arriving at the observation center the 17
~
following morning and brief him on what was going on 18 at that time.
19 g
why did you call the public affairs
'3 officer, whom I assume was Mr. Abraham?
- 1 A
Yes.
Q Why did you call him?
-~
"3 A
I believe I called him to inform him of the
-og congressman's visit the following morning e5 Q
And you placed the call to the congressman's S ENJAMIN R E;:C RTIN G S ERVIC E
I Keimig 43 2
office first, I guess, and then to Mr. Abraham?
3.11 3
'A I don't recall the sequence.
I never did get the congressman that evening or that night, and called 4
5 him the next morning, and just woke him up out of bed.
6 He was home.
7 Q
Did these celephone calls conclude your O
participation, active or otherwise, in this affair 9
for that day?
10 A
As I recall; yes, they did.
11 When did.you arrivc on-site Friday Q
12 morning?
13 A
I believe it was somewhere between 8:30 and 14 8:45.
15 Q
Did you then again report to the observa-16 tion center?
17 A
Yes.
18 Q
What was the situation at the observation 19 center at the time of your arrival?
- 0 A
Similar to the night befo re when I left.
I
~
al attempted to get the latest information for the
~
(_
oo congressman who was to arrive, as I recall, somewhere
~~
~3
~
9 between 9:00 and 10:00.
^4 Q
Was there any greater or lesser concern
~
o w i th respect to the state of the reactor when you S ENJ AMIN REPCRT!NG S ERVICE
l 1
Keimig 44 3.12 2
arrived on Friday morning?
3 A
No, I don't believe so, o th e r than the fact that 4
the conditions had not changed and that was of some concern.
It wasn't getting any better.
6 Q
This was approximately 8:30, you said, 7
on Friday morning?
8 A
I believe it was 8:30.
9 Q
Did any new information come into the u
10 center that morning to change that posture or 11 thinking?
12 A
I don't recall.
13 Q
Do you recall if any information came into 14 the observation center with respect to off-site 15 readings of radiation?
16 A
When I arrived, I don't believe there were any 17 significant changei 'in o f f-site radiation levels.
18 Q
Did you hear any rumors at that time that l9 there might be an off-site reading of radiation 20 approximating 1200 millirems per hour?
21 A
No, I didn't.
22 Q
Do you remember hearing any information 23 concerning any off-site readings at all?
24 A
Yes, the re were some low level readings at the
]
25 perimeter of the plant I am sorry, the pert =eter S ENJ AMIN R EPC RTIN G S ERVIC E
1 Keisig 45 3.13 2
of the sites.
3 Q
Is it fair to say, these were readings 4
with no basis for unusual concern?
5 A
well, the readings were of a basis for concern 6
inasmuch as the levels were higher than we had ever 7
seen at a site boundary for any extended period of 8
time.
9 Q
old anyone at the observation center feel 10 that these levels of radiation reading presented an 11 immediate hasard to the health, even if it were a i
12 hazard to a minor degree, to the health of the people 13 in the area?
14 A
I can't speak for the people in the center.
15 g
now about for yourself?
16 A
Yes, I had some concern; if the levels had 17 gotten any higher,'y'es.
13 Q
Did you contact NRC headquarters in 19 sathesda at all that morning?
l
'20 A
I really don't recall.
21 Q
Did you contact NRC Region I?
-k-A I am sure I must have.
23 g
you do not remember any of the conversa-tions?
20 A
No.
S ENJ AMIN R EP O RTIN G S ERVIC E
I Keimig 46 3.14 2
Q old you talk to Mr. Abraham that morning?
3 A
sometime during Friday, I did: I don't remember 4
if it was in the morning or afternoon.
~
n b
5 Q
oo you remember the substance of the 6
conversation?
7 A
I believe it related to the interferences we 8
were getting from news media people who were flocking 9
around the observation center.
10 Q
What did you tell him about that?
11 A
I told him it was interfe ring with our activities.
12 Q
What did he say?
13 A
As I recall, he said he though it best that he 14 remain where he was.
15 Q
old you talk to Dr. Gallina that morning?
16 A
I don't recall.
17 Q
How ab o 'a t Jim'Higgins?
18 A
I am sure at sc=eti=e during that day I talked 19 to all those people because as they came of f shif ts
- 0 from the control room they would stop in at the at environmental =onitoring van and deb rie f with us on no their activities in the control room and the status of
'3 the plant.
o.
Q old you have occassion to talk with any 4
o5 persons from the ccamenwealth of Pennsylvania that SENJAMIN R EPC R TIN G S ERVIC E
I Keimig 47 3.15 2
morning?
3 A
I don't recalls I don't think so.
4 Q
Were you aware that morning of any deci-C' 5
sions that might be made w i th respect to recommending 6
evacuation of the immediate area?
7 A
off the record?
8 Q
Yes.
9
'(Discussion held off the record.)
10 A
I believe it was sometime around noon, and I 11 don't remember the source of the information, and it 12 may well have been a news broadcast that concerned 13 Governor Thornburgh recommending that pregnant women 14 and children under five years old evacuate the area.
15 Q
old you discuss that evacuation recom-16 mendation or any of 'the options of it with anyone?
17 A
Formally?
~~
18 Q
That morning.
19 A
Formal discussion?
20 Q
Any kind of a discussion.
21 A
No.
No, as a matter of fact, I was somewhat 22 amazed th a t the decision had been made.
23 g
why were you amazed?
24 A
It didn't appear to me that the radiation levels 25 that were being ecunted would have recuired that.
SENJAMIN R EPC RTI N G S E RV!C E
?
1 Keimig 48 3.16 2
Q Why was that?
3 A
secause they didn't appear to be that high.
4 Q
What would you have considered a high 5
enough level to make an evacuation advisory of that 6
sort advisable?
7 A
A number of very difficult to give because it 8
would depend on what was occurring and what the condi-9 tions of the occurrence were.
10 Q
Answer the que'stion as best you can.
11 A
I think, as I just said, I can't answer it in a 12 number.
It would depend on the circumstances.
If it 13 was an instantaneous release from the plant stack, 14 that would be different than the generation radiation 15 level around the plant steadily increasing.
16 Q
Did */ou have knowledge at that time of 17 any releases from the plant stack or from any avenue 18 from the plant and it did not necessarily have to be 19 from the stack?
'20 A
Yes.
21 Q
What knowledge did you have?
22 A-I heard of one reading of approximately 1200 MR 23 per hour.
24 Q
Didn't I just ask you that questior 25 earlier, and you indicated you had not heard anything EENJAMIN R EPC RTIN G E E RVIC E
~
\\
I Keimig 49 9
3.17 anything of this sort?
3 A
You asked me that question, "When you arrived at the observation center on Friday morning," and the
('
5 answer to that was "No";
that was sometimo later 6
during the day.
7 Q
When did you hear the information about 8
the 1200 millirem release?
9 A
Either late morning or early afternoon.
2 10 Q
Can you be more specific?
11 A
No, I can't.
19
~
Q Who gave you that information?
13 A
I don't re me mb e r.
14 Q
What exact information was given to you, 15 to the-best of your recollection?
i A
Just what I, stated, that a measurement was taken; 17 I believe it was.an,, aerial measurement.
18 Q
You were told it was a measurement that 19 was taken somewhere about the site or somewhere other "O
than ground level?
~l A
That is correct, and the reading was somewhere j
e,
~~
around 1200 MR.
'3
^information be fore or
~
Q Did you hear that 94-
~
after you heard in fo rma ti on with respect to evacuation n_o-advisories?
S ENJAM!N R EPC RT!N G S ERVIC E
1 Keimig 50 3.18 2
A I am not sure.
3 Q
What was your thinking when you heard that.
t 4
1200 millirem information?
(-
5 A
I thought that they probably had a burp from 6
one of the waste storage tanks.
7 Q
Did you postulate in your mind a cause 8
for' that burp?
9 A
No, I don't think I did.
10 Q
oid you do th a't at any other time?
11 A
For that particular release?
12 Q
Yes.
13 A
I think sometime thereafter I tried to determine 14 what may have caused that increase of radiation from 15 the stack.
16 Q
When did you try to determine it?
17 A
Sometime on Friday afternoon.
18 Q
Can you be more specific?
19 A
No.
'20 Q
How did you go about trying to determine 21 what caused the release?
C 22 A
Sy contacting the people that we had, the 23 inspectors that we had at the plant, and questioning 24 them as to what plant evolutions were taking place 25 which may have caused that.
l S ENJ AMt N R EP O RT!N G S ERVIC E i
l
1 Keimig 51 3.19 2
Q Whom did you contact?
3 A
I believe it was one of our inspectors in the 4
control room, Unit 2 control room.
(
5 Q
Who was that?
6 A
It may have been the Unit 1 control room.
7 Q
Do you know who it was precisely?
8 A
No, I don't.
9 Q
Do you remember the information that was 10 given to you?
11 A
The information that was given to me, as I can 12 best recall it, was that there was a trans fer of waste 13 water from one tank to another which probably caused 14 that release.
15 Q
Did you ever have reason to believe or 16 suspect that that release might have been of a 17 continuous nature rather than of a sporadic nature?
18 A
No.
19 Q
Did you relay the information with respect 20 to the 1200 millirem release to anyone else?
21 A
That information had already been relayed to our 22 Region I Incident Response Center and the headquarters 23 Incident Response Center.
24 Q
Did you relay that informatica to anyone 25 else?
l A
I can't recall.
B ENJAMIN R EPCRTING S E RVIC E
I T-4 Keimig 52 2
Q Did you hear at any time on Friday 3
morning any information with respect to the capacity 4
~
of the waste gas decay tanks at the site?
b 5
A Can you be more specific?
6 Q
There cwas a possible question in some 7
person's mind on that morning relating to the con-8 tinued capacity o f the waste gas decay tanks which, 9
as I understand it, were necessary to assure that 4
10 radio activity for the primary coolant that was 11 being let down, would not be released unfiltered into the atmosphere, so that there was concern that 13 there be continuing capacity within those tanks.
14 Did you hear anything of that nature 15 on Friday morning?
16 A
I think the only tank capacity which was of 17 any concern on itiday morning was the liquid 18 waste storage tanks.
I don't recall hearing any-19 thing about any waste gas decay tanks.
20 Q
Why were the liquid waste tanks of concern?
21 A
Secause they were filling.
on Q
What would be the problem if they 23 filled?
l 24 A
There would be nowhere for the water to go.
25 Q
Why was that of :encern?
l S ENJ AMIN R EPC RDNG S ERVIC E
.s*
.2 I
Keimig 53 o
Q Why was that of concern?
3 A
Well, there was water in the auxiliary building 4
on the floor which was causing the high radiation CT.
s levels in the auxiliary building, and it was desired 6
to get that water out of there.
7 Q
,So you are saying that if these tanks 8
filled, there would be more water in the auxiliary 9
bulle'ing, and that would result in a release to 10 the environment?
11 A
Yes.
12 Q
Were you aware at any time on Friday 13 of the decision made to send Mr. Denton to the 14 site?
15 A
Yes.
16 Q
In what way did you become aware of that?
17 A
I believe I.wgs told by Boyce Grier.
18 Q
Did you play any part in that decision 19 making?
20 A
No.
The previous day, however, Mr. Rirhard 21 b
Vo llme r, who works for Mr. Centon, did arrive at 22 the site some time in the early afternoon. I was 23 involved in briefing him as to what we had done, 24 what we were doing, what we planned to do.
o-o Q
Were you also briefing people at NRC, S ENJ AMIN REPCRUNG S ERV!CE
54 I
3 Keimig 2
Bethesda?
3 A
No.
4 Q
Who was doing that?
O A
I have no idea.
All I know, it wasn't mal 6
Q oid you have any contact at all with 7
NRC, Bethesda, on Friday morning?
8 A
Yes, I believe-I did with regard to com-munications equipment.
~"
10 Q
Could you be more specific?
11 A
We needed mobile telephones, because the lo telephones that were available to us were sorely 13 inadequate, and we also needed walkie-talkies, 14 C3 radios, to communicate between survey vehicles 15 and communicate between various people who were 16 at the observation Center.
17 Q
Did t.he 3ubble become of concern to
~
18 you on Friday?
19 A
Which bubble?
"O
~
Q I unde rs ta n d there was a hydrogen
~l bubble wi-hin the reactor.
What other bubbles.are no
~~
you referring to?
- 3 A
I was just asking for clarification.
24 Q
When you ask, "which bubble," do you n-.a mean there was more than one bubble?
S ENJAMIN R EPC R TlN G 3ERVICE
4 I
Keimig A
No.
3 Q
I thought maybe there was, and that 4
might require further clarification.
(
5 so let us refer to the hydrogen bubble.
6 A
I wasn't concerned about the hydrogen bubble.
I Q
On Friday or a t any time, you mean?
O A
At any time.
9 Q
Were o the rs concerned?
10 A
It would appear from news media reports that, 11 yes, there were other people ' concerned about the la hydrogen bubble.
13 Q
Why were you not concerned, if others 14 were; if that is a question you can answer?
15 A
I was not conce rned. becaus e hydrogen is 16 routinely used as a cover gas in pressurized water reactor plants t o.
scavenge. oxygen, and I could 18 not imagine how oxygen could get into the system 19 in quan tity enough to cause a combustible mixture; "O
~
realising that if a hydrogen bubble in fact did 91
~
exist, and hydrogen in small amounts did get into L
~~
the reactor vessel, that the hydrogen would mix "3
with the oxygen to form water, wh'ich is the reason
^4 hydrogen over pres are is used in pressurized
.va water reactors.
S ENJ AMIN R EPC RTIN G S ERVf C E
~
-e
5 1
Keimig 56 o
Q By this time were you aware of the 3
possibility that there might have been an explosion:
4 within the reactor earlier?
C'
.3 A
I became aware of the rumor of an explosion 6
within the containment building -- the reactor 7
building some time mid-Friday afternoon.
8 Q
What information reached you concerning 9
that?
10 A
That it was po s s ib le that there was, from 11 indications available in the control room which 12 had been reviewed by the licensee, and also from 13 recollections o f some people who were in the con-14 trol room on Wednesday afternoon that a hydrogen 15 explosion may have occurred.
16 Q
To yo,ur know le dge, did the control II room have any har,d i.7 f o rma tio n that would lead them 18 to that conclusion?
19 A
I understood that there was a pressure spike
'0 indicated on the contain=ent building pressure al instrumentation recorder.
(
~-
'o n
Q What would that tell you?
'3 instrument' mal-A That it might have been an
^4 function, a spurious signal, or that it could well ob have been a rapid detonation of hydrogen in the S ENJ AMIN R EPO RTIN G S ERVIC E L
1 Keimig 57 o
containment.
3 Q
Did that in fo rma tion, or rumor as you 4
characterize it, in any way influence your thinking 5
as to the hazards that the bubble may or may not 6
cause?
7 A
At that.particular time, no, because the free 8
hydrogen that was available to escape to the 9
containment wculd have dissipated in a detonation 10 on Wednesday afternoon.
11 Q
I did not follow that.
Would you repeat 19 Lt.
~
13 A
The free hydrogen which escaped from the'pri-14 mary system while the pressurizer relief valve was 15 open during the day on Wednesday would have been 16 dissipated by the, explosion, if it had occurred, 1~
so that there was,no, additional hydrogen, or way for 18 additional hydrogen to get in the containment building.
10 Q
So this information did play some role "O
~
in your thinking about the hazard that the bubble
'l
~
could cause?
no
"~
A The bubble was in the reactor vessel, not in 23 the containment.
The bubble 'of bencern was in the
'l
~
reactor vessel itself which, by this time, was n-
-0 bottled up.
E ENJ AMIN R EFO RTIN G S ERVIC E
I Keimig 58 9
Q Did you stay in the Observation Center 3
for the balance of Friday?
4 A
Yes.
(
5 Q.
When did you leave?
6 A
I believe it was late in the evening, probably 7
10:00-11:00 or so.
8 Q
Did any other events occur on Friday 9
that we have not already covered that you deemed to
~u 10 be of some significance?
11 A
Yes.
We received some inspectors from other l
regions to assist us in our monitoring of activities 13 in the plant.
Those people I assigned to different 14 watches, arranged for their lodging, automobiles 15 and so on and so forth.
16 Q
Were.there any.other events of signifi-17 cance?
18 A
We got mobile communication equipment from 19 our Headquarters.
20 Q
Anything else?
21 A
- to.
Q After leaving the Observation Center
~3 Friday evening, did you have any other involvement 21 at all with the p roblem at the site?
25 A
- don't believe so.
S ENJ AM!N R EPO RTIN G S E9VIC E i
ir
, - ~
~~
1 I
1 Keimig 59 i
2 Q
What was your next involvement?
3 A
Saturday morning.
4
~
Q That is when it was.
I am ahking what
('
5 w,
te7 6
A I returned to the observation Center and 7
continued my activities.
O Q
When did you return on Saturday morning?
9 A
Probably somewhere between 7:30 and 8:30.
10 Q
Was there any new updated information 11 with respecttto the state of the system when you l'~
arrived?
13 A
There was a yes, there was some concern 14 about the hydrogen bubble in the reactor vessel, 15 and whether additional core damage may occur due 16 to the b ubb le.
7 '
Q Was t.h e r.e increased concern with respect 18 to the hazards the bubble may be presenting at 19 that point?
'O A
On whose part?
- 1 Q
On the part of the people in the Observa-
~
nn
~~
tion Cen te r.
03
~ to' an'wer because I A
- find that difficult s
~
can't gauge what their concern was.
o Q
You just indicated that they did have SENJAMIN R Ei:C RT!N G S ERVIC E
1 Keimig 60 2
some concern.
I take it you did not share that 3
concern?
4 A
I guess the increased concern that I was r~
t' 3
addressing was-that which I heard through news 6
reports.
7 Q
,You received updates from public sources 8
upon arriving at the " Observation Cente r?
9 Yes, as well as A
10 Q
Did you receive any updated information 11 from the people at the observation Center?
12 A
From NRC personnel, yes.
13 Q
What did they tell you?
14 A
-That there was apprarently increased concern 15 with respect to the hydrogen bubble.
16 in the NRC with whom Q
Did the persons 17 i
you spoke that marning share that increased con-18 cern?
19 A
Yes, some of them did.
20 Q
I take it you did not?
21 A
From a technical point of view, no; from a
{
'~
public reaction point o f view, yes.
23 Q
Would you clarify that for me.
I 24 A
I was not concerned that an explosion could o.0 cccur in-a reactor vessel, yet it appears to me that S ENJAMIN REPCRTING S ERVIC E
-~
I Keimig 61 2
the news media reports about their concern for an 3
explosion was made quite vivid, and I thought people 4
were apt to react in a panic fashion, thereby
~
[2 5
causing me concern from the public point of view.
6 Q
Did you take any action based upon that 7
concern that you had?
8 A
A formal action, no.
There were people who 9
were walking up to the Observation Center from the c
10 public, asking questions, and : tried to alleviate 11 their concern, as best I could.
12 Q
What other information did you receive 13 from the NRC persons at the Observation Center 14 upon arriving on Saturday?
15 A
sasically, fust status information, plant 16 status information, and radiation levels.
17 Q
Durin,g this time period, and indeed on 16 the p revious day, how were you going about fulfilling 19 your responsibility to coordinate the activities 20 of the persons from this region who had arrived here "1
before you?
no A
3asically, assuring that we had coverage in n,
th e control room.
94 Q
What do you mean " coverage"?
l o5 A
Arcund the clock inspectors around the l
l S E NJ AMIN R EPC RTIN G S ERVIC E
I Keimig 62 o
clock in the control rooms.
3 Q
You prepared s'heduling plans to make c
4
~
sure someone would always be there?
[~.
5 A
That's right; relaying information requests, 6
special information requests from the regions.
7 Most o f them came from the region to people in 8
our Headquarters or from our Headquarters.
9 g,
What kind of information requests?
10 A
Specific requests such as "What is the radi-11 ation level at the north gate,"
and "What is the lo radiation level at the south gate," and things of 13 that nature.
14 Q
Did you enter into any analysis of information during these days?
16 A
No, I did not.
Q You sim ly relayed information?
18 A
That's right.
19 Q
What other coordinating tasks did you O
undertake in addition to scheduling people and
'l relaying information?
~
en A
I tried to take care of logistical support
~~
'3 for all the people that we were.ev g e t tin g on-site,'
a.
~'
such as better facilities, trailers, for instance, o~5 so we could work out of a trailer rather than whst S ENJ AMIN R EPC RTIN G S ERvlCE
1 Keimig 63 o
we were working out of before, which was the 3
Environmental Monitoring van, which had little space 4
~
in which to move around, because it was filled with p
O instruments.
6 Q
Does that complete your answer, or is 7
there something else?
8 A
There are many other things.
I just can't 9
think of them offhand.
x 10 Q
During Saturday or at any other time, 11 were you involved in or aware of contingency planning 10 going on, or planning with respect to evacuating 13 segments of the population, or with respect to 14 other emergency responses?
15 A
Was I involved in the planning?
16 Q
Were,you involved in or aware of, was
~~
17 the question.
18 A
I guess I was aware of such plans.
I was 19 not involved with them.
."0 Q
When did you first become aware of any
'l
~
auch plans?
A I don't recall.
It may sven have been on 23 yriday.
\\
'l
~
Q Did you at any time have involvement o
~
with that area of intersst?
SENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G S ERVIC E J
1 Keinig 64 2
A No, I did not.
3 Q
Did you at any time hear word that a 4
sabotage threat might have been received with 0-s respect to Three Mile Island?
6 A
No.
7 Q
,Did you remain in the Observation 8
Center during the e n t'i r e time on Saturday?
A Yes.
10 Q
Did any other events on Saturday occur 11 which you considered'to be significant?
12 A
Yes.
With Mr. Denton arriving on the scene, 13 I felt that the information was becoming less garbled, 14 bette r coordinated, and there appeared to be a 15 direction which had been established to place this 16 entire situation'in some kind of semblance of order.
17 I think that is quite significant.
18 Q
Did you ever have any contact with 19 Mr. Denton during this time?
20 A
Yes.
21 Q
When did you talk with him, or when oo
~~
did you es tablish contact with him?
23 A
I believe it was Friday af ternoon when he 24 arrived, or some time shcrtly thereafter.
n.O Q
Did you contact him, or did he contact S ENw' AMIN REPCRT!NG S ERVICE l
1 Keimig 65 2
you?
3 A
No, it was in a group meeting that we had.
4 He had been briefed by the people who had preceded
(
5 him the day before, his own people, and he basically 6
relied on us to relay information directly from the I
two control rooms, which I guess was our primary 8
function after he g o t-there.
9 Q
Wha t was the purpose of meeting with 10 Mr. Denton?
11 A
To discuss the plant status, what manpower 12 resources we had to do various jobs, what kinds of 13 environmental monitoring surveys we were doing, 14 and things of that nature.
Q Was it essentially to brie f him as 16 to the latest in'ormation?
A Yes.
18 Q
W e re there any other events of signifi-19 cance on that day?.
^0 A
I can't recall.
91 Q
When did you leave the Center on that
~
day?
03 A
Some time late evening.
'l Q
What did you do when you l e '- '
l o-l
'O A
Went to my motel.
SENJAMIN R EPC RTf N G S ERVIC E
1 Keimig 66 2
Q Was that your last involvement of the 3
day with this problem?
4 A
I believe it was.
(=
5 Q
What was your next-involvement?
6 A
Sunday morning.
7 Q
When and what was that?
8 A
Basically, the"same, coordinating activities 9
as I had done previously.
By this time, late 10 Saturday, our trailers had arrived and we were 11 setting up trailers Sunday morning, trying to get 10
~
facilities, telephones to be installed, and preparing 13 fo r the visit o f Mr. Jimmy Carter, and things of 14 that nature.
15 Q
Did any events occur on Sunday that 16 were of significance?
17 A
Yes, Mr. Ji-may Carter.made a visit.
18 Q
Was there anything of significance other 19 than Mr. Carter's visit?
20 A
Yes, that caused quite a disturbance in our 21 e
operation.
k_
1 on Q
What kind of disturbance?
'3 A
It seemed that all interest was focused on 24 the arrival of the President, and not very much, 25 or as far as I could tell, not very adequate S ENJ AMIN R EPC RT!N G S ERVIC E
4 1
Keimig 67 2
interest was being placed on what was going on at 3
the plant.
4 Q
Inadequate in te re s t do you think?
~
/~
v
'S A
Not enough, yes.
6 Q
What problems was that causing?
7 A
Fortunately, I don't believe it caused any
~
8 problems.
9 Q
Do you think it increased risks?
10 A
Yes.
11 Q
What kind of risks did it increase?
12 A
Dis traction o f those people who were in-13 volved in the decision-making processes.
14 Q
I am sorry, but I do not understand 15 your answer.
16 A
People who were involved in the decision-17 making process were distr' acted by making arrangements, 18 or b.*ing aware that the president was going to 10 come.
20 Q
And you think that created some 2I greater risk?
L.
A Yes.
23 Q
co you mean a risk-to the public health? -
't A
It may have.
n5.
Q A risk to the workers?
E3 ENJ AMIN R EPO RTIN G SERVICE
1 Keimig 68 9
A Well, yes.
3 Q
What was your thinking as to the state 4
of the reactor on Sunday?
[1, s
A I thought it was in a more stable condition 6
than it had been previously.
7 Q
What led you to that conclusion?
8 A
That uncondensible gases in the system 9
seemed to be or were on their way down in volume,.
10 and it just seemed like things were progressing in 11 a more orderly fashion. There was purpose to some 19
~
of the things that we re now going on.
13 Q
From Sunday onward, did you ever have 1
reason to think that the risk that the reactor 15 was posing to the health o f the public or the health of the wo rkers was increasing?
17 A
No.
18 Q
So from that point forward, would it 19 be fair to characterise your thinking as being that "O
~
the situation was getting better rather than worse?
21 A
Yes.
k.
oo
'~
Q From Sunday forward, did your role, as 03
~
you have already described it, change in any way?
24 A
Basically not.
o Q
How long did you remain On-site at i
SENJAMIN R EPC RTIN G SERVICE
I Keimig 69 2
Th ee Mile Island?
P 3
A I believe it was until April 16.
I can't 4
recall the exact date, but I think it was April 16th.
(
e Q
Why did you remain there that long?
6 A
I was a section chief in charge of the 7
IsE pe rsonnel on one shift, in charge of their 8
activities in the plant.
9 Q
May I see the notes to which you are 10 referring?
11 A
I really would rather not.
12 Q
Why is that?
13 A
They are handwritten and, basically, it is 14 this is off the record.
a memo 15 Q
This is on the record.
I think you 16 can explain your. reasons on the record.
II MS. MOE:.
I would like to consult 18 with my client about that.
19 MR. PEARSON:
Let us go off the record
."O then.
ol (Discussion held off the record.)
oo MR. PIARSCN:
I would.like to designate
'3
~
as Deposition Exhibit 2,
a memorandum currently 04 in draft form being preparsd by Mr. Kaimig
~
25 for Mr. crier, the subject of which is s
S ENJAMIN R EPO R TIN G S ERVIC E
1 Keimig 70 2
" Report of Activities at Three Mile 3
~
Island,' March 28 to Ap ril 18, 1979."
4 It is the understanding of the parties
/~
(.-
5 that M.r. Keimig will put this memorandum in 6
final form in the very near future, and 7
once it is in final fo rm, he will submit it 8
to the of fice o-f the President's Commission 9
on Three Mile Island for their use.
10 Is that agreed.by all parties?
11 MS. MOE:
Yes, that is fine.
12 THE WITNESS:
Fine.
13 (Above described docume.c heretz deemed 14 marked Keimig Deposition Exhibit 2 for 15 ide n t i fi e s tior., this date.)
16 Q
Let us return to F ri d a's the 30th for a 17 moment, if we could.
~
t 18 Do you have any recollection on Friday, 19 the 30 th, of calling Region I and indicating that
'0 someone f rom Headquarters had race mmended to the
'l Commonwealth o f Pennsylvania that Middletown
-b
,o
~~'
be evacuated?
'3
~
A A clear recollection, no.
~
Q Do you have an unclear recollection?
'5
~
A I may have made a telephone call during which S ENJAMIN R EPC RTIN G S ERV!C E
o.
1 Keimig 71 2
time that was discussed: I really don't recall, 3
I would like to say though, as I think you are 4
reading from some telephone reports from the
(
r 5
Region I of fice, that all this information is.here, 6
and this is why I didn't think it necessary to 7
recollect in great detail any of the telephone calls 8
that I made, b e c aus e" I knew all of this information 9
was being taken down.
10 Q
As long as you are giving us the 100 11 percent substance of your recollections as they 19
~
exist now, then that is fine.
13 A
Yes.
14 Q
I assume that is the case?
15 A
That is the case.
16 Q
I3 there anything else with respect 17 to your involvemen t..in this accident that we have 18 not covered that you would think worthy o f nention?
19 A
No.
20 MR. PEARSON:
Unless there is anything 21 rw else from any of the other parties, I think
("
2*
we have concluded the deposition.
23
~
A I would like to clarify one thing for the 1
24 record.
25 MR. ?EARSON:
- de will reopen the S ENJAMIN R EPC RTIN G SERVICE r
72 I
Keimig record then to permit Mr. Keimig to make o
one final and clarifying point.
3
~
A My recollection about the visit of the President to Three Mile Island, although it did 5
6 create a disturbance for us, in my estimation, I do think it did a lot to allay some of the fears 7
of the people in and around the area, so it did 8
9 serve a purpose.
With that, we will con-10 11 clude the deposition.
(Whereupon, at 7:10 p.m.,
the within 12 13 deposition was concluded.)
14 RICHARD R.
KEIMIG 15
\\
16 Subscribed and sworn to before 1
me 17 th i s. _ _ _ d ay o f._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _19 7 9.
18 19 j
coo 20 21 N
on_
~
23 J
1 1
24 25 3 ENJ AMIN REPCRTING S ERVIC E i
L
' - - ~
~
'1 73 2
I-N-D-E-X 3
' fitness Digeet 4
Richard R.
f..
Keimig 2
6 7
E-X-H-I-3-I-T-S 8
Keinig Deposition 4
9
$33.jgeg3gj{ga3{gg
{ age 10 11 1
Resume of Richard R.
Keimig 7
12 2
Rough draft of " Report of 13 Activities at Three Mile Island March 28 to April la, 1979" 70 15 16 17 18 19 20 -
21 22 l
23 o-os SENJAMlN R EFC RTIN G S ERVICE
,o e'
O 1
74 2
C E R T I. F I CATE 3
STATE OF NEW YORK )
- ss:
4 COUNTY OF NEW YORK)
...L
-O I, ROBERT ZERKIN, a Notary Public I
6 of the State of New York, do hereby certify 7
that t'h e foregoing deposition of. RICHARD R.
9 8
KEIMIG, was taken be fore me on the 16th day of August, 1979.
~~
10 The said witness was duly sworn be fore 11 the commencement of his testimony; that the l'
said testimony was taken. stenographically by 13 myself and then transcribed.
14 The within transcript is a true record of 15 the said deposit 1on.
~
16 I am.not related by biced or marraige 17 to any of the,,said parties, nor interested
~
18 directly or indirectly in the ma t te r in 19 controversy, nor am I in the employ of any of 20 the counsel.
~g n
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto k
e, 4-this_7g_4,__ day of (W.746 2 /
'~
0 set my hand 1379.
23
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~
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3/31/44 (ducation:
Sachalce of Marine $ctence-Engiaetring "af ne Marf ttre Aca demy, 1952 Muclear Pswer Tecnoisty, U.S. Merchant Marine Acadeey,1963 2eactor Technology. Healta 75ysics and ta;ert= ental React:r Czerations. 7tzas A A.'t.1964 Vater Chesistry for Nuclear 7:wer 714nts-7tta:: stat and Analysis, Calgon '.ateratory. Inc. 1964 1.f ce ns as :
Professional Enginear-Nuclear tagineering. Sta ta of C.alf fornia Second Assis tant ta;ineer. Steas Unl f atted. 'J.3.C.G.
Third Assistant Engineer. Ciesel Unitsited. U.S.C.G.
Santor 2eactor C:eratsr U.S. AEC (Espired).
Carii fica te:
Staff Vater' Chemist. FAST, Inc.
Professional Society:
herican Muclear Society Es;trience:
4/78 - Pre-CM er, seie:3r o n,ets sectien. tes;:nsible for the s
sent
- ro;ect.nanage
- ent of :ne O!E ins:ectica progra:s for reactors in preoperational tes:tng, startup testing, and operational ;hases at resident and non-resident inspector sites.
w te 4 1 Cen*-c1 T:::ert feetten (A::fne).
$/77 - 1/78 CM e f.
'f uel e t e a
Te::crarily :etattes :s supervise 13e ac:ivistes of a section that provites s:ecialittd sus:or: la :ae arts of nuclear satsef al c:ntrol and acc:untability. (NAC:AI) 2/77 - 4/77 Chief. Nuetear fuocer* Teetien 'fe. 2. Res::nsible for the 6/75 - 10/76 su:ervision af a s es:1cn *a: ;ravices sne:f alt:ed su;; ort in the and artas of qualt:y assurance slan ;recedures and cperator 1/73 - 4/78 retualf fication teltning. (MRC:AI) 10/75 - 2/77 CM ef, tetet:r C:nst-::tf en 2-ef fets f ee:f en f Actino):
Tem:crart ly as signes :s su:ervis e :r.e ac::vt :t es o f a s ection that ;revices pr:jec canastsen: !se nuclear ;cwer fac'ilities under : nstrue f on. (MRC:AI) 12/73 - 6/75 teacter 'as:eet:n. teeet:r Cassi te f ea 2 ef ect 3ecif en -
and Aes;enstsie for ::e tns;ec;t:n af :ciate etac:ar f acil f tf es 5/72 - 4/73 under : nstruction. Also, served as ?rinct:41 !asstetor for Land Reglen f:r Sa'e715 ;roj ect. ( AEC/NAC: AI) 4/73 - 12/73 tenet:r 5s ect:r. :etet:r *,st tad !:setue trene5 ies:enst:n e P:r :ae :ns:et:1:n af nucs ear rea: se f actlf tf es durt. g ;ra-3cerational and startus fes ting 4: f vi tt as. ( AEC:AI) 2/71 - 5/72 te*f er C eat
- tas f atiater. f uras !ad 8:e Ire. - its:casible f:r ae s.;:er e151:n of a ;rs;e:* ir:Us tagages (a 13e ;rtstratten of systen des t ga f tscriptf =ns. Jrt-o: era:1 coal tes: and c:erating ;r:cedures f1r acclear ani ::n<tational ;143: systacs for a utt1f ty nuclear ; wer facfif:y. Aise. res;;nsible for alannfag saa ifrte! g :ne ac::::ance. :er'ar ance. Ort c; era *f:nal I
and startus : stine
-tor :s ::. er-f al ::taa f on.
- a adsft!:n.
l served as A/C et;ra.ntative an u:11f ty. *:553. E/C and A/E jefnt tas: ;roup.
10/56 1/71 tester C ert:! m ten hst. r r.3 : ::21: sM ; r s.-s ::rt, !, e._.
ies;cas taie for one :rt: art: :a a*: a.ct: g s! reac::e ana
- nventf:nal ;1 ant ;roctcurts use; a:fard :ne M.S. !avannan and for Me anat ses of *ta:::r ;laa ::erati:r.s. Also served as i
t Shf ft su: erin:tr. der.: furtng ne sessels first rt'utilag and acted as llats:n <t:M etjulat:ry agtn:!ts and c:atri::ces.
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6/52 7/56 fee:ad i Sf-f 1ssistre: E :fa,ta. : e 'ita it ert 'stetr4*t:1 u es - ierve as.a::n iw:e-vis:e a::a r.: 1. 5. 5 4
- a nn aa.
Aes::ns til e 'ar :Me ::f ra t:n. a f stera?:t. testtag and otaer rtiatt: ac f vt:f es ::ect et efin :ne etac ar and ::nvt 9:f:ral
- 'a e r :I an *. 1153 s t r** ti a *ary sart:ws 30-*ary vts s els wi th j
- ts:Orsibili ty ?:r t.* e :: tat:t:n 43
- a ta ttaan* t af ::nven Tcaal
(#:ss!I} 3?eer ;lan:s.
.