ML19337A390
| ML19337A390 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 03/22/1977 |
| From: | NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| REF-10CFR9.7 NUDOCS 8009090649 | |
| Download: ML19337A390 (52) | |
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.IN.THE MATTER OF:
'is P CC:t1ISSIO?! DISCUSSIO:i 0:7 R3 SEARCH BUDGET PlaceC.gnington, D. C.
Dot, ' Jasda'. 22 ?! arch ' 977 Pages 1 - 50 i.
Telephone:
(202)347-3700 ACE -FEDERAL REPORTERS,INC.
OfficialReporters l
444 North Capitol Street Washington, D.C. 20001 NATIONWIDECOVERAGE DAILY 80090906 %-
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1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2
hUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3
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5 DISCUSSION OF SAFEGUARDS RESEARCH BUDGET
.6 7
8 9
Room 1115 10 1717 H Street Washington, D. C.
Il Tuesday, March 22, 1977 12 b
13 The meeting convened at 11:10 a.m., "hairman 14 Marcus A. Rowden presiding.
15 PRESENT:
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Marcus A. Rowden, Chairman I7 Victor Gilinsky, Commissioner Richard T. Kennedy, Commissioner 18 Peter L. Strauss, General Counsel 19 John Hoyle, Acting Secretary l
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24 Ace Federal Reporters, Inc.
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CHAIRMAN ROWDEN:
Mr. Gossick?
3 MR. GOSSIC:
The purpose of our being here this N
4 morning is to discuss.with you an upcoming meeting at 2:00 5
o' clock this afternoon w"ith Mr. Myers of the Udall staff.
6 As you will recall, following our budget pre-7 sentations to Mr. Udall and his committee, there were a great 8
number of questions that were directed to the staff in 9
various ways, but at any rate, 4 in particular have been 10 received less than formally, I would say, by Mr. Myers.
11 One question was in the list of 24 that we sent 12
,back over there.having to do with the distinction between
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13 safeguards research and technical assistance work.
- Then, 14 there was a March 4-letter from Udall that had 3 specific 15 ques tions.
16 One was asking for a brief description of the 17 safeguards contract research projects, the objectives, I
18 funding level, for both ' 77 and ' 78.
19 Secondly, they wanted to know what are the signi-20 ficant findings from all of our research efforts to date.
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21 Later verbally added to that was how have these findings been 7
22 incorporated in existing or proposed regulations?
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23 And finally, how are ERDA and NRC Research 24 Development Programs coordinated?
How do they differ?
A = F w w w n wen m.inc 25 Yestarday morning, I had a call from Henry who had
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received the answers to the latter 3 questions over the 2
' weekend.. He had seen them on Friday..
Anyway, his comment
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.was that these are just not responsive.
They are meaningless.
4 We don't know what we are talking about.
And the only thing 5
that would satisfy him or that would be of any effect at 6
this point since they have to complete their budget markup 7
process this week is to come down and discuss the program.
8 with him face to face which, of course, we readily agreed to 9
do.
10 Now, I think at least in my conversations with 11 him, and I believe as. reflected by conversations that others 12 have had with hi.n, there seemed to be a number of more or
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13 less fundamental points he is having problems with.
14 One, he thinks the distinction between research 15 and technical assistance is a contrived difference, it is l
16 unreal and doesn't really make any sense.
17 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Are we going to address 18 that question?
19 MR. GOSSICK:
We can discuss that.
There is a 20 problem there, anu there are some difficulties.
Why are not l
l-21 all safaguard contractual activities run in one place --
22 namely, NMSS?
Why is research involved in the first place?
23 What capabilities or expertise do they have?
i 24 This is.apparently an area that he is far from Ace-F.ews ne==.. inc.
25 convinced in.
He points to the enormous area of ERDA's
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1 safeguard budget and program and whether it is necessary in the light of-Lhat for NRC to do anything further.
He obviously 2
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believed there is great overlap and duplication between what
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4 we are doing and what ERDA is doing.
5 As an aside, Dr. MyerP compared NMSS' " bloated" 6
budget with the entire NRC budget which is $3.13 million 7
compared to the $19 million total this year in the effort in 8
NRC.
9 What Henry is saying --
10 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Is Dr. Myers the same as the 11 Mr. Myers you have been referring to?
I assume so.
12 MR. GOSSICK:
I'm sorry.
Yes.
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13 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Did he have any comments 14 about the domestic functions of ERDA?
15 MR. GOSSICK:
No.
This is comparison.
16 COMMISSIONERKENNEDY:
I just wanted to know what l'7 the relative comparison was.
18 MR. GOSSICK:- As the upshot of all this, he says 19 that he is proposing to reduce the $19.147 million to some-i 20 thing like about $2 million.
In other words, he is going to l
21 delete-about $17 million out of the NRC safeguards activity.
22 MR. HUBERMAN:
He is going to recommend deletion.
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23 MR. GOSSICK:
He is going to recommend that to Mr.
24 Udall.
Aco Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 That would entail the $10.9 that is in the i
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5 safeguards research budget would be zero and about $6.1 in 2
technical assistance programs -- that mostly is NMSS --
3 some smaller amounts in standards, inspection, enforcement and 4
reactor regulation..
5
'Of' course, if that was to come about, it would here 6
a very heavy impact on what we are doing, what we started in 7
'77, causing considerable regression of that program and 8
wasting of some effort that has gotten underway that we 9
wouldn't be able to complete.
10 I think one of the problems that we have had is in 11 communicating with Henry in this area.
If you will recall, i
12 we took our program briefings down, both in a detailed nature, C
13 to the staff.
We had those meetings.
There were some questions 14 and answers.
There were large numbers of people there.
15 The program briefings were presented to Mr. Udall's l
16 committee.
I'd say there were perhaps some questions, but I l'7 don't think that through those briefings and conversations, i
18 we obviously got to some of the points that are mentioned by l
19 Dr. Myers.
ii 20 We have offered several times to have one-on-one j
21 sessions such as we are going to try to do this afternoon.
22 And really, this is the first opportunity to do that, although !
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23 as I understand it, Congressional Affairs people have been 24 after Dr. Myers to address this or any other subject he Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 wishes to in that kind of a meeting.
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Clearly, I think the further refinement of the 2
i. written" answers, although we have taken another cut, based-
~3 on what we got back in the way of response, are here, and 4
I can leave'those..I have brought them down with me this 3
morning.
I don't know that that is really going to be 6
j important.
7 I think it is'important here to sit down with him 8
and address directly across the table some of the issues and 9
problems that he has and try to explain in the best way we can 10 :
what the problem is and be very candid in admitting when we-perhaps do have some problems, definition or for that matter 12 even the justification.
13
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One of the things that he seems to be very hung Id up on is the so-called modeling or evaluative projects, the 15 kind of efforts that research is pursuing.
He doesn't seem I0 to think that that bears any promise, and it is just a waste of money.
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18 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Does he indicate the basis for this judgment?
MR. GOSSICK:
He has not other than just making l
20 23 sort of a flat statement over the telephone, Mr. Kennedy.
22 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Have we looked hard, given
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~ the nature of the allegation itself, at the underlying i
24 rationale for and likely development of those modeling 25 programs?
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1 MR. GOSSICK:
I think I would have to defer to Ken.
2 MR. CHAPMAN:
The issue that Dr. Myers must be 3
concerned with is can you build a believable model.
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4 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
What are the.se models like?
5 MR. CHAPMAN:
There are 4 principal models that 6
eat up a big share of the budget.
One is on security trans-7 portation.
8 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
What is being modeled?
9 MR. CHAPMAN:
It models a transportation system 10 and its associated security arrangements and tries to put 11 those in perspective so that one can in effect plug in a 12 change of X numbers of guards or different kind of trailer 13 or different timing response of local law enforcement, any 4
U factor that pertains to that shipment, and see how it per-15 ceives the --
16 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
This is some kind of a model 17 which describes some kind of attack?
18 MR. CHAPMAN:
It models the security system and l
4 19 allows you to play games with that security system to see 20 where its weaknesses or strengths are and how the relative
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l 21 subsystem components play against those weaknesses.
It is a 22 computer portrayal of a security --
I 23 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Physical security at the transportation level?
2d m-FWwW Reorwn,19, 25 MR. CHAPMAN:
Physical security of a transportation L
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system.
2 CHAIRMAN ROWDEN:
And you can gaIg hat if some-
'3 thing happened.
4 MR. CHAPMAN:
That's No. 1.
5 No. 2 is the same things for a fixed site.
6 Model 3 is controlled material fixed site irodel.
7 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
The model in some sense 8
attacks the facilities?
9 MR. CHAPMAN:
The model is a facility which 10 allows you to make attacks.
II COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Subjects you to attacks, 12 and you get a model response.
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13 MR. CHAPMAN:
Yes, sir.
I4 The 4th model is an integration of a fixed site 15 material security.
16 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
You have 2 transportation 17 fixed site --
f 18 MR. CHAPMAN:
Material controlled at a fixed site
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19 and integration, 4.
I 20 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
What is the model in
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21 material accounting?
22 MR. CHAPMAN:
I will let Frank talk about that.
,i 23 That is-in my view a little bit less specific because we i
24 haven't come down yet on our material control procedures.
,. Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 But basically what-is being modeled, as I understand it, is I
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1 the' kind of system Livermore and Los Alamos have been working 2
on'which is a reasonably highly automated material control 3
of the country system.
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COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Are we modeling that or 5
developing the Livermore system?
6 MR. CHAPMAN:
We are not developing; we are modeling, 7
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
ERDA is developing the 8
system?
9 MR. CHAPMAN:
That is correct.
10 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Does that apply to ths 11 Livermore system, too?
12 MR. ARSENNAULT:
Yes.
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13 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
ERDA is developing the 14 system; we are then modeling and looking and evaluating the 15 weak spots?
' 16 MR. CHAPMAN:
We are trying to get the model, but h 1
17 the models aren't built; they are about halfway completed.
18
.That is one of the difficulties; we can't judge how useful _
19 these things are going to be until we see how they function; f
20 until there have been inputs and assumptions, we can't tell i
21 how' valid they are.
22 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
The fourth is the integrated i
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23 model?
24 MR. CHAPMAN:
Yes.
Ace Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
What do these models run I.
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apiece in dollars?
2 MR. CHAPMAN:
Frank can tell you better than I,
.......-...77-7C,'for.the physical 3
but the budget shows $1.6 at Sandia, 4
transportation model; $3.5 roughly for the fixed site-S model.
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6 CHAIRMAN ROWDEN:
Was that $3.57 7
MR. CHAPMAN:
For 2 years.
8 Almost $4 million, S3.8, at Livennore on the 9
material model, and $2 million at the integrated model which 10 is now complete, I guess.
The first phase of that is 11 completed.
12 MR. ARSENNAULT:
Yes.
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13 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Where is the support for 14 the actual Livermore material system?
15 MR. ARSENNAULT:
I think I would like to go back 16 and adjust one of those points.
The first step in the i
l 17 development of a model that Livermore is developing is the j
18 model of the facility itself because in the material controls l 19 system, you are concerned much more with the location and 20 quantities of nuclear material.
Hence, material control i
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21 depends a great deal on information systems and logic and 22 secondarily on physical devices which monitor the condition 23 of:the material.
24 So one of the tasks that Livermore is conducting Aa -Faswes Reconm inc.
25 is to model the AGNS reprocessing plant, for example, to i
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look for opportunities for diversion and tb^n model the 2
information logic system that would allow you to detect that 3
in a timely fashion.
4 What ERDA is developing is the technology related 5
to the ins'tallation of equipment that would.be used to monitor 6
the location and quantities of nuclear material.
So the 7
support for the Livermore task that we are talking about is 8
entirely from NRC.
9 They do rely on data generated within the ERDA 10 program at both Sandia and LASL as a data base for the 11 exercise of the model.
12 MR. HUBERMAN:
Is there any fundamental reason why
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13 ERDA shouldn't also be funding this?
In other words, would 14 it be a conflict of interest of any sort?
We would depend 15 on it less if ERDA were to do this.
16 MR. ARSENNAULT:
- Yes, i
17 MR. HUBERMAN:
I think you need to answer that 18 question to answer Henry's question.
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19 MR. CHAPMAN:
I am going to come back to that.
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20 The question that has been raised by Henry is his own i
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21 suspicion of modeling.
He is concerned that on.3 cannot invent
.i 22 credible models of these physical systems or material account !
23 ing systems; that the models themselves that have been invented i
24 will be suspicious with regard to their validity.
And he j
Am-FMwd Rgenm, Inc 25 is concerned that the people inventing the models have very l
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-little practical experience in terms of actual safeguard 2
operations and responsibilities.
3 So the first question is:
will the models be t
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4 credible?
Will the assumptions be correct, verifiable, and 5
so on and so on?
6 The second question is:
if they are credible, will I
7 they be useful?
Will they in fact have a significant impact 8
in our ability to carry out safeguard programs?
9 Those are the 2 fundamental issues.
First, he 10 doesn't believe, based on his own experience, you can build 11 credible models around this transportation.
12 Second, he is not convinced they will be useful.
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13 if credible.
14 CHAIRMAN ROWDEN:
To which our response is?
Our response is the only response we 16 have at the moment -- they are not far enough along with 17 this yet for us to determine whether these models are 18 credible.
19 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
How much money has been 20 invested already?
21 MR. CHAPMAN:
Well, as I said, the '77 budget was 22
$5.5 million.
23 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
That money has been spent?
s 24 MR. CHAPMAN:
Well, it is being spent.
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25
' COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
How much is it going to cost ll
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to produce these models?
2 MR. CHAPMAN:
I think Frank can answer that better 3
than I, but from what I have seen, it will take another 6 C
4 months or more of work to get the models to the point where 5
we can judge whether they have a use, validity.
6 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
At what cost?
7 MR. CHAPMAN:
At the end of the '77 budget, and 8
I assume most of that would be spent at that time, it would 9
be $5.5 million.
10 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
In other words, with that 11
$5.5 million, we can assume there will be 4 credible models?
12 MR. CHAPMAN:
There are 2 things that have to be
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13 done here before we can answer the question directly.
The 14 first thing is that we have got to very carefully go over the 15 inputs to the model development, what assumptions are being 16 made, hdw is this thing being played, what is the arithmetic l
17 involved?
Are we getting some equations that aren't really 18 relevant?
19 The second thing is once the model is sufficiently i
20 complete so you can use it, then we have got to test it i
i 21 against our actual field experience, against expert opinion, l
22 against whatever judgments we can make.
i 23 When those 2 steps are done, I think we can answer 24 the question:
is the model credible, and will it be useful?
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25 CHAIRMAN ROWDEN:
But when we entered this program,!
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it must have been with some reasonable expectation that we 2
could develop a useful end product here.
Is that based on 3
expertence or is that just based on analysis or what?
What 4
is the basis for giving us some level of confidence that this 5
would be a useful expenditure of money?
6 MR. CHAPMM; I am not sure there was a prejudgment 7
that it could be done.
8 CHAIRMAN ROWDEN:
Was it experimental?
9 MR. CHAPMAN:
I think it was prejudgtt int if it could 10 be done, it would be u,teful.
11 CHAIRMAN ROW! Eh r Has it been done in the past?
8 12 MR. CHAPMAN:
There has been modeling done in the
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13 past some. of which has been presented to this Commission, 14 some'of which has been very bad, some of which has been pretty 15 good.
I would say we have had mixed experiences with this
'16 kind of activity in the past." But if these can be done, it 17 will facilitate the staff operation in safeguard by allowing l
18 us to theoretically without going out test and probe these f
39 various systems.
20 So it has some utility.
Exactly how it will be 21 used, I'm not sure.
It should be useful pretty much across 22 the board in our safeguard activities.
But I wouldn't at the l l
23 moment be able to stand up and say we are convinced yet l
I 24 these models can be developed in a credible and useful way.
l sco-Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 CHAIRMAN ROWDEN:
Has ERDA used this modeling 1
15 1
approach in its own program?
2 MR. CHAPMAN:
ERDA is very much in favor of modeling 3
in a dif7arent sort of way.
Many of these things had some
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-early support from ERDA.
Some of them with slightlyLdifferent 5
labels still have some support from ERDA.- And the research 6
people have simply focused on these specific projects that are 7
directly relevant to their licensing operation.
8 COMMISSIONER GALINSKY:
1 sink maybe the comparison 9
actually was off base,-but these numbers we are talking 10 about are comparable to --
11 MR. CHAPMAN:
They are very big numbers; there is 12 no question.
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13 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
-- the amounts of r..Jn'ay we 14 talk about when we talk about upgrading security in the 15 industry.
16 MR. CHAPMAN:
Yes, sir.
I 17 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
So they are not insigni-
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i 18 ficant numbers.
l 19 MR. CHAPMAN :
No, and there is another way to say t
1 20 it if one wants to be absolutely candid.
If these models l
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21 never existed, never were built, we would probably still be 22 able to give you a safeguard program.
We would have to muscle.
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23 through a little bit more; we may have less sophistication.
I 24 CHAIRMAN ROWDEN:
Does it give us a sounder basis-AeFwww nomma. im.
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MR. CHAPMAN:
This should give us a sounder basis 2,
once we verify these models have some --
3 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
It seems to me -- stop me
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if I am wrong -- from your description of the nature of these, 5
models that I have looked at in the past, in any event, if 6
they are successful, if the project is successful, there is a great deal better basis for ascertaining the variety o'f mixes 7
8 of subsystem components that might be put together and judg-9 ing the validity of the total in any given case.
10 "OMAN:
Absolutely.
11 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
With a good deal less 12 subjectivity than will otherwise have to be the case.
13 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
What is your experience?
1 14 Have people been able to model small unit actions?
15 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Sure.
16 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
In an effective and useful l
17 way?
18 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Sure.
But it depends, of 19 course, on the nature of the input.
Yes, you can model them 20 pretty well, but it depende entirely on the nature of the l
l 21 input.
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22 MR. CHAPMAN:
I think the Rand work in connection l
l 23 with Vietnam, some of the caisson was pretty credible.
It is 24 a mixed bag.
There have been some good models and some bad Am.Fw.m nwonm. oe.
25 ones.
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COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
One factor that is obviously; 2
always loose in a model of small unit action is you have to 3
make some assumption about the quality of people and their
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motivation.
You can be off by a factor of 10.
5 MR. GOSSICK:
I guess another way of looking at
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6 this in talking about research is sometimes-it is just as 7
important to find out that you can't develop it or that it 8
doesn't lead you anywhere.
9 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Here, it seems to me what 10 is important-is that you are going to get some quantitative 11 judgment of the relative merit of a variety of subsystem 12 components as they are interrelated.
And without doing some (f
13 kind of a mathematical modeling exercise, I'm not sure how 14 you do that.
15 The variety of subsystem components that you can 16 make is pretty large.
17 MR. CHAPMAN:
If you can get reasonable staff i
I input for support or activity in connection with this develop. !
18 l
19 ment, it forces an organization.
And that is one of the points 20 that the research' people make.
It does force you to organize !
21 your approach to thinking about a total safeguard system.
22 One of the-weaknesses in my mind that we face in j
23 this thing.is that we are dealing with a very limited industry 1
24 which is prob' ably decreasing day by day.
Models have a Ace +eeww nemonw ine.
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. utility when you deal with fairly broad problems.
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CHAIRMAN ROWDEN Are these models geared to very 2
specific material, generaly high uranium?
MR. CHAPMAN:
It-doesnt matter:
You are just 3
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4 putting in something valuable and seeing how your security 5
system works.
The point is if we were dealing with several 6
hundred facilities, it would be a lot more useful, and we 7
could show a great deal more benefit out of the model than 8
we can where we are only dealing with a half a dozen.
9 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
I think we are cranked up --
10 MR. CHAPMAN:
When we were expecting nuclear energy Il to take off.
12 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
-- about having to deal with, f
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13 a large number of plants and trying to figure how to do that.
14 And, therefore, we went to computer models.
15 CHAIRMAN ROWDEN:
We haven't quite solved all our 16 problems with respect to the small numbers of plants we are 17 actually licensing.
18 MR. CHAPMAN:
I'make the point because I think l
l 19 that is a weakness, spending this much money to develop i
20 models when we are dealing with a small number --
i 21 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
We are arguing about 1 22 extra guard.
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23 MR C:IAPMAN:
I don't really think, however, short 24 of this kind of an approach -- and maybe you can do it if hFederal Reconers, Inc.
25 you can do.it with some slightly less level of sophistication,,
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but without an approach of this kind, I don't know how you are 2
going to be able to judge the total effectiveness of a system 3
made up of a series of subsystems each of which can be varied (1) 4 according to our own rules.
5 We are going to allow in our own rules, and it 6
seems to me wisely so, the licensee to vary the mix of 7
subsystem components he will employ so long as a performance 8
levei, ptrformance standard, is going to be met.
Untill 9
you have some way to measure the realitive effectiveness of a 10 series of subsystem components, varying them one against Il another, I don't know how you can really judge relative 12 merit of the total system against the performance standard l
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13 except in a more or less suujective way which is what we are Id trying to get away from.
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_..That is one place where quantification may have I6 some value.
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I 17 MR. GOSSICK:
One of the other things is, and I i
18 don't know whether it is particularly pertinent, but, of course, I9 Dr. Myers and that committee having seen this budget, I'm 20 sure, even when they look at the history which we have given 21 them, in '76, you know, we had over $7 million in our budget i
l 22 for safeguards.
We identified throughout NRC about 171 f
23 people working in the safeguards business.
24 That over doubled in '77 in terms of dollars and Ace Focieral Reporters, Inc.
25 added more people, 255.
Of course, now, that just happened 4
I
20 1
in our own crystal balling of what the problem is.
There has 2
been a lot of, shall we say, help from the GAO, Joint Com-3 mittee, TRCC, and there has been a lot of pressure, I think, 4
to cause us to build up the safeguard research program and 5
total program, both technical assistance and research.
6 I gathered in talking with Dr. Myers, it wasn't 7
even clear to him that this is specifically spelled out in 8
the conference report or the organization act where the 9
safeguard environmental health field cycle kind of research 10 was added, as you will remember, during the last throws of 11 the reorganizational hearingc.
12 And OMB even prescribed the dollar levels we are 13 going through in there, as you recall.
But that is the world i
14 as we see it.
And I'm sure he is looking at it somewhat 15 differently, l
16 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Could'I ask you, this f
i 17 S5.5 million is mostly in the '77 budget, right?
18 MR. CHAPMAN:
Yes.
19 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
So there is some follow-on 20 work.
What is that for?
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21 MR. CHAPMAN:
Continuing to go to complete the
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22 modeling.
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23 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
You said you thought 6 f
~._-..-.:-. ___. -. _.
l months.
Ace. Federal Repomes, Inc.
25 MR. CHAPMAN:
I said I thought in 6 months, we c
f.
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21 1
could begin t4 get some feeling for,whether or not the models --
2' COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
So really, there is still 3
a lot more money that needs to be spent.
m 4
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
I ndssed that.
I thought 5
you said $5.5 million was the end of the program.
/,
MR. CHAPMAN:
No, no.
That is '77 money.
I said 7
in probably 6' months, which'is toward the end of '77, we ought 8
to begin to have a feel.
9 COMMISSIONER, GILINSKY:
What would it take to com-10 plete the program in its entirety?
11 MR. ARSENNAULT:
Well, I believe that towards the 12 end of calendar '77, we will have products out of the modeling
(
13 activities that are clear enough and usable enough to allow 14 a determination as to whether it continues to be a fruitful 15 avenue to approach.
16 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
How much will have been 17 invested?
Because we will be part way into '78 then.
How I
18 much will have been invested?
_~
19 MR. ARSENNAULT:
We will have invested that.
20 CHAIRMAN ROWDEN:
Of the '78.
e 21 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
At the time we know 4*Ather 22 it is a worthwhile exercise, how much will we have invested?
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23 WR. ARSENNAULT:
As an approximation, about $7 24 million.
ce-Federes neooners, ine, 25 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
It-has to be more than
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22
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1 that. 4 thought it was $5.5.
2 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
It is another ---
3 MR. ARSENNAULT:
Half into the next year.
O 4
CHAIRMAN RO'"""N:
$5.5 completing '77 authorization.
5 It will complete the '77 authorization and another $1.5 million 6
from '78 which you think would have to be expended before 7
you reach that point in time?
8 MR. ARSENNAULT:
Yes, and a very small amount from 9
'76.
That would put us at a time where we ought to be able 10 to assess the impact.
11 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
What would it then take 12 according 1.o your present plant to complete the program in 13 its s tirety?
Would 3t be completed in '787 14 MR. ARSENNAULT:
This kind of activity can in 15 fact extend almost indefinitely, but not obviously at a i
g' 16 level __
l l
17 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
I have noticed i. hat about a l
I 18 great deal of laboratory activity.
They are the one 19 institution which man has created which will never, never die I
20 until man also is gone.
21 MR. ARSENNAULT:
The point is that there is not a
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piece of hardware that arises out of this development.
It is j
22 23 in fact a tool and a technique.
I would not expect the level 24 of effort ever to be as high as it is during the first few Ace 4ederW Repomrs. Inc.
25 years.
But I believe if the program turns out to be as i
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23 I
successful as I certainly hope it is, there would be justifi-2
' cation for on-going work to refine and improve the data base.
3 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
You are really talking k'
4 about --
5 MR. ARSENNAULT:
For several years.
6 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
-- going along at roughly 7
a $5 million level for several years here?
8 MR. ARSENNAULT:
I would say $5 million level for 9
1 or 2 more years, and then I would think it would drop away 10 to less than half that.
11 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
This deals mainly with the 12 fuel cycle safeguards and associated transportation, right?
(_
13 MR ARSENNAULT:
Yes, fixed sites and transportation 14 and includes material control.
15 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Fixed site only in the fuel
]
16 cycle area, not reactors?
17 MR. ARSENNAULT:
Includes reactors.
l 18 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
That's what I thought.
So i
i 19 it is fixed site safeguards across the board.
20 MR. ARSENNAULT:
That's right.
I point out that i
21 some of our earliest outputs will be related to reactor l
l 22 physical protection against sabotage, and we expect a report j
23 on the application of some of these models to reactor physical 24 protection this spring.
I don't know exactly when.
Perhaps Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 in April; possibly, it will slip a month.
I don't think that i
i
.~
24 1
report will result in a tool that could be used by NRC for 2
licensing or inspection, but we expect it to provide con-3 siderable insights to the NRC staff and guide them in their 4
evaluations.
5 And it will also allow us to review the content of i
6 the program that we have.
7 MR. GOSSICK: l Ben, are you aware of any other 8
major hang-ups he has in the diplomatic sense?
9 MR. HUBERMAN:
Is there any philosophical or legal 10 reason why ERDA couldn't do it.
to answer Henry's question, 11 you h' ave such a huge budget, why couldn't they pick up this?
12 MR. CHAPMAN:
Obviously, ERDA can dc. this.
ERDA
(
13 can provide all of our terms.
The question here is the question 14 of independence.
15 CHAIRMAN ROWDEN:
Let me raisa the philosophical 16 question --
l 17 MR. CHAPMAN:
The law relocated the research organ-j I
i 18 ization in NRC.
I believe there is a reason.
19 CHAIRMAN ROWDEN:
As a philosophical question, thepurposeofthisistogiveusabasisformakinglicensingf l
20 21 determination.
This is essentially the reason why we are in I
22 charge of this particular research activity, or we believe we f 23 should be.
I suppose some other agency could do it just as 1
24 they could do work in other areas.
Am-Faseres neportm. inc.
25 I~ guess _our position up to now has been that if.we t
i
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25 I
are going to use this for making licensing evaluations and 2
determinations, we ought to be the one to determine what the 3
product is.
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4 MR. GOSSICK:
Well, it is certainly thoroughly 5
coordinated, and whether it comes out of their budget or our------- -
_ _ _ _ _. _ _ _. _ =. = =
- - - - - - - - ~ - - -
6 budget, it still wouldn' t be at less cost.
7 CHAIRMAN ROWDEN:
There are really 2 questions.
8 Is it worth doing?
And if it is worth doing, who should do 9
it?
You want to get over the first threshold before you 10 reach the second one.
What would the impact be if these Il programs were simply terminated, the ones we are talking 12 about now?
13 MR. CHAPMAN:
As I said, from your perspective, Id I think the NMSS organizarion will give you that safeguard 15 program.
10 CHAIRMAN ROWDE'N:
The basis for it would be somewhat 17 different, though.
l 18 MR. CHAPMAN: 'The basis would be somewhat different) 19 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
And necessarily more 20 subjective.
f 21 MR. CHAPMAN:
Hopefully depending on how these 22 determinations-for evaluations come out, whether IE or NMSS, l
2; we would rely much more on expert opinion in our evaluations j
l i
and simply try to organize ourselves in a mechanical way l
24 Am-FaswW Reortm, Inc.
25 to determine the extent of the program as opposed to using i
l,
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26
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I these kinds of tools.
2 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
We have noticed, I think,
~
3 regularly the unanimity among expert opinion.
It has been a b
4 big help to us from time to_ time.
5 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Let me ask you, up to now, 6
and I realize these things ara just in a formative stage, 7
have you had the occasion to use any of the results of these 8
programs?
Have they affected any of your licensing decisions?
9 MR. CHAPMAN:
Not directly.
We used some of the 10 earlier modeling, work that was done by Sandia on physical 11 securities.
That was used initially in safeguard supplement.
12 The problem with that work as we got into it and started b.
13 using it and checking it more carefully was that it was based 14 on equations derived from essentially a Vietnam scenario in 15 which you have a fire pit, people actually shooting.
16 And, therefore, the weight of lead is the deter-l 17 mining factor.
That led to very large guard requirements with !
18 heavy weapons to exchange lots of lead.
As we got into it, i
19 we decided that model was not the appropriate model because 20 that in our opinion was not the way these kind of attacks 21 were made.
}
22 So I think the first use of the model was also i
22 used to a minor extent in some of their transportation 24 modeling, rather unsophisticated, but we have used that in
, Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc.
75 both the safeguard supplement and up-grade program.
i I
l
27 1
1 So there has been some use.
There has been some 1
2 iteration with both ERDA and the laboratories some of which 3
we have accepted, some of.which we have rejected.
k.
4 CHAIRMAN ROWDEN:
Again, another question was raised 5
a comparative'one.
Let's assume it has rtilities and makes i
6
' sense for NRC to do it, might we be better spending this sort 7
of money for doing other things in this connection?
j i
8 MR. CHAPMAN:
That is a tough querstion.
9 CHAIRMAN ROWDEN:
I know it is a tough question, i
l 10 but I gather there is some specific concerns that underlie 11 the question.
12 MR. GOSSICK:
You mean outside of safeguards?
13 CHAIRMAN ROWDEN:
No, in the safeguards area.
14 MR. CHAPMAN:
You think immediately of the 1 or 2 15 places you might.
I am assuming you are going to spend e.
16 the money, you might spend, as Commissioner Gilinsky said, l
17 somehow facilitating plant improvements.
18 CHAIRMAN ROWDEN:
We couldn't spend it.
~
~
19 MR. CHAPMAN:
I'm not sure that'is --
20 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
It is out of the same purse.
21 MR. CHAPMAN:
It is money out of the same purse 22 that may be spent in that regard.
If you gave it to me as
(
23
'an option, I'would spend a creat deal simply building staff.
24 We are still woefully defective in terms of carrying out the' A m-F W w W R o w w n.. x.
'25 functions of the Commission in the safeguards area in terms
._=
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28 1
of staff.
2 CHAIRMAN ROWDEN:
What about implementing recom-3 mandations-for study that have already been completed?
('
4 Obviously, Henry is sensitive as in the security agencies, 5
the recommendation obtains there.
Are there' measures that we 6
might be taking in that regard to follow up on our recom-7 mandations?
8 MR. CHAPMAN:
Let me turn that statement around a 9
little bit, Mr. Chairman.
I am not sure that Henry Myers 10 is sensitive or upset over the outcome of the security agency 11 study and its treatment by the Commission.
My impression 12 is that he is more convinced that those kinds of studies 13 done on a anonlaboratory basis by an individual who seeks out 14 the best sources of the model are, 1, less expensive and, 2,
15 far more productive.
16 My conversations with Henry are not so much he is i
17 offended by any failure to use his study, but rather have we l
1 18 taken advantage of all of the things that were done on that i
19 kind of direct contract basis in support of these various 20 studies as opposed to simply writing 189 and dumping large j
i 21 sums of. money in the laboratory without being able to really 22 monitor, judge or control the output.
23 So I don't think it is the particular study; it 24 is the technique.
He thinks this is a much better technique i
A=-rwww neom, im.
25 for contracting than what he called the old AEC system.
29 1
land he would like to see us expand that kind of a contractual 2
technique in direct support of that particular program.
3 He has never indicated to me at least he is upset
(',
4 by our-failure to use any-part of his study.
5 MR. ARSENNAULT:
Could I offer an observation in 6
connection with a previous question about the utility of the 7
model to point out that the preliminary modeling activities 8
that are now being built on within our program were used to 1
9 perform the vulnerability analysis studies of reactor sabatage i
10 vulnerability by Sarlia.
And those reports are finding use 11 in the NRR program and are finding use by utilities to 12 evaluate their current security systems.
(_
13 So that, I think, is one place where these things 14 hrve been useful.
1 15 I think, too, that one aspect of these modeling 16 activities hasn't been mentioned yet today.
And that is that 17 they provide a means by which one can demonstrate and j
18 explain the basis for the regulatory decisions that are made.
19 They do this by at least replacing some aspects of the pro-20 cess w'ith objective procedures.
l 21 We will never replace all of the subjective j
i 22
. judgments that are made.
So in these 2 respects, I think l
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23 they will have utility.
These are very early days in a j
i 24
-program like this to expect out' puts, particularly useful-A=-swem nomwn.is
-25
. outputs.
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30 1
.But there is one other preliminary ' output that has 2
found utility.
A very simplified version of one of the 3
evaluation model components has been developch.
And while I k.
4 think it is premature for application, NRR. and some parts of 5
the NMSS program have showed an interest in exercising the 6
model again for purposes of providing them with insights 7
concerning the systems rather than for application to any 8
regulatory decision.
9 So these things, I think, are finding some 10 acceptance and utility.
11 MR. FRAZIER:
At that point, you need to move it 12 back to answer the question:
what are the alternatives to
(.
13 using modeling as the basis for your regulatory decisions?
14 Ken has said expert opinion.
I am not sure but that we don't 15 have certain names for what that expert opinion looks like 16 rather than some generic category we have glanced at and 17 the relationships; that we want to try and look at I&E.
18 Those kinds of things are certainly the kinds of 19 alternatives which one could use as exercises to establish 20 some experiential guesses.
l 21 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
I think one to look at is 22 this system which we originally set up to deal with the 23 problem that seems less immediate now than it was when we
. 24 set up-this research program which is still appropriate for i
Am-FWwW R% ewes, lm 25 what would appear to be our current.
l
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31 1
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Is it less immediate?
2 MR. CHAPMAN:
It is a fair question.
3 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
I mean the question of a 4
large-scale fuel cycle industry and so on.
5 MR. CHAPMAN:
I would answer the following way.
i 6
Let's presurae that we can complete at some time -- say a 7
year or so -- reasonable development of a model to a point 8
where you could use it.
The question at that point is when 9
you ask the Director of Sa'feguards what the status of this 10 is and what would happen if you changed this or what is this Il feature.
12 If you believe that output, then it is a very usefuli
(;
13
_ too l.
If you don't believe that output, then you shouldn't 14 have it.
15 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
It certainly would provide 16 one more useful input to the Director of Safeguards.
l
~
17 MR. CHAPMAN:
The exchanges that you and I have 18 had across the table have all been my opinion supported by l
19 something or your opinion supported.
The models tend to f
20 formalize that.
21 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
It certainly gives one more 22 basis for judgment.
i s
23 CHAIRMAN ROWDEN:
We are dealing with a universe 24 which encompasses reactors which is going to be a continuing ;
Ace-Fas=w neomen., inc.
problem.
We are also dealing with a universe of fuel cycle p
25 t
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32
.o 4
1 facilities.
Though small, it maybe is still a particularly
-2 sensitive one and for which we still haven't completed our 3
own regulatory thing.
b.
4 And there is nothing based upon my correspondence 5
and what I read which would indicate that problem is simply 6
going to go away on the basis of some interim requirements 7
for upgrading of guards that we have adopted.
8 MR. STRAUSS:
Is it a problem models will avoid l
9 the use of such activity, they wouldn't give them subjectivity 10 that they will not themselves incorporate the more or less 11 objective judgments of the folks who --
12 MR. CHAPMAN:
They will help organize it, but I i '
(
13 think in the final analysis no one really believes it to be 14 real.
You have got to have opinions and subjectivity, but it 15 certainly helps to focus and organize the answers or the
\\
16 approach and foundation.
17 MR. HUBERMAN:
It tests your intuition.
This is 18 probably the best result.
19 MR. GOSSICK:
That is cer'ainly one of its big t
i 20 areas as we understand it.
I think another one that Ken 21
. described very briefly this morning to me the nature of it I
22 is the ERDA program in terms of hardware versus what we are
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23 doing' Ilun not sure that either he understands or has just i
24 listened carefully or believes.
I'm not sure which.
Ace 4.sersi n rwr.. inc.
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25
.But you might just-repeat what you told me this
.__---____.7._.__....__.
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33 1
morning.
2 MR. CHAPMAN:
I don't know how unless it is a funda-3 mental matter ERDA versus NRC research -- I don't know how 4
this can become a problem because we have been very careful 5
to be sure that Harry Lyons and that program over there is 6
not repeated except where it may be necessary to verify 7
something.
8; And basically what ERDA has been doing in their 9
program has been developing hardware.
And I can point to 10 things like retamake.and trailer, the testing they are doing
^
11 against sabatage or rupture of these shipping agents and 12 guard training syllabus, various penetration techniques,
(-.
13 where they are going to try to get through concrete walls and 14 all that kind of thing, it is all physical technology 15 equipment, hardware pieces.
l 16 They are doing some conceptual work, but mostly 17 are oriented toward putting together a demonstration system l
18 of safeguards either under Brookhaven for international 19 auspices or under Los Alamos for domestic auspices.
20 And what we are doing then is drawing on that 21 technology and trying to determine through these hopefully i
i 22 models whether that is relevant to our kind of business.
K.
j 23 For example, I have talked to the Commissioner.
24 The trailer is not relevant under the current situation.
I Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 cannot force the current shipping agents to capitalize that
~-
34 I
kind of a trailer.
It is just too damn expensive for the-2 number of shipments.
If we get into that mode, we are going 3
to have to buy that trailer or some other way, government k
4 eqaipment or whatever.
5 We are looking at these things all the time, trying 6
to determine their direct relevance to the current mode of 7
operation.
We may have to change our mode; we may have to a
buy those trailers and offer them to the shippers.
9 So there really is just no conflict in what we are 10 doing here except for a little fuzziness that always exists 11 in research programs.
I worry about it because we are both 12 putting money into the same pocket.
We are putting money
(
13 into Sandia and Livermore, Los Alamos.
And one worries about 14 whether that money is being kept pretty clean.
15 But so far as we can tell in looking at it, it i
16 is clean.
We are getting our fair share of their competence I
i 17 and ERDA is getting their fair share of that competence.
And 18 I think we are benefitting to some extent by having a single 19 contract.
I 20 COMMISSIONER, KENNEDY:
Could you help me with some t
I 21 of the fuzziness I have about some of these programs by 22 explaining NRC operations support?
That is $1,350,000 in '78; l
23
$1,768,000 this year.
Could you explain how that is different l 24 from what NMSS is supposed to be doing?
A. Fee w s neoo,w s.ene.
25 MR. CHAPMAN:
Well, I think the supporting study
a
- -. ~ -
35 1
aspect of the research budget that I told Frank about on the J
i 2
way down is a number that can go either way.
The effort can 3
be make.
So-called supporting studies could just as well be k_)
4 funded in NMSS' budget as the research budget because most 5
of this is directly user oriented.
6 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Isn't that what your tech-7 nical support is?
8 MR. CHAPMAN:
That's exactly what it is -- technical 9
assistance.
So that we have asked research to fund some of 10 these things, but they could just as well be funded under 11 technical assistance support programs than be under the 12 research budget.
13 On the other hand, the things we have been talking 14 about are not quite so clean because they do have relevance 15 to inspecrion, inforcement, NRR and so on and so on.
c.
16 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
And they are somewhat longer l 17 range.
~
18 MR. CHAPMAN:
For example, however, in the operation 19 support that is principally a study for regional, not for 20 me.
The main benefactor of that study if it pays off will i
21 probably be the inspection people and not the NMSS people.
22 So it is a judgment.
(
23 But I think in all honesty that supporting study, I
24 which pocket it comes under, is purely a decision.
It is A=-Fwww nomwn, is 25 bureaucratic, administrative.
l
..-._..a.._
36 I
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Was the information systems 2
program just at $1 million?
3 MR. CHAPMAN:
That is a program called ISUS, C
4 Integrated --
5 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Or is that the program, I 6
thought, that had been in being for --
7 MR. CHAPMAN:
No, no.
We are now funding through 8
Oak Ridge an ERDA' program'.that used to be called Nuclear 9
Material Information Systems and now called Nuclear Material 10 Management Safeguard System.
That program has limitations.
II In fact, the Oak Ridge people came back in the last week or 12 so to ERDA saying they are not sure they can add any more
(
I3 subprograms to the thing.
Id It has now a manpower of something like 7 people 33 or so, and it does not contain the information we need to 16 make our safeguard p'rograms in terms of the White Book that' f
I you are familiar with and other things that we report or f
17 18 keep track of.
Nor do we think it is adequate in the long l
\\
I9 term for the IEA reporting requirements.
l 20 We are taking a look through a contract just i
I 21 initiated with Boeing to see if we can more efficiently 22 collect information that is relevant to our interest and
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23 reproduce that.
This is across the staff.
It would take all 24 the IE information, SD requirements, NRR, NMSS, put this Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 all together and spend a year and about $1 million looking 4
o
/
37 f
1 at 'ehether that could be put together in some kind of a 2
data pool which we could then program withdrawals pertinent 3
to our specific needs, including IE.
(~
If we can do that, then we will decide whether 5
or not the NMSS becomes a subset program of that overall i
6 thing or whether we will go another route.
So it has about 7
a year's study effort looking at this data processing.
8 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
I'm not arguing whether it 9
ought to be done or not.
I guess after I hear your explanation, 10 my concern is the one which you have expressed before.
And 11 that is as to where it is in our budget, whether it belongs 12 in research or whether indeed it belongs as part of the k
13 technical assistance efforts of the individual operating 14 offices.
15 I am not going to change anything about the money.
16 MR. CHAPMAN:
It happens to be in both.
We l
17 have about $,400,000 in our budget also.
f i
18 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
That makes the fuzziness in l
I 4
19 my mind greater, not less.
20 MR. ARSENNAULT:
I would like to comment on that.
21 Commissioner Kennedy may recall during the budget briefing, 22
' he - raised the question of whether or not the support of the
,(-
l 23 inspection activities should be technical assistance.
And l
24 the Director of the Office of Regulation and I both responded Am pews no.wa. =
25 that we would be happy that it did smell and taste a great -
l
38 I
deal like technical assistance.
2 The reason why it was initiated in research was 3
because the Office of Inspection and Enforcement had a require-k.'
4 ment for this work and had neither the technical capabilities 5
nor the financial resources to initiate it and that when they 6
developed those, we would be happy to. transfer it to them.
7 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Perfectly good pragmatic 8
answer.
9 MR. ARSENNAULT:
And with regard to information 10 systems, I believe that both the Office of Research and the 11 Office of Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards have some-12 thing to contribute to this program.
And again, we had the
( ~
\\
13 resources to get it started so we have initiated it.
14 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
That is the kind of an answer 15 I think which would solve some of the problem with Dr. Myers.
16 The question there is the research budget.
And if it l
17 appropriately belongs in the research budget, it is one thing.'
18 If it is there because it happened to be a useful source of i
19 technical expertise and funds at a time when they were 20 critically short elsewhere, that is another question.
21 It is a perfectly reasonable thing to do, but they l
22 ought to understand that that is why it is and not because it -
23 is a big research program.
And I suppose the same thing would 24 apply to the topical studies.
l A=4mwe noomn. w.
25 MR. ARSENNAULT:
Topical studies, I think the
a:
39 1
. paper we prepared is functional.
It is a miscellaneous 2
category to pern it us to do studies on specific subjects that 3
require data collection or analysis.
It is neither cloarly k,.)
4 research nor technical assistance.
It is a bag that simply 5
doesn't belong anywhere else in a research program.
6 I think what we do there is properly research, but 7
what we do is not redetermined.
8 MR. CHAPMAN:
Let me just tell you what I believe 9
the punch line of this thing is.
What we are dealing with 10 today is the recommendation that Dr. Myers,will make to the 11 committee as a whole regarding our budget.
What I am informed 1;
is that we are probably no matter what words we use this
(
13 afternoon not going to be totally convincing that the payoff 14 of these efforts will be worth the amount of money being 15 requested.
16 On the other hand, I am also told that if this I
17 Commission makes a very strong, positive assertion that this i
18 work is useful and necessary that the committee as a whole 19 will probably pass the budget as it was submitted.
\\
20 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
So how does the Commission o
21 go about making that strong assertion since it has already 22 been there and my underutanding is it is not going back?
23 Is. that it?
I 24
' CHAIRMAN ROWDEN:
We have completed our submission AwFmww newwn. is 25
-process anless they have further questions.
What further steps!
40 I
have to be taken if indeed there are any open to us?
That
. ould depend on what the specific problems are.
That'is the 2
w 3
purpose of your going up there for discussion.
k,.
4 MR. GOSSICK:
That's right.
As far as-I know, this d
5 is the only area that is being requested.. I presume that 6
Dr. Myers, if he was to make such a recommendation to the 7
Chairman, would propose to report out a' bill like that, then 8
we might have some other opportunity to go back either to the 9
Chairman or in some form to express our views.
10 And I think it is going to be a rather unpopular 11 view at least as looked at by other committees as both 12 Ford and the Carter Admininstration and OMB have allegedly
[t. -
13 3crubbed this program, a
14 CHAIRMAN ROWDEN:
How does this process work?
It 1
15 would be Henry's recommendations to the subcommittee as to v.
1 16
.what should be done?
17 MF. GOSSICK:
Right.
18 CHAIRMAR ROWDEN:
They would adopt a position which-4 19 they would recommend to the full committee, and there may be i
l 20 an opportunity for expression at that point quite apart from I
21 our relations with other committees.
That is normally the way 22 the process works.
23 MR. GOSSICK:
That's my understanding of it.
I 24 think just sitting down with him very candidly, going through A= em-w no mn. im j.
71 25 this whole area and addressing as many of his concerns and o
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problems as we can as openly and honestly --
2 CHAIRMAN ROWDEN:
An honest presentation for'what 3
the basis of our request is,. is that it?
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4 MR. GOSSICK:
That's it as far as we are concerned.
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5 We will do our best.
6 MR. STRAUSS:
Before you go --
7 CHAIRMAN ROWDEN:
That's why you are here.
8 MR. STRAUSS:
Recapitulation.
9 As I heard the discussion, there were basically 2 10 sorts of things' that occurred.
You heard from time to time 11 in more or less discrete portions of the discussion from Ken 12 and Lee and some others respecting their understanding of Dr.
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13 Myers' concern and to some extent, but a vary limited extent, 14 a discussion of tactics in responding to those specific 15 concerns.
16 And I have no difficulty in concluding that those l
l'7 parts of the discussion were well within the rationale for l
18 closing the meeting.
l l
19 CHAIRMAN ROWDEN:
What is that rationale?
Would l
20 you recapitulate that again?
21 MR. STRAUSS:
When you are going to be having f
i 22 discussions with the Congress or a commi tee of the Congress I
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l 23 or somebody who works for the Congress, 1 2 need not do this l
24
.in public.
It would significantly frustrate that discussion.
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25 CHAIRMAN ROWDEN:
Any discussion ~or discussions I
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3
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42 1
relating to specific pieces of legislation or the budget.
2 What are the parameters of that objection?
3 MR. STRAUSS:
It would have been Congressional
./
4 business.
5 CRAIRMAN ROWDEN:
Any Congressional business?
6 MR. STRAUSS:
I would think Congressional business 7
would be included.
And it has to do with 2 things.
Fro.m 8
your perspective of preserving tactical ability; from the 9
committee's perspective, preserving the politeness of their 10 getting the response first and also preserving some degree 11 of confidence.
12 CHAIRMAN ROWDEN:
Not inviting them down to the
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13 Public Document Room.
14 MR. STRh0SS:
That's right, or others that Ken 15 can talk'about what he understands from Henry Myers or of 16 Henry Myers without either consulting or misrepresenting the l
17 man in public or giving away confidences or whatever the 18 case might be.
19 Now, the other part of your discussion, and they 20 were relatively discrete peations, concerned briefings on the l i
i 21 particular items that Dr. M'yers turns out to be interested l
22 in.
You talked for a long time about these programs that are l 23 being done up at Sandia, the models that are being done at j
t 24 Sandia and Livermore and tEs like.
That discussion in and teFm-mn===n w.
25 of -itself, it was hard for me to hear anything in that l
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discussion that-could be closed.
2 The closest I came to it was at the conclusion, Ken l
3 said something about, well, in order to get this, it is going 4
to require the Commission's strong and unequivical support.
5 I suppose an argument could be made that having a record on 6
which Commissioners'ask questions would suggest that they are 7
not strongly and unequivocally behind this, but rather 8
interested to know what is going on and a little bit skeptical 9
about it and could interfere with that tactical approach.
j 10 I can't say I think terribly much of that line of 11 reasoning.
And so my impression now is that while che matters i
12 that deal directly with Mr. Myers and his representations are
.k 13 appropriately withheld, we should review the transcript for 14 thos discrete chnuns, and I think there are a number of 15 them ranging from 5 or 10 minutes in length, that were 16 briefings on the particular programs rather than discussions i
17 of what was going to go on up on the Hill this afternoon 18 and put it in the PDR.
l' 19 CHAIRMAN RONDEN:
That is what you will recommend?
20 You will examine it?
l 21 MR. STRAUSS:
That's right.
22 MR. HUBERMAN:
By the way, for the future, would
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j 23 Lee and Ken and Frank and analogous people get a chanch I
a 24 review that transcript and see if they agree with you?
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25 In other words, sanitize it first or you do it on your own?
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1 MR. STRAUSS:
That's entirely the Commission's 2
decision.
3 MR. HUBERMAN:
If it is standard operating procedure
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for the future --
5 MR. STRAUSS:
I will be happy to do it if they would 6
like to review the transcript.
I will be happy to let them 7
review the transcript.
8 MR. HUBERMAN:
Is it right or wrong or neutral 9
for the people who are --
10 MR. STRAUSS:
I think the more time we spend on 11 this exercise rather than doing other things, the worse off 12 we will be, but any procedure the. commission wishes to follow
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13 is fine.
14 CHAIRMAN ROWDEhi:
Why don't you come up with a 15
' sensible recommendation in this regard?
Obviously, your view 16 of the law has to be the bottom line consideration, No.1.
17 No. 2, to the extent that others participate in 18 the process, you may want to get their view before determination 39 can be made.
j 20 MR. HUBERMAN:
It seems to me a lawyer can't be 21 sensitive to whether something that has been said is classified
'22 or not if he doesn't exactly understand what has been said.
23 CHAIRMAN ROWDEN:
That is the easy question.
The i
24 more difficult question is one of sensitivity.
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25 MR. STRAUSS:
There was some mention of Rand Vietnam l
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'I'm glad you reminded me of that -- during the 2
meeting.
The question came up in my mind whether they were 3
classified or not.
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4 MR. HUBERMAN:
At one. time, they were classified..
5 MR. STRAUSS:
The one other remark I would make --
6 MR. HUBERMAN:
It makes general sense.
7
. CHAIRMAN ROWDEN:
I think it is a valid point, and 8
I think Lee ought to be the point of contact.
i 9
MR. STRAUSS:
I raise a tactical question for you.
i 10 Of course, closing meetings like this is a matter of your 11 judgment wholly beyond what you may do as a matter of law.
i 12 And you may on occasions believe sirae open meetings are not
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13 transcribed and these meetings are, there may well be j
i 14 occasions when you say to your selves, "Well, we will have I
15 the open meeting and have no record of it."
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16 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Let me ask you what would i
1 17 have been the alternative for us if we wanted to have an 18 open meeting?
Could we do it on that short schedule? -
19 MR. STRAUSS:
In the circumstances that existed here, 20 you didn't find out until yesterday, absolutely.
21 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
We could s!mply have had 22 t _
an open meeting.
23 MR. STRAUSS: ~That's right.
i 24 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
How would you notify anybody?
Ace.Federes Reporem, Inc.
j 25 MR. STRAUSS:
Yesterday when you found out about it,!
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46 1
th'e secretary would have followed his usual --
2 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
We didn't decide to have 3
the meeting until 5:00 o' clock as I recall.
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'4 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Then, what would'you have 5
done?
6 MR. HOYLE:
There is not much we can do, Commissioner.
7 We would!have put a notice in the Public Documents Room last 8
night.
Of course, no one would see it until first thing 9
this morning, and then only by chance.
10 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
So there would be a notice II this morning.
I2 CHAIRMAN ROWDEN:
I don't want to appear to be k.
13 playing games in this regard to say, "Okay, we will have an 14 open meeting since nobody will attend if we don't have a trans-15 cript."
That wasn't the philosophy of our approach.
It was i
l 16 straight forward implementation of a recommendation made to l
17 us.
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18 MR. STRAUSS:
That is one reason I was as strong as 19 I was last night as soon as the issue of the meeting came up 20 about saying, "All right, now is the time to get together i
21 and make this decision."
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22 MR. HUBERMAN:
Shouldn't we have a procedure where
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l 24 the secretary his phone number and whenever such a meeting is Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 called, those people get a phone call instead cf this mickey t
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1 mouse procedure?
2 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
The only trouble with that-3 is that I think we would have to circularize the nation rather
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4 broadly and widely if we are going to be fair about that.
5 COMMISSIONER ROWDEN:
We will get Dr. Schlesinger's 6
list of 450,000.
7 MR. HUBERMAN:
We put it in the Federal Register.
8 MR. STRAUSS:
I think the secretary does have a 9
list of people who do want to be informed.
10 MR. HOYLE:
We do have 12 on a list now, mailing 11 list.
And we also have phone nunbers for --
12 CHAIRMAN ROWDEN:
Presa primarily.
13 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Nho are they?
14 MR. HOYLE:
Walter, could you explain who the 12
-15 are?
3 l
I6 MR. MAGEE:
One from the press, a number of private l 1
17 citizens plus Bechtel, Babcock and Wilcox and several other l
18 industry-related individuals.
19 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
I would like to know who i
20 is on that list and how we made it up.
j 21 MR. MAGEE:
These are persons who responded to our j
22 invitation to receive mailings from us on meeting announcements!.
23 MR. HUBERMAN:
That is nice, but when a meeting is i
24 called on an hour's notice or 5:00 o' clock yesterday, giving AwFWwd Rgemm, Inc 25 them something in the mail is not exactly giving notice.
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1 MR. STRAUSS:
It might be possible to.
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.2 MR.:HUBERMAN:
Of course, I can't sa; # rom the j
3 legal standpoint..
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COMMISSIONER ROWDEN:
Why are you being so modest?
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5 MR. STRAUSS:
What is is practical so far as the
~6 law is concerned, but I suppose it would be possible to 7
mechanize the process.
You put their phone numbers on magnetic 8
cards.- You have sort of a reverse telephone answering device.
9 And somebody picks up the phone.
10 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
We could have a recording.
Il MR. STRAUSS:
We pick up the phone and record, 12 "This is the Secretary of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission."
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13 CHAIRMAN ROWDEN:
Whatever is taken out, we could 14 add to our budget in that matter.
1 l
15 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
I was going to say soone.r 16 or later, we would have provided all of the necessary 17 accouterments for a full and open process and have no process i
18 left to conduct.
19 CHAIRMAN ROWDEN:
No process.
t 20 MR. HUBERMAN:
I think unless you do something l
t i
21 like that, this is a farce.
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22 CHAIRMAN ROWDEN:
What is a farce?
We are trans-l l
23 cribing this, and it is being edited to release the portions 24 which are publicly available.
Am Federal Reporters, Inc.
Excuse me, we are talking about open !
25 MR. HUBERMAN:
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meetings now.
2 CHAIRMAN ROWDEN:
You mean suddenly called open 3
meetings?
Sure.
That is the point I was making.
It would
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4 be viewed'as a stratagem for not revealing what goes on in 5
Commission' meetings.
6 MR. HUBERMAN:
I was reacting to exactly that 7
point -- call an open meeting, no record, nobody shows up.
8 CHAIRMAN RONDEN:. That is the precise observation 9
I was making.
You have to be careful you don't appear to be
'10 playing games.
11 MR. STRAUSS:
That is a consideration that is equally 12 applicable to anything that is called on a week's notice.
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13 MR. HUBERMAN:
Not if a guy gets a notice in the mail.
14 MR. STRAUSS:
There is a consideration in some 15 circumstances you might rather take your chances on who will 16 shcw up than have a transcrip,t.
i i
.17 CHAIRMAN ROWDEN:
Can you answer one question?
18 That is the NRC-ERDA overlap.
i 19 MR. GOSSICK:
I have revised pieces on the 20 attachments.
That is reponding to the March 4 letter from e
21 Mr. Udall.
I will.get these to John.
22 CHAIRMAN ROWDEN:
As a matter of fact, it was shown n.,.
23 to each of your offices before it went out.
,24 MR. GOSSICK:
I don't propose to leave anything Am-Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 else over there with Henry this afternoon.
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1 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
This paper was the March 4?
2 MR. GOSSICK:
I'm not sure Henry even wants any more 3
paper, but I guess we could give it to him this afternoon.
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4 It has been revised, and I will get it to John.
5 CHAIRMAN ROWDEN:
The meeting is adjourned.
6 (Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m.,
the meeting was 7
adjourned.)
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o UNITED STATES 8
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o
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W ASHIN GTON, D.C. 20555
%[*****l August 14, 1980 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY COMMISSION DETERMINATION REGARDING PUBLIC DISCLOSURE UNDER THE GOVERNMENT IN THE SUNSHINE ACT OF:
Transcript of Discussion of Safeguards Research Budget, March 22, 1977 Pursuant to the Commission's regulations implementing t' t-Government in the Sunshine Act (10 CFR 9.108(d)), it has been determined after a further review of this transcrip't that the entire text can be released.to the public.
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uel
. Chilk Sec 'etary of e Commission i
_ _.