ML19337A110
| ML19337A110 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | West Valley Demonstration Project |
| Issue date: | 06/26/1980 |
| From: | Dircks W NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS) |
| To: | Deuster R EMVNFWV, NUCLEAR FUEL SERVICES, INC. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8009080468 | |
| Download: ML19337A110 (4) | |
Text
f RE%'o, UNITED STATES
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1 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION h,
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 e
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JUN 2 61980 Docket No. 50-201 Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc.
ATTN:
Mr. Ralph W. Deuster, President 6000 Executive Boulevard, Suite 600 Rockville, MD 20852 Gentlemen:
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff urges that you, as co-licensee, give strong support and cooperation to a program to inspect and evaluate
-the condition of the high level liquid waste storage system at your Western New York Nuclear Service Center facility (the facility) in West Valley, New York. This program is being conducted by cur contractor, Rockwell Hanford Operations, and is described in a program plan entitled,
" Inspection and Evaluation of Nuclear Fuel Services High Level Waste Storage System," (RH0-CD-882).
It is the staff's intention to accomplish the inspection and evaluation of your high level waste storage system in the manner described in this program plan. This inspection and evaluation will use state-of-the-art technology to, among other things, verify the integrity of the carbon steel tank (8D-2) which is the primary barrier for the nearly 600,000 gallons of neutralized high level waste in storage at the facility. The inspection and evaluation of tank 8D-2 is particularly important in view of the discovery of the defective pan under that tank.
During the period of licensed operation of your facility, there have been many improvements in the specific techniques used to inspect, monitor and evaluate the safety conditions of underground high level liquid waste storage systems. The improvements in the technology used to perform surveillance of these waste systems have been developed primarily at the major Department.of Energy (DOE) sites at the Savannah River Plant (SRP) and the Hanford Reservation. These improved technologies have not yet applied to the surveillance program at your West Valley facility.
In recognition of this lack of continued technological development at West Valley, the staff requested through DOE that SRP examine the safety-related information available on the West Valley high level liquid waste storage system.
In addition, the staff requested that SRP report any recommended actions to improve the understanding of the safety conditions associated with your waste storage system. Based on their review, SRP provided the staff with a report and with appropriate recommendations.
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-Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. Upon reh'pt of SRP's report, the NRC staff recognized that implementation of most of the work recomi. ended by SRP was beyond the capability directly available to either co-licensee.
As a result, the staff made the decision to go directly to an organization with the resources and capabilities necessary to perform this work. This decision culminated in the initiation of our contract with Rockwell-Hanford Operations. At the same time, the staff recognized that some of the items recommended by SRP were within your existing onsite capability. As a result we requested that you perform certain evaluations. You agreed to perform these evaluations and committed to certain tests and improvements associated with the waste storage system.
The initial results of your efforts in this regard were quite disturbing.
The vault liquid level instruments for vaults 8D-1 and 80-2 were improperly installed in that the levelometer probes were 12 inches shorter than required. by the construction drawings. The steam supply line for the vault to pan eductor was also 12 inches shorter than required which resulted in the suction tail piece for the eductor being above its design level near the bottom of the vault. The flashing skirt around tank 8D-1 (piece 15-2 on Chicago Bridge and Iron Drawing No. V.D.-4413-8-D-12-11-3) is not installed as required by the drawing. These improper installations apparently occurred during facility construction.
Furthermore, the pan liquid level detection instrument for the on-service neutralized waste tank 8D-2 was inoperative for some indefinite period of time.
As a result, that instrument was incapable of detecting any liquid level in the pan. Finally, and most importantly, the pan for the operational waste tank 8D-2 was found to be defective in that it could no longer hold water during testing. The pan for 8D-2 is unable to collect and contain liquid waste in the event tank leakage were to occur.
The follow-up action taken by you with respect to the above problems that could be resolved within your directly available capability was satisfactory.
The problems described above with respect to the inoperative or improperly installed instruments and vault eductor have been corrected. The onsite capability for waste transfer from 8D-2 to 80-1 was improved and upgraded.
However, the most significant finding, which is the defect in the pan for 8D-2, remains unresolved.
O O
Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. The staff recognizes that the entire safety question associated with this pan defect may not be readily resolvable. Our desire to detemine the location, nature, cause, and possible repairability of this defect may remain unfulfilled, particularly if the defect is located underneath the tank. The fact that the entire question of the pan defect may not be readily resolvable makes it even more important to move ahead with a detailed assessment of tank integrity. Our only recourse is to continue to pursue the investigations originally recommended by SRP, concurred in by the NRC staff, and further developed and proposed by Rockwell. The staff concurred in and fully intended to implement these recommendations even before the defect in the pan was discovered.
Its discovery further under-scores the need to conduct these investigations in a deliberate, safe, and timely fashion.
Without the best information available to describe the condition of the high level liquid waste storage system at West Valley, the NRC has certain reservations concerning that condition. Because of the importance of this infomation, we expect continued and aggressive support, cooperation and initiative from both co-licensees in order to meet our contract schedule.
It has been brought to our attention by our contractor, Rockwell Hanford Operations, that you have written them stating your position with respect to the West Valley site activities to be conducted under this contract.
In your letter to Rockwell dated May 19, 1980, you stated your position that prior to granting pemission to conduct these onsite activities, appropriate indemnification agreements must be developed which would include assurances that any damage discovered as a result of these activities would be presumed to be attributable to those activities unless it could be othenvise clearly proven. Your position in this matter effectively blocks our contractor from gathering the infomation required by the NRC staff. This infomation is of paramount importance in the staff's efforts to continue the ongoing investi-gation and evaluation of the safety conditions associated with your high level waste storage system. Your position creates a problem that must be resolved expeditiously.
It is imperative that we meet as soon as possible M resolve this problem.
O O
Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. :
If you have any other problems working with our contractor, any safety concerns based on your review of Rockwell's proposed procedures, any problems meeting these schedules, or any other problems associated with implementation of the work required by this contract, I expect you to let me '.now promptly.
I also expect that if you have any such problems, that you fully and specifically describe these problems in a timely fashion. A member of my staff will be contacting you shortly to arrange for the meeting discussed in the paragraph above.
Sincerely, 0
W William J. Dircks, Director Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards cc: Governor Hugh T. Carey Sidney R. Petersen, Getty Oil Company James Larocca, NYSERDA
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