ML19332C664

Insp Rept 70-1113/89-13 on 891019-20.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Reevaluation of Adequacy of Licensee Emergency Response Capability Through Observation of Remedial Emergency Drill on 891019

ML19332C664
Person / Time
Site:	07001113
Issue date:	11/08/1989
From:	Kreh J, Rankin W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML19332C662	List: ML19332C661 ML19332C664
References
70-1113-89-13, NUDOCS 8911280396
Download: ML19332C664 (8)

Text

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Repc-t No.: 70-1113/89-13 Licensee: General Electric Company

,W11mington. NC 28401 Docket No.: 70-1113 License No.: SNM-1097 Facility Name: General Electric Company Inspection Condilcted: October 19-20, c69 Inspector:

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//- $ "Y J. y Kreh Date 51gined U*8*8T Appreved by: M-r W. H. Rankin, Chief Date Signed Emergency Preparedness Section Emergency Preparedness and Radiological Protection Branch Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards SUWARY Scope:

-This routine, ur. announced inspection was conducted in order to re-evaluate the adequacy of the licensee's emergency response capability through observation of the remedial emergency drill on October 19, 1989.

The annual drill conducted on June 7, 1989 was an unsuccessful demonstration of the itcensee's emergency response capability because several important drill objectives were not met.

Licensee management decided at that time to conduct a remedial drill before January 1, 1990.

Results:-

In ' the area inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.

The licensee demonstrated on this occasion a capability to adequately respond to an emergency involving a major fire (simulated) within the controlled area. All drill. objectives were met, and the licensee's critique was thorough.

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l 8911280396 891114 PDR ADOCK 07001113

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REPORT DETAILS 1.

Licensee Employees Contacted

• B. Eentley, Manager Fuel Production L

• J. Bradberry, Senior Program Manager Emergency Preparedness and Security

• A. Dada Manager, Chemical Manufacturing Engineering

• R. Foleck Senior Specialist, Licensing Engineering

• J. Harmon, Manager Technology and Automation

• R. McIver, Manager, Plant Engineering and Maintenance

• W. McMahon, Manager, Fuel Manufacturing Engineering (serv e s Emergency Director during the drill)

• S. Murray, Senior Engineer, Nuclear Safety

• P. Sick, Manager. Quality Assurance (representing General Manager)

• H. Strickler, Senior Program Manager. Environmental Protection and Industrial Safety

• C, Vaughan, Manager, Regulatory Compliance Other licensee employees contacted during th,s inspection included engineers, security force members, technicians, and administrative personnel.

• Attended exit interview 2.

Remedial Emergency Response Drill (88050)

The Radiological Contingency and Emergency Plan (RCEP) required that periodic tests and drills be performed to maintain proficiency in emergency response, to include an annual drill integrating the onsite and offsite components of the emergency response organization.

The drill on June 7,1989 was conducted by the licensee in an effort to fulfill the requirement for an annual integrated drill.

However, because of several serious communications deficiencies which significantly reduced the effectiveness of the licensee's response to the scenario, licensee

. management infonned the NRC on June 8,1989 that a remedial drill would be conducted prior to January 1,1990.

In addition, the NRC evaluation concluded that the scenario for the Jure 7 drill did not serve to effectively test the overall response capability of the emergency organization.

Details regarding these-matters are contained in Paragraph 5 of NRC Inspection Report No. 70-1113/89-06.

The remedial drill was staged on October 19, 1989, commencing at 1:00 p.m.

and terminating at 2:10 p.m.

The scenario involved a major fire within the controlled-access area.

Complicating factors included a criticality alarm, an injured Emergency Response Team (ERT) member, and potential loss of integrity (because of fire damage) of the air-handling system for L

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b several airborne-contamination areas.

All of the listed accider.t conditions were simulated except the criticality alarm, which was manually tripped.

The Castle Hayne Volunteer Fire Depettnent and New Hanover County Emergency Medical Services re sponded in real tine to the site and participated in the fire and medical aspects of the drill. The attachment to this report documents the licensee's drill objectives and scenario details as established in advance.

The inspector observed selected aspects of the drill, including the initial response at the fire scene, activation of the onsite emergency organization, management of the response effort by the Emergency Director and his staff at the Emergency Control Center (ECC), plant evacuation / accountability, and support efforts at the accident scene by offsite fire and medical personnel.

The onsite emergency organization and offsite support groups responded capably to the conditions postulated by the scenario.

A high level of realism was imparted to the accident scene through the contro11ers' use of a smoke generator and smoke bombs.

In accordance with the RCEP implementing procedures, the Emergency Director promptly declared a Notification of Unusual Event. Later (at 1:40 p.m.),

an Alert was declared because of the r.eed for offsite fire and medical support.-

The inspector attended the postdrill critique, which included observations and findings by controllers, evaluators, and principal players.

The problems identified during the critique were relatively minor and should be readily correctable.

The critique was considered thorough, and corrective actions implenented in response to the substantive findings will be reviewed during future inspections.

No violations or deviations were identified.

I 3.

Onsite Follow-up of October 4, 1989 Incident (88050)

On October 4, 1989, a licensee employee suffered an accident in which two fingers of her left hand were partially severed.

The wound areas were contaminated at a level of approximately 1,000 dpm, and the employee was transported to the hospital for treatnent.

The inspector reviewed the licensee's handling of this event with respect to the requirements of the RCEP. According to the discussion of the scope of the Unusual Event class in Section 3.1 of the RCEP, an injury such as the one described above appeared to fall within the definition of an Unusual Event.

However, the licensee categorized the accident as a Class 3 Unusual Incident in accordance with Section 2.9 and Table 2.1 of l

the license. Licensee management representatives stated that the RCEP was l

not intended to encompass accidents such as the one in question (and, in 1

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3 fact.theRECPimplementingproceduresdidnot),buttheyacknowledgedthe validity. of the inspector's interpretation as delineated above.

The licensee agreed to revise the RCEP to eliminate the cited overlap between the Unusual Event and Unusual Incident categories.

Inspector Follow-up Iteu'(IFI) 70-1113/89-13-01:

Revising the RCEP to eliminate redundancy with the license in the area of incident classification.

4.

ActiononPreviousInspectionFindings(92701) a.

(Closed) If! 70-1113/88-09-01:

Clarifying the implementing procedures to reflect all personnel with the authority for requesting Security to ectivate the Autocall system.

i Authority for activation of the Autocall system was specified in the Security Instruction for each of the Emergency Procedures, b.

(Closed) If! 70-1113/89-06-01:

Periodically demonstrating the capability to contact designated personnel to staff the ECC during off-hours.

Tests-of off-hour staff availability were conducted on Saturday, July 22 at 11:00 a.m. and on Wednesday, October 4 at 6:00 p.m.

The results were acceptable.

The licensee issued an instruction to Security personnel to perform such a test on a quarterly basis henceforth.

c.

(Closed) Drill Weakness 70-1113/89-06-02:

failure of the licensee's personnel and equipment to communicate necessary information in an accurate and timely manner, i

Minor communications problems were identified during the critique, but none resulted in critical impediments to the licensee's response efforts.

d.

(Closed) Drill Weakness 70-1113/89-06-03:

Failure of the scenario to effectively test the overall capability of the emergency response organization.

The scenario for the October 19 drill was unquestionsoly challenging for the emergency organization, particularly as it included the unexpected complicating factor of the criticality alarm.

.5.

Exit Interview (30703)

The inspection scope and results were summarized on October 20, 1989, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1.

The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results listed below.

Although proprietary information was reviewed during this inspection, none

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is contained in this report.

Dissenting comments were not received from 4

the licensee.

item No.

Description and Reference 70-1113/89-13-01 IFl: Revising the RCEP to eliminate redundancy with the license in the area of incident classification (Paragraph 3).

Attachment:

Scenario and Objectives for October 1989 Drill

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SITE EMERGENCY; DRILL'

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-SCHEDULED,FOR SJ D

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c pTO DEMONSTRATE; CAPADILITIES' OF GE WILMINGTON' S EMERGENCY: RESPONSE

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r ORGANIZATION,iRESPONSE_'IEAMS-AND' OFFS!TE AGENCIES IN'RESPONDINGiTO

!A SITE EMERGENCY.

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. PROVIDE-AN EMERGENCY RESPONS6 TRAINING EXERCISE CONSISTINGL

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-OF;' AN u!NCIDENT -IN L THEi CONTROL ACCESS AREA.

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ACCOUNTABILITY PROCEDURES.,

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ORGANIZATION!TO. DEMONSTRATE--THEIR STATE OF RESPON3E_AND._

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co'. PROVIDE INTERACTION OPPORTUNITIES BETWEEN OFFSITE SUPPORT.

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AGENCIES _AND. SITE. PERSONNEL.

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DEMONSTRATE OFFSITE-NOTIFICATION BY GE SECURITY.

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SITE EMERGENCY DRILL SCHEDULED FOR DCTOBER 1989 f

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SCENARIO:

A FIRE EiREAKS OUT IN THE FMO CHILLER ROOM.

THE FIRE RESULTS FROM A LEAKING TRANSFORMER SPRAYING OIL ACROSS A MOTOR WHICH BURST INTO FLAMES. RUPTURE OF ADDITIONAL

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COOLING TUBES RESULTS IN SHORT CIRCUITING ADJACENT 6-POWER LINES RESULTING IN A NUMBER OF EVENTS. AN I'

EMPLOYEE SOUNDS THE AUTOCALL FIRE ALARM.

THE FIRE WILL DE OF SUFFICIENT MAGNITUDE TO REQUIRE THE RESPONSE OF

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THE OFFSITE VOLUNTEER FIRE DEPARTMENT. WHILE ATTEMPTING TO EXTINGUISH THE FIRE, THE CRITICALITY ALARM WILL GO OFF REQUIRING IMMEDIATE EVACUATION AND ASSEMDLY OF THE L

EMERGENCY RESPONSE ORGANIZATION.

ADDITIONALLY THE FIRE r

WILL CAUSE A LOSS OF POWER WHICH WILL AFFECT THE EXHAUST BLOWER SYSTEMS FROM THE GADOLINIA SHOP AND THE UO2 SHOP FURNACE ROOM, AND GRINDER ROOM.

THERE WILL BE AT LEAST ONE EMPLOYEE OVERCOME BY SMOKE REQUIRING TRANSPORTATION BY THE OFFSITE AMBULANCE SERVICE.

ANTICIPATED ACTIONS k

AN EMPLOYEE GOING INTO THE AREA TO PERFORM MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES WILL SEE THE SMOKE AND ACTIVATE A FIRE BOX.

THE EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM WILL RESPOND ALONG WITH SECURITY SECURITY WILL BE REQUESTED TO NOTIFY 911 FOR OUTSIDE FIRE FIGHTING SUPPORT AND SOUND THE 4-1s.

THE FIRE DEPARTMENT WILL ARRIVE ON SCENE EXPECTING TO FIGHT THE

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THE CRITICALITY ALARM WILL SOUND.

EVACUATION OF THE EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM AND BUILDING PERSONNEL WILL OCCUR.

t THE SITE WILL BE CLOSED AND PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY PROCEDURES WILL COMMENCE.

THE ERT LEADER WILL RELATE TO THE EMERGENCY DIRECTOR THAT THE FIRE IS IN THE FMO CHILLER ROOM.

THERE WILL BE A LOSS OF POWER AFFECTING THE GAD SHOP, U02 FURNACE ROOM, AND UO2 GRINDER AREA.

THE ENTRY TEAM WILL BE DISPATCHED TO DETERMINE IF THE

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CRITICALITY ALARM IS VALID.

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RAD PROTECTION >PERSONDEL:WILL. BE DISPATCHED TO:THE

-STAGING AREA-TO DETERMINElIF THERE ARE,ANY RADIATIONL

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EXPOSURES"RESULTING FROM-THE " CRITICALITY",

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.THERE WID. BEiNO RADIATION READINGS ABOVE BACKGROUND.'-

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I INITIAL. AIR: SAMPLER RESULTS.WILL BE'ABOVE BACKGROUND'

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THE ORIGINAL; ACTIVITY WILL< DECAY:RATHER.

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. '1ld' lTHELFIRE DEPARTMENT,WILL BE' AUTHORIZED,INTO THE CONTROL ACCESS-COMPLEX TO FIGHT:THE FIRE.

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THE' MEDIA WILL RESPONO TOLTHE-SITE TO,MAKE INQUIRIES AS' i

A RESULT OF 911 DISPATCHING BOTH THE VOLUNTEER FIRE

' DEPARTMENT:AND THE OFF SITE-AMBULANCE SERVICE.

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i RTHE-FIRE:WILL BE CONTROLLED, THE CRITICALITY. ALARM WAS 1

CAUSED-BY.THE FIRE,7AND THE LOSS OF VENTILATION DID NOT 1

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'aM AN-ALTERNATE POWER'SUPPLYiOR' SYSTEM REPAIR WILL BE' C

-REQUIRED BEFORE RESTARTING THE-EXHAUST BLOWERS AND

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s ALLOWING'THE WORKERS TO RETURN TO'AFFECTED' WORK AREAS.

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